Chapter 1
Chapter 1, Part 1 of Epics of American History, Expansion and Reform, 1889-1926. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Epics of American History, Expansion and Reform, 1889-1926, by John Spencer Bassett, Political Reaction under Harrison, 1889-1893. One C. Text to the Spirit of Reform, The three decades of our political history between 1884 and 1914 were notable for a continuous struggle for political and economic reform.
The movement was but a continuation of an old impulse manifest in the opposition to slavery and, when that was accomplished, apparent in the demand for civil service reform. In its later phases, it worked for the adoption of the secret ballot, the reduction of the protective tariff, the destruction or regulation of trusts, the control of railroads in the interest of the general public, and the diminution of the power of party bosses. On the political side, the reformers were moving toward democracy. On the economic side, they looked toward the extension of the control of industry by the federal government. The reformers played a large part in our history.
They were the deciding factor in the election of Cleveland in 1884. When he could not accomplish all they expected of him, their ardor cooled and conservatism triumphed in the election of Harrison in 1888. After four years, the reformers turned back to Cleveland and he was again elected in 1892. Then came the free silver wave, which was considered by its supporters a demand for reform.
It discredited the Democratic Party and conservatism won in 1896. McKinley, who led the conservatives, was tactful and had the prestige of a successful war so that he seemed to have a long era of power before him. But the situation changed with his death in 1901. Roosevelt became president and opened another era of reform which went further than Cleveland had ever thought of going.
What he did Taft did not undo, and much that the two men left unfinished was completed by Wilson in the seventeen months of his presidency that passed before the World War mastered the thoughts of the nations of the earth. From that time, the problems of neutrality, warfare, and recovery from war have dominated our political thought. But it is probable that the reform impulse is not dead. The reformers were always a minority of the people, but they were active and convinced and their influence was out of proportion to their numbers. To the conservatives, they seemed impractical theorists. They were frequently unreasonable, but they were generally impelled by the highest purposes. By balancing between the two important parties, they were able to turn the tide in several elections,
and in the first decade of the 20th century, their representative, Roosevelt, made the policy of the government. As a class, the conservatives were men of high personal character. They were not troubled about political conditions because they considered the existing situation as satisfactory as could be expected in a fallible world. They resented the attacks of the reformers on party leaders, for party loyalty is ever a high virtue in the eyes of the conservatives. The reform movement was strong in New England and the Middle States, where the old American stock was most influential.
Many of its earlier leaders were of Puritan descent, as George William Curtis, President of Harvard, and a large number of clergymen, teachers, and philanthropists. Nevertheless, it drew many leaders from other sections of the public, as Carl Schertz, who was a German by birth, and Simon Stern, who was a Jewish lawyer in New York. Roosevelt, who became the embodiment of the movement in its later stages,
was of Dutch and Southern descent, and perhaps the old Puritan stock as a whole was not in sympathy with his cause. Wilson, who carried on the work after 1912, was of Southern stock, and the backbone of his support was Southern and Western. It was Roosevelt who made the reform movement a nationwide affair. In his day, it was more than an impulse for reform,
and it was also an expression of deep class feeling and sectional distrust. 3. Harrison Takes Office. President Harrison was a good lawyer and an upright man. He was loyal to party, not concerned about reform and a conservative by instinct. When elected, he did not expect to be the leader of his party, nor to fix the policy of Congress. He accepted the doctrine that the executive and legislature should not interfere with each other's activities. In the White House,
he lived a quiet life, practicing the private virtues, attending to his own tasks, and leaving the heads of the Cabinet's wide discretion in discharging their duties. His aloofness kept his acquaintances at a distance, and since few newspaper men got close enough to understand what kind of man he was. They often held him up to ridicule. The cartoonists portrayed him as a precocious-looking little man swallowed up under a grandfather's hat, an allusion to his grandfather,
William Henry Harrison, elected president in 1840. His private life was discussed with a freedom that violated the dignity of the high office he held. He made the mistake of appointing a number of his kin and relatives to office, and consequently he was denounced for nepotism. Misunderstood and apparently indifferent to the opinion of the world, he shouldered odium he did not deserve, accepted defeat in 1892 with resignation, and took a lower place in history than his merit
