Chapters 13
-
1 01 - Confronting the Canal du Nord 19:10
Canada's Hundred Days, John Livesay. Chapter One. Confronting the Canal du Nord.
There comes a time when the spent athlete, having passed his goal, throws himself panting on the ground, and relaxes his strained muscles. His heart labors visibly under his bared chest. Thus the Canadian Corps, after nine days' intense fighting, culminating in the capture of the Droucourt-Cayant line, abandoned itself to rest.
But it is a rest of a comparative kind only. The cessation of hand-to-hand fighting, but not relief from the perils of war. We have fought our way into this watery triangle, or one should rather say, Peninsula, formed by the flooded area of the Canal du Nord on the east, and the Sinsea and its marshes on the north. On the east we have settled down to sniping raids and local chutes. And the enemy is equally active. On the north he holds the entire country south and southwest of Douai, to the borders of Rue, Gavrel, and Oppi. For here his great system of defense is still intact, and the British line is hardly advanced from where it lay on August Twenty Sixth.
Our troops holding the line have a lively time, and have to improvise both defense and shelter. Daring things are done in the way of reconnaissance, and Canadian engineers in particular spend the day and night crawling on their bellies along the canal side, exploring for practical crossings, or flying low over its course, careless of death. But relatively few troops are actually in the line, because the position is one of great natural strength, and the enemy is in no mood to attack in force.
Exposed as they are, lying out for the most part in the open, our troops in the line have a bad time of it. The 2nd Canadian Division is in line on the right, from Inchey to the Arras-Cambray Road, and from there north the line is held by the 3rd Canadian Division. Casualties are heavy. Thus the 6th Brigade has been in the line from September 6th to 16th. The 31st and 27th Battalions and the latter had seventy-five casualties in that period, the loss of the former being even heavier, with a number of men gassed.
The character of the fighting is well illustrated by the following extract from the narrative of the Fourth Brigade, whose command was here taken over by Brigadier General G. E. McQuaig, Brigadier General R. Rennie, having been appointed to a command at Bramshot.
The 2nd Canadian Division was held up at the Canal du Nord, with the enemy patrols on the near-western side. The troops then settled down to the work of building a main line of resistance. The possession of Inchi and Muerves was still in dispute, and a counterattack was possible from that direction. On September Twelve Thirteen, the Fourth Brigade relieved the Sixth Brigade in the front line.
The occupied line extended from a few hundred yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road along the Canal du Nord to the Loque, just north of Inchi. It was about two miles in length, and there were practically no trenches. Rifle-pits and shelters had been made by the other troops, but these were very meager and unconnected. There could be no movement from one pit to another during the day. The enemy machine and field-guns were very busy, And for a while the troops suffered heavily, despite the splendid camouflaging of their positions with bows and other covering. The first task was to build a support line. This was sighted on top of the ridge in front of the Buisi switch. Large working parties from both reserve and support battalions were engaged on this every night under direction of the engineers.
When this support line was finished, a front line was begun. A section being built at a time. It was a period of dangerous and difficult work by night, and for lying low by day. There were several fierce patrol encounters by night around Barral Wood and the Big German Dump.
Similar conditions exist north of the Arras-Cambray Road, a particularly nasty spot being in the neighborhood of a court, San Quentin, where the enemy has direct observation from the commanding heights east of the canal.
Of units not in the line, some are lucky enough to go back to rest at Arras and beyond, but many are held in close support in the old trench lines, living in enemy dugouts. There is a continual strafing of this area day and night, and our troops, though far removed from the battle line, suffer many casualties. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Perkes, V. C., of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Battalion, Central Ontario, was severely wounded by a stray shell on the afternoon of September Fifteenth in the Guimap area. Rest is no picnic in no man's land. In the first days after the battle, there is a listlessness among such battalions. The men, thoroughly tired out, Lie about among the trenches and dugouts they occupy, sleeping a great deal or gossiping about the battle.
Losses have been so heavy that there is not the same elation that accompanies such a victory as Amiens. Indeed, the men are decidedly pessimistic. "'Well, I guess the old corps is pretty well done in this time,' says a grizzled miner from the porcupine. "'You just mark my words.' We'll go out to rest in a day or two, and shan't do another tap till next spring. It's just like Passchendaele all over again. There is, in fact, a general sense of depression. We have won our victory, but where have we landed? In the heart of no man's land, stretching to our strange imagination in all its horror through many bitter weeks of winter. For we have no notion in our head but that the war is going on well into nineteen ninety.
Presently, perhaps where we lie, the Bosch will make a stand, and we shall dig in, for the winter, the winter, the winter, the abominable winter. Such a feeling in early September is natural, inevitable. But it may be here noted that much the same idea obtained until well on into October, until indeed weeks after the Bosch had made his first proposals for an armistice. To take a still greater leap ahead, few men in the Canadian Corps believed in the armistice as an accomplished fact on the very night before it was promulgated. The reason for this lay no doubt in the fact that it was the fortune of the Canadian Corps to be fighting its way hard right up to what one may term the zero hour of peace.
But the view of the man in the field is extraordinarily circumscribed. His platoon is his home, or perhaps you may extend it to his company. Other companies in his battalion are next-door neighbors. He has a pretty good guess as to just what they are about. and once in a while stops in his own work to take a look over the fence into their yard. But the battalion, we are speaking of the private soldier, is the limit of his range, and indeed company officers have but slightly wider vision, and it is only the battalion officers who know about the doings of the brigade. These limitations, but in widening eddies, are to be found as one mounts progressively through the brigade to the division, to corps, and to the bright imminence of army.
Army knows it all. Of course, or it wouldn't be army.
The point of all this is just simply that in the varying degree of one's opportunity, whether one be private or captain or colonel, one is so engrossed in the immediate battle picture that one fails to grasp the significance of the war-map as a whole. One may be certain that no battalion commander engaged in the Drillcourt-Keant line affair gave a thought for several days to what was going on, north or south. So far as he was concerned, the war was being fought and won or lost right then and there. And how much more does not this apply to the private, who has not seen a daily paper for a month? and has not the privilege of reading the news bulletin telegraphed daily by army, a fount of information that irrigates in its passage thirsty minds at corps, division, and brigade, but has become a trickling stream before it reaches the battalion, and dries up entirely as it gets to Co.
H. Q. He does know, though, that over half his platoon are casualties, and the world is very black. Rumors of disaster chase each other round. Let me tell you something on the strict QT. The Bally Brigade is all so cut to pieces that its mother's son wouldn't know it. The sergeant, he says, we'll have to go out to Boulogne to refit. Good old Boulogne. The sooner the better. But there is a more hopeful note. I hope to God they won't leave us stuck here, says another. Four days rain. I'm fed up on no man's land. They say there's fine billets in Cambrai. Why don't they let us have a go at that and put in the winter there? That'd be something worth fighting for. Cambrai exercises a curious psychological influence on the corps.
It is the subject of talk in the mess, and the man in the ranks regards it as some vague Eldorado. From the Voir de Bouche, a considerable height about a mile southeast of Cany Court, We have a plain view of bourlon wood and hill, and we know that right behind, in the valley of the Scheldt, lies the fair city of Cambrai. Cambrai, in fact, dominates our imagination. Ask a soldier its population, and he will say offhand, Oh, about a quarter of a million or so. And he has some idea of Cambric loons, and that it was the capital of the old Frankish kings. This interest is because it is the first considerable city confronting us that has lain hid in the enemy grip since 1914. Amiens and Arras were familiar enough, familiar as the gay trysting-places of men on leave, less familiar in ruins.
But Cambrai has for us all the charm of the unknown, a name that stirs the imagination and quickens our interest. We conceive a city of beautiful streets and ancient palaces, crowded with monuments of art and war. No disappointment could have been greater than Cambrai as at last we came to see it.
But we have wandered afar from our gossiping soldiers. In such cases as this, the veteran INCIOs are invaluable. Eternal grumblers themselves, they will not allow it in their men. "'What are you talking about?' cries one. "'The old brigade done in? Why, you woodenhead! This brigade at only half its strength can lick the tar out of any other brigade in the Corps, and throw in a Bosch division at that. This battle was nothing. You should just have seen Regina Trench, my boy, and then you could talk.' With so many commissioned officers casualties, The value of these tried and tested old sergeants becomes more and more apparent. Just about this time, the Corps receives for the first time reinforcements who, to make no bones about it, are conscripts, drafts under the Compulsory Service Act passed at Ottawa a year ago, though they are to prove themselves as good soldiers as any.
It would seem that these men, many of whom were only held back by family circumstances from voluntary enlistment, had been snubbed and bullied on their training grounds. They meet here a very different reception, for they enter at once the Brotherhood of Arms. They are welcomed on precisely the same footing as had been the volunteer reinforcements. It was made very plain to them by these old sergeants that despite their intensive training in England, They were very green, nothing more than rookies, and must learn all over again, for which, with becoming modesty, they were did lucky to have come to the best school in France.
The NCOs enjoyed immensely this business of the breaking in of the young idea, young in war, if not in years. But beyond the hazards of battle, their own ranks are depleted, because many of them are over in England taking the officers course, to fill vacancies in their respective battalions. In the recent fighting, the percentage of casualties among officers has been out of all proportion, and this loss made itself felt throughout the fighting to follow. Anticipating a little again, this curious fact may be recited. A certain battalion received on September Twenty Sixth back from England Sixteen of its old NCOs, who had successfully taken their course, and all went into battle next morning. Next day, every one of them was a casualty, and within 48 hours the bulk of them were back again in blighty.
But in a day or two there is a marked change. The men begin to sit up and take interest in their immediate surroundings. The Y M C A has opened up a canteen nearby, And long lines of men gather. A patient cue, waiting their turn for cigarettes and biscuits and chocolate. Mail comes in. Wonderful is the efficiency of the Corps post office throughout these operations. Mail comes in, and there are letters from home to be answered. Letters one may be sure for mothers and sweethearts, never more welcome than now. There are other letters to write not so easy, taking much thought. But inspired by such a loving kindness for the chum who died upon the field, that when at last they reach a distant, sorrowing heart, they bring a brave message of comfort.
He was the best pal I ever had, and he died a hero. All through the battle I felt safe, because he was by me. And then I had to go on alone. Ran one we were privileged to see long afterwards.
But now a battalion band strikes up, a group of men gather, a football makes its appearance, laughter breaks out in the crowd, the battle and anguish are forgotten. These again are bright Canadian boys intent on having a good time. The Y. M. C.A., soldier's friend indeed, produces the paraphernalia of baseball, and soon two pick teams are at it hard, battling for the honor of the battalion, The men crowding in behind the plate, yelling support, and making side bets on each inning. Battalion officers umpire, and it is not hard to see they have the confidence of their men.
It is a merry scene in the waning light. The Corps has come to life again. When you see this going on, remarks an officer whose battle experience dates from Epers in April 1915, you may be sure the men are ready to go in again. These two battalions would put up a great scrap right tonight, but twenty-four hours ago they were a pretty sad-looking outfit.
We have seen how the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions had taken over the line of the Canal du Nord on the night of September Three, Four. They pushed right down to the West Bank, but this being exposed to direct fire from the opposing wooded slopes, it was held only by light patrols. The enemy showed a good deal of activity, and particularly in the region of Sochi-Koshi did not hesitate to push his raiding parties across under cover of night. Our outposts were thus continually engaged. Later on, our second division took over the entire Corps front. South of the Corps boundary, from Inchi-Inatois to Muerves, the situation of the Seventeenth Corps was not so good. For the enemy still clung fast to a strip on the west side of the canal, and to the canal bed itself, in this sector unfinished and dry.
The enemy was in great force, and it seemed, indeed, as if we were definitely held up on the west side of the canal. It was in these circumstances that the corps commander came to a momentous decision. Sir Arthur Curry was asked to attack on the present corps front, and thus turned the canal from the north. He refused to make what he regarded as a useless sacrifice of his men, pointing out the difficulties of the position, the flooded area immediately in front of us, backed by wooded slopes and our exposed northern flank. But he submitted instead alternative proposals, which finally were adopted, and led to the great Battle of Cambrai.
End of part three. Chapter One. Recording by James O'Connor. South, Massachusetts, May 2010.
-
2 02 - The First Battle of Cambrai 21:00
Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesay. Part Three. Chapter Two. The First Battle of Cambrai. From the Bois de Bouche, five miles distant, southeast by east, Bourillon wood looms up to view, dark and threatening, precisely as it looms up from any surrounding prospect whatever.
Between us lies the valley of the Canal du Nord, with beyond the ground sloping up to Bourillon. There save for an occasional little wood such as that of the quarry. Standing on the seventy-five meter elevation of the Bois de Bouche and facing Bourlon, a little to the right and on the west side of the canal lies the village of Inchi-in-Atois, and as far to the left, two thousand yards northeast of Inchi, but on the east side of the canal, is the village of Saint-les-Machions. Two thousand yards south of Inchey, on the west side of the canal, is the village of Muerves, which not only proved impregnable during every stage of the first battle of Cambrai, but only recently had withstood the assaults of troops of the Third Army on our right.
Immediately east of Inchey, a canal stretch of three thousand yards was still uncompleted, and therefore dry. These works are not situated in the valley bottom, but form an embankment on its eastern slopes, and this stronghold is reinforced by a series of lifting locks, each in itself a fortress, from forty to sixty feet in depth, edged by steep banks and masonry. Opposite in chief from the top of the east bank, presenting an elevation of about sixty meters, the hills slope steadily back, and up to where at the crest of Bourlon Wood, it attains an extreme elevation of one hundred and ten meters, thus commanding a clear view of all movements west of the canal as far as the Voix de Bouche.
All this slope presents for enemy machine-gunners a natural glacis. Paralleling the canal, Running from two to five hundred yards east of it is the heavily-wired trench system known as the Canal du Nord line. Midway between this and the summit is the strongly-fortified Marquion line. Over the crest of the slope and back of Bourlon-Wood is the Marquion line. Bourlon-Wood is a fortress in itself, its batteries of artillery and machine-guns dominating the approach.
We are already familiar with the features north of Inchi, the flooded area with all bridges demolished, and any attempted crossing entirely dominated by the superior east bank. Impregnable to assault from the west, the chain of villages lying along the east bank, Sainz-les-Machyon, Machyon, and Sauchy-Lestres, screened by woods and swamps, and extending north to the high ground of the town of Wausille-le-Vergère, has to be reckoned with by an attacking force crossing the canal further south, and striking thence eastwards, for until this trip has been cleared of its garrison, it presents a highly vulnerable flank.
Immediately south of Mouerves runs the Beaupalm-Cambrai Road, a first-class highway, Though now shell-torn, passing just under the southern slope of Bourlon Wood, through the village of Anou, and thence east to Cambrai, through the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame. One thousand five hundred yards east of the wood. Three or four thousand yards further east the road parallels, but at some little distance north, the Scheldt Canal, or to give it its French name, The Canal de Lescaux, and known also south of Cambrai as the Canal de San Quentin. A mile and a half north and a little east of Fontaine-Notre-Dame is the village of Rélincourt, situate on the Arras-Cambrai Road. This road, after crossing the Canal du Nord at Marquion, runs in a straight line southeast through Rélincourt and St.
Aulé into the Faubourg Contempere. where it joins the Boupalm Road at an acute angle, the combined road then passing east across the Scheldt Canal into the city of Cambrai.
Two thousand yards east of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, the Scheldt Canal, which up to now has followed a general northerly course, swings off almost sharp to the east, and then two thousand five hundred yards further on As it reaches the Faubourg Contempere, turns off again to the north. At the point where it turns east, the strongly fortified Marquand line, the last organized trench system west of Cambrai, passes from the east to the west side of the canal, and then takes a northerly course just east of Raelincourt, and between that village and Sa'ili, adjoining it to the northeast. Thence it passes in a northeast direction to a little west of Sainte-Cour, where it joins up with another strong trench system, running off at right angles west to link up with the Canal du Nord Line south of Sauchy-Lestres.
Forming a strong pivot of defense, the village of Hainecourt lies at the junction of the Marquand Line and this western trench line, five thousand yards northeast of Bourlon Village. itself, situated against the northwest slope of Burlawn wood. Between Burlawn and Hainecourt passes the Arras-Cambray road, and on this line, a thousand yards south of the road, is the considerable elevation known as Pilgrim's Rest. One more tactical feature may here be noted, this being the railway, that after crossing the Canal du Nord at Sauchy L'Estre, Winds up the hill through many deep cuttings, skirting Bourlon village on the north, and joining the Boupalme-Cambray road a little east of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, whence it follows the course of the road into Cambrai.
There are thus three distinct trench systems, all running more or less parallel to the Canal du Nord in a north and south direction. First, the Canal du Nord line. Then, midway up the slope, the Marquion line, and finally, behind Burl on Wood, the very strong Marquion line. Between these trench systems, the enemy had organized many series of fortified shell holes, protected by spider web wire, and it was in fighting through this maze, rather than in the actual storming of the trenches, that our heaviest losses were to be incurred.
In these September days of waiting, we are all studying the campaign of the previous November, now known as the First Battle of Cambrai. But different, indeed, are the plans and execution of such operations one gathers from the men who fought them from the stereotyped accounts of the contemporary histories of the war. For, embalmed in the official reports, on which these are necessarily founded, are often misstatements of fact and distortions of perspective. The patient historian of the future must dig below this surface if he is to discover truth in all her aspects, unclouded by prejudice and untarnished by self-interest.
Burlawn Wood and the whole surrounding battlefield is to enter so sharply, so poignantly, into the history of the Canadian Corps, that a sketch of this first battle is an essential preliminary to what is to follow. We shall be concerned not so much with its course from day to day as with its general scheme and the reasons for its relative failure.
After his brilliant success with the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge, Sir Julian Byng received well-deserved promotion to the command of the Third Army, then vacant by the removal of General Allenby to Palestine. It was not in his nature to sit down to passive defense, while hard fighting was going on elsewhere. And so he evolved the plan of attack, which, as we have seen in the account of the army in show, unsuccessful in result, though in some degree it was, was nevertheless destined to revolutionize conditions on the West Front, sounding the death-knell of trench-fighting, and preparing the way for open warfare. Oddly enough, that brilliant plan was not only the germ of our present success, but seems also to have supplied the inspiration for the great German offensive of the spring of 1918.
Struck by the fact that the battle in the north was not going so well as had been hoped, Sir Julian Byng, in July 1917, came to the conclusion that a diversion on the right flank of the Third Army might not only draw enemy troops from the north, but might seriously interfere with any plans the enemy might have for a counteroffensive on the large scale. He therefore laid his plan before the British commander-in-chief. Asking that his divisions in the line be supported by six fresh divisions, all the tanks and the whole of the cavalry. The idea being a secret attack, unheralded by the alarm bell of a heavy and protracted artillery preparation, as then was the fashion. A rolling artillery barrage, and the tanks being relied upon to break down the way for the infantry, While the cavalry were to seize any opportunity of passing through.
It is to be presumed that Sir Douglas Haig was sympathetic, but it was a new idea, never popular at G. H. Q., and the dreadful fighting in progress on the North seemed to deny the diversion of the necessary troops. Shortly after this, the Sixth, Thirty-fifth, Fortieth, and Fiftieth Divisions were sent North, And for the time being, the project was out of the question.
But Sir Julian, enamored of his idea, was not to be discouraged, and early in the autumn he advanced it again. This time he received encouragement, and was told he should have the Canadian Corps for the operation. For just thirty-six hours, the Third Army commander saw his great plan fructifying With to his purpose the corps he had done so much to make what it was. When there came the news that the Canadian Corps, too, was ordered North. Passchendaele destroyed any chance it had of taking part under its old leader in these new battle tactics.
After this, a rot set in for our cause. Russia had gone to pieces, and Italy was invaded. Divisions had to be hurried to her support from the West Front. But whatever the cause, perhaps because there was need for desperate measures, and the plan, while offering minimum risks, held out great prospects. It came about that in mid-October Sir Douglas Haig was finally converted, and the Third Army authorized to go ahead with its preparations. Instead of six fresh divisions, however, The battle must be fought with divisions already battle-weary, though all the tanks and cavalry were promised.
It is not to our purpose to deal with this very interesting operation at length, except in so far as it has a direct bearing on the second battle of Cambrai. The battle opened at dawn of November 20th, so soon as there was light enough for the tanks to see. There was a tremendous concentration of these, no less than four hundred and sixty being on the line, and the whole attack had been carefully rehearsed, each tank having its track at the jumping-off place marked out with its number, while the troops to follow were trained beforehand to maneuver with that particular tank. These tanks were of an early model, and could not cross unaided the Hindenburg line. Here, fourteen feet wide, and eight deep.
So the idea was conceived of a fascine, or faggots, suspended from their bows, to be dropped into the trench, and over which they climbed up the other side. This plan worked out perfectly in practice.
The surprise was complete, and for a time everything went well. The barrage jumping from trench to trench, and the defense being overwhelmed. But the troops engaged, stoutly as they fought, did not present a heavy enough mass of infantry to accomplish the full purpose, nor as their advance spread out into an ever-deepening salient, had they sufficient reserves to defend the line they had won.
The general direction of the attack was northeast. in the direction of Cambrai, across the Scheldt Canal, between Maniere and Cantang, and through Marquand, and north along the Canal du Nord, with the commanding heights of Bourlon Wood as an early objective. Three possibilities were present. One was the unlimited. That is to say, such a surprise might be effected that the Bosch would be rolled back a considerable distance. The second was that the Hindenburg support line, i.e., that is, the Marquand line, might be captured and consolidated, and the third, more limited in scope, was for a raid on a glorified scale, capturing trenches and inflicting considerable loss upon the enemy. In its result, what was actually achieved lay somewhere between the second and third possibilities.
At first, everything As we have seen, went according to program. On the right, good progress was made, our troops at one point establishing themselves across the Scheldt Canal. But in the center we were hung up for vital hours in front of Flesquiers. On the left, the attack went better, being pushed forward astride the Canal du Nord to the Boupaume Arras road. But the advance, considerable though it was, had not gone so far and fast as had been hoped. The enemy brought up great masses of reserves, and was able to hold the Maniere line. No opportunity had been furnished the cavalry to break through, though. As has been previously noted, one squadron of the Fort Garry Horse actually crossed the Scheldt Canal.
Nevertheless, the local success of the first two days was great. The attack reaching the line of the Scheldt, Cantang, Anou and Ruever.
It is possible enough that, left to his own judgment, Sir Julian Byng would have been content to consolidate this position, offering, as it did, a favorable line as a future jumping-off route. But on November Twenty Three, Sir Douglas Haig, no doubt anxious to exploit as far as possible such a striking success, ordered that Bourlon Wood be attacked from the South. The tired troops again went forward and stormed the wood. There followed five or six days' fighting of a ding-dong nature, with varying fortunes, during which the wood changed hands several times. We seized, but failed to hold, the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, which then established itself a tactical feature of first importance to any force consolidating itself in Bourlon wood.
Every student of the war will remember the thrill of pride and hope of November 20, 1917, and the following days. How at last a ray of light seemed to have penetrated those dark months. How the news was hailed with joy in every Allied capital, and with corresponding foreboding in enemy countries. But how, after ten days' heroic effort, the storm broke upon the weary but devoted troops, When five or six fresh enemy divisions burst up the Banto Valley, capturing Gonoloo and pushing into Guzacoa. Only the extraordinary gallantry and tenacity of some of the divisions engaged, especially the guards, the second and the Forty-Seventh and Fifty-Six Divisions prevented a disaster.
These three divisions held the Bourlon Wood Line against eight enemy divisions altogether. Five in the frontal attack, and three in reserve. They held on throughout the day. In some places the enemy drove in seven distinct attacks, but not one of them reached our main line, although forward posts changed hands. The great slaughter the enemy suffered there was at that time regarded the most serious he had had in the war. As it turned out, the success, limited though it was, proved a very great strategic value at a critical time. The enemy was thrown out of his stride for the rest of the year. Tactically, too, the Third Army had the best of it. The Hindenburg line south of Mouers was not only captured, but held.
They suffered indeed Forty-two Thousand Casualties in the Fortnights Battle, losing Seven Thousand Eight Hundred prisoners. But on the other hand, they inflicted casualties estimated at Eighty Thousand. Capturing eleven thousand prisoners and one hundred and seventy guns though against these must be set the one hundred and fifty guns the enemy captured on November thirty but he used up in the battle thirty divisions against the eleven british divisions engaged and many of these were either brought down from the north or deflected from italy altogether disappointing as the final result might have been The battle was a real victory. Had the Third Army been permitted to embark on it with the support requested, including the Canadian Corps, and at a time of year when the days were long, it is pretty certain that the highest expectations of Sir Julian Byng would have been realized.
As it was, laboring under every disadvantage, the soundness of his tactical theory not only proved itself, but has served as the model for all future operations on the grand scale.
-
3 03 - The Plan of Attack 21:53
III.
THE PLAN OF ATTACK.
The problem of the Canadian Corps was entirely different. In front of us, across the canal, lay the high ground from which Sir Julian Byng's men had been beaten back, but the weakness of his position had not developed from failure to push home those attacks. It came from the increasing exposed flank his drive north created for an active enemy east of the Scheldt Canal.
