menu_book Chapter 30

Introduction. Historic Survey of the Various Methods of Stating the Proof. Preliminary Questions by James Buchanan. The contrast between faith in God and atheistic unbelief is strongly marked and strikingly exemplified in the sacred writings. Of the one it is written, the fool hath said in his heart, no God. The wicked, through the pride of his countenance, will not seek after God. God is not in all his thoughts.

Wherefore doth the wicked contemn God? He hath said in his heart, Thou wilt not require it. He hath said in his heart, God hath forgotten. He hideth his face, he will never see it. They turned back from him, and would not consider any of his ways.

They regard not the works of the Lord, nor the operation of his hands. When they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful. They did not like to retain God in their knowledge. They profess that they know God, but in works they deny him. The carnal mind is enmity against God.

Of the other it is written, Be still and know that I am God. If the Lord be God, follow him. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God. That him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me,

that I am the Lord which exercise lovingkindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth. For in these things I delight, saith the Lord. He hath showed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God. O house of Jacob, come ye, and let us walk in the light of the Lord. I have set the Lord always before me, because he is at my right hand, I shall not be moved. I will look unto the

Lord, I will wait for the God of my salvation. God will hear me. When I sit in darkness, the Lord shall be a light unto me. God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble. Therefore will we not fear. Though the earth be removed, and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the sea, the Lord of hosts is with us, the God of Jacob is our refuge. My soul, wait thou only upon God, for my expectation is from him. He only is my rock

and my salvation. He is my defense, I shall not be moved. In God is my salvation and my glory. The rock of my strength and my refuge is in God. Trust in him at all times, ye people. Pour out your heart before him, God is a refuge for us. O God, thou art my God. Early will I seek thee, my soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee in a dry and thirsty land where no water is, to see thy power and thy glory, so as I have seen thee in the sanctuary. Because thy loving

kindness is better than life, my lips shall praise thee. When I remember thee upon my bed, and meditate on thee in the night watchers, because thou hast been my help, therefore in the shadow of thy wings will I rejoice. My soul followeth hard after thee, thy right hand upholdeth me. The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom shall I fear? The Lord is the strength of my life, of whom shall I be afraid? One thing have I desired of the Lord, that will I seek after,

that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord and to inquire in his temple. When thou saidst, Seek ye my face, my heart said unto thee, Thy face, Lord, will I seek. Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is none in all the earth that I desire besides thee. My heart and flesh fail, but God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever. Although the fig tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines, the labour of

the olives shall fail, and the fields shall yield no meat. The flock shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no herd in the stalls, yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation. Such is the striking contrast which is drawn in scripture between faith in God and atheistic unbelief, a contrast which evidently implies much more than a mere difference of speculative opinion and amounts to a radical opposition of spiritual character. Faith in God,

such as is delineated in the lessons and exemplified in the narratives of the sacred book, is something widely different from a mere intellectual conviction or a verbal acknowledgement of his being, for that may coexist with habitual practical ungodliness. Thou believest that there is one God, thou doest well that devils also believe and tremble. Such a belief is perfectly consistent with the spirit of atheism. There may be an evil heart of unbelief in departing from

the living God, where there is no avowed speculative infidelity. Atheistic unbelief may sometimes whisper in the heart or even utter with the lips the fearful words, no God, but it manifests itself more frequently and with equal certainty in the habitual forgetfulness of God, in the prevailing disposition to escape from his presence, in the practical disregard of his claims, in the constant tendency to adopt partial views of his character and to question the reality of his

moral government, in the strong aversion to seek after God or to consider the operation of his hands, in the feelings of distrust, jealousy, and suspicion with which he is regarded, in the unwillingness which is felt to acknowledge his sovereignty, his rectitude, his love, and in the inveterate enmity which cannot endure the thought of God as he is, and which will not be subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. Such is the nature of that unbelief which is so frequently

mentioned in scripture. It may or may not be associated with a profession of religion, but it involves the essential spirit of atheism. For men may have the form of godliness, and yet deny the power thereof. They may profess that they know God, and yet in works deny him. In like manner, faith in God is described in scripture as implying much more than the mere acknowledgement of his existence. He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them

that diligently seek him. It is not an occasional thought, or a transient impression of the divine majesty, but an habitual sense of his presence, such as produces reverence and godly fear and makes the believer to live as seeing him who is invisible. It implies an assured conviction of his being and a knowledge of his true character as the sole creator and supreme governor of the world, but such a belief as produces trust and confidence in him and makes him, the object of

supreme love, the source of spiritual joy. It chooses God as the chief good, the only satisfying portion of the soul. It rests in him, it waits for him, it longs after him, it walks with him, it seeks his face, it meditates on all his works, it meekly receives his word, it submits to his providence, it obeys his will, it delights in his fellowship, it is zealous for his glory, it worketh by love, it casteth out fear, it takes away the spirit of bondage, and imparts the spirit

of adoption, which crieth Abba Father. Such is the nature of that faith in God which is inculcated in the sacred writings. When we turn from the sacred page to the record of human experience and compare its lessons with the facts of our most familiar knowledge, we can hardly fail to perceive that the same contrast, which is so strikingly delineated there, is still visibly exemplified in the actual state of the world. Account for it as we may, mankind

are undeniably divided into two great classes, the believing and the unbelieving, the godly and the ungodly. We cannot commune with our own hearts or mingle with society or listen to the language or observe the conduct of men without discerning the reality of that contrast. We see some who set the Lord continually before them. We see others who are without God in the world. Some who live as seeing God who is invisible. Others who have no fear of God

before their eyes. Some who seek after God if happily they may find him. Others who will not seek after God. God is not in all their thoughts. Some who realize his constant presence and recognize his governing providence. Others who say, God hath forgotten, he hideth his face, he will never see it. Some who acknowledge him in all their ways. Others who in their works deny him. Some who pray to God always. Others who call not on his name. Some who fear and love and obey him.

