menu_book Chapter 16

section sixteen of bismarck and the foundation of the german empire by james hedelum this library box recording is in the public domain recording by s s kim manikut baisho portugal chapter ten outbreak of war with austria eighteen sixty five to eighteen sixty six the arrangement made at garstein could not be permanent it was only a temporary expedient to put off the conflict which henceforward was inevitable inevitable that is if the emperor of austria still refused to sell holstein to prussia it was however so far as it went a great gain to prussia because it deprived austria of the esteem of the other german states her strength had hitherto lain in a strict adhesion to popular feeling and to what the majority of the germans princes and people alike believed was justice

by coming to a separate agreement with prussia she had shaken their confidence bavaria especially was much annoyed by this change of front as it seemed probable that the most important of the southern states would soon be ranged on the side of prussia this was a consummation which bismarck ardently desired and to which he addressed himself with much energy the attitude of france was more important than that of the german states and in the autumn bismarck made a fresh visit to that country just as he had done the year before he went to take the sea bath at biaritz this step was the more remarkable because napoleon had received news of the treaty of garstein with marked displeasure and had given public expression to his opinions bismarck now saw duane de lis at paris and then went on to biaritz where the emperor was for ten days he lived there in constant association with the imperial family the personal impression which he made was very favorable

a really great man wrote mary m free from feeling and full of esprit he saw napoleon again on his return through paris the two succeeded in coming to an understanding napoleon assured him that he might depend on the absolute neutrality of france in case of a war between prussia and austria it was agreed also that the annexation of the dutchies to prussia would not be an increase of territory which would cause any uneasiness at paris napoleon would view it with favor bismarck went farther than this he opened the subject of a complete reform of the german constitution on the lines that prussia was to have a free hand in the north of germany he pointed out that the acquisition of the duchess would only be an earnest for the fulfillment of the pledge which history had laid upon the state of prussia for the future persecution of it we need the most friendly relations with france it seems to me in the interest of france to encourage prussia in the ambitious fulfilment of a national duty

the emperor accused as you know the division of europe into large national states was what he meant by napoleonic ideas he was willing enough to help in germany a change such as that he had brought about in italy it was agreed that events should be allowed to develop themselves when the time came it would be easy enough to come to some definite agreement this however was not all it was not to be expected that napoleon should render prussia so valuable a service without receiving something in exchange we know bismarck's opinion of a statesman who out of sympathy for another country would sacrifice the interests of his own the creation of a strong consolidated state in the north of germany could not be in the interests of france the power of france had always been founded on the weakness of germany even if napoleon himself with his generous and cosmopolitan sympathies was willing to make the sacrifice france was not

napoleon knew and bismarck knew that napoleon could not disregard the feeling of the country his power was based on universal suffrage and the popularity of his name he could not as a king of prussia could brave the displeasure of the people france must then have some conversation what was it to be what were to be the terms of the more intimate and special understanding we do not know exactly what was said we do know that bismarck led both the emperor and his ministers to believe that prussia would support them in an extension of the frontier he clearly stated that the king would not be willing to surrender a single prussian village he probably said that they would not acquiesce in the restoration to france of any german territory france therefore must seek a reward in a french-speaking people it was perhaps an exaggeration if duane de lis said he offered us all kinds of things which did not belong to him but napoleon also in later years repeated that bismarck had promised him all kinds of recompenses

no written agreement was made that was reserved for later negotiations but there was a verbal understanding which both parties felt was binding this was the pendant to the interview of plumbier but bismarck had improved on kabul's example he did not want so much he asked only for neutrality the king of prussia would not be called upon like victor emmanuel to surrender the old possessions of his house bismarck returned to berlin with his health engegurated by the atlantic winds and his spirits raised by success the first step now was to secure the help of italy he had seen nigra the italian minister at paris and told him that war was inevitable he hoped he could reckon an italian alliance but there was still however much ground for anxiety that austria might succeed in arranging affairs with italy

