menu_book Chapter 6

Chapter 3, Part 2 of Epics of American History, Expansion and Reform, 1889-1926, by John Spencer Bassett. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. McKinley and the War with Spain, 1897-1901 23. Dewey's Campaign at Manila Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, watched these events closely.

During a brief service as Acting Secretary, he caused the Pacific Fleet under Commodore Dewey to assemble in force at Hong Kong, well supplied for quick and decisive service. service. April 25, four days after war began, orders from Secretary Long-Reach Dewey saying, proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. The Spanish power in the Philippines was small. It consisted of the Bay of Manila and a few small

ports defended by old fortifications and a number of small ships of war, mostly wooden, to overthrow it proved an easy task. Dewey needed no urging. April 27 he set sail, and when morning came on May 1 he was inside the bay with the Spanish fleet, larger than his own force but not so well armed, stretched out before him under the guns of the fortifications. The battle that followed was a victory for the best guns. By noon, Spain's last arm of strength in the island was broken. Her fleet was a mass of ruins, and the city of Manila was undefended against the guns of the attackers.

The signal triumph was won without the death of one of Dewey's men in battle, and only seven wounded. None of his ships were injured. It was a brilliant engagement, making full allowances for the superior weight and range of his cannon. Dewey's squadron was sent forth in order to protect our shipping in the Pacific. That object attained, he might have gone back to San Francisco, leaving Manila to the prey of any power that felt like taking it. He did not feel warranted in pursuing such a course without specific orders.

He reported the situation to Washington and was ordered to remain where he was. Meanwhile, landing forces were sent to his aid and his squadron was strengthened but until they arrived his position was delicate. He declared Manila blockaded and announced that he would exercise military authority over the bay, which he was justified in doing under international law. The uncertainty of his position arose from the small force he had with which to

enforce his authority. Soon after he won his battle, foreign warships began to drop anchor before Manila. They came ostensibly to protect the interests of their nationals, but in reality to observe his operations. France and Japan sent one each, Great Britain three, and Germany five, which were far more than were needed to protect German interests. All the commanders but the German Vice-Admiral von Diedrich respected Dewey's authority, remaining quietly at their

posts of observation. Von Diedrich's ships moved freely about the bay. They took soundings, communicated with the Spaniards, interfered with the insurgents, then acting with Dewey, and in other ways violated the rules of blockade. This conduct was irritating. Dewey made a protest asserting the right to visit incoming vessels to ascertain their character. Von Diedrich undertook to call a council of the neutral commanders, but only one came, Captain Chichester, who made it

plain that he supported the American position. Nevertheless, the German commander did not cease his annoyance. He finally sent an officer to make some trivial protests, says Dewey, when I had heard them, though I made the most of the occasion by using him as a third person to state candidly and firmly my attitude in a verbal message which he conveyed to his superiors so successfully that vice-admiral von diedrich was able to understand my point of view an apparently reliable story has it that his actual words were and say to admiral von diedrich that if he wants a fight he can have it now 24. The Santiago Campaign. When the war began, it was thought that the summer of 1898 would be given over to preparations and the autumn to a strong attack on Havana. Unexpected events came up and the autumn, when it arrived, saw the fighting at an end and the diplomats busy making peace.

The thing that upset the plans of the War Department was the dispatch of a Spanish fleet to the West Indies. The people of Spain were alarmed at the prospect of having their army in Cuba cut off by the United States Navy and forced into surrender through lack of supplies. To reassure them, their government sent out a squadron of first-class ships to cruise off the Cuban coast and keep the United States fleet from blockading the Cuban ports, a task for which the squadron was not adequate. The commander, Admiral Cervera, was able and intelligent. He urged that he was not strong enough to defeat the navy of his opponents and not able to skid coal in Cuba in order to keep up operations.

