menu_book Chapter 27

CHAPTER XXXVII. THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT, PART III. In considering the fighting of September, the last stage of the retreat, we are concerned chiefly with the battles around Vilna. But before we reach that point, we must note the retreat from Grodno, the subsidiary salient

which offered the immediate point of danger. The German strategy attacked Grodno and Vilna together, but it was necessary for the Russians to extricate themselves from the first danger before they could offer any concentrated resistance to the second. If the situation was less grave than in the Warsaw salient in the first days of August,

it was strategically far more complex. Since it involved a withdrawal from two adjacent salients, the four sides of which had to be simultaneously guarded. The Grodno salient was roughly defined by the upper Niemen and its tributary, the Maratanka, on which stands the town of Orini.

This district is a maze of lakes and forests which offered many opportunities for rearguard fighting. Inside the salient, following its sides, were two railways, the main line from Grodno north eastwards to Petrograd by Orini and Vilna, and a southern line by the junction of Mosti, which connected at Lida with the great lateral system Riga-Vilna-Rovno, and was continued

to join the railway from Vilna to Minsk. The retreat of the Russians was covered by rearguards towards Grodno and by a screen of troops delaying the German advance across the main Grodno-Petrograd railway. Clearly, this latter line had to be held as long as possible, for a German advance across it would cut in on the flank of the retirement.

The first ten days of September were wet and cold, and the rivers overflowed and turned the swamps into mirrors. The weather gave some slight advantage to the Russians in the Grodno salient, since there were no railways moving from the sides into the interior by which the enemy could advance.

Galwitz attacked Mosti from the southwest and Schultz, moving by the line from Ulita, attacked Orini, as the first stage in a defense on Lida. By 8 September, Mosti had not fallen, and in the north the line of the Marichanka had not been cleared, while the Russian rearguards were still resisting on the line Ozary-Skydel in the center of the salient.

The stand on the flanks had served its purpose, for, when Skydel fell on the 12th, the whole Russian front had fallen back to a line from Mosti north to Orini, covering the vital junction of Lida. The salient had been cleared, and if we concede the Germans their claim of 4,000 prisoners, it was not too high a price to pay for its evacuation.

The situation of Grodno on 3 September had been only less anxious than Presomel on 20 May or the Warsaw salient on 8 August. Within ten days the danger had passed, and the line had been straightened. We turned to Vilna, where Hindenburg's main strategic plan was now maturing. It was fixed for 9 September, a combined movement of the 12th, 8th and 10th armies.

The Russians lay astride the Kovno-Vilna railway behind Koshidari, across the river Vyldia, along the Sventa river towards Vilkimir, while southwards they touched Orini and held the Petrograd line towards Grodno. Immediately after the fall of Grodno, Eichhorn made a frontal attack upon the Russian position west of Vilna, and in particular upon a sag in it between the Vyldia and the Sventa rivers.

On the low downs three miles northwest of the hamlet of Myzogola. This point marked Hill 154 on the map, was the position of danger not only for Vilna, but for the whole Vylyia line and the railways to Petrograd and Minsk. And accordingly the Russians strengthened it by bringing up two divisions of the Imperial Guard.

Eichhorn, while driving in the centre just west of Vilna, by a great artillery bombardment, made his chief effort on his flanks. From the second onward he was fiercely engaged at Hill 154. The Russian trenches were carried by the weight of German artillery, and for days the Germans held them against counter-attacks.

On the 12th they advanced, and after cutting their way through the Russian Guard, stormed the village of Myzogola, and drove the Russians back toward the Vylyia. Meanwhile, great masses of German cavalry swept round by Vilkimir and Kirchall, and threatening the marshes by way of the railway from Slavli to Svensiani, threatened the lines of retreat of the Vilna troops.

Schultz, on the southern side of the salient, was pressing beyond Mosdee and Skydel, and moving on Lida, which place was being bombarded by German zeppelins. The result of the Battle of Myzogola on the 12th compelled the Russians to fall back across the Vylyia, and presently the German cavalry had cut the Petrograd line at the station of Po-Brodzi, some 22 miles from Vilna.

On Monday, 13 September, it was plain that Vilna must fall. Most of the stores had been evacuated long before, and it remained to release the troops by a corridor which daily grew narrower. The Grodno salient was clear, and Alexeyev was able to concentrate all his attention on the Vilna problem.