the relations of the four powers at this time were very remarkable all turned on venetia the new kingdom of italy would not rest until it had secured this province napoleon also was bound by honor to complete his promise and free italy to the adriatic neither his throne nor that of his son would be secure if he failed to do so a war between austria and prussia would obviously afford the best opportunity and his whole efforts were therefore directed to preventing a reconciliation between the two german powers his great fear was that austria should come to terms with prussia and surrender the dutchies on condition that prussia should guarantee her italian possessions when bismarck visited napoleon at biaritz the first question of the emperor was have you guaranteed venetia to austria it was the fear of this which caused his anger at the treaty of gastein on the other hand bismarck had his reasons for anxiety

it was always possible that austria instead of coming to terms with prussia might choose the other side she might surrender venetia in order to obtain french and italian support in a german war the situation indeed was this austria was liable at any moment to be attacked by both italy and prussia it would probably be beyond her strength to resist both assailants at the same time a wise statesman would probably have made terms with one or the other he would have either surrendered venetia which was really a source of weakness to italy or agreed with prussia over the dutchies and the german problem thereby gaining prussian support against italy the honorable pride of mansdorff and the military party in austria refused to surrender anything till it was too late nonetheless the constant fear lest austria should make terms with one of her enemies for a long time prevented an alliance between prussia and italy

the italians did not trust bismarck they feared that if they made a treaty with him he would allow them to get entangled in war and then as at garstein make up his quarrel with austria bismarck did not trust the italians he feared that they and napoleon would even at the last moment take venetia as a present and as very nearly happened offer austria one of the prussian provinces instead it was impossible to have any reliance on napoleon's promises for he was constantly being pulled two ways his own policy and sympathies would lead him to an alliance with prussia the clerical party which was eagerly growing stronger and had the support of the empress wished him to side with the catholic power in consequence even after his return from france bismarck could not pass a day with full security that he might not find himself opposed by a coalition of austria france and italy

the austrians felt that they were to be made the victims of a similar coalition between prussia france and italy france always feared a national union between the two great german powers bismarck began by completing and bringing to a conclusion the arrangements for a commercial treaty with italy at the beginning of january the king of prussia sent victor emmanuel the order of the black eagle bismarck also used his influence to induce bavaria to join in the commercial treaty and to recognize the kingdom of italy then on january thirteenth he wrote to uzzedum that the eventual decision in germany would be influenced by the action of italy if they could not depend on the support of italy he hinted that peace would be maintained in this way he hoped to force the italians to join him affairs in the duchess gave bismarck the opportunity for adopting with good grounds a hostile attitude towards austria

goblins the new governor of holstein continued to favor the augustanburg agitation many had expected that austria would govern holstein as a part of the empire Instead of doing so, with marked design, the country was administered as though it was held in trust for the prince. No taxes were levied. Full freedom was allowed to the press, and while the Prussians daily became more unpopular in Schleswig, the Austrians, by their leniency, won the affection of Holstein. at the end of january they even allowed a mass meeting which was attended by over four thousand men to be held at altona this made very unfavorable impression of the king and any action of austria that offended the king was most useful to bismarck bismarck is using all his activity to inspire the king with his own views and feelings wrote benedetti the french ambassador at this time at the end of january he felt sufficiently secure to protest seriously against the austrian action in holstein why he asked had they left the alliance against our common enemy the revolution

Austria in return refused peremptorily to allow Bismarck any voice in the administration of Holstein. Bismarck, when the dispatch was read to him, answered curtly that he must consider that henceforth the relations of the two powers had lost their intimate character. we are as we were before the danish war neither worse nor better he sent no answer to the austrian dispatch and ceased to discuss with them the affairs of the dutchies this was a fair warning to austria and it was understood they took it as an intimation that hostilities were intended and from this day began quietly to make their preparations as soon as they did this they were given into bismarck's hand the prussians owing to the admirable organization of the army could prepare for war in a fortnight or three weeks time less than the austrians would require austria to be secure must therefore begin to arm first as soon as she did so the prussian government would be able with full protestation of innocence to point to the fact

that they had not moved the men and then begin their own mobilization not apparently for offense but as it were to protect themselves from an unprovoked attack in a minute of february twenty second mortcay writes that it would be better for political reasons not to mobilize yet than they would appear to put austria in the wrong Austria had now 100,000 men in Bohemia, and it would be impossible to undertake any offensive movement against Prussia with less than 150,000 or 200,000. To collect these, at least six weeks would be required, and the preparations could not be concealed. Six days later, a great council was held in Berlin.