warranted. During his one term, his party controlled both houses. He had no conflicts, no victories, no defeats. The first term of Cleveland, 1885 to 1889, made a sharp break in the history of the Republican Party, which had lived four years on the prestige acquired in the Civil War and Reconstruction. The four years spent out of office changed its personnel and spirit. Old leaders gave place to new. John Sherman and James G. Blaine were the only very
prominent men of the old regime who remained in office in 1889. The new men were direct in their methods and went straight to their goals. Two of them stood out with special distinctness. Thomas B. Reed of Maine and William McKinley, Jr. of Ohio. Both were members of the House of Representatives and both wished to be Speaker. The prize went to Reed, who promptly appointed McKinley chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. Reed ruled the House with a strong hand, and
McKinley prepared a tariff bill which gave color to Harrison's administration. This change was reflected in the makeup of the Cabinet. The only well-known man in it was James G. Blaine, secretary of state, it was to him that Harrison chiefly owed his nomination, and the appointment was considered an expression of gratitude. Blaine, however, was old and physically and mentally impaired, and he was not suited for the place assigned to him. The secretaryship of the treasury
was a difficult problem. Interest in free silver was reviving in the West, and Harrison was urged from that quarter to appoint a man in sympathy with the Western feeling. After some discussion, the place were given to William Wyndham of Minnesota. He had begun life with great sympathy for free silver, and for a few years before his appointment, he had been in business in New York. It was believed, therefore, that he understood the points of view of both sections and could
harmonize their demands. The appointment of John Wanamaker, a great department store magnate of Philadelphia's postmaster general, caused much comment, partly because he had no political experience and partly on account of the large campaign contribution he was reported to have made to the Republicans in 1888. The contest in that year marks the appearance of great campaign funds in our presidential elections. The Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883 made it illegal to levy
on the salaries of officeholders, and so party managers were forced to rely on contributions from loyal party men. It happened that the tariff was the leading issue at this time. Therefore, it was natural for the party managers to turn for funds to the protected manufacturers who would be benefited by party success. Furthermore, it followed that donors of these funds wished to have influence over the party decisions. In the Republican campaign of 1888, Marcus A. Hanna
of Cleveland proved very successful in raising funds from the businessmen of Ohio. As the party became more and more committed to conducting a businessman's campaign, Hannah's influence was extended. To many people, Hannah was the mere synonym for materialism. To those who knew him well, he was a whole-souled, enthusiastic, sincere, and straightforward man, but he used direct methods in reaching his ends. He was a conservative of the better type. His rise in power meant that
politics were changing from an ideal basis to the basis of material expediency. More than before, the political conflict was waged for economic ends, and less for what the men who made the appeals were in the habit of calling political principles. The new spirit showed itself soon after Congress assembled in December 1889. The Republicans controlled each house, but their normal majority was small, and the Democrats were able to make effective obstruction. In the house,
it had become the custom to consider a member absent if he did not answer on roll call. When they sought to block legislation, the minority would not reply when called and then would raise the point of no quorum. By repeating this process, they consumed time and obstructed legislation, which was their object. Reed, the new speaker, decided to break up the practice. He ordered the clerk to count as present all visible members, whether they had voted or not.
This action raised a storm of protest, and he was dubbed a czar, but his course was approved by public opinion, and from that day it has been followed by any party in power. By tactics like these, Reed was able to defeat a filibuster and to enable his party to carry through its program. 4. The McKinley Tariff, 1890 In his first term, Cleveland forced tariff reduction to the front. The issue was important because of the steadily accumulating surplus revenue averaging $100 million a year from 1880 to 1891.
For a time, this surplus was used to pay off the national debt, which was done by buying bonds and canceling them, thus putting the surplus back into circulation. But the national banks protested against this course because it raised the price of bonds required as a deposit to secure their note circulation. To avoid this difficulty and to prevent the creation of the surplus, Cleveland urged a reduction of the tariff. That is, he would reduce the surplus by leaving it in the pockets of the people before it reached the government. This plan was supposed by the protectionists.
They believed the country would support them and met the Democrats with an aggressive defense. They not only opposed the reduction of the tariff but declared that it ought to be higher. They took their victory in 1888 as popular approval of this declaration and entered office determined to pass an act with higher rates. Framing the tariff bill fell to McKinley and the Ways and Means Committee. They had to do two apparently opposite things, raise the taxes and at the same time lower the revenues.