Others who say, who is the Lord that we should obey him, and what prophet is there if we serve him? The contrast is as real as it is striking. It is not only delineated in the pages of scripture, it is exemplified also in the actual state of the world. What may be the cause of this vast difference between two classes of men, all endowed with the same intellectual faculties, all surrounded by the same glorious universe, and all subject to the same moral law, is a question

of deep and solemn interest, but one which must for the present be postponed. In the meantime, we look merely to the fact, so prominently exhibited in scripture, and so undeniably evident from experience, and in this fact we find the origin of the great conflict, coeval almost with the origin, coextensive with the spread and commensurate with the duration of our race, the conflict between faith and unbelief. For two large classes of men, living together and closely

connected in other respects, cannot entertain views and cherish dispositions and pursue practical paths so totally different, without coming into frequent collision, and however tolerant of each other's peculiarities, they will feel that they are necessarily in a state of antagonism on a subject of momentous importance, and will seek to vindicate their own sentiments by the most strenuous exercise of all their faculties. Unbelief can scarcely exist in the presence

of faith without entrenching itself behind some defensive rampart, and seeking to undermine the foundations of religion, and faith can scarcely maintain its ground in the presence of unbelief without having recourse to the shield of evidence and the weapons of reason. Hence the early rise and perpetual renewal of the great controversy which has agitated the minds of men in all ages, and which, simply defensive in its origin, soon becomes offensive in its progress, and can never

cease, while the same difference continues to subsist between truth and error, faith and unbelief. It is the inevitable result of that difference, whether religion be traced ultimately to the light of nature, or to the light of revelation. Pushed to its extreme limit, and viewed in its widest generality, it turns on the evidence for the being, perfection, providence, and moral government of God. In the oldest and most venerable record of religious faith,

a record which, apart from its divine authority, must ever be regarded as the most instructive document of antiquity, there is no elaborate argument or formal proof in favour of the doctrine which affirms the being and perfections of God. That doctrine is rather assumed than argued. It is authoritatively announced, not dialectically demonstrated. This method of treating the subject is in perfect accordance with the idea of a pristine revelation,

coeval with the commencement of the human race. And it reminds us that, according to the scriptures, mankind were never left entirely to the guidance of the unaided light of nature. But assuredly it affords no reason or even pretext for overlooking the existence or denying the validity of a natural evidence for God.

On the contrary, the very earliest scriptures, those of Moses and Job, not less than the Psalms and the prophets, do frequently and pointedly refer to the works of creation and providence in proof or illustration of his being and attributes. These references are made not in the way of formal logical argument, but rather in the way of simple and direct appeal, the decision upon the evidence being left to the spontaneous judgment of those to whom it is presented.

this method of teaching was the most suitable in the earlier stages of society while as yet philosophy and science were unknown just as it is still the most useful and indeed the only available method with multitudes who can discern the evidence which shines in nature while they are utterly incapable of appreciating the lengthened logical proof for it must never be forgotten that in the progress of society just as in that of the individual from youth to manhood there is first

the spontaneous and afterwards the reflective exercise of thought. The direct action of the human faculties on the objects which are presented to them in nature takes precedence of the reflex operation by which the self-conscious mind takes cognizance of its own processes and laws. Belief springs from the direct and spontaneous, the philosophy of belief from the reflective exercise of thought, and hence a natural and all but intuitive belief in God might be generated by

the magnificent spectacle of nature, especially on the supposition of a pristine revelation long before men began to investigate the intellectual principles and processes that were concerned in the production of it. It was only at a later stage when thoughtful and reflecting spirits sought to account to themselves or others for their cherished beliefs, and to explain the rational grounds on which they rested, that the natural evidence for the being and perfections

of God, which had been discerned before, became the subject of philosophical inquiry, and assumed the form of a systematic proof. And even when this stage was reached, the various elements which constitute the substance and strength of that evidence might not be all at once fully comprehended and still less accurately discriminated and defined. The popular argument from the beginning must have been, and probably must ever continue to be, that which is founded on two considerations,

patent to the observation and confirmed by the experience of all, the first being the manifest adaptation of means to ends in the economy of nature, whereby many most wise and beneficent purposes are subserved, and the second, the moral consciousness which bespeaks a law and a lawgiver, and instinctively suggests the idea of responsibility and retribution. But the philosophical argument, although neither more conclusive nor more impressive, might be more

subtle, elaborate, and systematic, and accordingly, from the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry, there has been a continuous series of systems bearing on the origin of the world and the existence and nature of God. Hegel conceives that it is easy, in an historical point of view, to account for the origin and even to explain the order and filiation of the various methods of proof. He endeavours to show that the cosmological proof is the most ancient of all, belonging to

the infancy of the race, a proof founded on the mere existence of the world, without any consideration of its peculiar properties or laws, and which might give the idea of an eternal cause, but not that of an intelligent moral governor. That next in order came the teleological proof, which rests on the facts of fitness everywhere discernible in the frame of nature, and which might give the idea of a divine artificer or protoplast, moulding the materials of nature

into useful and beautiful forms, but not that of a creator strictly so called, as one who gave existence as well as form to the materials themselves. That next again in order came the highest proof of all, the ontological, the last in the normal development of man's intelligence, a proof which does not rest on any empirical facts but is purely a priori and depends entirely on the ideas of reason. There is good reason, we think, to doubt whether this theory can be satisfactorily

verified. It appears to us that the different methods of proof, although they might occasionally appear as rivals, were not necessarily antagonists to each other, that they might exist simultaneously, not in a state of conflict, but of concord, and even of combination, and that, in point of fact, they were, at least in the fundamental principles on which they severally depended, not successive, but synchronous, while in their mere form they might be modified to a large extent by the peculiar

taste and genius of individuals, or the state of public opinion, at different epochs in the progress of philosophical inquiry. The ontological proof, which is supposed to be the latest and highest development of human intelligence in this department, may be traced up historically from Descartes to Anselm, from Anselm to the Alexandrian school, and from the Alexandrian school to Plato himself. Indeed, if it be duly considered that all the elements which constitute the substance and

strength of the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God have been coexistent from the beginning, that the mental faculties and the objects with which they are conversant have been ever the same, and that, from one or other or both of these, every conceivable argument on this subject must necessarily be derived. It will seem neither improbable nor unnatural to suppose that, from the earliest dawn of reflective thought, the different

aspects of the evidence may have attracted the special attention of different inquirers, and that, each pursuing the path most congenial to his own tastes and habits, some may have given greater prominence than others either to the physical or the metaphysical element, while both were laboring with equal zeal in the same cause. When the various methods of proof are arrayed against each other, as rival and even as antagonist systems, it may be justly said that their exclusive

claims are founded on a partial preference for some one element in the case to the comparative neglect of certain other elements, which are neither less essential nor more important to the completeness of the argument. In theology, as in philosophy, there is a fundamental antithesis, and yet a close connection between the object and the subject of human thought, between the external manifestation and the internal perception of truth. Both are equally indispensable to

knowledge of any kind. The very possibility of knowledge, such as belongs to man, is destroyed on the supposition, either of a mind without an object, or of an object without a mind by which it may be discerned. But the speculative inquirer may bestow a partial, an inordinate, or even an exclusive attention on one or other of the antithetic terms. He may look only either to the objective manifestation or to the subjective perception of the evidence, or, if he is forced

occasionally to refer to both, he will give the chief prominence to that which is most congenial to his own speculative tastes. Hence the devarification of the proof into two great rival systems, each including several distinct methods which differ in other respects but agree in this, that they all severally belong to one or other of the alternative terms of that fundamental antithesis to which we have just referred. The idealist, looking only to the subjective element,