His superiors ignored his protest. They did not dare let their people think they had abandoned the army in a far country. Savera set sail on April 29, 1898, going first to Martinique, May 12, where he learned that two hostile squadrons were sailing along the Cuban coast, looking for him. One was under rear Admiral Sampson and was on the northern coast of the island, the other under Commodore Schley, was on the southern coast. He made for Santiago on the eastern end of Cuba, arrived there before his adversaries, intercepted him and placed himself under the orders of the commander of the army at Havana. What he could do in Santiago without coal and too weak to fight his opponents, no one could see. He was in a trap and its doors were closed on him when Schley arrived off the harbor on May 28 with Samson coming up on June 1.

His situation was desperate, he could not cut his way out and Spain had no other fleet that could drive off the blockaders. In a short time famine would force him to surrender. Among the Bacchigators, Sampson was in chief command. He was not content to let time do its work, thinking the end could be hastened by establishing lines of investment around the town. Reporting the situation to Washington, he said that if there were a land force of 15,000 men

in front of Santiago, he could capture the place and with it the flower of Spain's navy. The force of his argument was understood by the President, and orders were given for sending out the required troops. They were hastily assembled at Tampa, Florida, regular troops, militia, and a regiment of volunteer cavalry the Rough Riders raised through the enterprise of Theodore Roosevelt, who became its lieutenant colonel. In all, there were 16,887 men and officers with General Shafter in command. The force was larger than the army that defeated Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781

and a little more than half as large as one of the many divisions used by the United States in the war against Germany in 1918. It sailed from Tampa on June 14 and was off Santiago on June 22. Landing was effected through the surf on the coast east of the town. Outposts were thrown forward and lines of supplies were established. June 30, after two skirmishes, the force attacked and carried the outer defenses of the town,

the Spaniards falling back to their inner lines of defense. This attack was mainly on San Juan Hill. The troops had been told they would break through easily, and they became discouraged when they met a stout resistance. Setting laying down to trench warfare added to their misery,

and the hot sun and tropical rains brought on sickness. Under these conditions a council of war was held on July 3, at which it was decided that the proper course to follow was to draw off the army to higher ground, recruit its health, and wait for reinforcements before carrying the siege further. A dispatch to that effect was sent to the War Department of Washington.

Had this course been followed, the war would have been prolonged for months. That it was not attempted was due to a suggestion of General Joseph Wheeler, who advised that a stern attitude be assumed and a peremptory demand for surrender be made on the Spanish commander. The demand was made, and it produced such confusion in the minds of the enemy that they believed themselves about to be overwhelmed.

Under this conviction, the governor of Cuba ordered Severo to try to cut his way out through the blockading fleet, in order that Spaniards might not see the dishonor of a fleet taken without a fight. Severo obeyed with a heavy heart, for he knew how futile was the attempt. A capital blunder had been made in sending his fleet into the trap. It was about to end in a tragedy. July 4 was Sunday, and Severo, his offers as a man, attended mass at an early hour and then went on board the ships. At 9.15 in the morning, the Admiral leading the way, the fleet turned its prowse seaward with all steam up and prepared to fight desperately its last battle. Rounding the headlands that concealed the inner harbor, it drew the fire of the blockading squadron, and a fearful running fight began.

Severo had ordered his ships to disperse as they emerged from the harbor, thinking that some might escape while the blockaders concentrated on others. The order was disregarded, and each ship followed the commander who had the post of danger. The battle developed into a series of marine duels, two lines of ships steaming parallel courses and firing as rapidly as they could.

The upshot was that one after another of the Spanish ships gave up the fight in a sinking condition and the last struck its color shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon. The squadron, four fine armored cruisers and two destroyers, was a series of burning wrecks and the Spanish casualties included 323 dead, 151 wounded and 1,782 captured. Samson lost one man killed and one wounded. Again the Navy had won a signal victory and again

the victory was due to the superiority of the cannon. The destruction of Cervera's squadron put an end to the discouragement in the army. Disease crept forward, but the men stood to their posts, extended the lines, brought up artillery over the worst roads, and soon had the city at their mercy. On July 17, Santiago surrendered. It was none too soon for the preservation of the army from disease. Fever of a serious type had already appeared, and so great