On the other hand, Provided we could cross the canal du Nord, overwhelm the enemy defense on the opposing slope, and seize the high ground, we should have attained a position not only practical for defense, but commanding the valley of the Scheldt and the city of Cambrai line within it. Once established on the high ground north of the city beyond the Marquan line, and its fall must come about inevitably, without the necessity of storming it, which would have involved not only heavy casualties for ourselves, but must have resulted in its partial destruction, from every point of view to be avoided so far as possible.
But to carry out this operation successfully, it was essential that our drive, necessarily of the spearhead type, be assured first a degree of protection along its exposed left flank, And second, that there must be adequate support by troops operating immediately on our right, so as to prevent the creation of an equally vulnerable right flank. On the left, therefore, any plan of attack must include the mopping up of the whole peninsula east of the Canal du Nord and south of the Seine Sea, thus placing that river between us and the enemy's army based on Douai. But on the right, All that was necessary was that as our line advanced north of Cambrai, the ground should be cleared as far east as the Schulte Canal.
We have seen how the corps commander declined to commit his troops to a frontal attack on the Canal du Nord from the area we were holding throughout September north of Sainz-les-Machions, where the flooded condition of the canal and the high banks opposing us denied success. and how he submitted an alternative plan. That plan is best explained in his own words as follows.
On September Fifteenth, I received the details of a large operation, to be carried out later in the month by the Third and Fourth Armies, in which the Canadian Corps was to cooperate by crossing the canal, and by capturing Bourlon Wood, and the high ground to the northeast of it. To protect the left flank of the attack. The 22nd Corps on the left was to take over the front held by the Canadian Corps to a point one thousand two hundred yards north of the Arras-Cambray Road, and the Canadian Corps was to take over part of the front held by the 17th Corps, Third Army, as far as Muerv's, exclusive, which was to be the Canadian Corps's right boundary for the attack. By this side slip to the south, the right of the Canadian Corps was to be placed opposite a dry portion of the Canal de Nord, on a front of about two thousand five hundred yards.
The Germans were then holding in strength a strip of ground on the west side of the canal, and every effort made by the Seventeenth Corps to clear this ground and reach the canal banks had been repulsed.
On September, twenty two, the task of the corps was enlarged so as to include, in addition to the objectives already mentioned, the capture of the bridges over the Scheldt Canal, north of Cambrai, and the high ground overlooking the Cincy Valley. The right boundary was not altered. To assist in carrying out the above additional task, the Eleventh British Division, and the 7th Tank Battalion were placed under my orders. The date of this operation was definitely fixed for September 27th, 1918, at dawn. It was decided that the 4th and 1st Canadian Divisions would carry out the initial attack, capture the village of Bourlon and Marquion respectively, and immediately thereafter seize Bourlon Wood, and east of Bois de Coquray and Darkford Wood, At this stage, the 3rd Canadian Division would pass through the right of the 4th Canadian Division and advance from the line east of Bourlon Wood in an easterly direction, towards Nouvelle-Saint-Rime, in liaison with the 17th Corps.
The 11th Division was to come up on the left of the 1st Canadian Division and advance in a north-easterly direction toward Epinoy and Oisille-le-Vergere. The 4th Canadian Division, on the right center, was to advance towards Blecourt, and the 1st Canadian Division, on the left center, was to advance in the direction of Abancourt. This attack was fraught with difficulties. On the Corps battle front of 6,400 yards, the Canal du Nord was impassable on the northern 3,800 yards. The Corps had Therefore, to cross the Canal du Nord on a front of two thousand six hundred yards, and to expand later, fanwise, in a northeasterly direction to a front exceeding fifteen thousand yards. This intricate maneuver called for most skillful leadership on the part of commanders, and the highest state of discipline on the part of the troops.
The assembly of the attacking troops in an extremely congested area, Known by the enemy to be the only one available was very dangerous, especially in view of the alertness of the enemy. A concentrated bombardment of this area prior to zero, particularly if gas was employed, was a dreaded possibility, which could seriously affect the whole of the operation and possibly cause its total failure. To meet such an eventuality, careful arrangements were made by the counter-battery staff officer to bring to bear a specially heavy neutralizing fire on hostile batteries at any moment during the crucial period of preparation. These arrangements were to be put into effect in any case at zero hour to neutralize the hostile defensive barrage on the front of attack.
With the exception of the 2nd Canadian Division, which was now holding the entire front, and would be in corps reserve at the time of attack, every resource of the Canadian Corps was to be crowded in that narrow space. The provision of an effective artillery barrage presented considerable difficulty, owing to the depth of the attack and its general direction. On the 4th Canadian Division front particularly, The depth to the initial objective was such that the batteries were compelled to move forward into captured ground and continue firing the barrage from these new positions. Provision was made for the advance of a number of batteries, with their echelons to the canal line and beyond, whilst the attack was in progress.
A large number of machine-gun batteries were detailed to supply the initial barrage, and later to advance in support of the infantry. Provisions were also made for engineer units to move forward immediately following the assaulting troops, to effect immediate repair to the roads and crossings of the canal in order to enable the artillery to move up in support of the infantry. The greatest precautions had been taken to ensure secrecy, and camouflage had been used extensively to prevent detection of the preparations of all kinds that were in progress. Further, to conceal our intentions, it was decided that no preliminary fighting to secure a jumping-off line would take place, and that the Germans would be left in possession of their positions west of the canal until the hour of the attack.
It was also hoped that, by letting the Germans retain this ground, their defensive barrage would remain well west of the canal, instead of being placed on the canal itself, where the banks offered a serious obstacle, and reduced very considerably the rate of advance of the assaulting troops.
On our right, the Seventeenth Corps was to advance and capture Fontaine-Notre-Dame, in conjunction with the capture of Bourlon-Wood by the Fourth Canadian Division. On the night of September Twenty Five Twenty Sixth, the Twenty Second Corps on the left took over the front as far south as the Arras-Cambraix Road, and arranged to extend the artillery and machine-gun barrage to their front, so as to deceive the enemy regarding actual flanks of the attack. The 4th and 1st Canadian Divisions went into the line on their respective battle-fronts. The 2nd Canadian Division, on completion of the relief, passed into corps reserve. During the night of September 26, 27, all final adjustments and moves were made.
and everything was ready before zero hour. This was for everybody a night full of anxiety, but apart from the usual harassing fire and night bombing, nothing untoward happened.
Before proceeding to the attack itself, a review of the general strategic plan of which it formed so vital a part is not out of place. The Fourth and Third British armies were about to launch a frontal attack on the Hindenburg system, hitherto unbroken, from San Quentin North to Cambrai. It was to be the honorable function of the Canadian Corps, having already passed through the Hindenburg line west of the Canal du Nord, to press forward on the extreme left of this general attack, and thus turn the Hindenburg system from the North. Its task was not so much to capture Cambrai, which, in fact, was outside our southern boundary, as to drive forward along the northern bank of the Scheldt, and thus compromise enemy communications north and south.
In our opening chapter, sufficient extracts were made from Sir Douglas Haig's Victory Dispatch to outline the general plan. We may now with advantage follow him again. The details of the strategic plan, upon which future operations should be based, were the subject of careful discussion between Marshal Focke and myself. Preparations were already far advanced for the successful attack by which, on September Twelfth, the First American Army, assisted by certain French divisions, drove the enemy from the San Miguel salient, and inflicted heavy losses upon him in prisoners and guns. Ultimately, it was decided that as soon as possible after this attack, four convergent and simultaneous offensives should be launched by the allies as follows.
By the Americans west of Mezires, by the French west of Argonne, in close cooperation with the American attack and with the same general objectives, by the British on the San Quentin-Cambres front in the general direction of Mauberge, By the Belgian and allied forces in Flanders, in the direction of Ghent. By these attacks, it was expected, as already indicated, that the important German forces opposite the French and Americans would be pressed back upon the difficult country of the Ardennes, while the British thrusts struck at their principal lines of communication. It was intended to take advantage of the weakening of the German forces on this front to clear the Belgian coast by a surprise attack.
Success in any one of these offenses might compel the enemy to withdraw to the line of the Meuse. The results to be obtained from these different attacks depended in a peculiarly large degree upon the British attack in the center. It was here that the enemy's defenses were most highly organized. If these were broken, the threat, directed as his vital systems of lateral communication, would of necessity react upon his defenses elsewhere. On the other hand, the long period of sustained offensive action through which the British armies had already passed had made large demands both upon the troops themselves and upon my available reserves. Throughout our attacks from August 8th onwards, our losses in proportion to the results achieved, and the prisoners taken had been consistently and remarkably small.
In the aggregate, however, they were considerable. and in the face of them, an attack upon so formidably organized a position as that which now confronted us could not be lightly undertaken. Moreover, the political effects of an unsuccessful attack upon a position so well known as the Hindenburg line would be large, and would go far to revive the declining morale not only of the German army, but of the German people. These different considerations were present to my mind. The probable results of a costly failure, or indeed of anything short of a decided success, in any attempt upon the main defenses of the Hindenburg line, were obvious. But I was convinced that the British attack was the essential part of the general scheme, and that the moment was favorable.
Accordingly, I decided to proceed with the attack, and all preparatory measures, including the preliminary operations already recounted, were carried out as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible. He then proceeds to describe the difficulties of the task confronting the Fourth and Third Armies. Continuing, the Battle of Cambrai, which on October Fifth culminated in the capture of the last remaining sectors of the Hindenburg Line, was commenced by the First and Third Armies, between the neighborhood of St. Quentin and the Scheldt, the fourth, Third and First armies in the order named, occupied on the evening of September Twenty Sixth, a line running from the village of Selincy, west of San Quentin, to Griecois and Pontropt, and then east of Villers and Limpier to Villers-Guyslain and Guzacor, both exclusive.
Thereafter, the line continued northwards to Havrincor and Muers, and thence along the west side of the canal du Nord to the floods of the Seine Sea at Acor-San-Quentin. On the First and Third Army fronts, strong positions covering the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord and Schell canals, including the section of the Hindenburg line itself, north of Gouzer-Corp, were still in the enemy's possession. His trenches in this sector face southwest, And it was desirable that they should be taken in the early stages of the operation, so as to render it easier for the artillery of the Fourth Army to get into position. On the Fourth Army front, where the heaviest blow was to fall, the exceptional strength of the enemy's position made a prolonged bombardment necessary.
I therefore decided that a very heavy bombardment, open during the night of September Twenty Sixth, Twenty Seven, along the whole front of all three armies should be followed on the morning of September, twenty seventh, by an attack delivered by the first and third armies. In this way, the enemy might be deceived as to the main point of the attack. The first and third armies would be enabled to get nearer to their final objective, and the task of the fourth army artillery would be simplified. On the morning of September, twenty sixth, French and American forces attacked on both sides of the Argonne, between the Meuse and Sweep rivers.
At 520 a.m. on September 27th, the Third and First British armies attacked with the Fourth, Sixth, Seventeenth and Canadian Corps in the direction of Cambrai on a front of about 13 miles from Gouzet Court to the neighborhood of Sauchy-Lestres. The success of the northern part of the attack depended on the ability of our troops to debouch from the neighborhood of Muerves and to secure the crossings of the Canal du Nord in that locality. The northern portion of the Canal du Nord was too formidable an obstacle to be crossed in the face of the enemy. It was therefore necessary for the attacking divisions to force a passage on a comparatively narrow front about Muerves, and thereafter turned the line of the canal farther north by a divergent attack developed fanwise from the point of crossing.
This difficult maneuver was carried out successfully, and on the whole front of our attack, our infantry, assisted by some sixty-five tanks, broke deeply into the enemy's position.
This testimony to the work of the Canadian Corps from so high a quarter is very satisfactory. Though it was Inchi and not Moueres that furnished the jumping-off spot, as has been explained. This difficult maneuver had originated in the brain of the Canadian Corps commander. It was a daring plan that success alone could justify. Every commanding officer in the Corps, to whom the secret had been entrusted, was well aware of that. Thus, the narrative of the 1st Canadian Division, after an appreciation of the general strategic situation, says, The battle was divided into three main phases, first on the left, the storming of the Canal du Nord, and the advance on Cambrai. Followed immediately by the second phase, the great blow which shattered the Hindenburg line, and outflanked the defenses of San Quentin, and third came the general attack on the whole front, which resulted in the capture of Cambrai and San Quentin, and forced the enemy to retire behind the line of the river Selve.
It was in the first phase of this battle that the Canadian Corps was chiefly interested, for to the Corps was given the task of forcing the Canal du Nord, capturing Bourlon Wood and the high ground to the north of it, and then advancing on Cambrai and seizing the crossings of the Scheldt Canal and the Cincy River to the east and north of that city. This would afford complete protection for the main attack to the south, and this was the real objective of the Canadian Corps. The attack presented many unusual features. In the first place, the Canal du Nord was passable on the course sector on a front of two thousand five hundred yards only. This meant that four divisions had to be got through this narrow defile, and in addition there were engineers, artillery, machine-gunners, and all the supply trains of various descriptions.
To add to these difficulties, the canal had to be bridged in many places, especially to permit the passage of guns and limbers. At the very outset, therefore, the success of the battle devolved upon the engineers, while the infantry, under cover of the artillery barrage, might carry the canal in the first rush. It was essential that guns and ammunition be brought forward across the canal as soon as possible. To do this, bridges were a necessity. The task set the engineers was of vital importance. The plan, of course, was confided to the Army commanders. Sir Julian Byng, as has been seen, was in command of the Third Army on our right, and on one of these September days he came over to Corps Headquarters at Neuville-Vitas to talk it over with Sir Arthur Curry.
Mutual confidence and esteem existed between the past and present Canadian Corps commanders. Sir Julian could speak with peculiar authority, but no one knew this battlefield so intimately, had studied it to such good purpose, nor could more fully appreciate its dangers and difficulties. He had heard, he said, of the proposed plan of attack, and as an old friend he could not refrain from pointing out its hazards. Did Sir Arthur Curry think he could really carry out the operation? Because, in his opinion, the Canadian Corps was attempting the most difficult maneuver yet attempted on a battlefield in this war. They discussed the plan in detail, And Sir Julian went away, if not convinced, at least immensely struck by its audacity and brilliance.
-
4 04 - Marching up to Battle 19:42
Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey. Part Three, Chapter Four. Marching up to battle.
We come to the evening of Thursday, September Twenty Sixth, the Feast of St. Cyprian. Our valley east of New Ville-Vatasse is now crowded with troops. On many occasions during the past four years men have massed here, friend or enemy, for attack or defense. But never have they been so thickly, so openly congregated, Nor will they be again, one may hazard, so long as history is in the making.
But until nightfall there is little sign on the surface. No place in the world is so empty as no man's land. It is populated only as is a desert plain by an advancing horde of locusts. They pass over, stripping every green thing as they go, and leave it even more waste than it was before. One recalls a little scene on the plateau just to the north a month ago.
It was in the early afternoon, very hot, and not a sign of life, except that shells were bursting around Montchil-le-preux, and a tremendous uproar was in progress over the slope to the northeast, where the gray fog of our barrage was fast blotting out the dark outlines of sart wood, but not a sign of life. Suddenly a shrill whistle, and immediately men in kilts covered with khaki aprons began tumbling up, literally from the bowels of the earth, from unexpected and unseen mouths of dugouts, so cunningly contrived by their late occupants, the Bosch, that they are quite unnoticeable even a few yards away, for they lie flush with the ground, with no betraying litter of excavation.
They stumble up awkwardly, for they are laden down with their kit. The roll is called, a brief order, and they trudge off towards the smoke and the uproar. An extraordinary prosaic business. In a few minutes the little plateau is as empty again as a warren after the drumming alarm has sent the conies scurrying to cover. But presently a flare goes up from the wood. Then it was the matter of a platoon moving up from support into line. Now it is battalions, brigades, whole divisions, or the corps marching up to the great assault in the Canal du Nord. The days are growing short. The sun sets by six o'clock, and an hour after it is dark. In the gloaming is a scene of bustle and ordered confusion. The men, laden down for the battle, stand by in companies.
Waiting the word. A great concentration of artillery is going forward, and engineer trains are pushing up with pontoons and bridging material, steel and heavy timber. It has been our good fortune to dine, if such may be termed the hasty meal, in a bomb-proof shelter with the headquarters of a battalion whose adjutant is a particular friend. This battalion is to move into support, and next day its objective is bourlon wood. We gladly accept an invitation to march up some way with it.
It is a long and tedious march of some dozen miles over secondary roads and traversing ridge after ridge. The movement is diagonal, because we pass southeast out of our own area into that of the core on our right to the jumping-off line astride Inchi-Inatois. The men whistle and sing in the best of spirits. They march by companies in column of four, strung out over the white road, tramp, tramp, tramp, under a starlit sky. They march through the ghostly outlines of Wancourt, over a plank road our engineers have built across the Coyul, and so up the steep climb of Wancourt Ridge. Here the colonel, who is riding ahead, orders a halt. and the men have a ten-minute rest. They line the roadside, lighting cigarettes and chafing one another.
On the left, the Arras-Cambray Road around Viz and Artois is being straight by distant enemy batteries, and occasionally he turns a searching fire on our battery positions. But it is nothing more than normal. Some bombing is going on north of the Scarpe, but it is too dark for effective work. Or our marching units would offer a conspicuous target. The night is mild with a southwest wind, the moon entering its last quarter. A late riser is hidden by scudding cloud. We watched the battalion march by. A fine sight, for it has been recruited up to strength. Steaming cook-kettles bring up the rear, with a hot meal ready for the men. Then we turn back. For we, too, must be getting to our appointed place.
It is after midnight when we start out. It has begun to rain, at first a drizzle, and then a pitiless downpour. And it is pitch dark. But as we climb out of Cherry Sea on the road to Hindacore, a stray enemy shell ignites one of our ammunition dumps, and makes the going better. From Hindacore, the road runs over another ridge to Canicore. Whence it turns sharp south, past the Bois de Busch, then southeast towards Inchey, becoming little better than a track. Midway and on the right are Henley Copse and Bois de Inchey on an elevation but two thousand yards from the village, and commanding a view of the canal and battle-ground beyond. This road is a quagmire, lined with trenches facing south. Part of the Hindenburg support line taken by us three weeks before.
We are early, and shelter for a time in a dripping dugout. Our troops, wearied by their long march, are crowded close in the trenches, in the woods, and behind the hill-cress, with perhaps a tarpaulin stretched over their heads. But at four o'clock the rain stops, and a clearing sky promises a fine day. We walk on to the little hill crowned by the Bois d'Inchi, where are some trenches and great variety of shell-holes. Two of our battalions lie in this little wood. The troops are packed very close, the attacking divisions being squeezed into a perilously narrow frontage, because the line of assault is confined to less than a mile and a half on either side of Inchi and Atrois. which, indeed, is the boundary between our fourth and first divisions.
From where we stand, the canal is but three thousand yards away, and the Bosch are holding this side of it, their line running due north from the northwest corner of Mueres, taken recently by the Seventeenth Corps, midway between Inchey and the canal to west of Sainz-les-Machions. The first task of our infantry, therefore, is to overwhelm them and thus make good the west bank of the canal itself. But the limited area is also restricted in depth. Close behind is a great concentration of artillery, which is about to lay down what for its limited area is the most intense barrage of the war. All the Canadian Corps artillery is here, with seven hundred rounds to each gun, as well as a large number of Imperial heavies.
The attack offers an extraordinary difficult problem. In the first place, the character of the initial barrage is in itself unique, for it is not the usual straightaway affair. Covering first the actual crossing of the Canal du Nord, it is designed then to protect the advance of the infantry on Verlon Wood on the one hand, while on the other it is to fan out in a wide sweep to the north, Until finally it shall return from the east on to the east bank of the canal, pinning in by its arc the enemy garrison holding that side of the canal as far north as Wausse-le-Vergere.
But that description hardly succeeds. It is more than that. The intention is that our first division, after crossing the canal, shall swing off first northeast, then north, and gradually close back on to the east side of the canal, thus taking from the rear the enemy garrison, whose position from frontal attack west of the canal, as has been before explained, is impregnable. To provide a protective flank for this complicated operation, a stationary barrage is to be laid down some little distance east of and parallel to the canal. As the sweep of the infantry develops, A creeping barrage is to advance from south to north between the canal, and this stationary barrage, the latter being lifted step by step as it is reached.
It is extraordinarily ingenious and intricate, to be understood best by reference to the barrage map itself.
Starting with a barrage three thousand yards in width, it is to fan out to nine thousand yards. Changing form as it goes, and the least error in synchronization by either gunners or infantry must result in disaster to our own men. This calls for an unprecedented concentration of artillery in a restricted area. A little arc back of Inchi, so hazardous in itself that should the enemy discover it, and lay down a counter barrage on these massed batteries, they must be wiped out. And yet it is a risk in all its gravity essential if the daring tactical maneuver as a whole is to have any prospect of success.
In order to give our troops room to deploy for the attack, it is necessary to leave them a clear space of two thousand yards deep west of the enemy line, and our battery positions are therefore just that much further from the canal line. If adequate support is to be given on men as they advance up the long slope against bourlon wood, our batteries must crowd down as close as possible to the canal, so soon as its line is secure. From the canal, our field batteries can command a range to the extreme limit of bourlon wood.
In order to accomplish this, a novel device has been determined upon and worked out in detail. This has been styled an extension barrage. Four brigades of our field batteries are all limbered up, and at zero hour go off on the heels of the infantry. By six o'clock, forty minutes after the battle opens, these are actually in position on the west side of the canal. An hour go in the enemy's hands. They thus extend the effective range from the kick-off line from six thousand five hundred, to eight thousand five hundred yards, and as a back battery goes out of action through exhaustion of its effective range, its area of fire is taken over by one of these front batteries, and then it too comes up to the canal bank.
This maneuver is made possible by the very effective smoke barrage we lay down to screen enemy observation from Bourlon Wood. But the final objective lies considerably east of Bourlon Wood, And it therefore becomes the imperative task of our engineers to push practical crossings over the canal, so that the guns can follow up the infantry. Three hours was the utmost they could be allowed for this task, but without efficient artillery support, our attacking lines are apt to be driven back down the slope, and in the final analysis the success of the operation devolves upon the engineers.
But more even was required from the artillery than this intricate and fan-like barrage. Enemy counter-barrage work must be smothered, and for this purpose a great concentration of heavies was provided both of our own and imperial batteries. For three weeks our artillery observation planes had been spotting the enemy's battery positions, and it had been found that he was continually moving his batteries about, Having in all one hundred and five battery positions in front of our attack. In order to smother these by our counter-battery work, it might be presumed it would be necessary to concentrate fire on every one of them—an impossible task. The problem was, in fact, and practice solved in a brilliant fashion.
Immediately the battle opened, our observers flew low over the enemy positions, Reporting by wireless not where his batteries were, but what positions were empty, thus enabling our artillery to concentrate their fire on occupied positions only, with what success will be seen.
There are always tense minutes before zero. It is a pregnant hour, but never more so than this morning, for we are packed so close that if the enemy is apprised of the attack, and lays down a barrage, our slaughter must be fearful. For several days he has been nervous, but our jumping-off line has been camouflaged by deliberately destroying his wire far to the north and south.
As the rain clears off, the men make shift to get a meal. A tot of rum warms their chilled limbs. Mist still hangs low in the valley, but beyond the outline of the slope can be made out. Officers consult their maps and compasses, and get their men to their jumping-off ground. Engineers are there with infantry floats. The men carry scaling-ladders. All is ready, but the minutes are interminable.
At five o'clock there is a faint flutter of dawn in the east. Just then the enemy starts throwing up twin red balls of fire. The SOS call he used in the Army Inn show. But nothing comes of it. At last, at 20 minutes past 5 of the morning of Friday, September 27, the barrage opens. Some batteries are so close that the noise is stunning. Five minutes later, the men push forward to secure the west side of the canal. The enemy, complete though is his surprise, pours in a heavy shell-fire. This morning his SOS signal is twin green balls, and soon his entire front line for miles north and south becomes twinkling green. He does not know where the main stroke is to fall. Within a very short time the canal is crossed, our men scaling the locks, bombing as they go, and soon the battle is streaming away up the eastward slopes.
Prisoners captured this side of the canal come in at once, and testified to the complete surprise. They are from the 63rd Naval Division and the 1st Prussian Guards Reserve Division. Big fellows, these, but they do not look so terrible. We had been warned of them, for two days before enemy aircraft had dropped leaflets among our men. Spare this terrible bloodshed, One Red. It is time for peace, Canadians. You will be only slaughtered if you go against our terrible guards. The entire staff of an enemy battery was captured before it had fired a shot.
One of our own gunners performed a wonderful exploit. Realizing how essential it was to get the guns up as near the canal as possible, Lt. H. H. Finney of the First Battery, C. F.A., made a personal reconnaissance along the canal overnight. and then under cover of darkness took his section of 18-pounders in front even of our outpost line. He lost half his horses and ammunition, but was able, when zero struck, to direct his fire on an enemy machine-gun position across the canal at point-blank range with open sights, destroying it entirely.
Canadian engineers now worked feverishly constructing bridges. and the work goes forward with a will. Before Nine o'clock, the first battery crosses the canal. Prior to this, Lt. J. A. Davin of the 1st Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column, immediately after Zero, and under heavy shell-fire, made a reconnaissance of the Canal du Nord in front of Inchey. Located a practical crossing, and by his persistence, disregard of danger, and good leadership, took over a column of wagons, and established his A.R.P. One Thousand Yards East of the Canal, where he kept up a much-needed supply of ammunition for the forward batteries until the bridges were built. Since August 8th, in every battle, this officer had thus pushed forward his ammunition dumps into the heart of the fighting.