To raise the rates was not difficult since the manufacturers willingly pointed out to the committee how much increase should be made. Ingenious ways were found for lowering the surplus. In some cases, the rates were placed so high that the articles concerned were not imported as freely as before, which reduced the receipts by that much. Another means was to place non-protected articles on the free list. The most notable article in this list was raw sugar.
A comparatively small amount of our sugar was raised in Louisiana, and to save these producers from loss, a bounty of two cents a pound was allowed to domestic producers of sugar, including the makers of maple sugar. Another striking feature of this act was placing high duties on tin plate, which at the time was not produced in the country. It was defended on the ground that it would create a useful industry. One impulse for creating the duty was to enlarge the market for the iron sheets on which tin is plated. The McKinley Act was an avowed protectionist measure for the benefit of the manufacturers.
As such, it aroused the opposition at first of the farmers who believed that it burdened them for the benefit of other people. To meet this argument, duties were laid on the import of agricultural products. Before this time, duties on specific farm products as wool had been placed in tariff bills to obtain the support of farmers. But this act was the first which included a general system of such duties. The concession was worth little to the farmers, for such vast quantities of farm products were produced in the United States that little was imported,
while prices at home and abroad were fixed through competition in the markets of the world. While the bill was before Congress, the first Pan-American Congress was in session at Washington. It had been called largely through the efforts of Secretary Blaine. He was a strong advocate of Pan-Americanism. He seized on the occasion to try to promote Pan-American trade by means of reciprocity in tariffs.
McKinley opposed the idea and said, We have been beaten in every agreement of reciprocity we have ever had with any nation in the world. He kept reciprocity out of the bill while it was in the House, but Blaine got the Senate to insert it. And when the law passed, it provided that if certain countries did not make reductions on some of our exports, the president might impose discriminating duties on the sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides sent by them into our ports.
With this club in his hands, Blaine negotiated reciprocity treaties with several Latin American states. It was not possible to see how this policy would work out, for the reciprocity treaties were swept aside when the tariff was revised under Cleveland in 1894. The McKinley bill encountered stern opposition in the Senate, some of it from leading Republicans. The old line, Republicans did not readily accept extreme protection. Blaine told McKinley himself that such a policy would protect the Republican Party into a speedy retirement.
It took so long to adjust differences and pass the bill that the president did not sign it until October 1, 1890, on the eve of the congressional elections. Public opinion was much excited. Prices rose as a result of the passage of the Act, and there was a general feeling of disappointment in the country. The result of the election was the overwhelming triumph of the Democrats. The Republican majority of 10 became a Democratic majority of 138, and McKinley himself was defeated, probably through a gerrymander of his district by a recent Democratic legislature. The Republicans retained the Senate, but their majority there shrank from 14 to 6.
5. The Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 1890 The Bland-Allison Act of 1878 directed the coinage from 2 to 4 millions of silver dollars monthly. But the secretaries of the treasuries used the discretion allowed them and never coined more than the minimum. As the amount coined increased, it became ever harder to keep it in circulation. It was paid out whenever someone was found who would take it, but it came back promptly.
Several bills to stop silver coinage appeared in Congress, but none passed. The friends of silver were devoted to it. they suspected the Treasury officials of deception and declared them insincere in their efforts to keep the white metal in circulation. If the government, they said, paid its obligations in gold and silver instead of paying in gold when demanded, the people would take each metal readily,
but experienced financiers knew that the public hoards gold if the government refuses to pay it out on demand, with the result that gold goes to a premium. Such a course would have plunged the country into the confusion which existed after the Civil War and up to the resumption of specie payment in 1879. To avoid this situation, the government felt it necessary to make any reasonable sacrifice in order to keep on a gold basis. Undoubtedly, silver was in a bad way. Such large
quantities were being mined that the price fell steadily. In 1872, the bullion in a silver dollar was worth 102 cents in gold. In 1889, it had fallen to 72.22 cents. The leading countries in Europe had gone over to the gold basis, and quantities of their silver coins were thrown on the market as billions. This drop in the price caused serious loss to the owners of silver mines, who accordingly became active supporters of free coinage. It was also significant that the western
and southern farmers had fallen into debt through several years of poor crops. They believed prices would advance if silver were coin-free and without limit. The businessmen in the cities took the other side, and the ensuing controversy was joined between the rich and the poor, the East and the West. Much feeling was created, and each side vied with the other in denunciations. Cleveland was opposed to free cornage and more than once urged the repeal of the Law of 1878. In the Campaign of