was the alarm that early in August the whole force was ordered to Montauk Point, Long Island, to recuperate its shattered health. 25. The Treaty of Peace Severa's defeat and the fall of Santiago convinced Spain that the war was lost, and July 18 she asked the French government to act as intermediary in making peace on the basis of the independence of Cuba. The request was received favorably by McKinley, and arrangements began to be discussed

looking to a cessation of arms. While they were still proceeding, a force commanded by General Miles moved from Cuba to Puerto Rico July 21 and established United States authority there by an easy conquest. August 12, a protocol was signed by the two nations and fighting ceased. The terms of the protocol were dictated by the United States. They provided for an amortiz, depending the completion of a treaty, the recognition by Spain of Cuban independence,

the cession of Puerto Rico and one of the landrones in the Pacific Ocean as indemnity and the postponement until the final treaty of the status of the Philippines. The United States room maintained their position there pending that event. It was provided that commissioners from the two nations should meet in Paris to settle the terms of peace not later than October 1. On the day named the following commissioners in Paris opened the discussion of the treaty.

William Ardé, who resigned the secretaryship of state to be chairman of the commission, Whitlaw, Reed, Senators Cushman, K. Davis, William P. Fry, and George Gray, the last named was a Democrat, the others were Republicans, three of the members were senators, and from that fact arose some criticism. The Constitution, it was remarked, provides that the president shall negotiate a treaty and the Senate ratify it, but to have senators negotiating as well,

as ratifying a treaty, was more than was contemplated in the plan of government. The point was unimportant, for Spain was so badly beaten that she could do nothing but accept what was offered. McKinley really conducted the negotiations by cable, telling the commissioners what to demand. They in turn told the Spaniards, who accepted with heavy hearts. The first thing was to settle the future of Cuba. Spain wished to transfer it to the United States by them to

be handed over to the natives. Much of her debt was secured by pledges of the Cuban revenue, and she thought that by taking over the islands we should take over the debt. The commissioners refused to consider such terms, and it was decided that Spain should set Cuba free and herself become responsible for the debts under consideration. Puerto Rico and Guam, one of the landrons, were handed over to us in Congress, and the country was some feeling for the acceptance and retention of Cuba. But McKinley, remembering our pledge in the Teller resolution, declared that we must set Cuba free, and he had his way.

The fate of the Philippines presented the only serious point in the negotiations. An army of considerable strength had been assembled on the beach before Manila as rapidly as possible, and on August 13 it took the city without knowing that the protocol was signed on the 12th. a provisional government was set up under general merit but his authority was confined to the city and the shore covered by the guns of dewey's ships the remainder of the islands was in the hands of the natives who had taken up arms under aguinaldo as soon as the spanish power collapsed In the beginning, this revolt was supported by Dewey, but he changed his attitude when it became evident that his government might wish to hold the Philippines. Coolness grew up between the two armies who faced one another quietly while waiting for the action of the commissioners at Paris. The decision was with McKinley, who was in genuine doubt about the matter in the country at large, a strong feeling ramped for keeping the islands, partly because it was thought that they had great economic possibilities.

partly because it was felt that we might do much to spread our ideas among the Filipinos, and mostly because of an instinct for national acquisition. Three of the five commissioners in Paris shared this feeling. One day was undecided and one gray was opposed. The grounds of opposition were that we could not hold the islands

and develop them profitably on account of climate and the racial conditions there, that it was against our ideals to impose government on dependent peoples, and especially that we had fought the war on altruistic grounds and should treat the Filipinos as we had treated the Cubans, set them free to rule themselves.

McKinley weighed these arguments and observed the trend of public opinion. By the end of October, he concluded that the people desired annexation, and he accepted what he considered their verdict. The treaty provided that we should hold the islands and pay Spain twenty million dollars. McKinley later told a group of prominent Methodists how he came to his decision.