Sergeant Charles Glacier of the 1st Canadian Division Signal Column Had the honor of taking the first vehicle over the canal. He established a report center well east of the canal, laying wires under heavy fire to the brigade and batteries. His wireless aerials were shot down three times in half an hour, but on each occasion he re-erected them himself.
Our smoke barrage has now blotted out the distant scene. At half-past nine, the tanks come back. Their day's work done. About noon, clear above the smoke, a gold and silver shower goes up. It is the signal that burlong wood is in our hands.
-
5 05 - Operations: Sept. 27 23:46
Canada's Hundred Days, John Livesay.
Chapter Five. Operations, September Twenty-Seventh.
Preparations for this battle have been entered into at length, because, after all, it was the plan and the arrangements for carrying it out that mattered. Those perfected, as we have seen, and granted such an instrument as the Canadian Corps, efficiently supported by the veteran troops, ably commanded, of the 11th British Division, and the battle itself, up to a certain stage at least, went according to program. The different puzzle parts, all carefully worked out beforehand, fell into their place in the picture until it presented a perfected example of the art of war. It was not until difficulties arose on our right flank that the scene became blurred, and for a time threatened to ruin the general effect.
Sir Arthur Currie thus describes the opening operations.
At 520 a.m. September 27th, the attack was successfully launched, and in spite of all obstacles went well from the first. The barrage was uniformly good, and the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisional Artilleries, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General J. S. Stewart and Brigadier-General W. B. M. King, were successful in advancing into captured ground. and continued the barrage as planned. Early in the afternoon, the first phase of the attack was substantially over, and the readjustments of the fronts preparatory to the second phase were under way.
On the extreme right, however, the Seventeenth Corps had failed to keep pace with our advance, and our right flank, submitted to a severe infillade machine-gun fire from the vicinity of Haneu, had to be refused for a considerable distance to retain touch with the left of the Seventeenth Corps. Therefore, the encircling movement which was to have given us Bourlon Wood could not be developed. Fully alive to the gravity of the situation which would be created on the flank of the Third Army by the failure to capture and hold Bourlon Wood, the Eleventh Brigade, Brig. Gen. Odeon, of the 4th Canadian Division attacked from the north side of the wood, and captured all the high ground, pushing patrols as far as Fontaine-Notre-Dame.
It is recalled here that Bourlon Wood, which is one hundred and ten meters high, dominates the ground as far south as Flesquiers and Havrincourt, and that its loss, after very heavy fighting in November 1917, During the First Battle of Cambrai caused eventually the withdrawal of the Third Army from a large portion of the ground they had won by their surprise attack. A severe counterattack launched from the direction of Rayen Corps against the left of the Fourth Canadian Division was repulsed in the afternoon with heavy losses to the enemy. Owing to the situation on our right flank, already explained, The third Canadian division could not be engaged this day. The first Canadian division and the Eleventh British division, however, made substantial gains after the commencement of the second phase.
The former capturing Hainecourt and crossing the Douai-Cambrai Road, and the latter pushing on and taking Epinoy and Wasille-le-Vergere by evening, To get a clear picture, it is necessary to trace the corps in divisional boundaries. The southern boundary of the Canadian Corps, and therefore of our fourth division, was to start from the northwest corner of Mueres, and then run east five thousand yards, trending a little south all the way to a point midway between Anou and Berlon Wood. Thence it took a wide sweep, following the south and southeastern slope of the wood, to a point about five hundred yards northwest of Fontaine-Notre-Dame. This the Canadian Corps' southern boundary ran in almost a direct line a little north of east to the Faubourg Contimpera, skirting Cambrai on the far side of the Schulte, but crossing over the canal at Neuville-Saint-Remy, north of the city.
Thus, not only Anou and Fontaine-Notre-Dame, But the line of the Scheldt Canal, southwest of Cambrai, were left in the area of the Seventeenth Corps.
The interdivisional boundary between the Fourth Canadian Division, Major-General Sir David Watson, and the Third Canadian Division, Major-General F.O.W. Loomis, started east from Inchey, and then trended off more to the northeast, passing through Pilgrim's Rest, and following the general direction of Hainecourt. The northern boundary of the 1st Canadian Division, Major-General Sir Archibald C. MacDonald, will be outlined when we come to a particular description of its operations. For the time being, we will confine ourselves to the 4th Division.
Draw a line from the point northwest of Fontaine-Notre-Dame described above. A little west of north to five hundred yards east of Pilgrim's Rest, and we have the third objective of the Fourth Canadian Division, marking the end of the first phase. At this point, the Third Canadian Division was designed to come up taking over the southern half of the area of advance, marked out for the second phase, roughly represented by the line from Neuville-Saint-Remy to Saincourt, both inclusive. The fourth division was to continue its advance on the left of the third division, and therefore between the latter and the first division.
Owing to failure of the Seventeenth Corps to come up on our right flank, this plan never matured. The fourth division could do no better than reach its third objective, from Fontaine-Notre-Dame to Pilgrim's Rest, and the opportunity for further exploitation northwest of Cambrai by the Third Division was thus denied on the opening day. Better Fortune attended the First Canadian Division, finally supported by the Eleventh British Division, a deep salient being pushed into the enemy defense through Hainer Corps and between Sancor and Epinoy.
On the Fourth Divisional Front, the Tenth Brigade, Brig. Gen. R. J. F. Hayter, was intrusted with the storming of the canal. The attacking units had been highly organized for the work, and the men went at it with a zip. The Fiftieth Battalion of Calgary, on the right, and the Forty Sixth Battalion of Regina, on the left, the latter being in contact with the Fourth Battalion, Central Ontario, of the First Division, jumped off at five minutes past zero, and carried the enemy line on the west side of the canal in their first rush. Fixing their scaling-ladders, The forty-six climbed down into the dry bed of lock number four, where the garrison was bombed into surrender, and the advance continued unchecked.
The 44th Battalion, New Brunswick, and 47th Battalion, Western Ontario, of the same brigade, now came up in support. So soon as the canal was crossed, our troops, under cover of a very efficient smoke barrage, rushed the Canal du Nord trench system, and then advanced up the slope to their first objective, the Marquion line. A pause was here made for fifty minutes, when the attack was carried on by the 11th Brigade on the right and the 12th Brigade on the left, until the second objective was secured, this being a line just west of Bourlon Wood, but also including Bourlon Village, stormed by the 12th Brigade. Owing to the difficulties of the ground, no tanks got up here, though several were employed further north by the 1st Division, and the infantry depended on the barrage and their own exertions.
No sooner had the 11th Brigade on our extreme right reached the Marquion line than it became subject to a very heavy infallad fire from its right flank, owing to failure of neighboring imperial troops to take their objectives. As they were held up in front of the formidable Hindenburg support line. Particularly garling machine-gun fire came from the factory on the Bopalm-Cambray Road, just east of this support line, which here takes a bend south. This inflicted many casualties, and the 11th Brigade already was obliged to detach elements to form a flank in this direction. As it advanced to its objective of bourlon wood, It offered a more and more exposed flank, into which the enemy poured a heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, and launched a number of counter-attacks from the southeast.
The one hundred and second battalion, British Columbia, was forced to swing south a thousand yards outside the Canadian Corps area, taking the strongly fortified factory on the Boupon-Cambrai Road.
The Eleventh Brigade lost very heavily, Chiefly from machine-gun fire, but pushed steadily on, reaching their second objective, immediately in front of Berlon Wood. The brigade held a line with on the right the one hundred and second battalion, in the center the fifty-fourth battalion of the Kootenay, and on the left towards Berlon Village, the Eighty-seventh Battalion, Grenadier Guards of Montreal. The Seventy-fifth Battalion, recruited from the Mississauga Horse of Toronto, was in reserve, but pressure was so great on the right flank that it was brought up in support of the One. The battle headquarters of both battalions being established together one thousand yards west of Bourlon Wood. Inside of half an hour, an enemy five point nine inch shell made a direct hit on the combined headquarters.
Lieutenant Colonel F. Lister of the One. The second being badly wounded, as well as his adjutant. While the battalion signal officer was killed. The adjutant of the Seventy Fifth was wounded, and its signal officer also killed, and four or five other battalion officers became casualties, as did four officers of the British divisional staff on our right, who had come up to see how the battle was going. The same shell killed or wounded a number of signalers and runners.
The command of these two battalions now devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel Thompson of the Canadian Engineers, who had joined the Seventy Fifth Battalion overnight, having been recalled from London for that purpose, just as he was about to sail for Canada on leave. The Fifty Fourth Battalion on the immediate left fared equally badly, for a single shell wounded Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Carey, killed Major MacDermott, Captain Gall, and Foster, the adjutant and Captain Macquarie, while two other officers were wounded. This, and the fighting of the succeeding days, took very heavy toll of our battalion officers, several units losing their first and second officers in command, and company leaders right down to the subalterns.
After the disaster referred to above, Lieutenant Colonel Thompson moved his headquarters to the top of the hill. In the meantime, the Fifty Fourth had made a frontal attack on Bourlon Wood, and got through to its eastern slope. Here, they were strongly counter-attacked, and came under a very heavy infillade fire from Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and therefore sent back for further assistance. Lieutenant Colonel Thompson detached two of the companies of the Seventy Fifth in support, and these came under orders of Colonel Carey, whose wound was slight, enabling him to carry on his command. The remaining companies of the Seventy Fifth were held in reserve, though exposed to very heavy fire, while the One Hundred Second worked along the South and East of the Wood, seeking to join hands with the Fifty Fourth, but were prevented by the commanding position the enemy held at Fontaine-Notre-Dame.
From here, enemy machine-gunners trickled back into the Southeast corner of the Wood, and inflicted heavy loss on our men clinging to its southern outskirts, and the third company of the Seventy Fifth was therefore sent up to form a defensive flank. During the course of the afternoon and the evening, the one hundred and second beat back successive counter-attacks thrown in from the direction of Canton, two thousand yards to the southeast.
About midnight information was received from headquarters of the Eleventh Brigade, that some of the enemy had re-established themselves in Bourlon Wood. As the 3rd Canadian Division was to jump off at dawn from a line east of the wood, the third objective of September 27th, it became vitally important to protect their rear by clearing out these enemy elements. So the last remaining company of the 75th Battalion was sent in to drive them out and establish a defensive flank against Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Groping their way forward in the pitch dark, bombing as they went, and more than once coming to close grips with cold steel, this company accomplished its difficult task well before dawn broke, and Bourlon Wood was at last finally in our hands.
While this was going on, the Eighty-seventh Battalion had cleared the southwest corner of the wood and held it throughout the day. At night the battalion attacked again with the object of driving back the enemy into Fontaine-Notre-Dame. And this was the scene of a very gallant exploit on part of Lieutenant E. M. Preston, who, realizing that his platoon was under very heavy machine-gun fire from the railway embankment to the east, and that unless this was silenced, the entire advance must be held up, called for two volunteers. Though under continual heavy fire, directed by flares the enemy threw up, they crawled on their hands and knees until they got within bombing distance of the enemy post.
Ordering his men to throw their bombs, Lieutenant Preston rushed the post, killing or capturing the garrison, and sending back word that the advance could go on.
On the left of the 11th Brigade, the 12th Brigade, after storming the stoutly held village of Bourlon, passed on up the high ground, their right penetrating Bourlon Wood from the north, while their left established contact with the 1st Canadian Division at Pilgrim's Rest.
The 12th Brigade did not achieve this success without very hard fighting all day, and especially during the afternoon. When, as its elements were fighting their way up on the high ground through wire and concrete machine-gun posts, the enemy counter-attacked time after time, but was always beaten back. This brigade suffered too from the exposed right flank, but the men clung stubbornly to the ground they held. Exposed though it was to heavy fire from railing corps in front, and from all along the Marquan line as far south as the Bapaam-Cambraie Road. All its battalions were engaged during the day, these being the Thirty-eighth of Ottawa, Seventy-Second Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver, Seventy-eighth of Winnipeg, and Eighty-fifth of Nova Scotia.
The position then on the night of September Twenty-Seventh, Twenty-eighth, so far as our right was concerned, was that it held a semicircular position from southwest of Bourlon Wood, along its base to the east, west of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and thence running north to a little east of Pilgrim's Rest. Around this whole area the enemy's fire was concentrated, every foot of ground held being raked from one or more directions. Losses of the troops engaged, especially of the 11th Brigade, were very heavy. None but troops of the first class could thus have not only stood their ground, but consolidated the position under cover of night. To a certain extent, the plan had miscarried, but this was because of events over which the Canadian Corps could exercise no control.
It went amiss through lack of support on our right, but notwithstanding this, the gain had been very substantial, and in Bourlon-Wood we held the key to the defences of Cambrai.
Before proceeding to an account of what was going on in the northern area of the Corps, a detailed account of the wonderful work of the Canadian engineers will contribute to a better view of the battle as a whole.
The engineer preparations for the operation were undertaken at five days' notice, and were exceedingly difficult owing to the nature of the ground. The problem involved the repair of roads demolished by shell-fire. The building of cross-country tracks for infantry and horse transport to the front line. The pushing forward of light tramways to the front line to facilitate the delivery of ammunition, stores and supplies, the provision of engineer material of all sorts, and the construction of new headquarters for battalions, brigades, divisions, etc., and dug-out accommodation and shelter for the troops as quickly as they could be improvised. A difficult question was the provision of water supply for the large number of horses, approximately 40,000 assembled in a very congested area.
The great problem was to get the infantry and the guns over the canal in the face of the enemy barrage, and to provide sufficient facilities in the way of roads, bridges, and tramways, as would ensure the supply of ammunition for the artillery being sustained. and the supply of munitions, stores, and rations for the large number of troops engaged.
As it was clear that the enemy's barrage would fall naturally on the canal and be maintained there, the following were provided for.
Seven infantry footbridges of an unsinkable type, ten crossing for guns and horse transport, five of which had to be developed at once for heavy traffic, Even while the continuous stream of guns and ammunition wagons was pouring over them. At least ten times, Canadian engineer officers, flying at a height of about five hundred feet and subjected to heavy fire, traversed the length of the canal involved, reconnoitring for the best spots for tank crossings, bridge sites, and infantry crossings. Such was the preparation. Following were the results. Before Zero Hour, 18 miles of roads had been repaired up to the front lines, and seven miles of tramways constructed. On these tramways, over three thousand tons of ammunition per day were being delivered to advanced dumps and battery positions.
A huge concentration of horses was provided with the necessary water supply.
After zero, all crossings were put through successfully in spite of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. The first guns crossing the canal at Eight Forty A.M., the engineers went over with the infantry to get their foot-bridges across, and the engineer wagons with their six-horse teams were pushed forward so rapidly that in several cases all the horses were killed by machine-gun fire, and the men got their material down to the bridge sites by manhandling the wagons.
In one case, a party of Bosch machine-gunners, who had been overlooked by the mopping-up parties, emerged from a concealed tunnel and attacked the engineer party attempting to bridge the canal. The engineer officer in charge took part of his men and beat off the attack, and at the same time kept the work of construction going without interruption. The bridges constructed were of all types, pontoon, trestle, heavy pontoon, and heavy steel bridges for all traffic. A remarkable record was made in the erection of two heavy steel bridges of one hundred and ten feet span under heavy fire. The materials were got on the sites at two o'clock in the afternoon, and the approaches prepared, and the bridges erected in twelve hours actual work.
By early afternoon, three new pumping installations had been established on captured ground with sufficient horse troughs to water five thousand horses an hour. All materials were got forward to the infantry, and the positions gained consolidated. About three miles of tramways had been constructed and were in operation, and over one thousand of our wounded were evacuated on returning ammunition trains, operated by Canadian Corps tramways. The Battle of the Canal du Nord was an engineers' battle. The success of the whole operation depended upon the speed with which the crossings of the canal were provided, and the way in which they were repaired and improved during the day, so as to enable the guns and infantry to be maintained in the positions reached in their advance.
The reorganization the previous spring of the Canadian engineers was thus fully justified, and in the open warfare now about to open, the value of their work became ever increasingly apparent.
-
6 06 - Operations: Sept. 27 -Continued 25:50
Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesay. Part Three Chapter Six. Operations, September Twenty Seven continued.
No better account of the operations on September Twenty Seven of the First Canadian Division is available than its divisional narrative, already quoted so extensively. While the difficulties of an exposed flank did not present themselves to the same extent as were faced by the Fourth Division, This division was given a task so intricate in execution that the carrying of it out to the letter must ever be a justifiable source of pride for members of the famous Old Red Patch.
The boundary, says this narrative, between the fourth and first divisions for the first phase ran due east of Inchi, just north of Quarry Wood. Then, swinging slightly to the left, It ran from one thousand to one thousand five hundred yards of Bourlon. The first division left boundary was the Canal du Nord.
The first Canadian division then had to cross the Canal du Nord, seize the high ground to the north of Bourlon Wood, and mop up the valley of the canal as far north as the village of Sauchy-Lestres. Then, in the second phase of the battle, it was to capture Hainecourt, and the high ground north and east of that village. The First Division, therefore, in the first phase of the battle, had to attack from a front of one thousand, one hundred yards. Gradually extend this front until it became six thousand yards when the final objective was reached, and advance over six thousand yards.
The divisional commander decided to make the initial attack with the 1st Brigade on the right and the 3rd Brigade on the left. When the general line, Bourlon-Machyon, was reached, the 2nd Brigade would enter the fight between the 1st and 3rd Brigades, and would carry the battle right through the 2nd phase to the capture of Hainecourt and the high ground north and east of that place. This meant that each brigade had before it a distinctly different task. On the right, the First Brigade had before it a series of frontal assaults. First, it must cross the canal, then capture the Canal du Nord trench, advance two thousand yards, and take the Marquion line, then advance one thousand five hundred yards to the railway cutting and embankment that formed a natural trench line.
And then across open country to the final objective, a total advance of six thousand yards, ending with a frontage of one thousand five hundred yards.
The third brigade attack on the left resolved itself into a series of outflanking and turning movements. After the first rush across the canal on a three hundred yard front, the brigade would break the Canal du Nord trench line, and then swing north and even west in the attack on Sainz-le-Makayon, thus presenting the unique spectacle of our troops attacking directly toward our own lines. As a matter of fact, the artillery barrage here first of all traveled forward in the usual way, and then began to drop back towards the guns, the result being that our own barrage was between our infantry and the guns. After the capture of Sainz-le-Machyon, the brigade continued its rolling-up tactics by taking the Machyon line in Infilade and attacking both Keithwood and the village of Machyon from the east, in other words, taking the garrisons of these places in the flank and rear.
After crossing the Arras-Cambrai road, the brigade continued its flank attack on the Canal du Nord and Machyon lines, As far as the final objective for the first phase, a total advance of six thousand yards, and an extension of front from three hundred to two thousand five hundred yards.
The second brigade had a still different task. Its units had a four-mile march from the assembly position before they entered the fight. Once in the battle, it had practically open country before it, and attacked frontally, Being required to make an advance of roughly three thousand five hundred yards on a front of one thousand eight hundred yards. The division as a whole, staged forward on September 19, and on September 24 and 25, completed the march to the assembly areas. On the night of September 25, the 1st and 3rd brigades relieved units of the 2nd Division in the line, taking over their respective battle-fronts. Divisional Headquarters moved on September Twenty Sixth to Battle Headquarters in dugouts in a railway cutting, two thousand five hundred yards west of Inche.
September Twenty Seven was the day set for the attack. The ten previous days had been spent by all units in a careful study of the country, in planning their work, and in outfitting for the battle. The artillery were engaged in selecting battery positions and in getting ammunition forward, while the engineers had to plan their share of the bridging of the canal.
On the night of September, twenty sixth, all units moved forward to their assembly positions. The night was exceedingly dark, and a steady rain fell until nearly dawn, which not only added to the difficulties and discomforts, but made the going very slippery all the morning. Owing to the extremely narrow front from which the division had to jump off, attacking infantry and machine-gunners, supporting artillery, and bridging details of engineers, all had to be crowded into a small area. A heavy enemy concentration on this front would have jeopardized the success of the attack, but the enemy appeared to suspect nothing, and the night was normal. The 1st Brigade was assembled in depth on a front of about 700 yards.
The leading battalion, the 4th Central Ontario, was in the northeastern end of Inchey-Inatois. The 1st Battalion, Western Ontario, was in the lower end of the Buisee Switch, some 800 yards in rear of the 4th. The 2nd Battalion, Ottawa, was behind the 1st, and the 3rd, recruited from Toronto District, Behind the Second. The Third Brigade had to attack through a 300-yard defile, and so assemble on a 1-battalion front.
The Fourteenth Battalion, Royal Montreal Regiment, assembled in Pavelland Wood, with the Thirteenth Montreal Highlanders, 1,000 yards in rear in the Buise switch. The Fifteenth Battalion, Forty-eighth Highlanders of Toronto, was north of the Thirteenth In the 16th, Canadian-Scottish of Western Canada was holding the front line north of the assembly area of the 14th. The 2nd Brigade, as it did not come into action until four hours after the opening of the attack, was assembled just east of Cany Corps, some 3,000 yards in rear of the 3rd Brigade.
At 20 minutes after 5 on the morning of Friday, September 27th, The attack opened under cover of an intense shrapnel and smoke barrage. Some idea of the concentration of artillery may be gained from the fact that there was an 18-pounder gun to every 21 yards of barrage on the front of the 1st Division, and that there were 10 brigades of field artillery alone, whose two hundred and forty guns fired one hundred and eighteen thousand sixty-two rounds on this first day of the battle. Supporting this division, in addition to this, there were one hundred and sixty machine-guns firing in the barrage, while special companies of engineers were projecting smoke and boiling oil into the village of Marquion, and on the high ground further to the north.
The sight, when the first gleams of daylight revealed the battle, was weird in the extreme. The horizon, as far as the eye could see, was nothing but masses and long lines of leaping, billowing smoke, dense white smoke shot through at intervals with the flicker of bursting shrapnel or the black smudge of high explosives.
Battle, as far as it concerned, the 1st Division, can be visualized best by following the fortunes of the individual brigades. The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade launched its attack with the 4th Battalion. The 4th Battalion advanced two thousand yards, and captured the Canal du Nord and Marquion Trench systems on its front. The 1st Battalion then passed through it, taking up the fighting, and carrying the line forward a distance of one thousand five hundred yards. Just as this battalion completed its allotted task, Its right flank came under heavy machine-gun fire from the railway, one thousand yards north of Burlong Village. At this time, the Second and Third Battalions, which had been following closely, passed through the First Battalion.
They were held up almost at once by the enemy in the railway cutting and embankment. But by hard fighting managed to clear this obstacle without assistance other than that offered by batteries of the machine-gun battalion, It came into action at this time. Although the 4th Division on the right was held up more or less definitely on a line just east of Bourlon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions pushed on to the objectives set for the conclusion of the first phase, and even succeeded in working patrols forward to within one thousand yards of the villages of Raelincoeur and Hainecourt.
The 1st Brigade was assisted in its attack by four tanks, that did valuable service in the early stages of the attack, and had attached to it three batteries of No. 1 Co. of the 1st Battalion, Canadian Machine Gun Corps. While the infantry tanks and machine guns were advancing along the whole front, and while the canal was even under machine-gun fire, the engineers were rushing the work of bridge-building. With such speed was this done that at eight o'clock that morning, Batteries of the divisional artillery began to cross in support of the infantry. By 1030 o'clock, all batteries of both brigades were east of the canal. From zero hour on, the 1st Brigade, CFA, was attached to the 1st Infantry Brigade and advanced with it throughout the day.
In the meantime, the attack of the 3rd Brigade was meeting with stiff opposition on the left. The Third Brigade had only a narrow gap of three hundred yards on its front in which the Canal du Nord could be crossed. The opening attack of this brigade was made by the Fourteenth Battalion. This battalion cleared the canal on its front, and while one company advanced with the First Brigade, the remainder swung to the left, and cleared the Canal du Nord line by attacking it in Infalade, and finally following the local backward barrage already referred to, Attacked the village of Sainz-le-Machyon from the east, capturing it soon after nine o'clock.
The Thirteenth Battalion here took up the battle, following the same general plan put into operation by the Fourteenth Battalion. The leading company carried on with the general attack to the east, while the following companies, turning to the north, attacked Keith Wood and the Marquion line. The resistance was severe. The fighting very heavy, and progress was slow. In fact, the 7th Battalion, British Columbia, of the 2nd Brigade, and the 15th Battalion, as well as a battalion of the 11th Division, which were following in order to carry on the advance, became involved in the fighting here.
Although the Marquion line east of the village of that name was captured, the village itself was still in the hands of the enemy. As a result, the Fifteenth Battalion, and units of the Eleventh Division, as well as the engineers engaged in bridge construction, came under heavy machine-gun fire in crossing the canal north of Sainz-le-Machyon. Eventually, however, all the area in the canal valley up to Marquion was cleared by the Fifteenth Battalion. A combined attack by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Battalions then resulted in the capture of Marquion itself. The Fifteenth then pushed on rapidly, and by two o'clock in the afternoon had reached the final objective of the first phase.
Four tanks assisted the Fourteenth Battalion in the initial attack, but were unable to proceed beyond the Canal du Nord line. Three batteries of the Machine Gun Battalion were attached to the Third Brigade for this operation.