Suddenly, on Wednesday, the 15th, he was faced with a new and startling development. At that moment, Eichhorn's troops were enveloping the city in the form of a horseshoe, running from west of Lida through Orini, Novotroki, Myzogola, to Po-Brodzi. But on the 15th, the German cavalry masses swept up the Vylyia River towards the town of Velika, which lies on the branch line running north from Molo-Dech-Nuk Junction.

Vydssy fell to them next day, and on Friday the 17th, they occupied Velika. The Russian front had long ceased to be continuous, and there was a gap between the armies operating in front of Devenske and those now falling back from the Vilna salient. Through this gap was thrust the horn of the cavalry. At the same time, the right of the horseshoe closed in, and on that day was halfway between

Orini and the Lida-Vilna line. Vilna was being enclosed in a buckle, of which the ends were oriented not north and south, but east and west. The class was the line from the River Ljubida, southwest of Lida, to just north of Molo-Dech-Nuk Junction, a distance of some 80 miles.

The forces in the Vilna salient had only one good line of retirement, the railway to Minsk casking through Molo-Dech-Nuk, besides the Great Causeway some distance to the south. The southern railway by Lida was still open, but a retirement by it would be in the wrong direction and would lead to a congestion with the troops falling eastwards before Golvitz and Schultz.

The Germans were all but in possession of the Minsk railway and were drawing very near to the Lida line. Vilna was no longer tenable, and on Saturday, 18 September, the old Lithuanian capital fell. The Germans found it empty of stores and guns. All had gone eastward towards Minsk, and the troops were falling back by the Minsk line

and the Great Causeway. The evacuation was not an hour too soon, but presently Golvitz's cavalry cut the Lida railway. To protect their retreat it was necessary to fight a series of holding battles on the right flank.

The salvation of the Russians lay in the fact that the van of the enemy were cavalry, without infantry or heavy artillery supports. All along a line north of the Minsk railway, between Vilna and Molo-Dech-Nuk, the invaders met with a stubborn resistance. The Russian rearguards fought desperately in front of Mikelsky, Smorgan and Molo-Dech-Nuk.

And by a heroic effort, Fidzi, which the enemy had held for four days, was retaken on the 20th. Yet, on that day, the situation was something more than critical. The gap available for retreat had shrunk to little more than 50 miles. The Lida railway had gone, and the Minsk railway was in constant danger.

Suddenly the Great Causeway was clear, but a single road is no avenue for an army. Besides, if Molo-Dech-Nuk were taken, the Ullins would, in an hour or two, be astride the Causeway. Then suddenly the situation was eased, partly because the German thrust was weakening from pure exhaustion.

Partly their closing massed armies were getting in each other's way. The shortening of their front and the concentration against a salient meant overcrowding in a country where roads were few, and to this we may attribute the slowness of the advance by Golvitz and Schultz. It is clear, too, that the munitionment of the Russian armies had improved.

Reserves had arrived. There was no longer any serious scarcity of shell and the supply of small arms, though still inadequate, was largely increased. On the evening of 20 September the retreating troops were 30 miles from Vilna, and the Minsk railway still held.

The right wing of the retirement fought the enemy at the crossings of the Upper Velja, and on the 21st drove him out of Levadova, west of Molo-Dech-Nuk, and retook Smorgen with the bayonet, making large captures of machine guns. The northern horn of the horseshoe suddenly began to break. For some days there was heavy fighting around Velika and a German counteroffensive to the

east. But by the end of the month, Velika had been cleared, and the Russian line had straightened itself so as to run through Smorgen, due south to Novogrodek. The anxious Russian headquarters at Mogilev breathed freely again. A salient had been evacuated only less critical, and not less difficult than the salient of

Warsaw in the first days of the German advance east of the Vistula. It was a performance requiring brilliant staff work and the most steady courage and resolution on the part of the troops. How great was that steadfastness, maybe realized from one incident in the struggle. In the victory at Myzogola, where the Russian troops were blown out of the trenches by

artillery, the German captors were 5,000 prisoners, but only one gun. It may well be asked why Hindenburg's plan miscarried, for it began with all the advantages in its favor. The Germans had greater mobility in all their concerns' routes of transport and transport appliances, and so could obtain at any point local superiority.