seeks to construct a proof a priori which shall be almost, if it cannot be altogether, independent of the data of experience, and reach the conclusion by a direct act of intuition or by a process of abstract thought. To this class belong several distinct methods, such as those of Anselm, Descartes, Clarke and Lohmann, and also in part those of Kant, Jacobi, Schelling and Constant. These methods are very different, but they all resemble each other in this, that they

severally depend mainly, and some of them exclusively, on the subjective element, or that which the mind contributes to the process of proof. They are, to a large extent, independent of all existence, excepting that only of the mind itself, and even of all evidence excepting that of its own consciousness. But if the idealist attaches himself thus exclusively to the subjective element, there are speculative minds of another caste that may readily fall

into the opposite extreme, minds of a strong practical bias, abjuring metaphysics, looking only to facts, and devoted to experimental inductive inquiry, that may be tempted to bestow an exclusive attention on the objective part of the proof, and to seek in it a kind and amount of evidence which by itself alone it cannot yield. Such are the two great lines of proof, which have been severally prosecuted in all ages by different inquirers, according to their

peculiar mental tendencies. We are not disposed to reject either of them absolutely, nor yet to accept either of them exclusively. We cannot doubt that there is in each of them some element of thought which may have a real and perhaps important relation to the subject of inquiry, some portion or fragment of truth which may admit of being usefully applied to it in the way either of proof or illustration, and that although they have often been treated as rival and antagonist

systems, whatever is true in each of them may possibly be combined in one compact and comprehensive argument so as to form a firm phalanx of independent but mutually connected and subservient proofs. Different kinds of evidence and different modes of presenting the same evidence are required to meet the different capacities and tastes of men. Some, who are plain, practical inductive inquirers, will prefer the argument from design or final causes. Others, who are more given to

abstract speculation or accustomed to the processes of deductive reasoning, will have greater sympathy with the speculations of Anselm, Descartes and Clarke, while others still, in whom the imaginative or the emotional predominates over the intellectual, will luxuriate in the forms of natural beauty and revel in the sweets of sentiment, accepting these as sufficient proofs to them of an all-perfect mind, without being at all solicitous to invest their thoughts in the

garb of formal logic. For ourselves we deprecate every attempt to disparage any kind of evidence or of illustration that may serve either to establish the truth or to deepen the impression of God's being and majesty. We would give free scope to all the faculties of the soul, not only to pure reason and abstract thought, but even to imagination and sentiment and taste. We would appeal to the faculty of conscience, to the perception of the beautiful and sublime, to the

sense of dependence, reverence and awe, to the hopes and fears, the aspirations and yearnings of every human soul. We would accept and combine the contributions of them all, and still keep our minds open to receive and welcome every ray of light from whatever quarter descending that may aid us in raising our thoughts and affections towards the supreme. It seems often to be forgotten or not duly considered that a method of proof which viewed by itself apart from other collateral

considerations is felt to be defective may nevertheless contain in it some element of truth which admits of being most usefully applied to some part of the general argument. It may be difficult, perhaps it is impossible, to deduce the existence of God, as Descartes proposed, from the mere conceptions of our own minds, or at least to construct an argument out of them in strict logical form. And yet there is something in the fact that we have, and cannot but have,

the idea of an infinite and all-perfect being, that commends the doctrine concerning God to our highest reason, and gives it only the greater power over our convictions, just in proportion, as it is the more vividly conceived and the more seriously considered. In like manner it may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove on pure a priori principles, from the mere fact of existence, the reality of a supreme first cause, intelligent and free, and yet there is something in the

sublime and mysterious ideas of immensity and eternity, the infinite in space and the infinite in duration, which has a close connection with the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God, and this connection was marked by Mr. Dugald Stewart, even when he expressed his dissatisfaction with the a priori argument. Quote, although the argument, he says, as stated by Clark, does not carry complete conviction to my mind, I think it must be granted that there is something

peculiarly wonderful and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish from our thoughts than the consciousness of our own existence. Nay, further, I think that these conceptions are very intimately connected with the fundamental principles of natural religion, for when once we have established from the evidences of design everywhere manifested around us the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause, we are

unavoidably led to apply to this cause our conceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive of him as filling the infinite extent of both with his presence and with his power. Hence we associate with the idea of God those awful impressions which are naturally produced by the idea of infinite space, and perhaps still more by the idea of endless duration, so that the conceptions of immensity and eternity, if they do not of themselves demonstrate the

existence of God, yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature and attributes. End quote. In regard again to the argument from final causes, or the marks of design and intelligence everywhere visible in the works of nature, it may seem at first sight to labor under a radical and incurable defect. For nature, however vast, is still finite, and no finite effect may appear adequate to afford a manifestation of an infinite first cause. Yet the marks of

intelligent design and the proofs of powerful agency in nature afford the most popular and most impressive evidence of the being and perfections of God. And why? Simply because provision is made in the internal structure of the human mind for adducing the necessary from the contingent, the eternal from the transient, the infinite from the finite, a provision which takes immediate effect, even when men are scarcely conscious of its operation, or have never, at least,

made it the subject of reflective thought. No sooner does any mind believe in its own existence, or in that of any other object in nature, than it is forthwith constrained by an internal and inevitable necessity, or rather directed by a fundamental law of thought, to conclude that some being must have existed from all eternity. Separate the facts of nature from this fact of consciousness, and you go far to invalidate the proof from final causes, but conjoin them in your

system, as they are actually conjoined in experience, and you can show that while nature, as finite, mutable, and transient, cannot be an adequate measure, it may yet be a sufficient manifestation of the infinite and eternal. The ethico-practical proof, on which Kant so strenuously insists, whether it be derived from the laws of individual conscience or the moral relations of social life, depends on considerations that are to a certain extent valid, and that

contribute to swell the amount of theistic evidence. These considerations must in fact be taken into account if we would form any idea of God as the moral governor of the world, for it is from this source alone that we derive our conceptions of his moral character and of his relation to ourselves as our lawgiver, ruler, and judge. Any idea of God that might be formed from the mere indications of skill and power in nature, apart from the moral manifestations of his

character, must need be lamentably defective, and would amount merely to the knowledge of an omnipotent cause, or skilful mechanist, not of Jehovah, holy, just, and good. For the reasons that have thus been briefly indicated, we are disposed to regard almost every method of proof which has been adopted as containing some element of truth, some fact or principle which, at one stage or another, may be beneficially applied in the way of either confirming or illustrating

the doctrines of natural theology. The evidence for the being and perfections of God is not simple but complex. It springs from various sources and flows in different channels. It cannot be embodied in a single syllogism, nor exhausted by any one process of reasoning. It is essentially a cumulative proof, embracing a vast variety of different facts, and depending on several distinct laws of thought, and we shall do no justice, we may even do great injury to the sacred cause, if we