While this fighting was going on, units of the 2nd Brigade were marching forward, ready to intervene in the battle at the appointed hour. The 7th Battalion, the first to enter the fight, had to leapfrog the 13th Battalion, after that unit had captured the Marquion line. The 7th found the 13th hotly engaged, and assisted it in breaking the Marquion line. By this time, the artillery barrage had left the infantry far behind. A local barrage was arranged and supplied by the 2nd Brigade CFA, and under cover of this, the 7th Battalion was able to move forward, the enemy's resistance rapidly weakening as our troops advance. A chief resistance beyond the Arras-Cambrai Road was met with from machine-guns just north of Bois-de-Croquer.
Patrols were pushed forward and reached a line over two thousand yards north of the Arras-Cambray Road. During the afternoon, a small counterattack by the enemy on the center was repulsed. The 8th Battalion, Winnipeg, had followed the 7th in support, but were not called on for help.
This ended the first phase of the battle. By two o'clock in the afternoon, we had Berlon Wood, And our line then ran north and east from Bourlon village to within five hundred yards of Raelincoeur, then north practically to Hainecourt, and then swung back westward, meeting the Canal du Nord just north of Sauchy-Lestres. The second phase called for an advance by four divisions in line, the third, fourth, and first Canadian, and the Eleventh British Division. From right to left being ordered to continue the attack. The third division on the right and the 11th on the left had followed the attacking divisions closely, and were ready to carry on the fight. The intervention of a new division on each flank meant that the fourth and first division would have to close on the center.
It was found late in the afternoon that the fourth division could not continue the advance that day. The 1st and 11th Divisions, however, attacked about four o'clock in the afternoon, according to program. The continuation of the attack on the 1st Division front was carried out by the 2nd Brigade. The 5th, Saskatchewan, and 10th, Alberta Battalions had assembled ready to advance, and at 320 o'clock the 5th Battalion swept over the outpost line and advanced very rapidly, meeting little resistance. Hainer Corps was soon captured. The 10th Battalion here continued the advance, but soon began to meet opposition. Owing to the fact that the troops on the right were not advancing, the 5th and 10th Battalions had a heavy infallad fire poured into their flank.
The enemy here were in great numbers, apparently, and soon had field-guns as well as machine-guns firing on our troops. In spite of this, the 10th Battalion pressed forward until held up by a heavy and continuous belt of wire, just west of the Douay-Cambray Road. Patrols, although under heavy machine-gun fire, cut gaps through this wire by hand, and then, in a sudden rush, overpowered the gun crews and crossed the Douay-Cambray Road. East of the road, however, five belts of wire were encountered. And as the enemy fire was steadily increasing, the advance was halted.
The Eleventh British Division had advanced on the left and had captured Epinoy, but on the right the situation was far from secure. Here the brigade found itself with an exposed right flank of four thousand yards. The responsibility of guarding this flank developed upon the Fifth and Eighth Battalions, the Seventh being in reserve. On the front of the 5th Battalion, the enemy made three unsuccessful attacks at nightfall. The 1st and 2nd Brigades of Field Artillery supported the 2nd Brigade throughout the afternoon's operations, and supplied protective fire throughout the night.
This concluded the actual fighting on the first day of the battle, but during all this day the engineers had been busy bridging the canal. This task was entrusted to the 3rd Battalion Canadian Engineers. Five traffic crossings had to be constructed, and four foot-bridges. The first traffic crossing was completed at 840 o'clock that morning. All bridges, with one exception, were completed by 6 o'clock in the evening. The early stages of the work were carried out under machine-gun fire, many casualties being suffered.
After the 1st Canadian Division had secured the East Line of the Canal du Nord as far north as Sauchy-Lestres, the 11th British Division was given the task of going through them at this point, and exploiting the success along their left or northern flank. Compromising the veteran, thirty-second, thirty-third, and thirty-fourth brigades, it did its job in a thorough business-like way. Capturing 1st Sauchy-Lestres, Then, on its left, the high ground of Voissy-le-Vergere, and on the right, pushing on into Epinoy. Their left flank, some little distance east of the canal, was protected by a barrage, and after crossing over the canal, the Fifty-sixth Division of the Twenty-second Corps on our right pushed up between the canal and the barrage, preceded by a rolling barrage, and mopping up the defenses.
The fighting in this important corner, which united at once the north and the south of the Seine Sea and the east and the west of the Canal du Nord, was very severe. The Bois de Quesnoy was full of machine-gun nests and concrete pill-boxes. The enemy had a good field of fire, and the marshes, organized for defense, assisted him, but the Fifty-sixth Division was not to be denied, and reached its objectives.
On our right, the Third Army had crossed the canal and captured part of the Hindenburg line. For the reasons set forth above, opportunity had been denied the Third Canadian Division to go through the Fourth Canadian Division and storm the Marquire line. But the division was brought close up in support on the east side of the canal and suffered many casualties. It was now to move up during the night to be prepared to jump off at dawn. Failure to carry the Marquan line on the opening day gave the enemy time to bring up reserves from Douai and elsewhere. Aware now of our strategic plan to cut in north of Cambrai, he massed his divisions in front of us, and for the next four days contested the field with great determination, and even at times wrested from us ground we had won, but had been unable to consolidate.
Had the battle gone as planned without impediment, He would have been obliged to fall back at once over the Scheldt Canal northeast of Cambrai, abandoning the city, and thus avoiding for the Canadian Corps the terrific struggle that was now to ensue.
Many noteworthy feats of arms by all ranks were performed this day, both in the actual crossing of the Canal du Nord and the advance on Bourlon Wood. Of these, the following examples are selected from numerous cases, as being characteristic of the conditions encountered, and the spirit by which they were overcome.
Brigadier-General G. S. Tuxford, in command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, found that his task was to cross the Canal du Nord on a front of but four hundred and fifty yards, and then fan out on a brigade frontage facing due north as well as east, totalling five thousand five hundred yards. While very gallant officers commanded the three battalions engaged in the attack, these were all seconds in command, and had not previously commanded their respective battalions in an attack. This greatly increased the responsibilities of the brigadier, who kept in the closest touch throughout. Crossing the canal shortly after the attack was launched, under heavy shell and machine-gun fire, while the enemy still held part of the eastern bank, With an utter disregard to personal danger, he remained in the vicinity of the three battalions, directing their operations, and dealing with difficult situations as they arose.
Much of the success of the work of this brigade resulted from its commander's conspicuous gallantry, splendid initiative, and fine leadership.
In the attack on Berlon Wood by the Fiftieth Battalion of Calgary, Private R. Bloor, finding that heavy rifle-fire was coming from Quarry Wood, alone and of his own initiative attacked the position, driving the enemy into his dugouts, and holding him there until help came, when one hundred and forty-six officers and men, including an entire Battalion Headquarters staff, surrendered. He died later of his wounds.
Captain George Fraser Kerr of the 3rd Battalion, Recruited from Toronto District, while leading the left support company in the attack on Berlon Wood, gave timely support by outflanking a machine-gun nest holding up the advance on the railway embankment, when he rushed up two platoons, outflanking the enemy and capturing the garrison. When almost on the Arras-Cambrae Road, the advance was again held up by a machine-gun post, which he rushed single-handed, capturing four machine-guns, and thirty-one prisoners, his men then being one hundred yards behind him. This brilliant exploit prevented the enemy withdrawing a number of guns, which fell into our hands.
During the attack of the 8th Battalion, when a line of hostile machine-guns opened fire suddenly on his platoon, which was in an exposed position and no cover available, Corporal Alexander Brereton of Winnipeg, At once appreciated the critical situation, and realized that unless something was done at once, the platoon would be annihilated. On his own initiative, without a moment's delay, and alone, he sprang forward and reached one of the hostile machine-gun posts, where he shot the man operating the machine-gun, and bayoneted the next one who attempted to operate it, whereupon nine others surrendered to him. Inspired by this heroic example, His platoon charged and captured the five remaining posts.
-
7 07 - Operations: Sept. 28-29 32:26
Canada's Hundred Days, John Livesay. Chapter Seven Operations, September 28, 29.
The attack was continued on September 28, says Sir Arthur Currie. The 3rd Canadian Division captured Fontaine-Notre-Dame, one of the 17th Corps' objectives, and penetrating the Mark 1 line reached the western outskirts of St. Ola. The 4th Canadian Division captured Raelin Corps and Sa'ili, and the 11th British Division established posts in Aubin-Schule-au-Bac, and occupied the Bois de Canoy. The 1st Canadian Division, in view of their advance of the previous day, which had produced a considerable salient, did not push forward.
In other words, a day was spent by the Corps in straightening out its front, by bringing up the right to a level with the left. Developments of the previous day compelled a change in the area allotted to the Canadian Corps. Instead of pushing on in a northeasterly direction towards Neuville-St-Remy, The 3rd Canadian Division, with the 7th and 9th Brigades in line, after passing through the 4th Division at dawn, turned south out of the original Coy area, and stormed Fontaine-Notre-Dame, whose possession was essential if the advance were to be continued. Assisted by a hastily arranged but efficient barrage, the village was quickly reduced, And thus a movement began which resulted in the corps right being extended still further south until it took in the west bank of the Scheldt Canal.
As the battle developed, our troops stormed and consolidated the tongue of land lying between the Bhopalm-Cambray Road and this canal. And thus, instead of leaving Cambrai on our right, as originally intended, we advanced against its western outskirts, faced by the canal. It is necessary to keep this in mind, that this change of corps front bringing us under the walls of Cambrai was due to the inability of the Seventeenth Corps to make good our right flank from Anou, through Fontaine, Notre Dame, to the canal, because when we finally captured the city, some little feeling seems to have developed among our neighbors on the ground, that it was supposed by them that the Canadian Corps was outside of its proper area, and had no business to seize that honor.
As a matter of fact, as the progress of the battle will show, Cambrai was taken not by any local success along the canal front, but because in the great battle now developing north of it on the plateau east of the Marquan line, the Canadian Corps, in the course of several days' fighting, defeated in detail, every available force the enemy could bring up to its defense.
Fontaine-Notre-Dame once reduced, the 3rd Canadian Division pushed on to the assault on the Marquand line, the attack being intrusted to the 9th Brigade, Brigadier-General Diem Ormond. The line of attack was down a slope as smooth and open as an artificial glacis, swept by enemy machine-gun fire, and by his artillery in well-placed battery positions behind. The line itself was immensely strong, Sewn thickly with machine-gun posts, and covered by wide belts of wire. No harder fighting had been seen since the storming of the Droucourt-Keant line, and it resolved itself into a battle of detached and often isolated infantry groups. The attacking battalions lost very heavily, thus the 52nd Battalion of Fort William and Port Arthur, losing during the day from three hundred to four hundred of its effective strength.
This battalion had seen very hard fighting ever since the kick-off of August 8th, and its total casualties to the evening of this day were 50 officers and nine hundred other ranks. Weakened though it was, and exposed to more than one determined counter-attack, this battalion held the ground gained until evening, when it was relieved by the 58th Battalion Western Ontario, which went through and after a bitter struggle captured that portion of the Marquor line fronting it.
The remaining battalions of the Ninth Brigade, the Forty Third Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg, and the One Hundred and Sixteenth Central Ontario, encountered similar conditions, and fought with the utmost tenacity. Once the Marquor line was stormed, our troops battled their way forward into the valley lying between it and the Arras-Cambrain Road, Though commanded by enemy batteries on the heights beyond.
Meantime, the 7th Brigade, to the command of which Brig. Gen. J. A. Clark had succeeded, and appointment of Brig. Gen. H. M. Dyer to a command in England, was encountering equally desperate resistance, and suffering severely, particularly in officers. That very gallant soldier, Lieutenant Colonel C. J. T. Stewart was killed while leading into action Princess Patricia's Light Infantry. But this brigade, whose other units were the Royal Canadian Regiment, the 42nd Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada from Montreal, and the 49th Battalion of Edmonton, once again proved its mettle and fought its way forward to its objective. On the left of the Third Division, The Fourth Canadian Division advanced their line generally, and succeeded in practically wiping out the salient in which our First Division found itself, but only after sanguinary fighting.
The Tenth Brigade, Brigadier General R. F. Hayter, attacked, leapfrogging over the Twelfth Brigade, and advanced to the Arras-Cambra Road, storming the villages of Raelincore and Sa'ili. Between which ran the Marquand line. These two villages lie just under the brow of the plateau, and were veritable fortresses. To be won only after hand-to-hand fighting, our men bombing their way along trenches, and reducing enemy strong points in succession.
In this heavy fighting, Lt. Col. R. D. Davies of the 44th Battalion, New Brunswick, who on the previous day had personally led his battalion in its successful attack in front of Inche, again led the battalion, and notwithstanding heavy casualties, took every objective. Towards evening, the enemy launched very heavy counter-attacks against the brigade front, and especially against the Forty Fourth. Losses were so heavy that the line temporarily fell back. After having made a personal reconnaissance, Colonel Davies organized all elements of the battalion, and in cooperation with other units of the brigade counter-attacked, driving the enemy out, re-establishing our position, and recovering our wounded lying on that front.
His personal example, disregard of danger, and initiative, inspired all ranks to the greatest efforts under very difficult conditions.
The Fiftieth Battalion of Calgary, of the same brigade, when attacking the Marquand line in front of Raelin Corps on the same day, found itself up against heavy, uncut wire and machine-guns. Private W. H. Smith, finding that a machine-gun crew and its supports was inflicting heavy casualties on the battalion, went forward voluntarily alone, sniping as he went, until he was close enough to rush the post. Capturing the gun, and twenty prisoners. In work of this nature, the support of our machine-gun units was of vital importance, and magnificently did they respond. Thus, Captain Kenneth Weaver, 4th Battalion, Canadian Machine Gun Corps, of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, displayed conspicuous gallantry on this day in front of Raeland Corps.
He commanded three batteries of machine-guns, Two suffering severely early in the attack. He personally reorganized the batteries under heavy fire, established strong defensive positions with part of his guns, and after making a daring reconnaissance, established the remainder of his guns in advanced positions, bringing direct fire to bear on the enemy, and thereby establishing the advanced line of our troops at a most critical time.
Events on the front of the 1st Canadian Division this day may be summarized in the words of its own narrative as follows.
On September 28th, the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions opened their attack on the right at 6 o'clock in the morning. The attack on the 1st Division front was set for 9 o'clock, and was to be carried out by the 10th Battalion of Alberta. When 9 o'clock came, although troops on neither the right nor the left had caught up, and in face of very heavy artillery and machine-gun concentration on their front, the 10th Battalion went bravely forward, and calmly commenced to cut lanes through the heavy enemy wire by hand. For two hours this unequal fight went on, in spite of swiftly dwindling numbers. The fight was marked by many instances of individual dash and gallantry, but none finer than the example set by Captain Jack Mitchell, M.
C. of Winnipeg, who, though wounded twice by machine-gun fire, continued to pass up and down in front of the wire, seeking a point of entry, and cheering and helping his men. He was hit for the third time, this time mortally, and carried out dying.
When it was found late in the morning that the 4th Division was held up some distance west of the Douay-Cambrai Road, The attack of the 10th Battalion was given up. That night, the 8th Battalion of Winnipeg relieved the 10th. This was the scene of a brilliant exploit on part of Private John Patrick Collins of Edmonton. When the 10th Battalion was held up by wire southeast of Epinoy, he went ahead alone, and of his own initiative, and although under heavy shell and machine-gun fire, and with no cover, proceeded laboriously to cut a lane through thirty yards of wire. He was wounded seriously in the leg, just as his task was completed. But our men charged through the gap, and captured their objective.
Very gallant work this day was that of an artillery officer, Captain James Creswell Auld, 1st Brigade Canadian Field Artillery. Following up the barrage, he established his O-Pip. observation post on the right flank of the infantry near Sa'ili. Seeing that the infantry were held up by machine-gun fire from the village, he went forward, laying a telephone wire, until he could direct the fire of his battery on the houses and barns where the enemy was fortified. The battalion on the right was holding a line with its flank exposed for some thousand yards to infillade enemy machine-gun fire, and had lost heavily, both in officers and men. Rushing forward, he called upon the infantry to follow, and carried the machine-gun post whence came the fire.
He was hit in the leg, but refused to be evacuated until he was unable to walk.
Further north, the Eleventh British Division consolidated its position along the south bank of the Cincy from the Voix de Quinoy, where it had established post overnight, to Obenshule-au-Bac, where the enemy had an important rail-crossing over the river, defended by a strong trench system. Throughout the day, the enemy put up a very stubborn resistance, throwing in fresh divisions, and endeavoring at all hazards to prevent our forces debouching on to the high ground between Cambrai and the Sensi Marshes. Measured by depth of penetration, the day's advance had been relatively small. But the capture of the Marquor line had been a great feat in itself, and it left us with a practical jumping-off line from the outskirts of St.
Aul on the south, through Sa'ili, Hainecourt, and Epinoy, to the Sinsee at Obenshule-au-Bac. East of this line, and on considerably higher ground, ran the Douay-Cambrai road, passing in a south-easterly direction from Obenshule-au-Bac, A little east of Epinoy, to one thousand two hundred yards east of Hainecourt. Thence, two thousand yards east of Sa'ili, to where it crossed the canal into Cambrai, at Newville St. Remy. Two thousand yards east of St. Ola, the Douay-Cambrai Railway, after leaving the Cincy, takes a wide loop east of Epinoy, to a point not far from the western outskirts of Abancourt. And thence, passing through Sancour, runs east of, and practically parallel to the road through Tilloy, into the sharp northern angle of Cambret.
This railway, with its high embankments and deep cuttings, was to prove a strategic feature of the first importance, both to the attacker and defender, in both of which roles Canadian troops were to figure at one time or another During the next few days.
Heavy fighting characterized September Twenty Nine, says the Corps commander. The Third Canadian Division, the Fourth Canadian Division, and the First Canadian Division all made progress in the face of severe opposition. The Third Canadian Division pushed the line forward to the junction of the Arras and Boupalm Road, the western outskirts of Neuville-St. Remy, and the Douay-Cambraie Road. They also cleared the Marquion line from the Beupalm-Cambrai Road Southwards towards the Scheldt Canal. These trenches were in the Seventeenth Corps area, but it was difficult for our attack to progress, leaving on its flank and rear this strongly held position. The Fourth Canadian Division captured Sancor, crossed the Douay-Cambrai Railway, and entered Blecourt, but later withdrew to the line of the railway, in the face of a heavy counterattack.
The necessity for this withdrawal was accentuated by the situation on the left. The Eleventh Division, in spite of two attempts, had been unable to occupy the high ground northeast of Epinoy. This had interfered materially with the progress of the 1st Canadian Division, and had prevented their holding positions gained early in the day in the neighborhood of Abancourt Station, The relinquishment of which, in turn, endangered the flank of the 4th Canadian Division.
The 3rd Division attacked with all three brigades in line, the 9th on the right, fighting its way down to the Scheldt Canal, the 8th in the center, and the 7th on the left. Very brilliant work was done by the 1st C.M.R. of Saskatchewan, in storming St. Ola in face of intensive machine-gun fire, Both from that village and Neuville-Saint-Remy beyond, where one of our staff officers described the rattle of machine-guns as drowning out the roar of the artillery. In this attack, the battalion lost three hundred and fifty men, but by two o'clock in the afternoon had cleared the village and pushed its line forward to the banks of the canal at Cambrette. Co-operating in the capture of St. Ole was the One Hundred and Sixteenth Battalion Central Ontario.
The assault gaining materially from the very brilliant action of Lieutenant Bonner, who, with one man, worked behind an enemy trench and bombed their way up it from the rear. Two whiz-bang batteries, a dozen machine-guns, and a large number of prisoners were gathered in here.
From a church tower in St. Ola, a clear view was offered of the city lying in the valley across the canal, where clouds of smoke indicated that the enemy was burning his dumps. In the dip of ground to the west of St. Ola lay a number of our field batteries in the open field, suffering heavy casualties from enemy counter-battery fire. Overhead, our battle planes pursued and drove back enemy scouting machines. Bringing down two within our lines, while a third was sent crashing by our machine-gun fire. Behind the ridge, along a sunken road, passed all manner of lorries, including our motor ambulances, paying no heed to bursting shells. Well up to our battle line, and marking by its curved formation the depth of the salient, we had pushed home.
Were our observation balloons, the familiar sausages? Once in a while the intrepid observers, not inaptly named balloonatics, were forced to descend suddenly by parachute when their floating homes had been rent by high explosives, or set afire by the flaming arrows of a daring enemy aviator. Back of all lay Bourlon Wood.
On the left of the Third Division, the Fourth Canadian Division pushed in a very vigorous attack, supported by a fine barrage, The Twelfth Brigade attacked at Five Twenty A.M. through the Tenth Brigade, with the Thirty-eighth Battalion of Ottawa on the right, and the Seventy Second, the Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver, on the left. The Thirty-eighth Battalion was held up because troops on its right were not up, and it was exposed throughout the day to a flank as well as a frontal fire. Though suffering many casualties, this battalion consolidated its line and beat off enemy counter-attacks. It suffered a severe loss when Lieutenant Colonel S.D. Gardiner, whose brilliant leadership had been a great stimulus to all ranks, sustained a broken hip and other wounds from which he subsequently died.
The Seventy Second Battalion pushed forward very gallantly, capturing Sancor and compelling the surrender of its garrison, numbering more men than the entire battalion's strength. Advance was then made in the direction of Blackmore, where the enemy was established in strong underground works with a formidable system of machine-gun posts. Lieutenant J. McKnight of B Company, with five men, penetrated into the village, and to this little advance party a hundred of the enemy surrendered, being marched out in column of four. The company coming up, the rest of the garrison laid down their arms. Three hundred and fifty in all. An overwhelming counterattack then developed from down the Bantenever beam, and our men fell back on Sancor, but taking with them two hundred and forty prisoners.
It is the first time we've had to chuck anything we've once got hold of, and we don't like it, said one of these Vancouver Highlanders. As they fell back, Four of our men, too seriously wounded to be brought back, could be heard putting up their last fight.
Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick of the Seventy Second Battalion set a fine example, rallying his men in the front line when the position was critical in face of determined enemy counter-attacks.
The Eighty Fifth Battalion was pushed up in support. and, passing through Sancour, beat off two or three enemy counter-attacks. During this period, Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Ralston was wounded in the cheek, temporarily losing the sight of one eye, but refused to be evacuated, staying with his battalion until it came out of the line some days later. The attack on the left had not developed as well as had been expected, and both the Seventy Second and Eighty Fifth Battalions held a very exposed position. Our position in Sancourt was, however, consolidated, and provided an advanced jumping-off point for the next day's battle.
At a critical period in the day's fighting, Brigadier General J. H. McBrien made a personal reconnaissance on horseback, during the course of which he was slightly wounded in the leg, but carried on until he had obtained the information required to continue the attack. Every battalion in the Twelfth Brigade was engaged during this day of exceedingly stiff fighting. The Seventy-eighth Battalion of Winnipeg, coming up in support, and equally distinguishing itself in beating off the overwhelming forces launched by the enemy in his effort to prevent our securing footing on the plateau. This battalion pushed out far on the plateau, and for a time was almost cut off. Most of its officers were casualties, and Brig.
Gen. McBrien sent up two of his intelligence officers in support. Staff Captain Barry, formerly of the Seventy Second Battalion, and recalled after only three days leave to take part in this battle, found himself isolated with seventeen men south of Couvelier. But notwithstanding his wounds, from which he afterwards died, He held the position against all assaults until support came up. Staff Captain Merston of Vancouver also did very fine work.
Here, once again, the stubborn qualities of the Canadian soldier were brought into full play, for it was only by the fine tenacity of all ranks that the ground consolidated was held.
On the left, on the fronts of the 1st Canadian and 11th British Divisions, The attack was generally held up. The Second Brigade, to the command of which Brig. Gen. R. P. Clarke had succeeded on promotion of Major-General Loomis to command the 3rd Canadian Division, attacked with the 8th Battalion of Winnipeg in the line, and good progress was at first made in the direction of Abancourt. But as the troops on our left failed to capture the high ground northeast of Epinoy, this temporary success had to be abandoned. The struggle for the plateau was now about to open. The positions attained by the intensive fighting of the three first days, September, Twenty Seven, to Twenty Nine, had brought us to the fringe of this plateau, whose possession must be followed by the fall of Cambrai, and the turning of the entire enemy line south, in the direction of San Quentin.
The position on our right had been made more secure by the advance of the Seventeenth Corps, which had captured the village of Proville, across the Scheldt Canal, southwest of Cambrai, and the anxiety regarding our vulnerable right flank was at length removed. Before entering on a detailed account of the fighting of the next two days, September 30 and October 1, a description of the battlefield is necessary.
As already explained, the ground in front of our line was bisected first by the Douay-Cambrai Road. and then further east by the Douai-Cambrai Railway. East of this railway lies a rough quadrilateral or triangle, bounded on the west by the railway, and on the north by the canal de la Seinecy, while its base is formed by the Scheldt Canal, running generally northeast from Cambrai to the point beyond Estrin, where it connects with the Seinecy. The Canadian Corps front along the line of the railway from the Scheldt to the Seine Sea extended over about 10,000 yards, and its attacking direction was northeast, its objectives being on the right to seize the bridges of the Scheldt, and in its center to seize the high land contained within this triangle.