Their munitionment was many times better than that of the Russians. They had the mechanical devices, limitless motor transport, skilled gangs of road-makers to remedy the pathlessness of the country. The campaign was no longer one of hammering at entrenched lines. The only entrenchments now on both sides were rough sheltered trenches.

The Russian front was not continuous, but a group of armies, and these armies had been shaken loose from all fortified bases. It seemed a sovereign chance for Germany to put into effect her outflanking and enveloping strategy and to turn her strategic pursuit into a series of decisive actions. Napoleon's success after Gena might well be repeated.

Why then did all the battles of the Saliens fail of being a German victory? Why, save for two days in the retreat from Vilna, were her armies never within sight of success? Much must be set down to the tenacity and skill of the Russian resistance. For that no praise can be too high.

In a closer study of the details increases our admiration for the achievement. But there were contributory faults on the German side. As her armies rolled eastwards, they began to lose their initial advantage. Large numbers were absorbed, like the French in the peninsula, in garrison duties and in guarding lines of communication.

The country was hostile, and security must be fought for. They remained lost in elasticity, the greatest misfortune of all. Partly they were very tired, for many units had been advancing since May, and though they had occupied great tracts of land, they had never received that inspiration which comes from inflicting indubitable defeats on the enemy in the field.

Again, they were clogged by their very strength. Under the best of circumstances, their great guns and their large supply trains must travel slowly. Hence, while any section of the Russian front could be driven in, the fruits of the resulting salience could not be reaped.

Before their bases could be cut, the Russians had slipped out of the noose and straightened their line. True elasticity could be found only in the cavalry, and the mounted arm by itself was not enough. It may be doubted if German cavalry reached the same level as the other branches of her

service. In the wars of Frederick the Great, they had been the best in Europe, and at Rosbach had performed one of the classic cavalry exploits of history. They had failed in the Napoleonic War. They had one or two fine feats to their credit in the War of 1870.

For example, at Mars-Latorre, Vienville, and L'Oigny-Pourprey. End of footnote. But in the present war, they had shown themselves feeble in shock tactics, and of little value as mounted infantry. Had the cloud of horsemen who swung round the Russian right at Villica on 15 September

been supported by infantry, the long sought decision might have been reached. Even had they been trained to mounted infantry work and trench fighting, like British cavalry, they might have compromised the Russian retreat. Footnote. Von Morgan, who served on the Russian front, wrote,

The German cavalry was always hampered by a certain dependence on the infantry. It always retired at night behind them. It ought to have been able to arrange for its own security. Its taste for enterprise against the enemy's rear and flanks was not great, and when, as an exception, it did show it.

Sufficient use was not made of fire, and it charged, though carvings would have been more effective. Minor Truppen, held in Comfa, 1920. End of footnote. As it was, they were checked, held, and finally routed.

Speed was necessary if Germany wished to win a second Ulm, but her great machine could not be hurried. It could strike a hammer blow, but not at the spot and at the moment that the blow was most deadly. It could create many salients, but it could not compel a rout.

Her method of war seemed to have been designed to elderly group commanders, highly trained, aided by superb equipment, but without the fires of genius or youth. We turned to the lesser salient, informed by the retreat of the Russian center from Brest-Litovsk. We left McKenson's army, now under Linsingen, marching northeast to cut off their retirement,

and Prince Leopold just leaving the forest to Bielsawek in his advance against the Brest-Minsk railway. On 5th September, the latter had forced a defile of the marshes north of Fuzani, through which ran the road from Brest to Sloanum, while his cavalry had reached the Brest-Minsk line at Kartsuokaya, Bereza.

The right of the Russian center accordingly fell back towards the Zeljanka River, a tributary of the Niemen, where it was in touch with the left of the retreating Grotno army. Meanwhile, by the 7th, Linsingen had reached the Pinsk railway, about 34 miles from Pinsk and 70 from Brest. His progress in the early days of September must have reached an average of 4 or 5 miles

a day. That western fringe of the Pripyat marshes in a dry season was not too difficult even for a modern army, as this rate of advance showed. And in the pursuit of the Russian center, the main risk came from Prince Leopold, who, moving in better country, with several roads and two railways to assist him, endeavored

to outflank the Russians on the north. Between Volkovitsk and Sloanum, in the mid-valley of the Zeljanka, was the ground chosen for the blow. He took Volkovitsk on the 7th and swung his right southwards against Rozani. Linsingen was now entering more difficult country, and though his center moved steadily