venture either to circumscribe the field of inquiry within narrow and arbitrary limitations, or to confine ourselves to one principle of reason as the sole basis of proof. We have said that the objective and the subjective elements of proof are equally indispensable, that the facts observed in nature would afford no evidence apart from those rational principles by which alone they can be discerned and interpreted, and that these rational principles, again, could have no occasion

for their exercise apart from the phenomena of nature and experience. This necessary correlation between the facts of observation and the fundamental laws of thought suggests the inquiry whether in the statement of the evidence we should begin with a discussion of the principles of reason on which its validity depends, or with an exhibition of the facts in nature by which these principles are called into action. Considered as subjects of speculative inquiry,

these two topics, although closely related, are radically distinct, and it might seem to be the most scientific course to establish in the first instance the rational principles or laws of thought on which the validity of the proof depends, and thereafter to apply them to the facts of nature and experience. But for practical purposes we think it better to adopt a different course, and one that is more in accordance with the actual progress of the mind in the acquisition

of knowledge. It should never be forgotten that a large portion of our most important knowledge is acquired in the first instance by the spontaneous exercise of our faculties on their appropriate objects, and that it is not till a later stage that we derive any advantage from the process of reflective thought, or the analysis of the mental laws by which our spontaneous judgments were determined. If the laws of thought to which we appeal be really con-natural to the

human mind, they will come into play spontaneously on the presentation of the objective evidence, and by our own consciousness of their operation in our bosoms, we shall be best prepared for estimating their force and appreciating their value as constituent elements in the general proof. State the fact in the first instance and let the law operate spontaneously, then advance with the aid of this newborn consciousness to a critical inquiry into the

mental process. By reversing this order, we involve ourselves at the outset in what must be an abstruse discussion of the principles of psychology and metaphysics which is in no wise necessary to legitimate our spontaneous judgments and which may be reserved with advantage for a later stage. At each stage in our course we present a fact or a class of facts which are no sooner understood in their true import than the mind spontaneously acts upon them according to its

fundamental laws and it is thus prepared to respond to any appeal that may be afterwards made to its own consciousness in verification of these laws. And as, in point of fact, the only parts of the proof which can be seriously questioned are those which depend not on the facts of nature but on the principles of reason, it is advisable, we think, to present the facts in the first instance that they may make their own natural impression on the mind, and to proceed thereafter to a separate

consideration of the psychological principles which are involved in the process of proof. On a survey of the various methods for stating the proof, as they have been successively exhibited, four questions of a preliminary kind are naturally raised. First, whether a formal proof of the existence of God be either possible on the one hand or needful on the other. Secondly, whether on the supposition of its being both possible and useful, it may be best conducted

in the a priori or in the a posteriori method. Thirdly, whether on the same supposition it should consist chiefly of those facts and considerations which are patent to all, so as to be adapted to the popular mind, or should also embrace the philosophical explanation of these facts, so as to assume a scientific form. And fourthly, whether it should proceed exclusively on the ground of natural evidence, or avail itself also of the light of revelation. A brief answer to

each of these questions will serve at once to determine the plan and to explain the rationale of the arrangement which we propose to adopt. The first of these questions demands our notice at the very threshold of the inquiry, chiefly on account of a very singular coalition of apparently adverse parties,

who, differing in all other respects, concur in this, that anything like an effective and legitimate proof of the existence of God is impossible. On the one hand, the speculative atheist,

whether his infidelity assumes the sceptical or the dogmatic form, denies not only the validity of every extant proof, but the existence of any accessible body of evidence or of any intellectual faculty capable of affording the slightest rational ground for belief in God.

On the other hand, the transcendental idealist and the sentimental mystic speak of such an intellectual intuition, such a direct and immediate apperception of God, as is altogether independent alike of any process of reasoning and of any external sign or manifestation in the shape of evidence, and they conclude that all argument on the subject is superseded by its self-evident certainty, that a formal proof is impossible just because it is superfluous. Wide, as is the distance

between these two extremes, there is a point at which they meet and coincide. They both concur in affirming that the existence of God cannot be proved, while only one of them adds that it need not be proved. Hence we hear it reiterated on every side, and sometimes in quarters where it might have been least expected, that the existence of God is not a topic for argument but an object for faith, that if it be credible at all, it must be credible simply in the light of its own self-evidence,

that it cannot be established by any process of reasoning, and that all reasoning on such a theme weakens rather than confirms our convictions. Did we defer to the dictum of a recent writer whose erratic genius seldom fails to express itself in strong language, we should feel that we are engaging in a useless and even perilous task. Quote, the deity exists by a necessity of his own nature and men will never cease to believe in his existence. The most impious act a human

creature can commit is the attempt to prove a fact so omnipresent and irresistible. He who asserts that there is no god is a madman. He who by elaborate reasoning endeavours to show that there is a god is a fool. We think it necessary to take this state of feeling into account when we are entering on a statement of the evidence, both because we have reason to believe that it prevails to a considerable extent, not only among particular schools of speculative inquirers,

but even in the mind of the Christian community, insomuch that the study of the natural evidence is distasteful to many, who have no doubt in regard to the truth itself, and also because we apprehend that there is a confused mixture of truth and error in the supposition from which it springs. It seems to have been supposed that, when we speak of proving the existence of God, we mean to do so by a long process of reasoning or argument, a series of concatenated syllogisms,

such as is sometimes employed in the department of pure science, and on this supposition proof has been deemed superfluous on the very natural ground that there must surely be a shorter and more direct access to one of the most universal, as well as most important convictions of the human mind. To a certain extent we sympathize with this feeling, and were the supposition well founded, we might even concur in the conclusion to which it leads. There could scarcely be a greater or

more mischievous error than to represent the evidence for the being and perfections of God as so abstract or so complicated that it could only be exhibited in a long chain of reasoning, or discerned and appreciated only by men of science. But when we speak of proof as either possible or necessary in such a case, our language is not meant to imply this. On the contrary, the process may be extremely short, consisting of a very few steps. It may take place spontaneously

under the operation of the natural laws of thought, without our being distinctly conscious of a train of reasoning, and the evidence may be no sooner discerned than the truth is intuitively believed. There is much that is intuitional and spontaneous, both in the perception of the evidence and in the reception of the truth, just as in every other branch of ontology, whether it relates to our own existence or the existence of our fellow men or the reality of an external material

world. But in no case, so far as we can see, is there any intuition so direct and immediate, or any belief so spontaneous as to be altogether independent of evidence. Our belief, for instance, in the existence of our fellow men and of their radical resemblance to ourselves in respect of intelligence and feeling, may be said in a certain sense to be intuitive. It is so natural and so inevitable that we are scarcely conscious of passing through any process of reason in reaching

it, and yet it springs unquestionably from certain signs or manifestations of thought and emotion in them, which are immediately discerned to be similar to those of which we are conscious in ourselves, and which are not equally displayed by any of the inferior animals. There is not only a spontaneous perception, there is also a real evidence, an evidence which may not require, and may scarcely admit of a formal statement, but which is nevertheless the sole ground and the

sufficient justification of our belief. There is both a strong resemblance and a radical difference between the grounds of our belief in the existence of our fellow men and those of our belief in the existence of God. There is a resemblance insofar as our belief in both instances depends on certain signs or manifestations which are discerned and interpreted as the natural evidence of the truth, but there is also a difference arising out of the different nature of the evidence to which they

respectively appeal. It is utterly inconceivable that any sane mind should either deny or doubt the existence of kindred beings around it, not because this truth is discerned without evidence, but because the medium is so transparent, and the facts so familiar and undeniable, that no one except the systematic skeptic will even profess to call them in question. It is otherwise with the doctrine which affirms the being and perfections of God,