The depth of the attack from St. Coeur northeast to Estron is about 9,000 yards. Superficially, the ground favored the direction of the attack, for the ridges all trimmed away to the northeast. Beginning at the Scheldt, the ground sloped gradually up towards the northwest, over a bare slope to a ridge on the 75 meter level, running some three thousand yards northeast from Tilloy. Roughly parallel to this ridge, one thousand to two thousand yards northwest, but with a little dip intervening, is a high, bare plateau, running finger-like from the railway between Tilloy and Sancor, northeast past Cuvallier, midway between that village and Palincor. Two thousand yards east, and a little south of Tilloy, is the hamlet of Morinches, with the wood of the same name low lying on the Scheldt.
Following the Scheldt another thousand yards east is the Pont A very important tactical feature being a series of bridges over the Scheldt and its spillways, connecting the northern bank with the industrial suburb of Escudouvres. Northeast another thousand yards is the town of Ramelis. Still, following down the bank of the Scheldt, two thousand yards northeast of Ramelis, is the village of Essoirs. whence a ravine cuts due west into the plateau towards Cuvillier.
In the fighting to follow, the area thus described, namely the Scheldt on the right and the plateau on the left, fell within the third and fourth Canadian divisional areas respectively, the immediate objectives of the former being Tilloy, Morinchese, and Ramelese, and of the latter Esquires on the right and Cuvillier on the left.
The dividing line between the 4th Canadian Division and the 1st Canadian Division on its left was provided by the strongly-marked feature known as the Batigny Ravine, running northeast from Sancour through Blocour, one thousand five hundred yards distance, thence through Batigny, one thousand eight hundred yards from Blocour, and so to the Seine Sea. Along the bottom of this defile runs a wooded highway, Affording excellent cover for enemy machine-gunners, who were able to sweep the bare ridges and plateau on either side.
Rising gently up from Battenay Ravine to the northwest, a series of small detached spurs fill in the ground to where it slopes down again on the north to the Sensi Canal, and in the heart of these, the strongly fortified village of Abancour, one thousand five hundred yards northwest of Battenay, offered a formidable pivot of defense. Between Aventcourt and Epinoy, three thousand yards west, lies very high ground, commanding Aventcourt and the Battenay Ravine. The position offered a tactical peculiarity, in that its strength lay rather with the ravines than on the ridges, whose exposed surface was everywhere dominated by artillery and machine-gun fire. It thus came about that our troops found that their task had but begun when they stormed the ridges, and that it was an infinitely harder task to cling on to the ground they had won in face of a withering fire that at times caught them in rear as well as in flank.
The skill with which the enemy continually filtered fresh troops, for the most part machine-gunners, along the ravine bottoms into the very heart of our defense, and in face of terrible punishment, was in its way a tactical masterpiece. But the truth was he was prepared for the greatest sacrifices in order to hold the plateau. He had actually brought divisions out of the active battle line in front of the Third Army to the south of us, and in front of our neighboring corps on the north, to throw in against the Canadian Corps. It was a last-ditch business. The spirit that animated him is shown by the following corps order, captured by us a few days later.
Soldiers of the Corps, up to the present time we have given up to the enemy a certain amount of foreign land of little value for military reasons, while causing him heavy casualties. The British are seeking a decision, and we of this Corps have a most important section from the point of view of a decision. Remember that here you are now defending your home, your family, and your dear fatherland. Remember how your homes will look if war is carried there and withered invasion of the enemy's hordes. If you will stand fast, victory will be ours as before, for you are superior to the enemy, who now only shows a desire to attack with tanks, and these tanks we shall destroy. Therefore, carry on. Use your rifle cold-bloodedly, and cold steel with courage.
I expect that every man will do his duty in the decisive battle coming from the general to the youngest private.
It is curious to note how yet once again the German soldier is told that it is only the tanks he has to fear. As has been seen in this great battle of Cambrai, the Canadian infantry depended almost entirely upon their own efforts and their admirable artillery. Nevertheless, It is beyond question that the tank became something of an obsession with the German soldier. His morale in this direction was supported by every kind of mechanical device, of which the anti-tank rifle was perhaps the most efficient. At the crossings of the Canal du Nord, south of Marquion, Canadian engineers located two hundred and forty-five anti-tank mines, which were destroyed by gun-carton. Various devices were used. A favorite being a loose plank left lying in the road, which required, however, the weight of a tank before setting off the detonator.
One of the few tanks at our disposal fell victim to a mine of this character.
-
8 08 - Operations: Sept. 30-Oct. 2 24:19
Operations. September 30th. To October Two.
The operation of September 30 was planned in two phases, says Sir Arthur Curry. In the first, the third and fourth Canadian divisions were to push forward across the high ground between the Scheldt Canal and the Blecourt-Bantinay-Rabine, when Broutinel's brigade was to pass through them and secure bridgeheads at Ramillies and Essoir's. The second phase, to take place on the success of the first, provided for the seizing of the high ground overlooking the Cincy River by the 1st Canadian Division and the 11th British Division. The attack commenced well, and the villages of Tilloy and Blecourt were captured by the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions, respectively. A heavy counterattack, however, against the 4th Canadian Division, and the left flank of the 3rd Canadian Division, assisted by exceptionally severe infilade fire from the high ground to the north of the Blecourt-Bantanay ravine, forced the line on the left bank to the eastern outskirts of Sancour.
The second phase of the attack was not carried out, and the net gains for the day were the capture of Tilloy, and some progress made on the right of the 3rd Canadian Division, from Newville-Saint-Remy, South. Prisoners taken during the day testified to the extreme importance, in the eyes of the enemy, of the positions held by him, and the necessity that they be held at all costs. Zero Hour was set for Six A.M. before dawn. It was designed to lay down a rolling barrage on the narrow front selected for the initial attack. And to protect the flanks by smoke barrages, to blot out enemy observation in the ravines and on the high ground to the north. For this purpose there was a considerable concentration of our artillery.
All our field batteries had suffered severely in the fighting of the previous days, as the guns had to be pushed up in the open, taking advantage indeed of what natural cover offered, but without prepared emplacements. Casualties were proportionately severe. Thus, on one day, the Twelfth Battery, Canadian Field Artillery, lost one officer, Captain Ross, and four other ranks killed, and eighteen wounded, and the Eleventh Battery, in an exposed position on the Cambrai Road, suffered a direct hit, and had twenty-seven casualties in one day.
The gallant work of our gunners under these trying conditions is well illustrated by the following extracts from the diary of the Thirteenth Battery C. F.A.
September. Twenty-seven, Berlon Wood Show, took position just after dawn between Inche and Canal du Nord, i.e., that is, across No Man's Land, and from there took part in second phase of attack. This was only possible by the smoke barrage, which screened enemy observation from Berlon Wood, which had not at that time been taken, moved position same evening to just north of Quarry Wood. Gunner McCallum wounded at guns, later killed on way to Dressing Station. Corporal R. Cameron, Corporal J. Mitchin, Bombardier King, and Gunner A. Patterson wounded at guns.
September 28th. Moved Guns to north side of Arras-Cambrae Road by a farmhouse one and a quarter miles west of Raelincore. Gunner Painter, wounded at Guns, later died of wounds. Same night, Bomb lit in wagon lines one and a half miles west of Guns, killing 28 horses, and wounded drivers Dawson, Melville, Blackmore, Monroe, Baird, Clark, Nelson, Hogg, and Corporal Riddell. Dawson died of wounds. Signallers, Murray and Clark, wounded on officers patrol. Clark died of wounds.
September 29, another show. Severe fighting, little progress. Shell and wagon lines killed driver Gagne and wounded driver W. Lawson, also killing eight horses. Moved up one section in afternoon under Lt. Stubbs and Simons. At 11 p.m. received orders to move up remainder of battery to forward section position on Sunken Road, just south of Hainecourt, for show before dawn next day. September 30, show, Zero Hour, Four Thirty A.M. Enemy had planned his decisive counter-attack with eight divisions on our two-division front, To commence this morning at 5 a.m. Counter-battery fire very intense. Two guns out of action by shell-fire. Gunner R. Leach killed at guns, Sergents H. Murray and Foster, and Gunner W.
Herschel wounded at guns. Terrific fighting by infantry, attacks, counter-attacks, etc. Terrific casualties, especially in infantry. Moved guns back in afternoon to form a position. Gunner's spear and wounded during night by stray shell at guns. October 1st, another show. Progress slight on account of reduced strength of units. Advanced battery 1,000 yards to next little dip in front. This battery was recruited in 1914 from Hamilton and Brantford, Ontario, and it is interesting to note that 34 originals were still on strength at the armistice. While the democratic character of the Canadian Army is shown by the fact that twenty-two of its NCOs obtained commissions. The attack went well at first, but with dawn came a heavy gale from the west, which resulted in the failure of our smoke barrage, and our men who had pushed out along the ridges became exposed to a tremendous concentration of enemy fire, presently supported by massed counter-attacks.
They have a machine-gun to every ten yards of front, said a brigade staff officer. There has been nothing like it in this war. From the ravines, they pick off our men on the ridges like crows. Over ninety per cent of our casualties are from machine-gun bullets.
The task assigned the 3rd Canadian Division was to capture Tilloy and Morin Sheese. and then push on to Ramilles in close conjunction the Fourth Canadian Division was also to push out due east with Essoise as the final objective. The attack on our right prospered from the start. Troops of the Seventh Brigade, including the PPLPs on the right and Royal Canadian Regiment on the left, capturing in succession Tilloy and Morinches, with elements even pushing on to the outskirts of Ramilles. Our position along the Shell Canal was thus consolidated, and a wedge driven in between the garrison of Cambrai and the German forces massed about the northern plateau.
Unfortunately, the same good fortune did not attend our left. The attack was undertaken by the 11th Brigade, to which the 85th Battalion had been detached from the 12th Brigade in support. The 100th Battalion, British Columbia, was also held in reserve, but was under very heavy fire throughout the day, and came into action at a later stage. The attack was carried out by the Eighty-seventh Battalion, the Grenadier Guards of Montreal, on the right, the Seventy-fifth Battalion, Central and Western Ontario, in the centre, and the Fifty-fourth Battalion, British Columbia, on the left. A good advance was made along the plateau under cover of darkness, but with Dawn and the failure of our smoke barrage as related above, the attacking force was subjected to a tremendous infilade machine-gun fire from Blecourt and Abancourt.
The men in little knots began digging themselves in on the bare upland, and there withstood wave after wave of enemy infantry, advancing with the utmost courage to the attack. Although great holds were torn in their ranks by our artillery and machine-guns, the position on our left was untenable, and our men fell back, fighting every step to the line of the railway. This, in turn, brought to a halt troops on our right, and finally led to their partial retirement. But although at one stage Tilloi was lost, we recaptured it before the end of the day. T. Loy will go down in the history of the P. P. L.I. Princess Patricia's Light Infantry as one of its most famous fights. After every senior officer had fallen, Captain James Nesbitt Edgar assumed command of the battalion.
At a critical hour, when three companies on the left were badly disorganized under tremendous machine-gun fire, and had even begun to withdraw from the position one, he went forward and rallied the men. Leading them on to their objective. By his cheerfulness, energy, and disregard for danger, he so inspired all ranks that they willingly followed him through the most intensive shell and machine-gun fire. And it was due to his unflagging work that enemy counter-attacks were beaten off, and Tilloy remained in our hands at the end of the hard-fought day. The character of the fighting, described by those who took part in it as the stiffest Canadian troops had ever faced, can best be gathered by following the fortunes of one of the battalions engaged, this being the Seventy Fifth.
This unit, as we have seen, had lost heavily in the successful attack on Berlon Wood. On the morning of September, Twenty Nine, it moved up from Berlon to the Lillas Farm on the Arras-Cambres Road. One, five hundred yards west of Raelandcourt, and about as much southwest of Hainacourt, bivwacking there for the night. Guides reported at Two. Thirty a.m. for the attack on the Douay-Cambrai Railway. The first objective. On the way into the jumping-off line, two company officers were killed at head of their companies, and only four officers per company were left. In the darkness there was some confusion. But three minutes before zero, every company was in its appointed place, five hundred yards in advance of our outposts, holding the line, and just west of the railway itself.
Our barrage opened twenty yards short of the railway, and then settled for ten minutes on the line of the embankment, following which our men went over. Three minutes later, the enemy, who had massed a number of divisions for an attack in force, Laid down an intensive barrage of five-point-nine-inch guns and yellow cross gas on the very area our men had just left, but causing not a single casualty. It was a much heavier barrage than our own, but ours was magnificently, uncannily even, accurate, destroying entirely the enemy's line of defense along the steep railway embankment. The second in command, Captain Duncan. A company commander was killed almost at once as the battalion swept forward. A hail of machine-gun fire came from the exposed left flank all along the Batinay ravine, and although a screen of defensive posts was thrown out against Black Corps, no troops could long stand up against such punishment.
The battalion fell back to the railway and clung there all day. Towards evening, Colonel Thompson was ordered to withdraw his men to the Marquion line. Two thousand yards back, but only fifty men were left unwounded, and every officer but himself had become a casualty. Nevertheless, what remained of this battalion went into action again on the following day. The fifty-fourth and one hundred and second battalions took over the posts established.
In Blecourt, besides numerous machine-guns, were four heavy guns, and a special battalion of Werthemberger marksmen, Stout fellows who made great play with their machine-guns. The attack had failed, but nevertheless the line of railway had been attained and held, and the enemy's evident intention of driving us back into Bourlon Wood had been frustrated by our bold offensive. But it was clear that the battle was far from won. We must either abandon what had been gained with so much heroism, and at such great cost, Thus crippling the general advance, or face the alternative of pursuing the battle with weakened forces until we had gained a decision and established ourselves upon the plateau. The issue is plainly set forth by Sir Arthur Currie, who then proceeds to trace the fortunes of the crucial battle of October One in the following terms.
The tremendous exertions and considerable casualties consequent upon the four days' almost continuous fighting had made heavy inroads on the freshness and efficiency of all arms, and it was questionable whether an immediate decision could be forced in the face of the heavy concentration of troops, which our successful, and, from the enemy's standpoint, dangerous advance, had drawn against us. On the other hand, It was known that the enemy had suffered severely, and it was quite possible that matters had reached a stage where he no longer considered the retention of this position worth the severe losses, both in men and morale, consequent upon a continuance of the defense. It was therefore decided that the assault would be continued on October 1, the four divisions in line attacking simultaneously under a heavy barrage, Coordinated by the G.
O. C. R. A. During the night, the Twenty-Second Corps took over a portion of the front held by the Eleventh Division, the Fifty-Six Division becoming responsible for the defense of the relieved front at 6 a.m. October 1. The attack made excellent progress in the early stages, and the troops reached the general line Scheldt Canal, East of Neuville-Saint-Remy, Morinchi's Wood, Couvilliers, Pantinay, All-inclusive. The decision of the enemy to resist to the last quickly manifested itself. About 10 a.m. heavy counter-attacks developed up the Batinet ravine from the direction of Raillancourt. These supplemented by Infilade fire from the high ground just south of Aventcourt, which still remained in the enemy's hands, due to a certain extent to the inability of the 11th Division on the left to make progress, were sufficient to press back our advanced troops.
Pockets of the enemy in Bleckhor and Bantinay continued to give trouble, and our line was ultimately forced by greatly superior numbers out of couvaliers, Bantinay, and Bleckhor. To continue to throw tired troops against such opposition without giving them an opportunity to refit and recuperate was obviously inviting a serious failure. And I accordingly decided to break off the engagement. The five days' fighting had yielded practical gains of a very valuable nature, as well as seven thousand fifty-nine prisoners and two hundred and five guns. We had gone through the last organized system of defenses on our front, and our advance constituted a direct threat on the rear of the troops immediately to the north of our left flank.
And their withdrawal had now begun. Although the ground gained on October 1 was not extensive, the effects of the battle and of the previous four days' fighting were far-reaching, and made possible the subsequent advances of October and November, in so far as the divisions engaged against the Canadian Corps drew heavily on the enemy's reserves, which had now been greatly reduced. It is worthy of note that the enemy employed six divisions to reinforce the four divisions already in the line, making a total of ten divisions engaged since September Twenty Seven by the Canadian Corps. In addition to their ten divisional artilleries and large number of heavy guns, these German divisions had been reinforced by thirteen marksman machine-gun companies.
In the same period, only three additional divisions And one regiment were employed by the Germans to reinforce the front from Honecourt-de-Cambre, a front of approximately 18,000 yards in length. This comparison of employment of reserves showed clearly that the enemy was greatly perturbed by the success of our advance, and the serious threat had offered especially to his northern defenses. Throughout this phase, very heavy calls had been made on the Corps artillery, Major-General E. W. B. Morrison and the Canadian Engineers. With the exception of the advances of the 1st Canadian and 11th British Divisions in the second stage of the attack of September Twenty Seven, all operations carried out during the five days took place under cover of artillery barrages.
The amount of ammunition fired was exceptionally large. And it was only by the most strenuous efforts on the part of all ranks of the artillery that the supply could be made to keep pace with the expenditure.
The success in this respect was to a large extent due to the exertion and skill displayed by the Canadian engineers, Major General W. B. Lindsay, in every branch of their activities, notably in bridge-building and repair of roads.
The night of September 30, October 1, was bitter cold with torrential rains, and for the most part the troops detailed for the attack next morning had to tough it out in the open. Zero Hour was set for 5 a.m., while it was still dark, and it was hoped that by a broad attack covering the entire Corps front between the Scheldt and the Sin C, the disastrous Infallide fire, which had stopped and thrown back our attack on a relatively narrow front of the previous day would be blanketed. This plan postulated success all along the line, and the development of a weak spot anywhere must seriously compromise success elsewhere.
The attack at first succeeded admirably. On the right, elements of the third division pushed on through Morin Sheeves. Seized the bridgehead at Pont-derre and established posts in Ramilles. The attack was intrusted to the 9th Brigade, with the 43rd Battalion Winnipeg on the right, and the 52nd Battalion, Fort William and Fort Arthur on the left, advancing under heavy machine-gun fire on the crest of the hill down the slope towards Ramilles. The 58th Battalion, Western Ontario, and the 11th Battalion, Central Ontario, came up in support. All four battalions being very heavily engaged. The One Hundred and Sixteenth pushed on into Ramilles, the attacking force rushing the bridgehead in face of the point-blank fire of a whiz-bang battery.
Major Carmichael, who had succeeded to the command of the battalion after Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Perks, had been wounded, and who himself had been wounded in the army in show, led his men throughout, and even after he had been seriously wounded, refused to be evacuated, staying with his command for two hours until he was no longer able to direct his men.
On the left of our third division, the fourth Canadian division also drove home its attack, the 11th Brigade advancing across the plateau and storming Pouvelier. But as has been related by the corps commander, a weakness developed on the extreme left, and in turn the 1st Canadian Division fell back, Forcing the withdrawal of the 4th Division, which found itself with its left flank in the air. The 1st Battalion, British Columbia, which had led the attack with great gallantry, was for a time in perilous danger of being isolated and cut off, and it was only the utmost heroism of its men, supported by flanking outposts promptly thrown out against Blackmore and Batinay by Brigadier-General Odium, that saved it from disaster.
In a day of wonderful deeds, particularly striking was the leadership of Lieutenant Fram Thomson Lyell, one hundred and second battalion, a native of Lancashire, who had enlisted at St. Catharine's, Ontario. Finding himself in command of the company on the right flank, now only fifty strong, by skillful dispositions he captured a strong enemy position east of Blecourt, and with it seventeen machine-guns and eighty prisoners, This he fortified, and clung steadfastly to it until relieved, thus preventing the turning of our flank. This officer had had a wonderful record throughout this battle. After leading his platoon against Berlon Wood, he rendered invaluable support to the leading company, capturing a strong point, which held it up by a flank movement, taking one field-gun, four machine-guns, and thirteen prisoners, The rest of the garrison being killed.
Later, his platoon, much weakened by casualties, was held up by machine-guns at the southern end of Berlon Wood. Collecting every man available, he led them toward the strong point. Springing forward alone, he rushed the position, killing the officer in charge, when the garrison surrendered with five machine-guns. Having made good his objective, capturing forty-seven more prisoners, He consolidated his position, and thus protected the remainder of the company. During this battle, Lieutenant Layal captured in all three officers and one hundred and eighty-two other ranks, one field-gun and twenty-six machine-guns, exclusive of heavy casualties inflicted.
End of Part Three, Chapter Eight, Recording by James O'Connor, Randolph, Massachusetts, May. 2010.
-
9 09 - Operations: Sept. 30-Oct. 2 -Continued 24:06
Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesay. Part Three, Chapter Nine. Operations, September 30th through October 2nd, Continued. What had happened on the left is described in the narrative of the 1st Canadian Division, already drawn upon so copiously. Orders were issued on the night of September 30th for a synchronized attack on October 1st by the four divisions in line. The 1st Divisional Front was extended a thousand yards to the south, making a total front of attack of about three thousand yards. During the night, the 3rd Brigade, Brig. Gen. G. S. Tuxford, Moved forward to the right and assembled behind the Twelfth Brigade, through whom they were to attack. The attack of the First Division was to be made by the Third and First Brigades.
The barrage opened at Five o'clock. On the right, the Thirteenth Battalion, Montreal Highlanders, attacked and captured Blaycourt, after very heavy fighting. On the left, the 1st Battalion, Western Ontario, and 4th Battalion, Central Ontario, launched the attack for the 1st Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. A. Griesbach. The 1st Battalion secured the line of the railway north of Blaycourt, but were unable to get beyond owing to the intense fire from Avancourt. On the left, the 4th Battalion got to within 200 yards of the railway, but were definitely held up there. Further on the left, the attack of the 11th, British, Division had been stopped at the very start. In the meantime, the 16th Battalion, Canadian-Scottish of Western Canada, and 14th Battalion, Royal Montreal Regiment, passed through Blaycourt and attacked on their right and left.
Cuvier and Bantigny were captured by eight o'clock by these battalions, respectively. Enemy activity on the exposed left developed into counterattacks against the Fourteenth Battalion, three being driven off. Both battalions were now in untenable positions. Enemy machine-gun concentrations on the high ground west of Abancourt, sweeping their left rear and artillery firing at point-blank range from their front. Under the circumstances, a retirement was ordered. The enemy being made to pay dearly for every foot of ground given up. A short stand was made at Blaycourt, but fresh enemy attacks forced our line back to the west of this village, a line held with the aid of artillery and machine-gun fire against continued enemy attacks.
The fighting to which the 1st Canadian Division was thus exposed was peculiarly bitter, and gave opportunity for many deeds of heroism. Thus, Captain Chester Francis Cummins of the 1st Battalion, Western Ontario, while leading his company, found that, owing to the darkness, his men were pushing in ahead of our own barrage. He ran forward, and under heavy machine-gun fire, checked and reorganized the men. In the subsequent advance, in which his company suffered many casualties, he was severely wounded in the arm. But with indomitable spirit and almost superhuman effort, he forced his way forward, cheering and inspiring his men until again hit. He nevertheless still pressed on, cheering and exhorting his men until he received a third and fatal wound.
In the attack on Abancourt, the 4th Battalion, Central Ontario, found itself held up by wire and machine-gun posts. Sergeant William Merrifield of Ottawa, finding that his men were being shot down by the deadly fire coming from two enemy machine-gun posts on high ground on the flank, attacked them both single-handed. He dashed from shell-hole to shell-hole until he had sniped three of the crew of the first post, and then killed the fourth with the butt of his rifle. He fell wounded into the post, but presently recovering. He clambered out and attacked the second post, throwing a bomb, and under cover of the explosion, dashed in and killed the three men working the gun. He then returned to his platoons, refusing to be evacuated and leading his men with great skill until severely wounded.
In this battle, Major Roderick Ogle Bell Irving, commanding the 16th Battalion Scottish, fought his last fight. He skilfully led the attack in the darkness, fearlessly exposing himself in all places until the objective of Cuvier was taken. The battalion had suffered severely, but he went along the line, reorganizing his men and consolidating the position. While he was engaged on this, at his outposts, a heavy enemy counterattack developed on the left flank of the battalion. He personally directed the fire of two machine guns until the ammunition was exhausted. When, seeing his left flank was in danger of being enveloped by the masses of the enemy, he ordered the withdrawal of the outpost line.
He remained until every man had left the outpost, but while retiring on the main line of resistance, he was fatally wounded. He refused to allow his men to stay with him as the enemy was rapidly surrounding the spot where he lay. His body was afterwards recovered by the battalion. The narrative of the 1st Canadian Division continues as follows. That night, the 6th Brigade of the 2nd Division relieved the 3rd Brigade, and the 2nd Brigade relieved the 1st Brigade on the left. The next day passed without incident, and on the night of October 2nd, the 2nd Brigade was relieved by a brigade of the 11th British Division, the relief of the 1st Division being completed by 10 o'clock on the morning of October 3rd, the division then coming into corps reserve.
As a matter of fact, the 6th Brigade was engaged during the day of October 1st, the 27th Battalion of Winnipeg, 28th Battalion of Regina, and 29th Battalion of Vancouver, all taking part in the battle, as did other elements of the 2nd Canadian Division, Major General Sir Henry E. Burstall. This division, which, as has been recorded before, had seen fighting all through the early summer months in the line before Arras, While the other Canadian divisions were in G. H. Q. Reserve, and had actively held the line of the Canal du Nord throughout September, was now brought up to renew the vigor of our attack on the following morning, the intention being for the 5th Brigade to go in on the right and the 6th Brigade on the left, relieving troops holding the center of our line.