A war with Austria must come sooner or later. It is wiser to undertake it now, under these most favorable circumstances, than to leave it to Austria to choose the most auspicious moment for herself, said Bismarck. The rupture, he explained, had already really been effected. That had been completed at his last interview with Caroli. Bismarck was supported by most of the ministers. The king said that the Dutchess were worked a war, but he still hoped that peace would be kept.

The arrangement of the foreign alliances was now pushed on. The king wrote an autographed letter to Napoleon saying that the time for the special understanding had come. Goltz discussed with him at length the terms of French compensation. Napoleon did not ask for any definite promise, but suggested the annexation of some German territory to France.

It was explained to him that Prussia would not surrender any German territory, but that if France took part of Belgium, the Prussian frontier must be extended to the Mars, that is, must include the northeast of Belgium. Again, no definite agreement was made, but Napoleon's favoring neutrality seemed secure. There was more difficulty with Italy, for here an active alliance was required, and the Italians still feared they would be tricked. It was decided to send Maltica to Florence to arrange affairs there.

This however was unnecessary for Victor Emmanuel sent one of his generals, Govone, nominally to gain some information about the new military inventions. For the next three weeks, Govone and Beryl, the Italian minister, were engaged in constant discussions as to the terms of the treaty. Of course, the Austrians were not entirely ignorant of what was going on.

The negotiations with Italy roused among them intense bitterness. Without actually mobilizing, they slowly and cautiously made all preliminary arrangements. A dispatch was sent to Berlin, accusing the Prussians of the intention of breaking the Treaty of Gastein, and another dispatch to the German court, asking for their assistance. thoroughly weighted on Bismarck, assured him that their military preparations were purely

defensive and asked point-blank whether Prussia proposed to violate the treaty. The answer, of course, was a simple no, but according to the gossip of Berlin, Bismarck added, You do not think I should tell you if I did intend to do so. On March 24, a dispatch was sent to the invoice at all the German courts drawing their attention

to the Austrian preparations for which it was said there was no cause. In view of this obvious aggression, Prussia must begin to arm. That this was a mere pretext is shown by a confidential note of Moltke of the same date. In it, he states that all the Austrian preparations up to this time were purely defensive. There was as yet no sign of an attempt to take the offensive.

Two days later, a meeting of the Prussian Council was held, and the orders for a partial mobilization of the army were given, though some time elapsed before they were actually carried out. After the constant excitement of these weeks, Bismarck's health again began to break down. Except himself, there was in fact scarcely a single man who desired war.

The king still seized every opportunity of preserving the peace. England, as so often, was beginning to make proposals for mediation. All the Prussian diplomatists, he complained, were working against his warlike projects. He made it clear to the Italians that the result would depend on them. If they would not sign a treaty, there would be no war.

The great difficulty in arranging the terms of the treaty was to determine who should begin. The old suspicion was still there. Each side expected that if they began, they would be deserted by their ally. The suspicion was unjust, for on both sides there were honorable men.

The treaty was eventually signed on April 9. It was to the effect that if Prussia went to war with Austria within the next three months, Italy would also at once declare war. Neither country was to make a separate peace. Prussia would continue the war till Venetia was surrendered.

On the very day that this treaty was signed, Bismarck, in answer to an Austrian dispatch, wrote, insisting that he had no intention of entering on an offensive war against Austria. In private conversation, he was more open. To Benedetti, he said, I have at last succeeded in determining a king of Prussia to break the intimate relations of his house with that of Austria.

To conclude the treaty of alliance with Italy, to accept arrangements with imperial France, I am proud of the result. Suddenly a fresh impediment appeared. The Austrians on April 18 wrote, proposing a disarming on both sides. The Prussian answer was delayed for many days.

It was said in Berlin that there was a difference of opinion between Bismarck and the king. Bismarck complained to Benedetti that he was wavering. When at last the answer was sent, it was to accept the principle, but Bismarck boasted that he had accepted it under such conditions that it could hardly be carried out. The reluctance of the king to go to war caused him much difficulty. All his influence was

required. It is curious to read the following words which he wrote at this time. It is opposed to my feelings, I may say to my faith, to attempt to use influence or pressure on your paternal feelings with regard to the decision on peace or war. This is a sphere in which, trusting to God alone, I leave it to your majesty's heart to steer for the good of the fatherland.