along the Pinks railway, his wings were in trouble in the marshy upper valleys of the Pripyat. On the 16th, after an action with the Russian rearguards east of Genova, he occupied the town of Pinsk. The army of Brest had never been in serious danger, and Prince Leopold's efforts were

now directed rather to the southerly envelopment of the Niemen armies retreating from Grodno. He swung his right flank beyond Sloanum and endeavored to turn the Russians on the Shara and take the junction of Boranovichi, which would cut the immediate communications with Minsk for that section. He took the army of the Niemen from the army of Brest and gave him a point on the coveted

lateral Riga-Lembert line. In this enterprise he failed conspicuously. After some hard fighting, he was flung back from Boranovichi and by the end of the month was firmly held by the Russian right center on a line running through Novogrodnik and cutting the Brest-Moscow railway a little east of Pinsk.

The Russian front had once more been straightened except for the curve westwards to Riga. This curve, however, was no longer a sag since the bend of the line in front of Divinsk was broad and shallow. The exact configuration was not unlike a hockey stick with the head to the north. Bellows' operations against the Divina line had regressed little during the month, and

south of him there had been a Russian counteroffensive from Divinsk against the northern flank of the Great Cavalry Sweep, which had for a moment put the Vilna army in peril. In the south of the front Ivanov had done more than hold his ground. He had struck so vigorously against the German right that he was in a fair way to free the Volhynian Triangle.

His main counterstroke began on 7 September. As the German center advanced toward Pinsk, it became necessary to bring forward the right wing, which held the country south to the Romanian border. The German aim, apart from the improved alignment to be gained by an advance of the right wing, was to get possession of the section of the lateral Riga-Lemburg railway between the junctions

of Tsarny and Rovno. In Kovel, the main line to Kiev runs through Tsarny, and another line to Kiev and Odessa passes through Grovno, sending off a southward branch to Lutsk. The lateral railway runs from Tsarny by Rovno to Lemburg. If Rovno and Tsarny could be taken, the whole Volhynian system would be in German hands.

And a vital section of the lateral line would have been obtained for operations against the southern flank of the Russian center. Farther south, the railways radiating southeastwards from Lemburg furnished magnificent communications. The chief was the main line to Kiev and Odessa, which crossed the Sarath at Taranopol junction, from which a line ran down the east bank of that river towards Romania, thereby providing

another valuable link in lateral transport. The Dniester receives on its north bank a series of tributaries running roughly parallel with each other, from west to east to Nilya Lipa, the Zloty Lipa, the Sripa, and the Sarath. The events of the past two months had forced the Russian left under Luchitsky from riverline to riverline, and on the 7th of September they were back on the west banks of the Sarath,

with their flank on the Dniester. It was the last river position available to the defense. On 7th September, the right wing of Linsengan's army was moving towards Tsarny junction, on the hard ground just south of the Pripyat marshes. Berm Ermoly, with Puhala's cavalry, was advancing from Lutsk and Dubno, both of which

he held against Ravno junction. Bothmer, with threatening Tarnopol and flanks of Bolton, was preparing for a great assault on the Sarath line in Tremblova. The Russian front had a deep sagging at southeast of Dubno, caused by Ivanov's advance the week before on the Styr, and the necessity of holding on to Tarnopol.

That day Ivanov chose for a counterattack. Part of Bothmer's force had been moved against Tarnopol, when it was surprised and broken by an assault of Brusilov's army. At the same moment, a blow was delivered by Luchetsky from Tremblova, farther south, against flanks of Bolton.

The enemy was taken unaware in both places, and in the two days' battle which followed lost the better part of an army corps. Linsengan, in the north, attempted to relieve the pressure by an assault on the 11th upon the line of the River Gorin, west of Tsarny. He failed, and lost many prisoners.

On that day, the Russian left advanced from Tremblova, swept flanks of Bolton from the banks of the Sarath, and drove him westwards, across the watershed to the Stripa. There was a counterattack next day, but on Monday the 13th, the whole of flanks of Bolton's force, as well as Bothmer's right, was back on the Stripa. Next day, the Russians had cleared most of the eastern bank, and even won a few bridgeheads.