These two brigades came up during the early afternoon, and for some hours lying in close support. They were here exposed to very heavy fire and suffered heavy casualties. Thus, the 6th Brigade was in support of the 9th Brigade along the line of the Scheldt, and though it had no actual fighting in this sector, one of its battalions, the 27th of Winnipeg, lost nine officers and a hundred and twenty-five men. Nothing is harder on troops than this passive exposure to a galling fire, and when the order came to move up in active support, there was general relief. Pressure was so great during the afternoon that it became necessary to use some of the elements of the 2nd Canadian Division in the line, and thus for the last time in the history of the Canadian Corps, all four of its divisions were engaged in a common battle line on the same day.
The description given above makes clear the reasons for the relative failure of this cumulative effort. There was here all the material for a striking success, and in the early morning all the objectives have been attained. But the weakness of our left flank due to the failure of the 11th Division to take and hold the heights between Epenois and Abencourt reacted all along the line. But this was only one cause. The other was our own weakened ranks. Together, with the unprecedented number of men at this stage in the war, the enemy did not hesitate to throw in against us. His losses were tremendous. Our artillery had never had such a day. From dawn until dark, they poured in their fire often at point-blank ranges, and the litter of enemy dead upon the battlefield, as it was afterwards exposed to our view, was nothing less than appalling.
If we had fallen short of victory, the sequel was to show that we had beaten the enemy to a standstill, and that he had no stomach left for further fight with the Canadian Corps. Allusion has been made before to a published narrative of the First Army, under which the Canadian Corps fought all the way from Eros to Mall. It is entitled, The Final Blow for the First Army in 1918, and what it says about this particular day is interesting. October 1st and 2nd. On these days, the fighting was extraordinarily severe. The Canadians, who are experts at tough fighting, acclaim it the stiffest they have ever been up against. The object was to take the bridge heads over the canal northeast of Combray. That once done, the enemy would be out of the commanding and extremely valuable high ground which, on the south, Commanded Combray with its railway junctions, and on the north rested on the St.
C. marshes, and overlooked the country to the north of them, in many ways a key position to the whole line. Here then, on ground admirably suited and organized for defense, and necessary to the Boche line, the Germans put up a desperate fight. Up the ravines from the northeast, especially up the hollow leading to Bantigny, they brought division after division. Thirteen divisions are known to have been thrown into the fight, only to be smashed by our tireless guns and our indomitable troops. One battery of heavies on October 1 fired 16 hundred rounds. The enemy's cleverly placed machine guns fought hard. Round Blaycor, as a center, the battle raged. But the machine-gun positions were hunted down.
The masses of the enemy were torn by our artillery fire with awful slaughter, to be replaced by others who suffered the same fate. The Canadians in the Eleventh British Division, though suffering from heavy losses and wearied with days of fighting and advancing, held and improved their ground. Pressed in front and with his retreat, threatened by the advance of the Third Army from the South, the Hun began sullenly to withdraw. Though still fighting, his shattered divisions. The ground was ours. The capture of Combray was now only a matter of time. Patrols had already entered its outskirts. It is difficult to give a true picture of this day's fighting. Did space permit? Official records of the deeds of individual officers and men who this day earned military honors would fill in the sketch.
A few of these have been given above. The following cases illustrate how the men fought day after day, almost without pause, until they were tired and battle-weary, but still refused to admit defeat. Lt. Milton Fowler Gregg, Royal Canadian Regiment, a native of Mountain Dale, New Brunswick, when the advance of the 7th Brigade on September 28th against the Marcoing Line was held up by a heavy machine-gun fire on both flanks and thick, uncut wire in front of the enemy trench system, Crawled forward alone and explored the wire until he found a small gap. Through this he led his men, organizing bombing parties which went right and left along the trench. The enemy counterattacked in force, and through lack of bombs the situation became critical for his company.
Although wounded in the head and weakened by loss of blood, he started back alone to our attacking line, and going from one company to another, collected a further supply of bombs, which he carried back, suffering a second wound, this time in his side. He found but a handful of his men left, but he quickly reorganized them and started to bomb the enemy out of his defense system. This consisted of a series of short trenches, three to seven yards long, and the enemy advanced over the top to the attack time after time, but at length he cleared the system, himself killing eleven and taking twenty-five prisoners. Notwithstanding his severe wounds, he steadfastly refused to be evacuated. On September 30th, he again led his company into the attack, but he was severely wounded and was ordered out by his senior officer.
He made his report at battalion headquarters and then collapsed. Lieutenant Honey, who had risen from the ranks of the Seventy-eighth Battalion of Winnipeg, particularly distinguished himself. On September Twenty-seventh, in the attack on Bourlon Wood, when his company officer and all other officers had become casualties, he took command and skillfully reorganized under severe fire. He continued the advance with great dash, and reached the objective. Then... Finding that his company was suffering casualties from Enfilod machine-gun fire, he located the machine-gun nest and rushed it single-handed, capturing the guns and ten prisoners. Subsequently, he repelled four enemy counter-attacks, and after dark went out alone, and having located an enemy post, led a party and captured the post and three machine-guns.
On September 29th, In the fight for the plateau, he led his company against a strong enemy position with great skill and daring, and continued in the succeeding days of the battle to display the same high example of valor and self-sacrifice. On the last day of the attack by his battalion, he was wounded in both legs, but carried on, doing wonderful work. Finally, he received wounds from which he died. Captain John McGregor, second, C.M.R., who enlisted at Vancouver but as a native of Nairn, Scotland, during the attack of the 8th Brigade on September 30th, although wounded, led his company under intense fire. When held up by a machine-gun post, he seized a rifle and single-handed and in broad daylight attacked with a bayonet, killing four and capturing eight of the enemy.
His prompt action saved many casualties and enabled the attack to go forward. Later on, he gathered his men together under intense fire and organized a party to fill in a gap in the flank and reinforced our troops attacking Tilwa. Hearing that two commanders of companies attacking on the right had become casualties, and seeing that the stubborn resistance of the enemy was holding up our advance, with absolute disregard of danger, he went along the line. organized the platoons, and taking command of the leading waves, continued the advance. Later, after a personal daylight reconnaissance, he established his company in Neuville-Saint-Remy, thus greatly assisting the advanced into Tilroy. During the attack on the Canal du Nord, on September Twenty seventh, Lieutenant Thomas Eason Miller, Eighth Battalion, of Winnipeg, led his platoon with great skill and gallantry.
His company commander became a casualty early in the engagement, and though he himself was wounded, he remained on duty, showing splendid judgment and coolness in command of the company, taking it to its objective. That evening, just west of Haincourt, the enemy counter-attacked on the exposed right flank of the 2nd Brigade, but Lieutenant Miller succeeded in building up a right flank, and that night he made a daring reconnaissance. Disregarding his wound, next day when troops on his right failed to keep up with the advance, he established contact by covering the gap and thus secured a very dangerous situation. On September 29th, when at 9 o'clock in the morning his battalion attacked east of the Douai-Cambres road, All of the officers of the two companies on the right having become casualties, he took command and led the attack successfully through two belts of wire and under heavy fire attacked alone a group of the enemy and captured 22 prisoners.
When troops on either flank failed to keep up, he consolidated a line and beat off three enemy counterattacks. At half past two that afternoon, he was knocked unconscious by a shell. But recovering two hours later, resumed command and protected the right flank against repeated attacks, refusing to leave the line until the battalion was relieved. His determination and coolness won a glorious fight. Sergeant Theodore Martin, in the same operation, when all the officers in his vicinity had become casualties, and though himself severely wounded in the lake, recognizing that the situation was most serious and must be controlled, remained in a shell-hole, where, although unable to move, he continued to direct his men for ten hours, refusing to be evacuated until relieved.
Not only did he display a great fortitude, but his cool and accurate messages telephoned into battalion headquarters throughout the day saved a very tight corner. Great heroism was displayed by the auxiliary services in this terrible battle, and by none more so than the chaplain service. Once again the padres gave proof of their devotion upon the field. Thus, Captain Albert Edward Andrew, chaplain of the Royal Canadian Regiment, when our men were forced to withdraw, for forty hours, without an interval for rest, made repeated trips into no man's land, often in the face of intensive machine-gun fire, bringing in our wounded. When all the officers of this battalion had become casualties, he remained in the front line, carrying food and drink to groups of our men, and inspiriting them, so that even in the midst of beating off an enemy counter-attack, they raised a cheer for his gallantry.
In this battle, Canon Scott of Quebec City, beloved senior chaplain of the 1st Canadian Division, was wounded by a shell which exploded beside him. Wounding him in many places, in arms, legs, and body. When he was wounded, the expression of surprise that he had so long escaped was very general, as it was frequently remarked that he was looking for it. On the route of evacuation, despite his painful wounds through aid-posts, dressing-station, and casualty-clearing-station, he carried his large crucifix in his hand and preached to those about his impressive sermons on patience, Christian fortitude, and resignation. A wounded soldier remarked how edifying it was to see how happy he was in his sufferings.
Gallant work, too, was done by the medical service. The conduct of the stretcher-bearers, Working continuously under fire was beyond all praise, and nothing could surpass the devotion of the drivers of the ambulances. Magnificent work throughout was done by our field ambulances, and also by medical officers attached to fighting units. Thus, on September 27th, Captain Albert R. Hagerman, M.O., of the Seventy-eighth Battalion followed close behind the attacking infantry and established a regimental aid post in the open under heavy shell and machine-gun fire. On September Twenty Ninth, he established a dressing station in a forward trench, and for two days he worked unceasingly under shell fire in this position, dressing hundreds of wounded.
In the intensive fighting of these days, casualties among regimental officers were particularly severe, these exposing themselves fearlessly in order to hearten their men. Among the wounded was Lieutenant Colonel C. R. E. Willetts of the Royal Canadian Regiment. In this battle, the Canadian Corps touched its pinnacle of fame. Beyond question, the battle, and especially the fighting of September 30th and October 1st, was the most savage and sustained in which the Canadian Corps ever engaged. Only the utmost heroism and tenacity of our infantry, ably supported by our gunners, enabled us to cling on in the salient we had driven into the heart of the enemy's defense in face of withering fire and there withstand wave after wave of counter-attacks by almost overwhelming numbers.
In this wonderful stand against enemy masses determined to wrest from them their conquests, gallant and heroic episodes were innumerable. Battalions, companies, and little knots of men stood their ground unflinchingly, though often detached and even cut off for a time from all support. It is the penalty of storming troops, such as the Canadian Corps, that they sometimes create for themselves in their impetuous advance unprotected flanks. The salient they drive into the enemy line becomes enveloped, and if power is not at hand to widen it out into a practical front, the troops in the apex must either fight it out against overwhelming odds or fall back. The latter is not the lesson the Canadian Corps had learned, and it was this desperate clinging to positions tactically untenable that contributed to our heavy casualties.
There is the case of a sergeant who refused to fall back when ordered by his superior officer, and fought his company all day until night descended. In those five days of battle, the Canadian Corps dealt such a blow at the enemy that he reeled back to final defeat. Above everything else, it was the unconquerable spirit of all ranks that gained the decision. Notwithstanding his lavish outpourings of blood, he had not shaken a whit or stranglehold on his vital pivot of Combray. But that we had gained the decision was by no means clear on the evening of October 1st. Our losses had been so severe, our reserves had been so freely drawn upon, that there was anxiety on all hands that night as to whether the morning might not see a last final thrust, such as we might be in no condition to fight off.
Logic was against it. He had used up against us on this day no less than thirty-three battalions. Our intelligence reported that since the battle opened, he had been forced to send to the north five reserve divisions he might still have drawn upon, and it was difficult to see where he could get fresh troops to continue the battle. It was a night of anxiety indeed, but there was the cheering sight of enemy dumps being blown up and burning in his immediate rear. But we were taking no chances. At five o'clock in the morning on October 2nd, our artillery laid down a tremendous counter-preparation along the whole line, designed to catch his waves should they be advancing to the assault. Nothing developed.
Dawn broke, and the enemy line was suspiciously quiet. Then word began to go around that he was falling back, that he had mistaken our barrage for another attack such as he had had to face in each of the five preceding mornings. The battle was won.
-
10 10 - After The Battle 25:29
After the Battle.
He's beat it! The word passed with incredible rapidity. His wind was up, and he had gone back to the canal. From corps commander to men in the ranks, it was a tremendous relief. The battle was won. Our sacrifices had not been in vain. Combray, sign-manual of our victory, lay within our grasp, and might be taken at any hour. As a matter of fact, this was not quite the case. His power for offense was indeed broken, but for some days yet he lay sullenly on his line running across the Bantigny ravine. Only at night great fires could be seen far in his rear. Some stiff fighting had still to be done before Combray fell, and the enemy was cleared out of the triangle on the hither side of the Scheldt.
But on October 2nd, after five days of the hardest continuous fighting in which the Canadian Corps had ever been engaged, knowledge came to us that the victory was ours. Four Canadian divisions, with the 11th British Division, had met and overwhelmed twelve enemy divisions. The fight had been over his chosen ground, where he had lavished every art of defense. After the initial surprise of the morning of September 27th, it had all been ding-dong uphill work, a battle entirely of infantry and artillery. So great importance had the men attached to the position that he had squandered men in its defense on a scale that recalled the early years of the war. But not then, nor for weeks afterwards, did we realize the magnitude of the victory.
It was the last battle on the grand scale in which the Canadian Corps was engaged. Thereafter followed much hard fighting, particularly before Valensee, and even up to the very gates of Molles. But it was on a divisional rather than on a corps scale. The corner was turned. The enemy was so badly beaten that hereafter his one desire was to get away, and though he fought stout rearguard actions, they were but in the nature of delaying battles. Pressure was too great and continuous for him to attempt to make a permanent stand. He had had his belly full of the Canadian Corps. His best divisions had been washed out, and could never again take their place in the battle line. The vaunted Hindenburg system was no more.
Skillful use though he made of the country, he had no prepared line, no elaborate system of trenches and wire, no nests of concrete machine-gun posts on which to rally his retreating forces and make a last bid for victory. He was bankrupt both in resource and plan. He had lost so many guns that his gunners were chary of working their batteries from advanced positions. His efforts, indeed, were devoted to getting back his heavier batteries to safer positions in the rear, and more and more he depended upon his devoted machine-gunners. The victory was complete, indeed. So far as the Canadian Corps was concerned, it definitely ended Field Marshal Haig's first phase, and its repercussions along the West Front heartened our battling armies and brought dismay to the counsels of the enemy.
More, perhaps, than any other battle of this period, it broke his spirit, weakened his stomach for the fight, and set up that general rot which so soon was to convert his retreat into what was little better than a rout. But on October 2nd we knew nothing of this. The historian, with before him the results of a battle, cannot enter into the feelings of the men who fought it. He cannot envisage their tired bodies and wearied spirits. From his wide survey, he fails to realize that even as they congratulate themselves on a victory and lick their sores, they are girding themselves for the next great battle. Certainly few in the Canadian Corps could then grasp its full significance. Indeed, we had had such a grueling, had lost so heavily, that common talk was that we should go out of the line to refit.
It was said that already our first division had been taken out. We knew the Boche was beaten, because, given everything in his favor on that never-to-be-forgotten night of October 1st and 2nd, he had failed to come again, and next day had abandoned us to the bloody field. But we quite expected him to bring up new divisions and throw them in once more. Battle vision is extremely limited. Everyone is intensely engaged on his own particular job. His concentration and preoccupation do not permit him to survey intelligently the front as a whole. He hears, but immediately forgets, that so-and-so on our right is doing great things, and down south the Boches have fallen back many miles. For him, the enemy immediately in front is everything.
That is the fellow he has to tackle and overcome. And his experience is that when he has done it once, he will have to do it all over again a few miles further on. He respects the enemy, because he has come to know him as a good fighting man. He cannot understand his psychology. He cannot understand how his machine-gunners, after putting up a desperate resistance and taking terrible toll of our ranks, throw up their hands to the cry of, Kamerade! Directly we are on them with bombs and cold steel. But, brave man himself, he admits that up to a certain point, and particularly in those long waves of counter-attack, the Boche is brave too. He cannot, in a word, conceive that the enemy he has fought four years under all sorts of conditions is about to crumple up and in six weeks' time will be content to sign a shameful armistice.
He sees going over his head our propaganda balloons and has heard they are doing good work. But then he has picked up German propaganda and lit his pipe with it. Such then was the attitude of mind of the regimental officer and the men in the ranks. But they were mighty pleased to have given the Boche such a licking, but on October 2nd they were more intent on riding their way into comfortable winter quarters in Combray than on anything else. Word went round that the British Corps on our left was to winter in Combray. We were very peeved. What then did we think about it all? We thought so long as fine weather lasted, we should punish the Boche as hard as we could, and finish the job next spring, when the American army would have attained great strength and gained real battle experience.
Let us try to put ourselves back into that state of mind. Captured enemy orders had exhibited desperate efforts to return to the battle tactics of the successful years by abandonment of the principle of the thinly held screen of machine guns backed by great depth of defense. This system was adopted as the consequence of a weakened manpower resulting from his abortive offensive of the previous summer, the final bid for victory. His plans were then so perfected. His preparation on such a scale that he was convinced failure was impossible. He did fail. We are not here concerned with the causes. But he came so perilously near success that the strategic situation on the Marne warranted his throwing in every available bayonet.
When it developed that all this tremendous sacrifice of manpower had been in vain, So far from losing heart, he took best measures possible to avert defeat and the annihilation of his armies. For his offensive, he substituted a mobile defensive, shortening his lines and seeking in every way to economize and augment his depleted manpower. His chief surprise packet of 1918 was the enormous number of his machine-guns, He proposed, in fact, to base his defense on machine-gun posts instead of rifles, and a better illustration of his system could not offer than the character of the opposition encountered by the Canadian Corps during the Battle of Combray. Theoretically, a machine-gun every ten yards should have stopped infantry attacking over open ground, but in practice it failed.
Failure thus demonstrated, he sought to return to defensive by the counteroffensive of field gray masses, as was shown on October 1st. Passive defense proved ruinous to his morale. To regain even local initiative, he must have something like equality of manpower, where its need is supreme on the shock front of battle. A document we captured at Combray instructs commanding officers that they must no longer depend on a perfunctory front line of resistance, nor on outposts of machine-gunners, with infantry supports and reserves deeply echeloned in the rear. The danger has pointed out that the driving in of the light front line tends to create disorder and spread consternation behind. Front lines must be held in force with supports and reserves well forward.
Particular attention is to be given to the protection of positions by anti-tank contrivances. Finally, the troops are exhorted to die at their posts if they hope to keep the enemy out of the fatherland. The result of these admonitions was seen in the Battle of Combray. There was a return to infantry counter-attacks. These, in turn, could be afforded only by a shortening of the line. This fierce battle, therefore, which seemed to our men engaged in it by the opening of the most intensive fighting of the campaign, in reality compelled the enemy to begin the retreat he was so soon to inaugurate. We had exhausted his reserves, and he must shorten his line. With his back to his own frontier, not only would his own line be considerably reduced, but he might feel he could count on a corresponding betterment in the morale of his men.
From that new orientation, he might reason with some plausibility that he could return with success to the counteroffensive, and teach the allies such a lesson that they would be glad to conclude what he considered a reasonable peace. Well on in October, After his retreat had begun, that was how the situation appeared. If that train of reasoning had hung together, we had still before us some of the hardest fighting of the war. The question was whether the German soldier was capable of such incessant retreats without loss of fighting spirit. Could the German psychology, fed on superhuman doctrines, resist such constant sapping of its faith and its own invincibility? And, again, had Fauch the power to turn this ordered retreat into a rout.
The answers to these questions were given in the second phase, now opening for the Canadian Corps. Such were the obscurities through which we moved. But a great ray of illumination was about to break upon us had we the wit to seize its significance. This was the first enemy proposal for an armistice. With the material facts accumulating, the publication of official reports, memoirs, and diaries, and those intensely interesting human documents wherein unsuccessful leaders seem compelled to take the world into their confidence, already the task of the historian grows easier, and he is able to pierce the veil of mystery that hung before us in early October of 1918. A notable contribution of this nature is that of Colonel Bauer, head of the Artillery Department at Great General Headquarters, but who is also credited by German public opinion with having been the special confidant and political inspirer of Ludendorff.
He has published in pamphlet form the German General Staff's version of the events which led up to the armistice. And from the facts he relates the London Daily Telegraph has deduced that it is clear that Ludendorff realized as early as the first half of August, 1918, that the war was lost, and that the request for an armistice was the result of urgent and repeated demands from General Headquarters. There is nothing in this new to the reader, for we have seen in the account of the Amiens show how after the events of August 8th, Lundorf made up his mind that all hopes of gaining a military decision must be abandoned. But it is extremely interesting and instructive to gather from Colonel Bauer's narrative how the immediate effect of the storming of the Canal du Nord by the Canadian Corps was to convince Ludendorff that not a day must elapse if any part of all that had been now lost in battle could be saved by negotiation.
Colonel Bauer's pamphlet is in part as follows. On June 30, 1918, Herr von Hintz had succeeded Herr von Kuhlmann. It was hoped that he would succeed in spinning piece threads. But nothing became known, although the government, that is to say also Herr von Hintz, were thoroughly acquainted with the internal and military situation. In his judgment of the situation, General Ludendorff was in complete agreement with the departmental chiefs concerned. As early as August 13th, that is to say, as soon as he had a clear picture of the result of the reports received as to the inglorious August 8th, Ludendorff invited the Chancellor and Herr von Hinz to a sitting, and gave them a clear picture of the military situation.
On August 14th, a fresh discussion took place under the presidency of the Emperor. The Chief Army Command emphasized the necessity of an early conclusion of peace, as we were at the time still strong. But had to reckon with an increasing deterioration of the military situation. Herr von Hintz renewed his promise to initiate peace overtures. All through September, the Chief Army Command waited full of anxiety as to what fruits the presumed activity of the Foreign Office would bear. But when four weeks had passed without result, Ludendorff decided on September 28th, 1918, in complete agreement with all the responsible departmental chiefs of the operations section, to report to the field-marshal that the moment had come to submit to the imperial government the demand that peace negotiations should be inaugurated immediately, and for this purpose an armistice proposed to the Entente.
The field-marshal agreed. On September 29th, Admiral von Hintz and Count Rodern Imperial Ministry of Finance, who had been summoned to Spa, arrived at General Headquarters. From utterances of General Ludendorff as to his negotiations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it became known that Hintz had sketched a very gloomy picture of the internal political situation, had described Revolution as being at the door, and had proposed an immediate reconstruction of the government. After this had been confirmed, the military situation and the promotion of the peace step were discussed. Thereupon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared that a peace opera could only be made by a new government, which must be supported by the confidence of the entire people.
The old government, he said, was compromised both at home and abroad. It was regarded as mendacious and insincere. Herr von Hintz expressed the opinion that a new government could be formed by October 1. His Majesty the Emperor charged Count Rodern to take in Berlin the necessary steps for the formation of a new government. The chief army command asked for an acceleration of the formation of the government. This the state secretary for foreign affairs promised. He said that he anticipated no special difficulties. The imperial chancellor, who arrived at Spa on the afternoon of September Twenty Ninth took no further action. As Ludendorff received news that the negotiations for the formation of the new government were dragging, he called up his representative in Berlin on October 1st, and urged him to put pressure on the vice-chancellor, von Pehr.
Now that the Chief Army Command has come to this grave decision, he said, we must insist that no time is lost. Payer replied to the representations made to him that there was no one who could sign a peace offer, as the new chancellor had not yet been appointed, and that he was still uncertain whether he could succeed in forming a cabinet. He asked whether headquarters would not agree to a postponement of the peace offer. This suggestion brought him the same day the following peremptory telegram from Hindenburg. If, by between seven and eight o'clock this evening, there is the certainty that Prince Max of Baden will form a government, I agree to a postponement until tomorrow forenoon. Should, on the other hand, the formation of the government be in any way doubtful, I consider it necessary to issue the statement to the foreign governments tonight.
Prince Max arrived in Berlin on the afternoon of October 1st, but now a new difficulty arose. Before he could accept the chancellorship, it was necessary for him to have the permission of the Grand Duke of Baden. This could only be obtained through the mediation of the Emperor, who was on the journey from Spa to Berlin. However, the Imperial train was stopped at Cologne, and by a strenuous use of the telephone, the Grand Duke's consent was received by midnight. On the following morning at nine o'clock, the representative of headquarters submitted to the leaders of the Reichstag parties, who met under the chairmanship of the vice-chancellor, a report on the situation containing the following notable passages.
The chief army command has been compelled to take a terribly grave decision, and declare that, according to human probabilities, there is no longer any prospect of forcing peace on the enemy. Above all, two facts have been decisive for this issue. First, the tanks. The enemy has employed them in unexpectedly large numbers, where, after a very liberal clouding of our positions with artificial mist, they affected a surprise. Our men's nerves were often unequal to them. Here they broke through our first line, opened a way for their infantry, Appeared in the rear, created local panics, and threw the control of the fighting into confusion. Where they had once been identified, our tank defense weapons and our artillery quickly settled with them.
Then, however, the misfortune had already happened, and solely the successes of the tanks explained the large number of prisoners which so painfully reduced our strengths, and brought about a more rapid consumption of reserves than we had hitherto been accustomed to. We were not in a position to oppose to the enemy equal masses of German tanks. Their construction would have exceeded the resources of our industry, which was strained to the uttermost, and other more important things would have to be neglected. But it is the reserve situation which has become absolutely decisive. The army entered a great battle with weak complements. In spite of all the measures adopted, the strength of our battalions sank from about 800 in April to about 540 at the end of September.