My path is prayer rather than counsel." and then he again lays before the king the insuperable arguments in favor of war. Let us not suppose that this letter was but a cunning device to win the consent of the king. In these wars, more than in anything else, we see his deepest feelings and his truest

character. Bismarck was no Napoleon. He had determined that war was necessary, but he would not go to the terrible abitrament with a light heart he was not a man whom from personal ambition would order thousands of men to go to their deaths or bring his country to ruin it was his strength that he never forgot that he was working not for himself but for others behind the far-sighted plotter and the keen intriguer there always remained the primitive honesty of his younger years

he may at times have complained of the difficulties which arose from the reluctance of the king to follow his advice but he himself felt that it was a source of strength to him that he had to explain justify and recommend his policy to the king all anxiety was however removed by news which came the next day a report was spread throughout the papers that italy had begun to mobilize and that a band of garibaldians had crossed the frontier the report seems to have been untrue how it originated we know not when ron heard of it he exclaimed now the italians are arming the austrians cannot disarm he was right the austrian government sent a message to berlin that they would withdraw part of their northern army from bohemia but must at once put the whole of their southern army on a war footing prussia refused to accept this plea and the order for the mobilization of the prussian army went out as soon as austria had begun to mobilize war was inevitable

the state of the finances of the empire would not permit them to maintain their army on a war footing for any time nonetheless another six weeks were to elapse before hostilities began we have seen how throughout these complications bismarck had desired if he fought austria to fight not for the sake of the dutchies but for a reform of the german confederation in march he had said to the italians that the holstein question was not enough to warrant a declaration of war prussia intended to bring forward the reform of the confederation this would take several months he hoped that among other advantages he would have at least bavaria on his side for the kind of proposal he had in his mind though at this time he seems to have had no clear plan was some arrangement by which the whole of the north of germany could be closely united to prussia and the southern states formed in a separate union with bavaria at the head

he had always pointed out even when he was at frankfurt that bavaria was a natural ally of prussia in a great war the considerable army of bavaria would not be unimportant at the beginning of april bismarck instructed savini his envoy at the dyacht to propose the consideration of a reform in the constitution the proposal he made was quite unexpected no details were mentioned as to changes in the relations of the princes but a parliament elected by universal suffrage and direct election was to be chosen to help in the management of common german affairs it is impossible to exaggerate the bewilderment and astonishment with which this proposal was greeted he was the man who had risen into power as the champion of monarchical government as the enemy of parliaments and democracy voluntarily taking up the extreme demand of the german radicals it must be remembered that universal suffrage was at this time regarded not as a mere scheme of voting it was a principle it was the cardinal principle of the revolution it meant the sovereignty of the people

it was the basis of the french revolution of eighteen forty eight it had been incorporated in the german constitution of eighteen forty nine and this was one of the reasons why the king of prussia had refused then to accept that constitution the proposal was universally condemned bismarck had perhaps hoped to win the liberals if so he was disappointed their confidence could not be gained by this sudden and amazing change they distrusted him all the more a government that despising the laws of its own country comes forward with plans for confederate reform cannot have the confidence of the german people was the verdict of the national party the moderate liberals men like zibel had always been opposed to universal suffrage even the english statesmen were alarmed it was two years before disraeli made his leap in the dark and he was the prussian statesman making a far bolder leap in a country not yet accustomed to the natural working of representative institutions he did not gain the audiation of the liberals and he lost the confidence of his old friends

Napoleon alone expressed his pleasure that the institutions of the two countries should become so like one another. There was indeed ample reasons for distrust. Universal suffrage meant not only democracy. It was the foundation on which Napoleon had built his empire. He had shown that the voice of the people might become the instrument of despotism.