Up in the north, Linsengan and Berm or Molle continued their efforts to win to Rovny and Tsarny, but achieved nothing. In a week, Ivanov had advanced his front in some places as much as 20 miles, and had accounted for at least 80,000 of the enemy's troops. In the last fortnight of the month, he continued his pressure, directing his attention to the

northern sector. Dubno was retaken, and on the 23rd his rearguards entered Lutsk, while his cavalry seemed for a moment to have threatened Kovel itself. He had affected something very like a demoralization of the forces opposed to him. The troops had to be brought down in haste from Prince Leopold, and it was found necessary

to put the Austrian 4th Army and all the troops of the dual monarchy to the north of it under Linsengan's charge. The end of September saw a very definite check in the triumphal German advance. Vilna and Grano had fallen to them, but they had not made good the line of the Divina. They possessed only a small section of the lateral railway system, which they desired,

that between a point south of Divinsk and a point south of Lida. They had failed to cut off the troops in the Grano and Vilna salients. Winter was almost upon them, and they had as yet found no suitable position for winter quarters, and must still struggle through the rains of autumn and the first snows before they could find a line of security.

Above all, Russia had won time without the sacrifice of any armies. There is reason, indeed, to believe that in September the retreat was scarcely less costly to the German attack than to the Russian defense. Arms and supplies were coming in, sufficient to check the tide, if not yet enough to turn it.

Nevertheless, no country can suffer as Russia suffered from May to September without a strong reaction. Army corps cannot be reduced to less than 1500 bayonets without the nation asking questions. The myriads of homeless peasants pouring eastwards along every highway, their troops retiring from the front to the bases, the endless streams of wounded were a reminder of misfortunes

which gave the most casual to think. The mere problem of relief was enough to strain the capacity of the country to the utmost. We have seen the consequences of the first collision disasters which led to the disgrace of the war minister who had prophesied smooth things, the appointment of Polovanov in his place and Guchkov as minister of munitions.

But the purge of the bureaucracy was not yet sufficiently drastic. At the meeting of the Duma in August, astounding revelations were made as to the extent of subterranean German influence. It was alleged that various banks were under German control and had endeavored to corner certain commodities and hamper the manufacture of munitions.

That many shears and armament works were owned by Skoda and manipulated by Krupp. And that in consequence, the companies had dismissed workmen or limited them to five hours a day. Such revelations inspired a profound uneasiness among all classes of society. The Duma, when it met in August, was looked to for the expression of the national will.

But the Duma, as is the manner of popular assemblies, tended to dissipate its energies. It was given complete freedom of speech and for a little, seemed about to become at once a safety valve for popular feeling and a new broom to sweep clean the bureaucratic chamber. A progressive bloc was formed under the presidency of Mr. Milikov, comprising all the moderate and liberal elements in the assembly.

Its avowed purpose was, in the words of its declaration, strict conformity of the administration with the law for the removal of duality in civil and military operations, the dismissal of unworthy and incompetent administrators, and the adoption of a wise and tolerant policy in internal affairs, so as to remove racial, class, and religious differences. Unfortunately, the bloc began instantaneously to develop the left and a right wing.

The right wished all the energies of the Duma to be devoted to administrative reform, while the left, under Milikov, made the mistake of raising a controversial constitutional question and asking that the cabinet should be made responsible to the Duma. A blizzard is not the best moment for even the most reasonable scheme of redecorating and improving the comfort of a house.

The premier, Mr. Goromancom, secured the emperor's assent to the prorogation of the Duma till November. It was indubitably a blunder, for the Duma was the only means of expression for the popular voice. The immediate result was a week of confusion and danger.

There were serious riots in the cities and strikes in the munition factories. The agitation was patriotic in intention on the part of most of the agitators, but it is more than likely that German agent provocateurs had a hand in its inception. The emperor summoned the rival leaders to his tent in the field, and an understanding was arrived at.

Milikov dropped his constitutional schemes, and all parties agreed to concentrate on practical administrative reforms. The period of prorogation was cut short, and the new minister of the interior was chosen directly from the Duma. This was Mr. Kovatsdorf, a moderate conservative deputy from Orel, whose anti-German figure

in the August session now gave him the office once held by Stolepin. Meanwhile, as political strife died down and as the Russian armies drew clear of danger, news came which opened a new stage in the campaign, for on 25 September the long-expected offensive in the West had begun. End of chapter 37, part 3.