Moreover, this number could only be maintained by the dissolution of twenty-two infantry divisions, the equivalent of sixty-six infantry regiments. The Bulgarian defeat devoured seven further divisions. There is no prospect of bringing these strengths to a higher level. The current enrollments, the convalescents, and the combings, out, will not even cover the losses of a tranquil winter campaign. Only the embodiment of the nineteen hundred class will give the battalion's strengths a single increase of one hundred men. Then our last reserve of men will be exhausted. The losses in the battle now in progress have been unexpectedly high, especially in officers. More than ever the troops require the example of their officers, whether in defense or attack.
The officers had to, and have, recklessly risked and sacrificed themselves. The regimental commanders and higher leaders fought in the front line. Only one example. In two days of battle, one division lost all its officers killed or wounded. Three regimental commanders were killed. The small body of active officers still available has melted away. The building up of the divisions coming from the great battle is now hardly practicable. What is true of officers is also true of non-commissioned officers. Through American help, the enemy is in a position to replace his losses. American troops as such are not of special value, to say nothing of being superior to ours. Where they attained initial successes by mass tactics, they were repulsed in spite of their superiority in numbers.
It was, however, decisive that they were able to take over wide stretches of front, and thus give the English and French the possibility to set free their own battle-tried divisions and create for themselves almost inexhaustible reserves. So far, our reserves have sufficed to fill the gaps. The railway brought them up promptly. Assaults of unparalleled severity were repulsed. The battles are described as of unexampled severity. Now our reserves are coming to an end. If the enemy continues to attack, the situation may demand that we retire fighting along large stretches of the front. In this way, we can continue the war for an indefinite time, impose heavy losses on the enemy, and leave behind us devastated country.
But that can no longer give us victory. These perceptions and events brought to maturity in the minds of the General Field Marshal and General Ludendorff the decision to propose to the Emperor to attempt to break off the struggle, in order to spare the German nation and its allies further sacrifices. Just as our great offensive of July, Fifteenth, was immediately broken off when its continuation was no longer commensurate with the necessary sacrifices, Even so, it has now become necessary to abandon the continuation of the war as hopeless.
We still have time for this. The German army is still strong enough to delay the enemy for months, to attain local successes, and to confront the Entente with fresh sacrifices. But every additional day brings the enemy nearer to the goal, which will make him less inclined to conclude a peace which would be tolerable for us. Therefore, no time must be lost. Any twenty-four hours may change the situation for the worse, and give the enemy a chance of clearly recognizing our present weakness. That might have the most disastrous consequences for the prospects of peace as for the military situation. Commenting on this, the Daily Telegraph says, From Colonel Bauer's narrative and the documents which he cites, It is established beyond controversy that Prince Max's request for a cessation of hostilities, sent off on the night of October Fourth and Fifth, was the result of the action not of the politicians but of the generals, and that the motive behind it was the realization that Germany had been beaten in the field and could only escape appalling military disaster by the transfer of the struggle from the battleground to the Green Table.
Any hopes that Ludendorff may have had of being able to stem the tide were finally wrecked in this battle of Combray. The Canadian Corps had done far more than break down the defense on their front. They had pierced through his entire system, had cut off his armies in the north from his armies in the south, and had turned the Hindenburg line so that thereafter our third and fourth armies were able to march forward, capturing towns and villages, and encountering for the most part but enemy rearguards, fighting delaying actions. Only at St. Quentin was a real organized defense offered, and that soon broke down before the valor of British and Australian troops.
-
11 11 - The Corps Commander 26:08
THE CORE COMMANDER. On October 3rd, the corps commander issued the following special order to the troops of his command. I wish to express to all troops now fighting in the Canadian Corps my high appreciation of the splendid fighting qualities displayed by them in the successful battle of the last five days. The mission assigned to the Corps was the protection of the flank of the Third and Fourth Armies in their advance, and that mission has been carried out to the complete satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief. In your advance, you overcame the very formidable obstacle of the Canal du Nord. You carried by assault the fortified Bourlon wood, the marcoing line, and seized the high ground extending along the Douai-Cambres road.
The towns of Oiseleverger, Epinois, Haincourt, Marquion, Sainz-le-Marquion, Saint-Cour, Bourlon, Fontaine-Notre-Dame, Raincourt, Sailly, Saint-Hoy, Neuville-Saint-Remy, and Tillywa are now ours, and your patrols have entered Combray itself. How arduous was the task assigned to you, and how valuable to the enemy was the ground that you captured, can be judged by the fact that whereas in the operations of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th British armies, thirty-six enemy divisions have been engaged to this date. Twelve of those divisions, supported by eleven independent machine-gun units, have been met and defeated by the Canadian Corps. As you formed the flank, you suffered enfilade and frontal artillery fire all the way, and the hundreds of machine-guns captured testifies to the violence of the opposition from that source.
Every evidence confirms the fact that the enemy suffered enormous casualties. He fought stubbornly and well, and for that reason your victory is the more creditable. You have taken in this battle over seven thousand prisoners and two hundred field and heavy guns. Thus bringing the total captures of the Canadian Corps since August 8th of this year to 28,000 prisoners, 500 guns, over 3,000 machine-guns, and a large amount of stores of all kinds. Even of greater importance than these captures stands the fact that you have wrested 69 towns and villages and over one hundred and seventy-five square miles of French soil from the defiling Hun. In the short period of the two months, the Canadian Corps, to which were attached the 32nd Division for the Battle of Emile, the 4th and the 51st Divisions for the Battle of Arras, and the 11th Division for this Battle of Cambrai, has encountered and defeated decisively 47 German divisions, that is, nearly a quarter of the total German forces on the Western Front.
In the performance of these mighty achievements, all the arms and branches of the corps have bent their purposeful energy, working one for all and all for one. The dash and magnificent bravery of our incomparable infantry have at all times been devotedly seconded with great skill and daring by our machine-gunners, while the artillery lent them their powerful and never-failing support. The initiative and resourcefulness displayed by the engineers contributed materially to the depth and rapidity of our advances. The devotion of the medical personnel has been, as always, worthy of our praise. The administrative services, working at all times under very great pressure and adverse conditions, surpassed their usual efficiency.
The chaplain services, by their continued devotion to the spiritual welfare of the troops and their utter disregard of personal risk, have endeared themselves to the hearts of everyone. The incessant efforts of the Y.M.C.A. and their initiative in bringing comforts right up to the front line, in battle, are warmly appreciated by all. The victories you have achieved are the fruit of the iron discipline you accepted freely and of the high standard you have reached in the technical knowledge of your arms and the combined tactical employment of all your resources. You must, therefore, with relentless energy maintain and perfect the high standard of training you have reached, and guard with jealous pride your stern discipline.
Under the lasting protection of divine providence, United in a burning desire for the victory of right over might, unselfish in your aims, you are and shall remain a mighty force admired by all, feared and respected by foes. I am proud of your deeds, and I want to record here my heartfelt thanks for your generous efforts and my unbounded confidence in your ability to fight victoriously and crush the enemy wherever and whenever you meet him. The great spirit and high purpose of Sir Arthur Currie shine out through these words. He had reason, indeed, for pride in the achievements of his command, and he gives generous and unstinted praise to all arms. In a great measure, as we have seen, it was his own battle, planned by himself, a daring piece of strategy whose even partial failure must have meant ruin almost irretrievable.
That risk he faced because of his faith in the men they led, in their courage and high state of efficiency. But in those five critical days he must have passed many anxious hours, for long victory hung in the scales. It was such a crisis as Grant had in his mind when he wrote in his memoirs that, in every well-contested battle, there comes a moment when the combatants on both sides become exhausted. And the general who at that moment first finds it in his heart to make one more effort will generally succeed. By nightfall of October 1st, the enemy was exhausted and the battle won. The men of the Canadian Corps were very wonderful, but they owed much more, perhaps, than the Canadian public realized to their commander.
Even a professional army of long-standing and old traditions is what its commander makes of it. Wrote the late Colonel G. F. R. Henderson in his History, Stonewall Jackson in the American Civil War. Its character, sooner or later, becomes the reflex of his own. From him, the officers take their tone. His energy or his inactivity, his firmness or vacillation, are rapidly communicated even to the lower ranks. And so far-reaching is the influence of the leader that those who record his campaigns concerned themselves but little as a rule with the men who followed him. The history of famous armies is the history of great generals, for no army has ever achieved great things unless it has been well commanded.
If the general be second-rate, the army also will be second-rate. Mutual confidence is the basis of success in war, and unless the troops have implicit trust in the resolution and resources of their chief, hesitation and half-heartedness are sure to mark their actions. They may fight with their accustomed courage, but the eagerness of the conflict, the alacrity to support, the determination to conquer, will not be there. The indefinable quality which is expressed by the word moral will, to some degree, be affected. And the writer goes on to quote the proud words of Jackson, so applicable to the Canadian Corps. My men sometimes fail to drive the enemy from his position, but to hold one? Never.
Foch, that great master of the art of war, once said in the course of his lectures to the French Staff College, Who says chief means a man of character? That goes without saying, but means also a man capable of understanding and contriving in order to obey. And in another place, to be disciplined does not mean that the soldier commits no fault against discipline, that he commits no disorder. To be disciplined does not mean that the soldier executes the orders received in such measure as seems convenient. Just, rational, or possible, but that he enters frankly into the thought and into the views of the chief who has given the order, that he takes all the steps humanly practicable to give his chief satisfaction.
To be disciplined does not mean to keep silence, to abstain from action, or to do that only which the soldier thinks he may do without compromising himself. It is not the art of avoiding responsibilities, but rather of acting in the sense of the order received, and for that purpose of finding in the mind, by research and reflection, the possibility of carrying these orders out, of finding in the character the energy to face the risks which the execution of the orders involve. Foch quotes with approval the saying of Joseph de Mastre. A battle lost is a battle which the army believes to be lost, for a battle cannot be lost materially. Conversely, a battle gained is a battle in which the army refuses to admit itself beaten.
Foch goes on to say, No victory can be won without a vigorous command, greedy of responsibilities and ready for bold enterprises. Possessing and inspiring in all the energy and resolution to go to the very end. Without personal action rendered in goodwill, without judgment, without freedom of spirit, in the midst of danger, gifts natural in the highly endowed man, in the general born, advantages acquired by work and reflection in the ordinary man. Sir Arthur Currie took his life and reputation in his hands when he decided to attack the Canal du Nord at Inchie. If he had failed, he would have been covered with shame and obloquy. He had been warned, as we have seen, by Sir Julian Byng, of the formidable nature of his self-appointed tasks.
Indeed, it is not too much to say that at that time no other troops in Europe could have undertaken with confidence that astonishing feat of arms. Not only did the device meet with entire success, but it saved many thousands of casualties that must have been fruitlessly incurred if the corps commander had stuck by his book, by the letter of his orders, and thrown the corps into a second passendale at the flooded triangle of the Saint-Cy and the Canal du Nord. He thus gave proof of the highest discipline and obedience as defined by Foch himself, But, to put it mildly, this was not the definition that prevailed in the British armies, where the bad old tradition, there's not to reason why, too often and too completely obtained.
The Canadian Corps, with its aggressive commander, could not therefore have been popular with the higher command. It was always stepping out of its routine course, its prescribed battle area, and butting into other people's territory and field of activity. And in doing so, it was inevitable that certain corns were trodden upon, certain susceptibilities bruised, certain reputations imperiled. In time, the people of Canada will come to realize how great a figure Sir Arthur Currie was on the West Front, how his commanding personality on the one hand, his passionate devotion to his men on the other, Coupled with the unique reputation the Canadian Corps had won as storm troops, and its independence of command in the sense that it was not permanently attached to any particular army, but was thrown in wherever need was greatest, made him something more than a corps commander in the ordinary sense.
Made him, in the closing months of the war, a force to be reckoned with, and even on occasion placated. Had the war continued, he might have gone far. His military genius recognized, his vigorous leadership proved, save that there must have still attached to him the proud disability of being a Canadian citizen soldier. But, according to the letter of the law, he is not a good subordinate. He cannot be popular with the powers that be. He is always complaining about something, getting his own way, or making it unpleasant for people if he doesn't. Thus, when ordered to abandon his planned offensive at Lenz, and take the corps up to the Salien. He refused point-blank to serve under the commander of the Fifth Army.
He has placed under his old chief a First Army, looks over the ground before Passendale, and then protests against the whole operation as being useless in itself and likely to cost the corps fifteen thousand casualties. But he is told it must be done. There are compelling political reasons. For after the terrible battles of nineteen seventeen, the morale of both the British and French armies is low, and it is essential to finish the season with a victory. The thrice-accursed Passendale Ridge must be taken. So he sets about to make of it the best job possible, and on that stricken field the Canadian Corps plants again the standard of hope in the heart of the Allies. Then, in the panic of the following march, he finds the corps is being torn to pieces.
Its divisions hurried here, there, and everywhere. Orders given and countermanded, and then issued again. He protests strongly. The Canadian corps, whose value is tested, must be kept together. And he wins out. Again, in the Emile show, he protests at the strength of the corps, Now it has performed its allotted task, being whittled away in secondary but expensive operations in front of Roy, and proposes instead a drive on Bapaume. He ventures to make the suggestion that he believes, if we made an attack on the Third Army front in the direction of Bapaume and in conjunction with an attack by the French from their present line, we could force the Boche to evacuate the positions he holds on this side of the Somme without ever attacking him.
And this is exactly what did happen, though, as we have seen, the Canadian Corps was transferred to the Arras rather than the Albert sector. Finally, we arrive at that neck of the woods, the flooded triangle of the Saint-Cy and Canal du Nord. He says that it cannot and will not be done by the Canadian Corps, but he proposes an alternative, and goes in and wins. After the battle, a British Army commander, in no way connected with the operation, said that the attack of the Canadian Corps across the Canal du Nord With the subsequent extension of our line was the most brilliantly executed maneuver in the history of this war. Is all this insubordination? If so, it is a quality that makes for victory.
The average Canadian is willing to take a chance, because he has confidence in himself, and the Corps commander is very much a Canadian. He was not to be bound by precept, nor tradition, nor red tape. If he has a job to do, he must go about it in his own way and no other. As Zennephin puts it, the art of war is to guard one's liberty of action. Clausewitz, in his book, On War, enters very fully into the qualities of the successful commander. Military genius, he says, consists in a harmonious association of qualities of which one or another may predominate, but none must be in opposition. It is not the possession of one single quality such as courage, for this might exist while other necessary qualities of mind and soul were wanting.
After discussing physical and moral courage, he proceeds. The next requisites for war are a certain strength of body and also of mind, both of which are necessary to overcome physical exertion and suffering inseparable from war. Another essential is good, sound common sense. With the above qualifications, a man is fairly equipped for war, but to be a great commander he requires to have his understanding highly developed. Now, if a commander is to succeed in this perpetual conflict with the unexpected, two essential qualities are what the French call coup d'oeil and resolution. By coup d'oeil is meant a correct survey, not only by the physical, but also by the mental eye. A more modern expression for this is a quick and correct appreciation of the situation.
Resolution is courage in the face of responsibility and springs from the understanding. But mere intelligence is not courage, and many clever men are often without resolution. We must always guard against the fact that in great emergencies a man is apt to be swayed more by his feelings than by carefully reasoned thought. Resolution is the child of the intellect, and the outcome of reasoned thought backed up by a will determined to carry out what reason dictates. If we take a general view of the four elements composing the atmosphere in which war moves, namely, danger, physical effort, uncertainty, and chance, it is easy to conceive that considerable moral forces are necessary to confront them.
And these qualities are best described as energy, firmness, staunchness, and strength of mind and character. All these qualities are nearly related, but are by no means the same thing. Energy is an active quality, and one which a commander who is himself imbued with it can infuse into his subordinates. Firmness denotes the resistance of the will in relation to the force of a single blow. Stanchness in relation to a continuance of blows. A strong mind is one which, though capable of deep feelings, never loses its self-command, and in which the perception and judgment are able, under all conditions, to act with perfect freedom, like the needle of a compass in a storm-tossed ship, and which can retain its serenity under the most powerful excitement.
Strength of character means tenacity of conviction, whether it be the result of our own or others' views. Clausewitz goes on to say how necessary it is for the commander to have an eye for country, and he points out the difference between the qualities for subordinate and high command in the following terms. It is true that a man may be a brave, plain, honest soldier without being possessed of much power of reflection, Resource, or fine education. But these qualities do not by any means suffice for a man who aspires to acquit himself creditably in the higher ranks of the army. Each grade of command demands different qualities in different proportions, and an extra step in rank often loses for a man the reputation he had justly earned in a subordinate position.
By these standards, General Curry measures high as a soldier and leader. At the beginning of the war, it would have seemed incredible that a civilian could, within so short a space, rise to such military eminence. In this connection, a sketch of his pre-war military career is of interest. Born at Knapperton, Ontario, December 5th, 1875, Arthur William Currie is of Irish-Canadian parentage. His father's family emigrating to the eastern townships of Quebec in 1830. In 1893, he went west, teaching school at Sydney, British Columbia, and then followed some years of active business life in real estate and finance. In 1897, he enlisted in the 5th Regiment of Canadian Garrison Artillery, and three years later qualified for his commission as a gunner, obtaining his captaincy in 1902.
Always keen on the rifle, in 1905 he was elected president of the British Columbia Rifle Association, and in the following year was awarded his majority. Four years later, Lieutenant Colonel Currie was appointed to the command of the 5th C.G.A., and in 1913 he took command of an infantry battalion, the 50th Regiment Gordon Highlanders. A few days after the war opened, he took his battalion to Valcardiae. Training ground of the 1st Canadian Contingent, and next month was appointed Brigadier General of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade. In February 1915, he crossed over with his command to France. Mentioned in dispatches in June for his conduct on the battlefield, General Currie, in the following September, was appointed commander of the 1st Canadian Division, which he held until when, after Vimy, in 1917, he succeeded Sir Julian Byng in the command of the Canadian Corps.
Given a natural military genius, confirmed by long years of study of military problems, and such continuity of training as our militia cadres afford, and add to these four years of actual battle experience, and the thing is not so impossible. Sir Arthur Currie, indeed, is not the only example the war offers of a great citizen soldier, but he was fortunate that throughout his successive steps in command he had at his control a weapon inferior to none. When at last he came into command of the Canadian Corps, he had the imagination to look ahead and foresee the day when it might be called upon to break down the seeming impregnable wall the enemy had built across the Western Front, and this purpose he kept always before him.
Hardly had the bloody wounds of Passendale healed than he is at work training reinforcements, and infusing through all ranks the theory and spirit of the offensive. Making ready for the day that even in those dark weeks of March he saw faintly adumbrated upon the battle scene. Nothing, indeed, is more characteristic than the special order he issued his troops on March Twenty Seventh, nineteen, at an hour when many stout hearts quaked. It ran as follows. In an endeavor to reach an immediate decision, the enemy has gathered all his forces and struck a mighty blow at the British Army. Overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, the British divisions in the line between the Scarp and the Wise have fallen back fighting hard, steady and undismayed.
Measures have been taken successfully to meet this German onslaught. The French have gathered a powerful army, commanded by a most able and trusted leader, and this army is now moving swiftly to our help. Fresh British divisions are being thrown in. The Canadians are soon to be engaged. Our Motor Machine Gun Brigade has already played a most gallant part and once again covered itself with glory. Looking back with pride on the unbroken record of your glorious achievements, asking you to realize that today the fate of the British Empire hangs in the balance, I place my trust in the Canadian Corps, knowing that where Canadians are engaged there can be no giving way. Under the orders of your devoted officers in the coming battle, you will advance or fall where you stand facing the enemy.
To those who will fall, I say, you will not die, but step into immortality. Your mothers will not lament your fate, but will be proud to have born such sons. Your names will be revered forever and ever by your grateful country, and God will take you unto himself. Canadians, In this fateful hour I command you, and I trust you to fight as you have ever fought with all your strength, with all your determination, with all your tranquil courage. On many a hard-fought field of battle you have overcome this enemy. With God's help you shall achieve victory once more. This sincere, simple piety is an essential part of the man. It is the fiber of his being, and in the hour of distress he turns naturally and with complete faith to a higher power.
It is impossible to be long in contact with him without being convinced that here is a rock of a man. Strong of soul, direct, straightforward, marching straight to the goal, abhorrent of devious paths, yet very human, stern of purpose, But with a deep well of tenderness that suffers with his men, and seeks continually to spare them on any term short of treachery to the cause. Big in mind and spirit, as in body, he has actuated through all these hard days, but by a single motive—the honor of the Canadian Corps, and the defeat of the enemy.
-
12 12 - Capture of Cambrai 25:24
Chapter 12 Capture of Combray For some days now, we had held the west side of the Scheldt Canal, from the south of Saint-Doy through Neuville-Saint-Remy, and continual sniping went on between troops of the 8th Brigade, CMRs, Brigadier-General D.C. Draper, and enemy machine-gunners posted opposite in the suburbs of Combray. But to storm the city by frontal attack across the canal and then to fight our way through its narrow streets must have proved a very expensive operation without any commensurate gain. Great flares showed that the enemy was systematically destroying his stores, and in two or three districts, fire seemed to have hold of the houses. The city itself is dominated by the height to the southeast lying between the villages of Bergenier and Awoynt.
And it was decided that our attack should await the capture of this height by the XXVII Corps on our right. Progress here, however, was slow, and the combined operations set for October 8th failed to come off on that account. Had the troops on our right succeeded in capturing a point in their attack of that morning, the Canadian Corps was to attack at 9 o'clock the same evening, the bridgeheads from the north under cover of darkness. But though O'oint was not taken, it was pretty certain that the attention of the enemy was focused on that battle-front, and the occasion therefore appearing perpetuous, it was decided late the same night to attack in the small hours of the next morning. Arrangements had to be completed in a great hurry.
The corps commander describes the events of this period as follows. The 2nd Canadian Division had been in close support throughout the day of October 1st, and during the night October 1st and 2nd relieved the 4th Canadian Division and parts of the 3rd and 1st Canadian Divisions in the line from the railway south of Tilwa to Blaecourt inclusive. On relief, the 4th Canadian Division came into corps reserve in bivouacs in the Anchiette-Quent area. The relief considerably thinned out the infantry, and in anticipation of possible counterattacks, a large number of machine-gun batteries were placed in the line. October Second passed without any substantial change in the situation. The enemy's artillery was very active throughout the day, and at 615 p.m.
he delivered a determined counter-attack, with a force estimated at about a battalion strong against the ridge northeast of Tiloix, on the 2nd Canadian Division Front. This counter-attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. During the night, October 2nd and 3rd, The Eleventh Division extended its frontage to the right as far as Blaycor, inclusive, relieving the remainder of the First Canadian Division, who came into Corps Reserve West of the canal on completion of the relief. The dispositions of the Canadian Corps at noon October Third were as follows. In the line, the 3rd Canadian Division on the right on a 1-Brigade front, from the Arras-Combrae Railway to the Cambrai-Douaye Railway, south of Tilwa.
The 2nd Canadian Division in the centre, on a 2-Brigade front, extending to the northern outskirts of Blaycourt, and the 11th Division on the left, continuing the line to a point 1,000 yards south of Aubincheul-Aubac. In corps reserved the 1st and 4th Canadian divisions. The latter was moved to Billets in the Haute-Avesnes-Arras area on the night of October 7th, 8th, to give more opportunity to rest and refit. The period from October 3rd to 8th passed without any material changes on the corps front, An enemy counterattack was beaten off by the 2nd Canadian Division opposite Bantigny on the morning of October 4th, and the 11th Division considerably improved the line on the northern flank by successful minor operations on October 5th and 6th.
Many patrol encounters took place, in which some prisoners were captured, and our artillery and machine guns kept the enemy under continual harassing fire day and night. In addition, our heavy artillery carried out a daily program of gas concentrations and counter-battery shoots. Orders were received on October 3rd for the relief of the Corps by the 22nd Corps. Concurrently with this relief, and as it progressed, the Canadian Corps was to take over the front of the 22nd Corps. Plans for further operations having been formulated to take place on the Third Army Front, the Canadian Corps was ordered on October 5th to cooperate by forcing the crossings of the Scheldt Canal north of Combray, and the relief contemplated was therefore postponed.
The Third Army had been successful in crossing the Scheldt Canal south of Combray between Crevecourt and Provis. The operation now contemplated had for object the capture of Combray by envelopment. This was to be carried out in two phases. In the first phase, the Twenty-Seventh Corps was to capture Aloynt by attacking from the South. The Canadian Corps was to cooperate by artillery demonstration. In the second phase, the Canadian Corps was to cross the Scheldt Canal and, advancing rapidly, capture Escudouvre, joining hands with the XXVII Corps northeast of Cambrai. The positions occupied by the Third and Second Canadian Divisions were not favorable for an attack by day. The Third Canadian Division was in front of Cambrai, and house-to-house fighting was out of the question.