1888. His opponents used this fact against him, and in free silver sections they declared themselves more friendly to silver than Cleveland. Now that they were in office, they were called on to do something for silver. Harrison's first annual message, 1889, anxiously expected by the silvermen, contained nothing positive on the subject. He merely referred the matter to Congress and sent with it a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, William Wyndham, which the President
said he had not read. Wyndham wished the United States to receive at the market price, but not to coin all the silver bullion offered, however much the and wherever it came from, and to pay for it in treasury notes. When offered for redemption, these notes were to be received at the option of the treasury in gold or in such quantities of silver bullion as at the time of redemption were worth the face value of the notes. If silver fell in this interval, which Wyndham did
not think possible the government would have to hand back more billion than it had received for the same amount of notes. The scheme was designed to make a market for silver. Its author thought it would mean the issue of not less than 37 million dollars of these notes annually, which was a larger inflation by half than resulted from the law of 1878. Wyndham's plan appeared in the House as a bill, Bland, leading three free silver champion, moved as a substitute to free and
unlimited coinage of silver. He was defeated by a vote of 140 to 116, and the bill, with important amendments, passed the House. In the Senate, it was summarily replaced by an out-and-out free silver bill, which passed by a majority of 17. The bill then went to a conference committee after the House had refused the Senate substitute. At this time, the tariff was before the Senate, and a group of silver Republicans let it be known that they would kill the McKinley bill
if free cornage was not passed. They had the power by acting with the Democrats to carry out the threat. They thought it as proper for Congress to legislate for the benefit of the farmers and silver miners as for manufacturers. Their threat alarmed the tariff men, and a compromise was agreed upon by which the tariff bill passed in a silver purchase measure was enacted. John Sherman, senator from Ohio, took a prominent part in passing this law, and it became known
as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. It provided for the monthly purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver at the market price to be paid for by issuing treasury notes, legal, tender, and redeemable as the government chose in silver or gold. This act meant the inflation of the currency by about $37 million a year and more than that if a billion rose in price. The situation of the Republicans had in fact been critical if the Eastern men had not compromised the silver
Republicans were pledged to join the Democrats and pass a free ununlimited Cornish law, and if that were vetoed, the party would be hopelessly divided. To avoid this situation, the Act of 1890 was passed. The extreme silvermen were deeply disappointed. Free coinage, they said, was betrayed in the house of its friends, and they began to demand leaders who were truer to silver than to party. Sixth, the Sherman Antitrust Law, 1890. Half a century ago, competition was relied
upon to give ample protection against overcharging. For this purpose, two parallel railroads were sometimes built where there was business for but one. Manufacturers, merchants, and even professional men competed for patronage. In this system was much duplicating of plant, overmanning of industry, and waste of effort. As early as 1880, some of the businessmen began to combine their plans. By this means they saved greatly in costs of operation and had better
position in the buying and selling markets. Thus sprang up the trusts. They were unpopular from the first, for they were monopolies. Their smaller rivals, whom they pressed to the wall or forced into involuntary sales, raised loud complaints and won public sympathy. Thus the question went into politics and legislatures began to discuss the annulment of the charters of the combining corporations. The first successful trust was the Standard Oil Company, which began at Cleveland
as an Ohio corporation under the management of John D. Rockefeller, noted for business ability. He induced several other oil refiners in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York to combine with him for united operations, fearing that no legislature would grant them a charter for the purpose in view
they got control in 1872 of the South Improvement Company, a Moribund Pennsylvania corporation whose chief asset was a charter, allowing it to carry on almost any kind of business it chose. The project began favorably, but it was broken up when the Pennsylvania legislature revoked a charter on the ground that it was not used for the purposes for which it was granted.
Before the charter was repealed, Rockefeller, who headed the Standard Oil Company in Cleveland, managed to get control of most of the refiners in that region. He bought them with stock in his own company, but they had the choice of war to end or an amicable sale. When they realized that he and his group had obtained such terms from the transportation companies that smaller dealers could not compete with them as independents, they accepted his terms. By this means, the Standard Oil Company, in three months, enlarged its daily capacity from 1,500 to 10,000 barrels of oil and thus was able to produce more than a fifth of the refined oil in the country.
It was in a position to wield a large influence over the oil business. Baffled in his attempts to organize the industry into one chartered company, Rockefeller now formed a pool of the refiners, controlling four-fifths of the industry. It was dissolved at the end of a year because it was thought that some members violated the agreement, often the fate of pools.