All the old suspicions were aroused. people began to see fresh meaning in this constant visit to france napoleon had found an apt pupil not only in foreign but in internal matters it could mean nothing more than the institution of a democratic monarchy this was bonapartism it seemed to be the achievement of that change which years ago Gellach had foreboded. No wonder the king of Hanover began to feel his crown less

steady on his head. What was the truth in this matter? What were the motives which influenced Bismarck? The explanation he gave was probably the true one. By universal suffrage, he hoped to attain a conservative and monarchical assembly. He appealed from the educated and liberal middle classes to the peasants and artisans. We remember how often he had told the Prussian House of Commons that they were not the true representatives of the people. Direct election and universal

suffrage I consider to be greater guarantees of conservative action than any artificial electoral law. The artificial system of indirect election and elections by classes is a much more dangerous one in a country of monarchical traditions and loyal patriotism universal suffrage doing away as it does with the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie leads to monarchical elections there was in his mind a vague ideal the ideal of a king the father of his country supported by the masses of the people he had a genuine interest in the welfare of the poorest he thought he would find in them more gratitude and confidence than in the middle classes we know that he was wrong universal suffrage in germany was to make possible the social democrats and ultramontanes

it was to give the parliamentary power into the hands of an opponent far more dangerous than the liberals of the prussian assembly probably no one had more responsibility for this measure than the brilliant founder of the socialist party Bismarck had watched with interest the career of La Salle. He had seen with admiration his power of organization. He felt that he was a man who, in internal affairs and in the management of the people, had something of the skill and courage which he himself had in foreign affairs.

He was a great demagogue, and Bismarck had already learned that a man who aimed at being not only a diplomatist but a statesman and a ruler must have something of the demagogic art from lassalle he could learn much we have letters written two years before this in which lassalle obviously referring to some previous conversation says above all i accuse myself of having forgotten yesterday to impress upon you that the right of being elected must be given to all germans this is an immense means of power the moral conquest of germany obviously there had been a long discussion in which la salle had persuaded the minister to adopt universal suffrage the letters continue with reference to the machinery of the elections and means of preventing abstention from the poll for which la salle professes to have found the magic charm one other remark you must make this measure as later events were to prove was in some way characteristic of all bismarck's internal policy

own once complained of his strokes of genius his unforeseen decisions in foreign policy bold and decisive as he could be he was also cautious and prudent to this he owes his success he could strike when the time came but he never did so unless he had tested the situation in every way he never began a war unless he was sure to win and he left nothing to chance or good fortune in internal affairs he was less prudent he did not know his ground so well and he exaggerated his own influence moreover in giving up the simpler conservative policy of his younger years he became an opportunist he would introduce important measures in order to secure the support of a party even though he might thereby be sacrificing the interests of his country to a temporary emergency he rarely applied to home affairs the habits he had learned in diplomacy there every alliance is temporary when the occasion of it has passed by it ceases and leaves no permanent effect

he tried to govern germany by a series of political alliances but the alliance of the government with the party can never be barren the laws to which it gives birth remain bismarck sometimes thought more of the advantage of the alliance than of the permanent effect of the laws even after this there was still delay there were the usual abortive attempts at the congress which as in eighteen fifty nine broke down through the refusal of austria to give way there were dark intrigues of napoleon who even at the last moment attempted to divert the italians from their prussian alliance in germany there was extreme indignation against the man who was forcing his country into a fratricidal war bismarck had often received threatening letters now an attempt was made on his life as he was walking along unterden linden a young man approached and fired several shots at him he was seized by bismarck and that night put an end to his own life in prison he was a south german who wished to save his country from the horrors of civil war

moltke now that all was prepared was anxious to begin bismarck still hesitated he was so cautious that he would not take the first step at last the final provocation came as he hoped it would from austria he knew that if he waited long enough they would take the initiative they proposed to summon the estates of holstein and at the same time brought the question of the dutchies before the diet bismarck declared that this was a breach of treaty of garstein and that that agreement was therefore void prussian troops were ordered to enter holstein austria appealed for protection to the diet and moved that the federal forces should be mobilized the motion was carried by nine votes to seven the prussian envoy then rose and declared that this was a breach of the federal law prussia withdrew from the federation and declared war on all those states which had supported austria hanover and hasse had to the end attempted to maintain neutrality but this bismarck would not allow they were given the alternative of alliance with prussia or disarmament

the result was that when war began the whole of germany except the small northern states was opposed to prussia i have no ally but the duke of mecklenburg and mazini said the king and of the