The second Canadian division was separated from the canal by glacis-like slopes, devoid of cover, and on which the enemy had good observation from the numerous houses on the east side of the canal, as well as from the high ground east of Escudouvray. In addition, Morinchiers, Pont-d'air, Ramiers, and the villages to the north were strongly held by the enemy. In spite of the difficulties of a night operation, it was decided that the 2nd Canadian Division would attack by night and attempt to seize the bridges before they were blown up by the enemy. The 3rd Canadian Division was to cover the right of the 2nd Canadian Division by capturing the railway embankment and entering Combray as soon as possible to prevent any action of the enemy against the right flank of the 2nd Canadian Division, which, under the best circumstances, was bound to be in the air for some time after the crossing of the canal.
Brutnell's brigade was to cross the canal as soon as possible, and extend the gains of the 2nd Canadian Division by seizing the high ground east of Thun-Saint-Martin. Ten brigades of field artillery were available for the operation. During the previous weeks we had made a number of set attacks just before dawn, but an attack at dead of night was a novelty. The 2nd Canadian Division held a line from Tillywa to just west of Blais-Cour. And the direction of their attack, with zero at 1.30 a.m., was to be due east. In order to distinguish one another, all the troops attacking were equipped with white brassards on both arms. The password of Combray was first selected, but owing to possible confusion with the familiar cry, Camerade, it was changed to Borden.
There had been a careful preliminary rehearsal in anticipation of the attack set for the previous evening, with a plotting out of positions for each platoon, for the advance must be made by compass alone, and everything depended on its orderly progress and the avoidance of confusion. The 5th Brigade, Brigadier General T. L. Tremblay, was intrusted with the attack on the right on the bridgeheads. The battalions in the line being the 25th, Nova Scotia, the 26th, New Brunswick, with the 22nd, French-Canadians, in support, and the 24th, Victoria Rifles of Montreal, holding the line in reserve. In the dark, it was impossible to mop up, and garrisons were left at stated intervals to deal with pockets of the enemy.
Advance of the infantry through the pitch-dark of a rainy night could not be synchronized to anything in the nature of a creeping barrage, and so instead the artillery laid down crashes on selected areas. Everything went well from the start. Our patrols had reported that the Boches were holding the sunken road west of Ramier, and the road vents running along the left bank of the canal to Morinchewood. On this area, our artillery laid a crash for ten minutes, then lifting their fire on to the line of the canal itself. Our men found that the enemy garrisons had been either wiped out or had fled, and advanced without opposition to the canal. The first objective, which was reached on the minute, it was of the greatest importance that a crossing should be made practical immediately, so that the attack could be pushed forward behind Combray itself.
For this purpose, Canadian engineers advanced with the infantry, bringing cork floats and bridging material. Pont d'air is a series of three bridges, leading directly into Escudouvray. And this was the scene of a brilliant exploit by an engineer officer, Captain Colson Norman Mitchell, commanding the Tunnel Company, 4th Battalion, Canadian Engineers, and a native of Winnipeg, Manitoba. He led a small party ahead of the first wave of infantry in order to examine the various bridges on the line of approach, and, if possible, prevent their destruction. Coming to the Pont d'Hre, he found the first bridge already blown. Under a heavy barrage, he crossed to the next bridge, where he cut a number of lead wires.
Then, in total darkness and unaware of the position or strength of the enemy at the bridgehead, he dashed across the main bridge over the canal. This bridge was found to be heavily charged for demolition, and whilst Captain Mitchell, assisted by his NCO, was cutting the wires, the enemy attempted to rush the bridge in order to blow up the charges, whereupon he at once dashed to the help of his sentry, who had been wounded, killed three of the enemy, captured twelve, and maintained the bridgehead until reinforced. Then, under heavy fire, he continued his task of cutting wires and removing the charges that he well knew at any moment might have been fired by the enemy, hurling his party and himself into the air.
He had thus saved two of the bridges, and shortened by some hours the work of repair. The artillery now lay down a barrage for two hours along the far side of the canal, giving our engineers time to lay their crossings. Both the 25th and 26th Battalions crossed over the Pont d'air before four-thirty a.m., and proceeded to their final objective, which was reached an hour later, before dawn. This was four thousand yards beyond the Scheldt, with outposts pushed out another one thousand yards. Strict orders had been given the 5th Brigade that none of its troops were to enter Combray. Otherwise, they could have penetrated from the north at the same time, as will be seen later, that the 8th Brigade was making good its entry from the west.
In this very brilliant night operation, over 300 prisoners were captured and many machine guns, our own casualties being practically nil. Many more prisoners were mopped up by the garrisons as soon as daylight appeared. But this feat of arms by no means exhausted the work of the 2nd Canadian Division that night. The Fourth Brigade, to which Brigadier General C. E. McQuaig had succeeded to the command on the appointment of Brigadier General R. Rennie to a command in England, was held in reserve. But the Sixth Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier General A. Ross, Brigadier-General A.H. Bell having been wounded, was set the important task of forming a left flank for the operation against the canal.
The brigade kicked off from a line east and southeast of Saincourt, and advanced to its first objective, a line a thousand yards southeast of Blaecourt, and then started to build up a flank from that point in a straight line to Remier. The advance began shortly after the attack of the 5th Brigade had developed, with the 31st Battalion of Alberta on the right and the 27th Battalion of Winnipeg on the left, the 29th Battalion Vancouver in close support, and the 28th Battalion Regina mopping up. The 27th pushed right on into Ramier, where a number of prisoners were captured. This important bridgehead being secured, the twenty-ninth and thirty-first built up the flank facing northeast, but as it was apparent that the enemy was taken completely by surprise by this unexpected night attack, our advantage was exploited to the utmost, and our troops by noon had pushed on and captured in succession Blaecourt, Bantigny, Cuvier, and Esouard.
At the same time, the Eleventh British Division, on our left, attacked and took the high ground and the hitherto impregnable village of Abancour. Thus, at one stroke, we secured the plateau, which had been the scene of such terrible fighting the previous week. The enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his forces across the Scheldt, and his rear-guard was driven in with very little loss to ourselves. Meanwhile, the 3rd Canadian Division had crossed the canal and captured the city itself. The 8th Brigade was holding the west side of the canal, the 5th C.M.R. Eastern Townships being at St. Oye. When at 3 o'clock of this same morning, orders came to send a patrol across the canal with the view of establishing a bridgehead beyond.
Two of our men swam the canal, Landed on the other side, and proceeded to bomb out the enemy machine-gun post known to be established at the railway bridgehead. But they found the post deserted. The enemy had evacuated the city half an hour after midnight. Linked arm in arm, our infantry streamed over this broken-down bridge, and by 430 a.m. two companies were across. By six o'clock, Canadian engineers had constructed a pontoon bridge, over which our field batteries crossed, and by six-thirty a.m. we had penetrated the Place d'Armes, and an officer's patrol was sent to inform our surprised neighbors, troops of the Twenty-Seventh Corps on our right, that we were in possession. The fourth C.M.R., Central Ontario, had been simultaneously engaged in penetrating the city from the northeast, and by 1030 a.m.
we had pushed through to the southern and eastern outskirts. Captures consisted of an officer and 35 men of a guards reserve division, left behind to complete the destruction of the city, with five guns, a pineapple, and a number of machine-guns. The rest of his material the enemy had either removed or destroyed. The capture of Combray was accomplished without a single casualty. But Combray had been delivered over to destruction. We had been compelled to level with our artillery a street of houses along the canal, and had sprayed shrapnel on commanding points whence the enemy had kept up harassing machine-gun fire. But otherwise we had been careful not to damage the city. As we first entered it, the darkness of night was lit up by incendiary fires.
The Place d'Armes, a noble square, on which faced the Hotel de V and other fine buildings, was already bursting into flames, and in a few hours was a crumbling ruin. Explosions detonated in almost every quarter of the city. Walking down the Rue de Noyon and the Rue de Paris, past the cathedral, one noted a dozen in a bare half-hour. Each followed by an outbreak of fire. Before long, Canadian engineers were on the scene. Searching buildings for incendiary shells set with a time-fuse, the method of destruction adopted. By noon, the Place d'Orme was a scene of desolation, of charred brick and smoldering timbers. The sun hung a fiery ball amid the smoke, and an atmosphere surcharged with the dust of rocking walls and charred particles.
Through this ruddy haze passed Canadian soldiers wearing pickle helmets, found in abandoned quartermaster's stores, and loaded down with enemy gear. Through it hurried Canadian engineers, now bent on blowing up burning houses clustering around the ancient belfry, that that at least might be saved. Through it paced a little party headed by a venerable figure, Monsieur Thullier, Abbe of Saint-Bruin. Surveying the ruin that had overtaken his diocesan capital. The inhabitants had been evacuated, but a few days before the miserable remnant that was left but he had refused to go, although they threatened to shoot him because he must stay by the bedside of a dying woman. Now he was accompanied by half a dozen shadowy figures who had remained hid in cellars, and by a bearded French officer who had arrived as representative of the French government.
France can never forget nor forgive this, remarked the officer with tears in his eyes. Torch in hand, he comes offering us peace. It was a vile, purposeless act of vandalism for which General Von Marwitz was the army commander responsible. A west wind was then blowing, and the entire city with its suburbs appeared doomed. A shift of wind that night... Together with the tireless efforts of Canadian engineers, assisted by two of our infantry battalions detailed for the work, finally checked the conflagration. But the heart of the city was gone. Everything of interest, of historical value save the belfry, was destroyed. The Boche had deliberately blown up the museum, the gallery of art, and the bishop's palace.
But one may be certain it was not until every article of value had been removed. All industries had been wrecked, and the machinery of the lace factories moved to Germany. And this malignant spite was by no means confined to public institutions. No sooner was the civilian population evacuated than their homes were given over to sack by the soldiery. Outwardly, the streets and houses bore a respectable appearance. Within all was litter and ruin, where the lust of loot led to senseless and wanton destruction, the kicking in of furniture too heavy to move, the smashing of heavy mirrors, the slashing of family portraits. Almost every little back garden was the scene of brutal vandalism. Women's clothing, children's toys, pictures ripped from their frames, broken services of china, Feather-beds ripped open, books, bed-linen, private papers scattered from their files, all piled in one common ruin.
On this debris, everything portable in the house had been piled, no doubt with the intention of setting it on fire. But search the heap, and you will not find a single article of intrinsic value that could not find its way into a soldier's knapsack, into a Prussian officer's kit. In the park, even the statues had been taken from their pedestals. We had heard of these things, but now we saw them. While Combray burned, the enemy was falling back. The 5th Brigade had meantime pushed through the northern suburbs of Combray and Escudouvray, and crossed the railway to where, late in the day at the factory northwest of Carreur, our troops joined hands with elements of the XXVII Corps. who, after taking Auant, had worked round east of the city.
Patrols were pushed out, but had difficulty in getting in touch with the enemy. On the left, the 6th brigade had pushed out by night fell to the outskirts of Thun-Saint-Martin and Thun-Levesque. Earlier in the day, Brutnell's brigade had seized the high ground of Croix-Saint-Hubert, As the Canadian Independent Force, this brigade, with its powerful armored cars, had done much good work in the Amiens-Cheraux and elsewhere. Its mobile characteristics were to become increasingly valuable in the open fighting to follow. With the fall of Cambrai, the battle proper of that name may be regarded as having ended, though, as we shall see, during the next few days, the 2nd Canadian Division was to continue the pursuit of the beaten enemy.
Sir Arthur Currie's Dispatch covering the operation of October Ninth is as follows. At Forty-Thirty A.M. October Eighth, the Third Army attacked, and at the same hour an artillery demonstration was carried out on the Canadian Corps front. The Seventeenth Corps on the right did not reach a point, but in the evening they were ordered to continue their advance on the morning of October Ninth to capture this town. Concurrently with this advance, the Canadian Corps was to secure the crossings of the Scheldt Canal. In spite of the darkness of a rainy night, the assembly was completed, and the attack was launched successfully at One Thirty a.m. October Ninth. Rapid progress was made, and at Two Twenty Five a.m.
the Second Canadian Division had captured Ramier and established posts on the canal there, and the patrols were pushing out to the northeast. On the right, the infantry, assisted by a party of engineers, rushed the crossings at Pont-d'air, and after sharp fighting, captured the bridge intact, with the exception of the western spillway, which had been partially destroyed. Two cork bridges were thrown across, and by three thirty five a.m. our infantry were well established on the eastern side of the canal. The 3rd Canadian Division had cleared the railway, and their patrols were pushing into Combray. While the engineers were commencing work on the bridges. By 8 a.m., the 2nd Canadian Division had captured Escudouvray, and had established a line on the high ground immediately to the north and east.
Detachments of the 3rd Canadian Division had by this time completely cleared Combray of the enemy, and troops of the 3rd Army could be seen coming up towards it from the south. Combray was to be deliberately set on fire by the enemy. Huge fires were burning in the square when our patrols went through, and many others broke out in all parts of the city. Piles of inflammable material were found ready for the torch, but the enemy was unable to carry out his intention owing to our unexpected attack and rapid progress. A party of one officer and a few men, which had been left with instructions to set fire to Combray, was discovered and dealt with before it could do any further damage. The fires were successfully checked by a large detachment of Canadian engineers, who entered the city with the patrols.
A considerable number of road-mines, booby-traps, etc., were also located and removed. An air reconnaissance at dawn indicated that the enemy had withdrawn from the area between the Scheldt Canal and the Canal de la Sanse, and that all bridges over the latter had been destroyed. Brutnell's brigade, passing through the infantry of the 2nd Canadian Division, seized the high ground at Croix-Saint-Hubert, and pushed cavalry patrols into Thunlevesque. The 2nd Canadian Division, east of the canal, progressed towards the north and occupied Thunlevesque, Thun-Saint-Martin, Blais-Corps, Cuvier, and Bantigny, and the 11th Division occupied Abencourt and reached the outskirts of Pelliancourt. The 3rd Canadian Division was withdrawn at 710 p.m.
when the 24th Division, 17th Corps, passed through and joined up with the 2nd Canadian Division, and Combray and our positions to the east were taken over or occupied by the 17th Corps. The 3rd Canadian Division was moved on the following day to Bivouacs in the Anche-Quillon area to rest and refit after 12 days of battle.
-
13 13 - Conclusion of the Battle of Cambrai 16:25
Conclusion of the Battle of Cambrai.
Although Cambrai had fallen, the battle itself is not officially regarded by the Canadian Corps as concluding until October 12, when we were five miles east of the city, and the relief of the 2nd Canadian Division, our last division in the line, was effected. It will be well to describe these concluding days before turning to the new field of operations, opened up for the Corps north of the Sensi by the 1st Canadian Division. On October 10, the attack was continued with the 2nd Canadian Division on the right and the 11th British Division on the left. The front of the 2nd Division was changed to north of the Cambrai-Salzoir Road, and at midnight, October 9, 10, the 4th Brigade advanced through the 5th Brigade, with their right flank on this road.
The 19th Battalion, Central Ontario, on the right jumped off at seven a m from the railway cutting in front of Escudovna and captured the village of Neves at seven forty five a m at eight a m the eighteenth battalion, Western Ontario, jumped off on the left and attacked toward Ullwy. The fourth brigade was in touch on the right with the left brigade of the third army just north of Rieu. At two o'clock in the afternoon, the Nineteenth Battalion advanced another one thousand yards, and got two companies across the Erkland River. At seven p.m. they advanced another fifteen hundred yards, and took possession of the high ground, which was to be the assembly point for the attack on the following day.
That night, a relief of the troops by the Forty-eighth British Division was ordered, and the Fourth Brigade was to sideslip and attack on a narrow front along the roadway east of Ullwy. The 20th Battalion, Central Ontario, and 21st Battalion, Eastern Ontario, were ordered to make the attack on 8 a.m. of October 11, with the 18th Battalion in support. As it was impossible to relieve the 19th Battalion properly, the troops of the 48th Division were to pass through them, and they were then to go into reserve. Meantime, on October 10, the 6th Brigade had attacked on the left of the 4th Brigade, the 28th Battalion of Regina, on the right, capturing the village of Thun-Saint-Martin. In the face of very heavy opposition, especially in the northern end of the village, just south of Ouy, where the enemy had an immense munition dump, while on the brigade left, The Twenty-Ninth Battalion of Vancouver stormed Thun-Evec.
Enemy defense had now hardened, and it was apparent that the strongly held position of Illouis could be taken only by a set battle. A narrow neck of water, an affluent of the Scheldt, lies in front of Illouis, and surrounding it was a network of railway yards and sidings. Advantage of these obstacles had been taken to establish numerous machine-gun posts. The attack was made at eight a m by the 49th Division on the right and the 2nd Canadian Division on the left, the latter with the 4th Brigade on its right and the 6th Brigade on its left. To deal with Ilyui first, a frontal attack was made by the 28th Battalion, while the 29th Battalion pushed forward on the left of the village. Very hard fighting ensued, but by noon the village was in our hands.
It was the hardest piece of fighting the Twenty-Eighth ever did," said one of its officers. The place was full of machine-guns, and it took us three or four hours to clean it up. It was all hand-to-hand fighting, the Bosch being stout fellows. The battalion was broken up into small parties, fighting their way from house to house. One section, under Lieutenant White, of Saskatoon, captured the crews of five machine-guns itself. Altogether, about five hundred prisoners were captured, with over fifty machine-guns in this very brilliant little affair.
At noon, the remaining battalions of the Sixth Brigade, the Twenty-Seventh of Winnipeg, and the Thirty-First, Southern Alberta, pushed through the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth Battalion on the right and left respectively, establishing a line twelve hundred yards beyond Iwy. While this was going on, the Twenty Ninth British Division, on the right, had fought its way forward to the high ground east of the village. Our Fourth Brigade, advancing between this division and Iwhee, had a very trying time, for until the village was reduced, both the attacking battalions, the Twentieth and Twenty First, were exposed to heavy enfilade fire from Iwhee. Their casualties were heavy, Totaling seven hundred, but nevertheless they pushed their line forward along sunken roads east of the village, and finally made good the top of Ooyee Spur.
This fighting was the scene of a brilliant exploit by Lieutenant Lloyd Wallace Algee, 20th Battalion of Toronto, who showed conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice when his troops came under heavy enfilade fire from Ooyee. Rushing forward with nine volunteers, He shot the crew of an enemy machine-gun, turning it on the enemy, and thus enabling his party to reach the outskirts of the village. He then rushed another machine-gun, killing the crew, and captured an officer and ten men, and thereby cleared the end of the village. Lieutenant Algy, having thus established his party, went back for reinforcements, but was killed when leading them forward. In the course of the day, the enemy made a strong counterattack against the front of both the Forty-Ninth Division and our Fourth Brigade, supported by a number of tanks.
The line fell back some distance, but was later re-established. Against the Fourth Brigade, the enemy sent five tanks, four being captured British tanks. These were beaten off by our artillery and machine-gun fire, But the fifth, an uncouth German monster, was disabled, and remained stranded on the ridge, an object of curiosity to our men, its crude pattern exciting a good deal of chafing. All these tanks fired case shot. Lieutenant Crombie, when the advance of the enemy tanks had momentarily thrown our line into confusion, used an anti-tank rifle with good effect, until he was mortally wounded. When the Fourth Brigade fell back before this attack, the Twenty-Seventh Brigade was left, for the time, in front of Uwee with its right flank in the air.
But L. Col. H. J. Reilly, who had established his headquarters in Uwee itself, speedily built up a protective flank with his reserve companies. During the afternoon and night Uwee and our entire line was heavily and steadily shelled by the enemy. so that it was exceedingly difficult to relieve or support units in advance of the village. But, though suffering heavy loss, the twenty-seventh held the ground they had won until relieved in due course. Our troops of both the Fourth and Sixth Brigades were worn out by long marching and hard fighting, and had lost heavily, especially in officers and experienced NCOs. The news that the 2nd Canadian Division was to be relieved on the following day by the 51st British Division was therefore welcome.
On the morning of October 12, on our left, the 5th Brigade sent the 24th Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Montreal, Through the 6th Brigade, and this battalion, in conjunction with troops of the 51st Division, attacked in a northerly direction, capturing Hordane, and pushed on to the outskirts of Bouchane, where the flooded areas of inundations and marshes put a stop to our farther advance in this direction. Patrols of the 26th Battalion, New Brunswick, and 25th Battalion, Nova Scotia, actually pushed across the inundated area west of Bouchane. But nothing more could be done in this direction until further progress had been made south of Dwye in the operation that had now opened along the Scarp River.
That night, the 2nd Canadian Division was relieved and transferred to the new Corps area. This change of front is described by Sir Arthur Currie as follows. The attack was continued at 6 a.m. October 10 by the 2nd Canadian and 11th British Divisions. And good progress was made. The 2nd Canadian Division captured knaves, and by nightfall reached a point one and one-half miles northeast of the Cambrai-Salzwar Road. From there, our line ran westward to the Schulte Canal, exclusive of Uwe, where we were held up by machine-gun fire. In this attack, Brutonel's Brigade operated along the Cambrai-Salzwar Road, But finding the bridge over the Erkeren River destroyed could not get their cars further forward.
This bridge, although on the outpost line under heavy fire, was immediately replaced by the engineers, a covering party being supplied by Broutenel's brigade. Machine-gun crews from the cars went forward on foot, however, and materially assisted the infantry advance at this point, and the corps cavalry, By a brilliant charge helped in the capture of the ground east of the Rueu-Iui road. On the left, the 11th Division cleared the enemy from the area between the Scheldt Canal and the Sensi Canal, captured Pellencourt and Estrin, and reached the outskirts of Hem Lenglet, which they occupied during the night. The 49th and 51st Divisions were released from Army Reserve and transferred to the Canadian Corps On October 10, during the night of October 10, 11, the former relieved that part of the 2nd Canadian Division east of Uwe, and the 51st Thailand Division moved to the Esquiduvra area.
At 8 a.m., October 11, the Canadian Corps resumed the attack with the 49th Division on the right and the 2nd Canadian Division on the left. The enemy laid down a heavy artillery barrage, and both divisions encountered stiff opposition. After fierce fighting, however, our attack made good progress, the 49th Division gaining the high ground east of Uly, and the 2nd Canadian Division capturing Uly and the high ground to the north. About 1030 a.m., the enemy delivered a heavy counterattack under an artillery barrage, and supported by seven tanks, under the direction of Evidence Lessec, against the 49th and 2nd Canadian Divisions. Our line was forced back slightly at first, but six of the tanks were knocked out by our artillery, the assaulting infantry dispersed by our machine-gun and rifle fire, and the attack repulsed.
Meanwhile, on October 7, 8, the 1st Canadian Division had relieved the 4th British Division. 22nd Corps. On the frontage between Paloo and the Scarp River, and passed under the command of the G.O.C. 22nd Corps. At 5 p.m. October 11, I handed over command to the Corps Front, less the 11th Divisional Sector, to the G.O.C. 22nd Corps, and the 2nd Canadian and 49th and 51st Divisions were transferred to the 22nd Corps. At the same hour, I assumed command of the former Twenty Second Corps front, and the Fifty Sixth and the First Canadian Divisions were transferred in the line to the Canadian Corps. During the night of October Eleven Twelve, the Second Canadian Division was relieved in the East Line of the Ouy-Dunain Railway by the Fifty First Highland Division, and on completion of the relief, I assumed command of the remainder of the Second Canadian Divisional Front.
Extending from the Ouy-Danaen Railway, exclusive, to the Scheldt Canal. The Battle of Arras, Cambrai, so fruitful in results, was now closed. Since August Twenty Sixth, the Canadian Corps had advanced Twenty-three Miles, fighting for every foot of ground and overcoming the most bitter resistance. In that period, the Canadian Corps engaged and defeated decisively Thirty-one German divisions, reinforced by numerous marksmen, machine-gun companies. These divisions were met in strongly fortified positions and under conditions most favorable to the defense. In this battle, 18,585 prisoners were captured by us, together with 371 guns, 1,923 machine-guns, and many trench mortars. Over one hundred and sixteen square miles of French soil, containing fifty-four towns and villages, and including the city of Cambrai, were liberated.
The severity of the fighting and the heroism of our troops may be gathered from the casualties suffered between August Twenty Two and October Eleven, and which are as follows. Killed officers, Two Ninety Six, Other ranks, Four Thousand and Seventy One, Missing, Officers. 18 Other ranks. One thousand, nine hundred and twelve. Wounded. Officers. Twelve hundred and thirty. Other ranks. Twenty-three thousand, two hundred and seventy-nine. Total officers, 1,544. Other ranks, 29,262. Considering the great number of German divisions engaged, and the tremendous artillery and machine-gun firepower at their disposal, the comparative lightness of our casualties testified to the excellence of the precautions taken by divisional, brigade, and regimental officers to minimize the loss of life, having ever in mind the performance of their duty and the accomplishment of their heavy task.
Such was the Battle of Cambrai. There remains only to quote the telegram sent to the Corps commander on October 1 by General Sir Henry E. Holm, commanding the First Army. I wish to express to you and the troops under your command my high appreciation of the determined fighting of the Canadian troops during the last five days. During this time, Canadian troops, assisted by the 11th Division, and portions of the Fifty-sixth Division, successfully carried through the difficult maneuver of forcing the crossing of the Canal du Nord in face of a determined enemy, and having captured Burlund Wood and the high ground north and northwest of Cambrai. The importance which the enemy attached to these positions is shown by the number of divisions which he has employed, and by the violence of his counter-attacks during the last two days.
Troops of no less than twelve hostile divisions have been engaged during this period in the attempt to stem the successful advance of the Corps. End of Canada's Hundred Days. Part III by John Livesay.