Rockefeller and his friends did not give up hope. The thing that held them together was the special rates they had obtained from the railroads. For nine years they proceeded under this loose form of union. All the time the Standard Oil Company was expanding, now buying out, a competitor now adding to its capacity, and always becoming stronger through the ability of its head. It steadily gained the dominance of the oil refining group. In 1882, it was so completely in control that it felt able to give outward form to what had developed by gradual growth.
The first step was to organize four standard oil companies, one each in Ohio, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. This step was taken publicly and by a state charter. To bring these four companies into perfect concert, nine trustees with Rockefeller at the head were appointed. To them was surrendered the stock in the four state companies, and to their custody were transferred the earnings of the companies to be distributed as dividends to the persons who surrendered the stock. Thus was created the trust, an active voluntary agreement which did not require a charter.
Its existence was not publicly known until 1888. When the trusts stood revealed to the country, there was an outburst of wrath. Suit was brought to dissolve the Standard Oil Company of Cleveland, and dissolution was ordered by the courts, but ample time was allowed to comply. Fearing similar action in other states, Rockefeller turned to New Jersey,
already known for a friendly attitude toward trusts. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey increased its stock from $10 to $110 million, took over the property formally in the hands of the trustees, paid for it in New York stock and dissolved the trust created in 1882. Rockefeller's success was thus assured, and many others imitated his methods. The significance of a New Jersey charter was that
unless the legislature interfered, which was not likely in this state, the company could do business in any other state under the guarantee of the federal constitution that the citizen of one state shall be allowed in all other states the rights he has in his own state. Strictly speaking, the Standard Oil Company as enlarged in New Jersey was not a trust, but the term had caught the popular fancy and continued to be used for all such great concerns. Trusts rarely began with
the combination of all the enterprises in a given industry. Some concerns would not join, and others were not deemed necessary. Against such outsiders, bitter war was waged until they were crushed or forced to enter the combinations. In such contests were freely used the worst methods of the old era of competition, bitter feelings were aroused, and the aid of the state and federal governments was invoked. The demand was for the destruction of the new instruments of wrong, but no one seemed
to know just how it could be accomplished without seriously hindering the progress of legitimate industry. Much was said on the subject in the campaign of 1888, and when Congress met in 1889, many bills were introduced to prohibit trusts. The great difficulty was to frame a law that would not do more than was intended. Businessmen had been combining for years. How could some be allowed to combine and others prevented without violating the ordinary property rights that are
guaranteed by the Constitution? The answer was found in the Assurement Antitrust Law of 1890. It contained a simple and general statement that combinations established in restraint of trade passing from state to state and intended to promote monopoly were illegal, and the persons transforming them should be punished by fine or imprisonment. The country did not quite understand this law. It took it to mean much or little. In fact, it was such a law as might be enforced or
ignored as the administration understood its meaning. It was not until Roosevelt was president that determined efforts were made to execute it. 7. The Pension Act of 1890. Three kinds of military pensions have been granted by the United States. A. Pensions for physical disabilities incurred in actual service. B. Pensions for dependent soldiers or relatives of soldiers unable to provide for themselves. C. Pensions made merely on the ground of service. Provisions for pensions of the first
kind have been made in the beginnings of all our wars. With respect to most of our wars, provisions have been made for service pensions when the survivors of a war have become old and few. As to pensions of the second class given to dependent persons who are not disabled, they were granted to revolutionary soldiers in 1818, and a full service pension was voted to revolutionary soldiers in 1832.
Opponents of the tariff declared that this pension was established to use up the treasury surplus and to do away with the demand for a lower tariff. No pensions of the second kind were voted for the War of 1812, but full-service pensions were granted in 1871 and liberally extended in 1878. A liberal law for pensions of the second class was passed in 1887 for Mexican war soldiers and full-service pensions in 1907, such is the history
of pensions for the wars earlier than 1861. Disability pensions for Civil War soldiers were authorized on a liberal scale by acts passed in Congress in 1862, 1864, 1865, 1866, 1872, and 1873. In 1872, Garfield said in the House that the expenditure for pensions, then standing at $27 million, had reached its peak, would remain stationary for a few years and then decline.