He gave the subject, he said, much thought and prayer, and one night late it came to me in this way. I don't know how it was, but it came. One, that we could not give them back to Spain. That would be cowardly and dishonorable. two that we could not turn them over to france or germany our commercial rivals in the orient that would be bad business and discreditable three that we could not leave them to themselves they were unfit for self-government and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over their worse than spain's

was, and for that there was nothing left for us to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to sleep and slept soundly. To this day it is not easy to decide whether the course followed was wise or unwise. The treaty reached the Senate on January 4, 1899, and met severe opposition there, mostly from the Democrats who were traditionally against expansion.

It finally passed, February 6, by a vote of 57 to 27, only one more than the necessary two-thirds. While it was pending, William J. Bryan urged his friends to vote for it. It was charged that he wished it adopted so that expansion could be made, a campaign issue in 1900. A short time later, one of his supporters who had voted for ratification offered a resolution declaring that ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Spain was not to be considered as a final expression of our Philippine policy. It passed the Senate but failed in the House.

26. The Philippine War Under Spain, the Philippines were governed by a captain-general appointed by the crown, and the provinces were administered by appointed officials. Local authority was practically in the hands of the friars and priests, who held the best lands and ruled the people, both spiritually, politically, and industrially.

The mass of natives were submissive, but a number, mostly of the Tagalog stock, resented the situation and sought to change it. Under the influence of Rizal, a novelist and an ardent patriot, a strong revolt was organized, which gave Spain much trouble. In 1896, Rizal was captured and shot, but a successor was found in Aguinaldo, who carried on the war until the government obtained his submission in 1897,

by promising a large sum of money and certain reforms in government. When Dewey sailed for Manila, 1898, Aquinaldo was in Singapore, discontented because Spain had not carried out her promises of the preceding year. He offered to go with Dewey and arrange cooperation between the natives and the United States in the efforts to drive Spain from the archipelago. Dewey acquiesced, took Aquinaldo to Manila Bay, set him ashore, gave him arms for the forces that gathered around him. Aguinaldo organized a civil government, which was recognized throughout the islands,

and he was elected president of a native republic. July 25, General Merritt arrived with orders to set up a provisional government. Up to that time, General Aguinaldo had been treated as a colleague. He was thenceforth ignored. When Manila was captured on August 13, he was not permitted to take part in the attack

nor to occupy any part of the city. He wisely submitted, holding his army in check in the region around Manila. As the Spaniards withdrew their garrisons from the towns along the coast, his troops occupied the positions. By the end of 1898, his authority was accepted in all the Philippines outside of the capital. The Filipinos awaited the fate of the treaty with much interest,

for in it was the question of dependence on the United States or independence and self-government. As the debate proceeded, their army around Manila was in a tense state of mind, and a similar feeling existed in the Army of the United States. February 4, two days before the treaty was ratified, fighting actually began. Three or four natives were fired upon for refusing to halt when so ordered as they approached the United States' lines. The fire was returned, and fighting became general.

The battle that followed was the beginning of the Philippine War, which did not end until 1902. The Filipinos fought in small bands and concealed themselves in jungles and hills. The whites pursued them into their hiding places, clearing up one province after another and establishing garrisons. Thus, gradually but surely the native republic was subdued. to break down this kind of resistance the whites resorted to reconcentration which we had denounced very bitterly when used in cuba but there was this difference in philippine reconcentration care was taken to supply good food to the victims and to give them proper sanitary conditions

in february nineteen hundred and one general funston with a body of native scouts found and seized aguinaldo in his mountain retreat this event greatly weakened the resistance which finally collapsed in april nineteen hundred and two with the surrender of general In this war were 1,026 contacts, and on our side the casualties were 245 killed, 490 wounded, 118 captured, and 20 missing. The known casualties on the other side were 3,854 killed, 1,193 wounded, 6,572 captured, and 23,096 surrendered. 27. The election of 1900. The war with Spain brought us much glory and little sorrow.

It lasted long enough to boom business and not long enough to exhaust it. It came at the same time as the development of the rich Klondike gold fields discovered in 1897. Gold now became plentiful. Prices rose. Farmers began to burn. They were paid up mortgages, and the people in general forgot the hard times of Cleveland's day. The situation favored the Republicans.