That doctrine may be as true in itself and as certain in its evidence as the other, but our belief in it, insofar as it depends on the unaided light of nature, rests on a variety of considerations which require to be considered and reflected on before their force can be duly felt. The evidence is of a kind that may possibly be overlooked and neglected by men

immersed in the cares and business of life. Hence the necessity of directing their special attention to the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God. This necessity is not equally felt in regard to the grounds of certain other primary beliefs, partly because they are generated naturally and inevitably by the circumstances in which we are

placed, and partly also because there is no temptation to deny or to doubt their certainty. Whereas with reference to God, the evidence, although equally conclusive, is not equally apparent or irresistible, it is more liable to be overlooked or disputed. We may neglect it when we are engrossed with the pursuits of business or even of science, we may reject and spurn it from a latent consciousness that religion, if true, would bring us under obligations and impose

restraints to which we are unwilling to submit. These considerations, derived from the very nature of the case, are abundantly sufficient to vindicate any judicious attempt that may be made to illustrate the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God. It is an attempt merely to place the facts of nature before the minds of men, so as to call into action the principles of reason or the laws of thought to which theology makes its appeal. It only remains to be added that,

even were the grounds of our belief more intuitively discerned than we have supposed them to be, yet when these grounds are called in question, when our belief itself is assailed by argument or undermined by sophistry, there may be occasion for reasoning, if not to prove the truth, yet to disprove the objections which have been urged against it, and this is, in point of fact, the reason of, by far, the larger amount of argument that has been employed on the side of

theism in its conflict with infidelity. That argument has been directed not so much to the object of proving the truth, for the proof consists mainly in a direct appeal to a body of natural evidence, which depends on facts and is independent of argument, but rather to the object of exposing the fallacies and neutralizing the objections of its assailants, and as long as there are skeptics or atheists in the world, so long must this warfare continue to be waged.

In this respect, theology has been called to encounter the same perils and to pursue a similar course with sound philosophy itself, for the same skepticism which assailed our belief in the existence and providence of God, as equally called in question the evidence of our senses, the reality of an external material world, and the very possibility of proving any one conceivable truth. Its assaults were, in either case, met by argument, but by argument directed not to prove

by reasoning what neither required nor admitted of such proof, but to show that our beliefs rest on grounds that are impregnable to every such assault, and to neutralize the presumptions that might seem to lie against them. On these grounds we conclude that a proof of the being and attributes of God, in the only sense in which we are concerned to defend it, may be alike legitimate and useful in itself, and that it may even be absolutely necessary both for the production of an intelligent

belief in the popular mind, and for the prevention or cure of atheism, at certain critical stages in the course of speculative inquiry. It may be called an argument, a proof, or a demonstration, but it is nothing more than a statement of the evidence which exists in nature, and it consists in an investigation of the sources from which that evidence is derived and the principles of reason on which its validity depends.

The second question, whether on the supposition of a proof being possible it may be best conducted after the a priori or the a posteriori method, may be differently answered according to the sense in which these phrases are understood. They are often used somewhat vaguely. Sometimes they denote a process of reasoning,

at other times they describe merely the source of data on which that reasoning proceeds. In the former sense, an a priori argument corresponds to a process of deduction, by which particular truths are derived from more general theorems which virtually comprehend them, while an a posteriori argument corresponds to a process of induction by which we rise from particular facts to general laws. In the other sense, they are applied to denote not a process of reasoning or a method of argument,

but merely the supposed origin of the constituent elements of thought. Thus any element of thought is said to be an a priori principle when it is supposed not to be given in experience but to be furnished by reason, and so any other element of thought is characterized, with reference to its source or origin, as an a posteriori idea when it is supposed to be given not by reason but by experience.

The ideas of reason are thus distinguished from the ideas of experience and any argument which proceeds mainly on the former is often called an argument a priori, while that which proceeds mainly on the latter is as often said to be an argument a posteriori. After the most serious reflection, we admit the distinction, both between the inductive and the deductive methods of reasoning,

and between the a priori and the a posteriori element of thought, but in applying that distinction we are prepared to maintain that there never has been, and never can be an argument so purely a priori as to have no element in it derived from the ideas of experience, nor an argument so purely a posteriori as to have no element in it derived from the ideas of reason. There is a real and a wide difference between the two methods of reasoning,

but that difference does not consist in the entire exclusion from either of ideas derived both from reason and experience. If you call that element of thought which is furnished from within an a priori principle, and that other element which is furnished from without, an a posteriori idea. You may thus discriminate between the two, but if you attempt to disjoin them, or to found an argument directed to any practical object exclusively on either, the attempt must prove

abortive, for what God hath joined together, in the very constitution of our nature, in the correlation of subject and object, no man may part asunder. If by an a priori principle you mean an element of thought furnished from within and springing immediately and spontaneously from the structure and laws of the mind itself, then there is an a priori element, not only in the process of abstract reasoning, but in the simplest case of induction, in the most common act of

perception, and even in sensation itself, it is involved in all experience. In sensation, which is often supposed to be merely empirical, there is really an a priori element. It is not the exclusive product of an external cause, it is the joint product of subject and object, of matter and mind, it depends as much on the constitution of the one as on the properties of the other, and hence both Kant and Mill have shown that the theory which represents the mind

as purely passive in sensation proceeds on a partial view of the conditions required, and that the laws of our organization and mind are as much concerned as the properties and influence of outward objects. And if there thus be, on the one hand, an a priori element in every judgment or argument a posteriori, it is equally evident, on the other hand, that the converse is also true, that there is an a posteriori element in every a priori proof. Mr. Mill has endeavoured

to show that the whole force of the syllogism depends on a prior induction, that every process of deductive reasoning presupposes some idea derived from experience, and that geometry itself rests ultimately on definitions, such as are possible only on the supposition of our having observed figures and magnitudes. In short, human knowledge, in all cases without exception, depends on the combination of two elements, a sudden rudimentary experience and some mental

law or principle of reason, and in the absence of either, knowledge is non-existent and reasoning impossible. Let us supply these general views to the special subject of our present inquiry. It appears to us that neither the a priori nor the a posteriori proof of the being and attributes of God could be valid or conclusive, did it confine itself either to the facts of experience or the ideas of reason exclusively, and that both must be combined in any effective statement of the evidence.