His prediction might have proved correct but for the activities of the pensioned attorneys. These men were numerous in Washington. They helped to soldier for a filing's claim and received a fee fixed by the government. When the claim was good, they rendered proper services, but as the good claims became fewer, some attorneys took up bad claims, many of which were rejected by the Commissioner of Pensions. Then grew up the habit of referring such claims approved by a lenient committee to Congress as private bills, where they usually passed without inquiry on the floor of either house. In carrying out this process, the pensions' attorneys became a powerful and persistent lobby.
They went further than mere private bills and sought to get laws passed for more liberal pensions. To carry their schemes through, they established newspapers and appealed to the soldier vote. They had a strong influence in the Grand Army of the Republic, composed of officers and soldiers of the Civil War. Their first striking success was in 1879 when the Arrears Pension Act was passed. This act referred to disabilities which, by the old law, were allowed if they developed within five years from discharge.
The Act of 1879 gave any pensioner the arrears from death or discharge to the time a pension was applied for. The prospect of thus receiving a large lump sum appealed to many a man or woman who would not apply for a small sum paid at intervals. Under the stimulus of the attorneys, the Act was passed with the strong support of each party. Under it, the pension bill rose from $27 million in 1878 to $56 million in 1880, and the number of applicants increased from 44,587 to 141,466 in the same period.
The pension attorneys were rewarded for their efforts by this vast increase in business, though the legal fee did not exceed $10 for each claim. When Cleveland was president, he adopted the plan of examining carefully the private pension bills sent him for signature. Many of them he signed and many he vetoed after satisfying himself. They were unwarranted. Against him, the pension attorneys opened their powerful batteries and reminded the public that he was elected by the votes of former Confederate soldiers.
Cleveland did not modify his course, and when the lobby got Congress to pass a bill in 1887 to allow pensions to all soldiers dependent on their own labor and not able to earn a living, he vetoed that bill also. For his entire pension policy, he was severely arraigned in 1888, and the assault was a strong factor in his defeat.
President Harrison took the office pledge to liberal pension policies. He appointed James Tanner Pension Commissioner, a prominent agitator for pensions, as Corporal Tanner. He had made many speeches at soldiers' reunions and on the stump, supporting the work being done by the pension attorneys.
When Commissioner, he openly expressed his determination to increase the pensions by a policy of re-rating. He began with the employees in his office, where he thus increased the annual amount paid for pensions by $16,000. Tanner's procedure was so much criticized that his superior, the Secretary of the Interior,
cautioned him to change his methods. He resented the censure and quarreled with the Secretary, with the result that Harrison interfered and dismissed him an act acceptable to most people. In his first annual message, December 3, 1889, Harrison encouraged the passage of a dependent pension law.
Congress complied and the President signed such a law on January 27, 1890. It granted pensions of $6 to $12 a month to honorably discharged soldiers who had served as much as 90 days and who suffered from mental or physical disability, however incurred so that they could not support themselves by manual labor, provided that such disability had not been incurred through vicious habits. When the law was passed, responsible officials gave assurances that it would be enforced in a liberal spirit, and despite its formal reference to disabilities, it was, to all intents, a service pension act. In its second year of operation, when it was fully acting, the total expenditure for pensions had increased by $68 million a year, and in the course of 17 years, by a total of $1,058,000. It was passed as a political measure with an eye to the old soldier vote.
Since 1890, the pension system has been further expanded. The act of 1890 was by President Roosevelt in 1904 so interpreted that any soldier 62 years old should be considered disabled by old age and therefore entitled to a pension. He also won the esteem of the pensioners by appointing Corporal Tanner,
whose forced resignation under Harrison had been resented by the old soldiers to a remunerative office in Washington. Roosevelt's order of 1904 had the disadvantage that it might be revoked by a future president. To prevent such a thing, Congress was induced to pass a law in 1907 for service pensions to Civil War soldiers 62 years old. In 1912, Congress expended its pension benefits still further by increasing the rates allowed to such beneficiaries with a maximum of $30 a month to men who had reached 75 years.
The Civil War pensions have been extremely expensive. From 1866 to 1917, when the United States entered the World War, the total disbursement for pensions, including the comparatively small amount paid the soldiers of the Spanish and Indian Wars, had amounted to $5,119,080,336.
In 1866, the number on the pension rolls was 126,722. In 1917, it was 673,111. It is the largest expenditure for pensions of any sort in the history of the world. End of chapter 1, part 1.