They renominated the genial McKinley and adopted a platform in which the strongest note was self-congratulation. The only incident that caused a ripple at the convention was the selection of a candidate for the vice-presidency. Theodore Roosevelt returned from Cuba at the head of his rough riders with his brow wreathed in laurels. He and his men had fought well, the newspapers had done them full justice, and he found himself a popular hero. He reached New York just when his party, because of a popular vote against the Platt machine, was seeking a reform candidate for governor.

At the same time, a group of independents were ready to bring out a candidate for that office. Each faction asked Roosevelt to lead it. At last, he accepted the regular nomination, remarking that he was going to be a reform governor and hoped that all reformers would vote for him. At the polls, he was successful by a fair majority. Platt and his friends accepted Roosevelt with the idea that they could control him.

They were astonished to find that he would have his own way, and Platt was most chagrined of all. The public enjoyed his disappointment, and Roosevelt grew in his favor. After a year and a half, Platt was disgusted and made plans for nominating Roosevelt as vice president. He thought that if Roosevelt accepted, he would be elected and shelved. On the other hand, if he declined the nomination, he would destroy his influence in the party.

In either case, Roosevelt would lose his hold on New York politics, which was Platt's chief purpose. Roosevelt realized that a trap was being laid for him and did all he could to prevent it, but he did not dare go as far as an absolute refusal. Hannah, controlling the convention in behalf of McKinney, was opposed to Platt's design. He said that it was sheer foolishness to take such action as to have only one life.

between that madman and the presidency. A large number of the delegates were pleased to offer Roosevelt any honor, whether he desired it or not. To these were added the delegates whom Platt and his friend Key could control, and the total was large enough to override the desires of Hannah.

After McKinley died, Platt claimed for himself that he kicked Roosevelt upstairs into the presidency. In the Democratic Party, Bryan was as strong as in 1896, free civil as an issue was dead, but the western and southern combination that brought him forward was as determined as formerly that the New York leaders should no longer dominate. He shifted his war cry into a challenge to the trusts and big financiers, and he marshaled his followers for the coming battle. But with a strange facility for adopting an unpopular idea, he hit upon the opposition to expansion as the chief issue. The war was over, it had been fought with great satisfaction, and the Philippines were ours. Anti-expansion was not a live issue, at best it was only a protest.

The country did not care for it, and Bryan, despite his many able speeches in the campaign, was defeated by an electoral vote of 155 to 292. McKinley's first term passed into his second with pleasant prospects, victor in war and in politics, his expansive nature gave him goodwill for all parts of the country. In the Spanish War, he had been particularly impressed by seeing the men of

the South wearing the uniforms against which their fathers had fought in the 60s, now marching side by side with the sons of the men who had fought against the Confederacy. In his second inaugural address, he said, sectionalism has disappeared. Divisions on public questions can no longer be traced by the war map of 1861. In a speech made in Atlanta some time earlier, he had struck a popular chord in the South when he said that the time might come when the national government would

help to care for the graves of the dead Confederate veterans. Another expression of his broad outlook on the life of the whole people was seen in the modification of his terror views. In a speech at Buffalo on September 5, 1911, he said, we must not repose in fancied security that we can forever sell and buy little or nothing. If such a thing were possible, it would not be best for us or for those with whom we have to deal. The period of exclusiveness has passed. The expansion of our

trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of goodwill and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times. Measures of retaliation are not. If, perchance, some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and protect our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad? This speech raised

great expectations. McKinley, the champion of protection, was turning to world trade, and it seemed that he was about to lead a movement for remodeling our tariff policy. Then suddenly came the stroke of the assassin, which put an end to his life. September 6th, the day after this remarkable speech was made, he was shot by a weak-minded blacksmith who had fallen under the influence of anarchistic preaching until he thought it a virtue to kill all rulers.

The victim lingered eight days and died on September 14. Numerous bulletins from his sick room kept constantly before the people his brave struggle for life and the solemnity of his final moments. He died repeating, Nearer my God to thee, and the country, forgetting political differences for the time, repeated the hymn in a thousand commemorating meetings. End of chapter 3, part 2