This remark is abundantly confirmed by the result of all the attempts that have ever been made to construct a proof out of materials derived exclusively, either from reason or experience. It has been well said that Descartes' celebrated arguments for the existence of God have all been sometimes called by courtesy a priori arguments, though some of them are as much deductions a posteriori,

the elements, however, being from the mind, not from the material universe, as those which are usually so called, i.e. they are from effects to causes, and from effects manifesting a certain nature to a cause manifesting a similar nature. end quote. We cannot advert to all the examples, but we may select one which all competent judges will admit to be, in many respects, the most memorable effort of human reason to elevate

itself, by pure thinking, to the knowledge of him who is infinite and eternal. The demonstration of the existence of God by Dr. Samuel Clark is one of the noblest monuments of human thought. It is the product of a mind at once acute and profound, and whatever defects may be ascribed to it by the rigorous criticism of reason or the sceptical criticism of unreason, it will ever retain a permanent value in the eyes even of those who decline to adopt or sanction it on account of

that portion of truth which unquestionably belongs to it. It is characterized throughout by that vigorous intellectual energy which made Clarke a fit associate and correspondent of Newton and Leibniz and Butler. On a careful analysis of this celebrated argument, it will be found that it may be divided into two great branches, and that in each of these it depends entirely for its validity on the combination of an empirical fact with a law of reason, in other words on the

conjoined force of the a priori and a posteriori elements. In the first branch, which proceeds on what Kant would have called the fact of unconditioned existence, experience is called in, but only to the extent of postulating the existence of something, and then on the ground of this fact of experience the author rises, by the aid and under the guidance of an established law of thought, to the inference that something must have existed from all eternity, or that there

must be in the universe some being that is necessary and self-existent. He next proceeds to deduce from the idea of a necessary and self-existent being certain conclusions respecting its nature and the attributes which must belong to it. Without enlarging on this part of the proof, in which he founds on mere unconditioned existence, as Baronius says a metaphysician ought to do. Let us turn to the second branch of his argument, in which he attempts to prove the intelligence,

wisdom, goodness, and other perfections of God. In this he founds not on bare existence as unconditioned, but on existence so conditioned as to afford evidences of design, and is compelled again to have recourse to the combined strength of reason and experience. In proving his eighth proposition that the supreme cause and author of all things must be an intelligent being, he frankly admits that this, which nevertheless is said to be the main question betwixt us and

the atheists, does not so obviously and directly appear to us by considerations a priori, because through the imperfection of our faculties we know not wherein intelligence consists, nor can we see the immediate and necessary connection of it with self-existence as we can that of eternity, infinity, and unity. But a posteriori, almost everything in the world, demonstrates to us this great truth, and affords us undeniable arguments to prove that the world,

and all things therein, are the effects of an intelligent and knowing cause. The argument, considered as a pure a priori speculation, thus breaks down in the hands of its ablest advocate, and that too just at the most critical point, the point which, by his own admission is, quote, the main question betwixt us and the atheists, end quote. It is only fair to add his own candid estimate of the comparative value of this kind of proof, as that is frankly stated

in a letter appended to his work. Quote, the proof a posteriori, he says, is level to all men's capacities, because there is an endless gradation of wise and useful phenomena of nature, from the most obvious to the most abstruse, which afford proof of the being of God to the several capacities of all unprejudiced men, and this is what, I suppose, God as a moral governor expects that moral agents should be determined by. The proof a priori is, I believe, strictly demonstrative,

but like numberless mathematical demonstrations, capable of being understood by only a few attentive minds, because it is of use only against learned and metaphysical difficulties, and therefore, it must never be expected that this could be made obvious to the generality of men, any more than astronomy or mathematics can be. This graceful admission is satisfactory so far as it goes,

but the fact that such minds as those of Butler, Reed, Stewart, Brown, Brougham, Whatley, and Chalmers were not convinced after the most careful study of the validity of this demonstration may be regarded as a sufficient proof that not only the generality of men, but some even of the few attentive minds may deserate something which they can by no means find in it. and yet we are very far from saying that this elaborate argument deserves the ridicule with

which it has sometimes been treated on the contrary we hold that it does contain the substance of a valid proof both from conditioned and unconditioned existence and that its chief defect lies in the professed attempt to prove everything a priori when from the very nature of the case we are under the necessity of combining the principles of reason with the facts of experience. Still, it has a permanent and imperishable value as one of the loftiest

monuments of human thought, and the deductive method which it pursues is, and ever will be, applicable to some topics included in the general subject which cannot be so well or so clearly proved in any other way. The masterly critique by Dr. Waterland amply proves the truth of this opinion. He rejects the proof for reasons which are distinctly and forcibly stated, but he adds that, quote, it may be legitimate to argue a priori from existence to attributes, or from one attribute to another,

that the divine existence may be considered in the first place, and after that the attributes, in their most natural order of conception, and when they are so placed or ranked, we may argue from them in that order, and such arguing may, without impropriety, be styled arguing a priori, as arguing from something antecedent, in natural order of conception, to something subsequent in conception to it. and this kind of arguing a priori which is reasonable ought not to be confounded with

the other which is manifestly usteron proteron and palpably absurd end quote the third question whether on the supposition of a proof being both possible and legitimate it should consist chiefly of those facts which are patent to all men or should also embrace the philosophical explanation of these facts may be briefly answered by saying that the two methods are not incompatible with each other, or mutually exclusive, and that both may be useful to different orders of mind.

The general community will always be most impressed by the evidence which arises from what Phenelon has happily called le coup d'œil, or l'aspect général de l'univers, by the facts which they observe in nature rather than by the philosophical explanation of these facts. The order which pervades the whole, at least, of the physical world, the regular succession of the seasons, the stability of the laws which control such tremendous forces as are ever in

action, and the manifold beneficent uses to which they are evidently subservient, these and similar facts, patent to the observation of all, constitute the strength and substance of what must ever be the popular argument for the being and perfections of God. No error could be more fatal or less pardonable than that of any attempt to supersede or disparage it, by insisting on the exclusive validity of a more scientific proof founded on the philosophical explanation of these facts.

The truth is, the facts are sufficient with or without a philosophical explanation of them. They were found sufficient even when they were associated with theories which were subsequently known to have an explanation that was false. It is deeply interesting in this connection to observe that the older writers on natural theology, who lived before the Copernican system of astronomy, had gained, through the labours of Newton and his successes, its present

unquestioned ascendancy, did, nevertheless, make very much the same use of the phenomena of the heavens when the earth was supposed to be the centre around which the sun, moon, and planets revolved, as is made of them still, when we know that the sun is the centre and the earth is a revolving planet. We find that not only Cicero of old, but how Phenelon and Ray in more modern times proceed on the palpable facts of nature, while they were either in error or in doubt in regard

to their right philosophical explanation, and that some of them, such as Ray, give their readers the option of either alternative without the slightest fear of weakening the proof. The reason is plain. The evidence arises from facts of fitness or examples of design and adapting means to ends, which may be clearly discerned and easily interpreted by the most untutored mind. That evidence does not depend insofar as its substance or strength is concerned either on

the philosophical explanation of nature, or on the metaphysical analysis of our own laws of thought. It rests on the palpable facts of experience and the first principles of reason. Quote, The belief of the existence of a deity, says Estlen, does not depend upon any deep, abstruse, or metaphysical modes of reasoning. If there be any first principles to which the human mind necessarily recurs as the foundation of all its reasoning and the ground of its belief on any

subject, these establish the doctrine beyond the possibility of its being shaken, end quote. Quote, I shall only insist, says Ray, on those things which every understanding may discern, the appearances which every eye sees, or the observations of fact, which must occur in the most inattentive of mankind, who has but common sense, for even these will be sufficient to establish the great truth upon, end quote. And M. Jacques Lourdes, an able and useful writer upon

this subject is equally explicit. The popular evidence is valid independently of the philosophical explanation. For, look to the marvellous provision for watering the earth, the constancy and regularity with which it acts within certain assignable limits, and the manifold purposes which are served by it in the support of vegetable and animal life, and who does not see in the palpable facts themselves

an evidence of design, although he may be utterly ignorant of the science of meteorology. Look again to the nutritive properties of certain alimentary substances, the provision which is made for their production, for the use of man and beast, and their relation to the appetites and organs of so many diversified tribes, and who does not see in the palpable facts themselves an evidence of design, although he may be utterly ignorant of

the science both of organic and inorganic chemistry. Look again to the alternation of day and night, and the corresponding alternation of labor and repose, to the succession of the seasons, and the corresponding succession in the growth, maturity, and decay of terrestrial vegetation, and who does not see a plan and a purpose, although he may be utterly ignorant of the science of astronomy and the explanations which it affords of the facts observed.

But while the popular evidence is perfectly valid without the aid of science, yet science, in its progressive discoveries, may furnish some fresh illustrations or some confirmatory proofs of the wisdom of God in nature, which may impart much interest to the study of the natural indications, and which may be addressed with greater effect to the higher order of speculative minds. They are not indispensable, but they may be highly useful. They may serve

a noble end if they prove merely that philosophy is not adverse to faith, that the deeper we search into the mysteries of nature, the more do we see of the wisdom which pervades it, and that the torch of science serves only to bring into view some additional facts which might either have escaped our notice or have been imperfectly apprehended on a more general survey of the works of nature. Hence the value of those contributions to the argument which have been

furnished by such writers as Wewell and Prout, Brewster and Bell, who have nobly proved by lesson and example that science is not the rival but the handmaid, not the antagonist but the auxiliary of religion. The fourth question, whether the proof should proceed exclusively on the ground of natural evidence, or avail itself also of the light of revelation, and how far these two may admit of being either wholly separated or harmoniously combined, is one which in the present state of

speculation appears to us to possess great practical importance. These two sources of evidence are distinct and, to a certain extent, independent, yet they are so closely related to each other that, in the experience of every inquirer in a Christian land, the streams which flow from them are insensibly blended together and exercise a concurrent influence over his mind. Various views have been taken of the relations subsisting between them and of the order in which

they should be severally discussed, or maybe most logically applied. Some have held that the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God must necessarily occupy the first place, and is entitled to claim precedence over every other proof, on the ground that the existence of God is presupposed in the very idea of a revelation, and that the evidence for revelation itself depends on this fundamental truth. Others have held that the chief proof, without which no other would be

conclusive, or at least effectual in producing conviction, arises from the testimony of scripture, which narrates the history of the creation of the world, and that it is only in the light of revealed truth that nature becomes sufficiently luminous to afford either proof or illustration of the simplest doctrines of theology. These two opposite tendencies are severally exemplified in the treatises of Principal Brown and Archbishop Sumner, the Essay on the Existence of a Supreme

Creator and the records of creation. Principal Brown follows the line of the natural evidence, making only an occasional reference to the contents of scripture, while Dr. Sumner founds mainly on the authority of scripture, and especially on that of the Pentateuch. The former expressly states that, quote, God's existence is presupposed by revelation and cannot consequently be proved in the first instance by revelation, end quote, and that, quote, to derive

from the sacred scriptures, any evidence of the existence of deity may have the appearance of arguing in a circle, for unless the existence and government of God be previously granted, the sacred oracles, as proceeding from him, can have no authority. If the fundamental point of his existence be contested, it is vain to maintain that their sanction proceeds from this source. Dr. Sumner again directs his argument mainly to the establishment of the credibility and truth

of the mosaic narrative of the creation. He anticipates the objection that, by following this line of proof, quote, it will lead us away from natural theology, end quote, but he adds, quote, if it does so, we are only following the course to which the subject itself leads every reflecting mind, for although nature gives a clear testimony, she speaks in vain to almost all. The harmony and design of the universe affords an unanswerable argument from final causes,

but the god of natural theology will never be anything more than a dumb idol of philosophy neglected by the philosopher and unknown to the multitude acknowledged in the closet and forgotten in the world end quote with all deference to these venerable writers we think that the two lines of proofs are neither incompatible nor mutually exclusive that they admit of being not indeed identified but harmoniously combined and that when thus considered and treated they

constitute two independent but concurrent witnesses to the truth. The reason which Dr. Brown assigns for his opinion amounts in substance to this, that God's existence is presupposed by revelation and cannot consequently be proved in the first instance by revelation. But there is both room and need for careful discrimination here. We must distinguish between the contents and the authority of scripture. In its contents we may find a valid evidence of the being and perfections of God,

such as is independent in the first instance of its inspired authority. In its miracles and prophecies, those manifest tokens of superhuman wisdom and power, in its sublime doctrines and pure morality, and above all in the life and character of Christ, the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person,

we may discern such a manifestation of God as may be even more striking and impressive than any that can be found in the ordinary course of nature. Besides, God is the author as we believe both of nature and of revelation, Why should we deal differently with these two volumes? If the existence of God be presupposed by revelation,

is it not equally presupposed by creation? And is not the whole theistic argument directed to show the logical necessity of this presupposition? Each of the two volumes presupposes an author, and the character of the product may, in either instance, convince us of his being as well as of his perfections.

If God has magnified his word above all his name, Is it conceivable that it should have no bearing on the manifestation of himself? Is it legitimate to say that creation exhibits evidence sufficient to make God known as the creator, and may it not be equally legitimate to say that revelation exhibits evidence sufficient to make God known as the revealer? The process may be longer, by a single step, in the one case than

it is in the other, but assuredly it is neither less logical nor less conclusive. The miracles and prophecies recorded in scripture were intended, indeed, to prove a particular dispensation of providence, the redemption of the world by the Messiah, but this does not hinder, but that they may also prove God's general providence over the world, as our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do prove it because this character

of the author of nature is necessarily connected with and implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things, so that indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the scriptural revelation as it would have been had the design of revelation been nothing else than to prove it, End quote. In all cases, it is by a manifestation of his perfections that God maketh himself known, and through whatever medium, whether of nature or revelation, that manifestation may be made to us,

it affords valid evidence of his existence as well as of his character. Accordingly, Dr. Brown afterwards admits that, quote, collateral proofs of deity may be drawn from the evidences of extraordinary power, wisdom, and goodness manifested in the economy of redemption, end quote, and while he insists chiefly on the natural evidence, he states more shortly some of the proofs, quote, which are derived from the sacred oracles, end quote. Dr. Sumner does not object to the

natural evidence on the ground that it is either inaccessible or inconclusive. On the contrary, he admits that, quote, nature gives a clear testimony, end quote, and that, quote, the harmony and design of the universe affords an unanswerable argument from final causes, end quote, but he objects to the sufficiency of natural theology as inadequate, without a revelation, to impart such a view of the character of God as is necessary for the ends of practical religion.

So far, every Christian theist will cordially concur with the venerable prelate, but the independent study of the natural evidence may be carried on concurrently with the equally independent study of scripture, and both may be necessary to impart that breadth to our conceptions and that strength to our convictions, which are indispensable to an enlightened and elevated faith. There are two considerations which seem to imply not only the propriety of

combining but also the impossibility of separating these distinct proofs. The first is that, according to our belief, they were both co-evil with the origin of our race. God never left himself without a witness in nature, nor did he withhold a witness by revelation from the fathers of the human family, so that the world has never been placed in a condition to test, by experience, the question how far by the unaided light of nature the reason of man could have risen to

the knowledge of God. The second is that even at the present day it is neither by a series of considerations altogether independent of revelation, nor yet by a mere proof of the credibility of the Mosaic narrative, that reflecting minds are impressed with the conviction of God's existence, but rather by the conjoined light of nature and scripture, and the concurrent influence, often undistinguishable, of reasons derived from both. A proof, to be complete in itself,

and adapted to the existing state of society, must exclude no ray of light from whatever quarter it may emanate, and overlook no fragment of evidence in whatever department it shall be found, and such a proof may be constructed, as shall conduct us to our ultimate conclusion by a series of successive steps, each firm and stable, and all leading to our final resting place, in the knowledge and belief of God. Never, perhaps, was the relation which subsists between

the natural evidence and the inspired word more correctly or more sublimely expressed than by the afflicted poet who wrote during a lucid interval on the walls of his cell with a piece of coal which has been well described as, quote, a live coal from off the altar, end quote, the following lines. Tell them I am, Jehovah said, to Moses while earth shook with dread and smitten to the heart, At once, above, beneath, around, all nature, without voice or sound, replied, O Lord, thou art.

Guided by the views which have been stated, we propose to avail ourselves of all the sources of evidence that may seem to promise any contribution, either to the proof of the existence, or to the illustration of the perfections of God. We hope to combine, without confounding, and to unite without identifying, the various elements on which the completeness of the proof depends, and to exhibit them, seriatim et gradatim, while we

endeavour at every successive stage to estimate the exact value of every particular contribution to the general evidence. For the argument in favour of the being and perfections of God, as the creator and governor of the world, is neither, on the one hand, a process of deductive reasoning in which particular truths are inferred from a more general truth which implicitly comprehends them all, nor yet a single solitary induction depending on any one law of reason or

any one class of facts. It is rather a series of inductions followed by a corresponding series of inferences, each resting on its own appropriate evidence and contributing something to the general proof. The inductive process may admit of, and may even require for its ultimate completion, a supplementary process of deduction from truths previously established. It is well known that the spontaneous operations of the mind are much more rapid and summary than any exposition can be of

the reflective processes of thought, and that a conclusion which is instantly and, as it were, intuitively reached by the former, as soon as the evidence is discerned, may not admit of being verified or proved by the latter without a more protracted process. It may require an articulate statement of various facts and principles which were all really present, although they might not be consciously perceived or accurately discriminated at the time when the conclusion was embraced.

Hence the necessity of a gradual and progressive advance in the statement of the evidence, and hence also the propriety of commencing with the simplest and most elementary part of the proof, and of proceeding thence to the next higher-end order, and so on, until, by a series of such steps, we reach the most elevated platform to which the human mind can hope to attain. In accordance with this general plan, we shall divide the proof into six parts,

The first, proceeding on the mere fact of existence as unconditioned and guided by the principle of causality or the law of efficient causes, establishes the existence of a necessary self-existent and eternal being, without determining in the first instance the nature and character of that being, or deciding whether it be God or the universe. The second, proceeding not on the mere fact of existence but on the existence of mind, an existence sui generis, which is immediately revealed in consciousness, and which is conditioned

or characterized by the well-known properties of perception, intelligence, and voluntary activity, and guided also by the principle of causality, or the law of efficient causes, demonstrates the necessity of supposing either an infinite series of derived and dependent intelligences, or the existence of a supreme intelligence, from which every inferior mind derived its being and its powers. The third, proceeding on the phenomena of conscience and guided by the instinctive idea of

law and authority, establishes the existence of a living personal God, holy, just and good, and his character as a lawgiver, governor and judge. The fourth, proceeding also on the effect of existence as conditioned, but referring to a different class of phenomena, surveys the constitution and course of nature as made known to us by experience and observation, and guided by the principle of teleology, or the doctrine of final causes, establishes the existence of an

intelligent, wise, and powerful first cause whose perfections are displayed alike in the material, the intellectual, and the moral worlds. The fifth, proceeding on the facts of history, whether these have been traditionally transmitted by oral testimony, recorded in writing or other memorials, or inferred from the existing state of the earth and its geological calendar, establishes the fact of a creation by demonstrating the comparatively recent origin of the tribes and

races by which the world is now inhabited, and especially of the science and civilization of the human race. The sixth, proceeding on a survey of the whole natural evidence, offers the complement and sum of the proof, and seeks to make all the scattered rays of light converge to one focus, so as to illustrate the majestic yet mysterious character of him who is the sole creator and supreme governor of the world. End of introduction, historic survey of the various methods of stating

the proof preliminary questions by James Buchanan