Chapter 34
SECTION 34 OF THE WATERGATE REPORT, VOLUME 3. ALL LIBRIVOX RECORDINGS ARE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. FOR MORE INFORMATION, OR TO VOLUNTEER, PLEASE VISIT LIBRIVOX.ORG. FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, VOLUME 3. CHAPTER XI. INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATORS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, PART VII.
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. The primary responsibility for law enforcement falls to the Department of Justice. To the extent that White House or political considerations interfered with that responsibility, it interfered with a critical part of our government. There was considerable evidence of White House contacts, including pressure and interference,
with respect to the Watergate investigation. It began almost immediately after the break-in, with a request to the Attorney General that he try to obtain the release of Mr. McCord. In the following days, he was warned about a too aggressive investigation. He was warned in mid-1972 that Magruder might have to plead the Fifth Amendment.
He was asked to provide raw FBI files on the case, and he was asked to be the White House secret contact with this committee. As noted earlier, an agency of the Justice Department, the FBI, was consciously lied to, was asked for raw files. Its director was given potentially embarrassing evidence from the safe of one of the Watergate burglars with instructions he interpreted as a request to destroy that evidence. The White House counsel testified that he, in fact, received information from the Justice
Department and the FBI on the Watergate case. Mr. Dean stated that he was asked by Mr. Mitchell, after Mitchell had left CRP, to get FBI 302 reports of interviews with witnesses, and that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman also thought it would be a good idea to get those reports. Mr. Martian, attorneys O'Brien and Parkinson, and Mr. Richard Moore all viewed those files after Dean obtained them. Dean pleaded guilty to an information charge in October 1973,
which charge included a conspiracy based on White House access to those files. There were similar pressures as to the whole Ellsberg matter. When Assistant Attorney General Peterson advised the president of the Ellsberg break-in, he was told, I know about that, and you stay out of that. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department received requests, which have been reviewed earlier as to the media, to go after targets of White House dislike.
After the Association of Milk Producers pledged $2 million to the president's campaign, a grand jury investigation of their association was halted by the attorney general. Nevertheless, antitrust violations were allowed to be pursued as a civil, as opposed to criminal, suit. The antitrust suit was, in fact, brought in February 1972, in spite of much White House concern by Messrs. Colson and Haldeman. The milk producers discussed their antitrust suit with
Treasury Secretary Connolly in March 1972, resulting in a call to the Attorney General. Other contacts with the Attorney General were made on behalf of the milk producers, and an attempt was made to give additional contributions in return for dropping the antitrust suit. A similar pattern of efforts to obtain favorable treatment from the Attorney General in an antitrust matter followed the transfer of $100,000 by the Hughes Tool Company to a friend of the President.
The Hughes Corporation was involved in antitrust problems relating to pending purchases of a hotel in Las Vegas and an airline corporation. At the time the money was being transferred, a representative of the corporation met with the Attorney General. The antitrust problems were subsequently resolved. The grand jury system, an essential element of the prosecution process, was subverted by members of the administration and CRP,
even to the point of special favors for such officials when they were to be called before the grand jury. According to one witness, Mr. Ehrlichman attempted to prevent former Commerce Secretary Stans from appearing before the Watergate grand jury by directing Assistant Attorney General Peterson not to call Stans. Stans' testimony was eventually taken in private, as was the testimony of Messrs. Coulson, Carely, and Young. It should be recalled that the Attorney
General doubled as a campaign manager from July 1971 until he resigned in April 1972. When asked if it wasn't improper for the chief law enforcement officer of the United States to be engaging in, directly or indirectly, managing political activities, the Attorney General responded, I do, Senator. He held this dual role while a number of large campaign contributors, such as the Association of Milk Producers, the Hughes Tool Company, and International Telephone
and Telegraph had important cases under investigation by the Justice Department. The Attorney General who succeeded him pleaded guilty to a charge pertaining to the ITT matter. The prestige of the Attorney General's office was misused. Mr. McCord testified that a very important reason for his participation in the Watergate operation was the fact that the Attorney General himself, Mr. John Mitchell, at his office had considered and approved the plan, according to
Mr. Liddy. Mr. Baldwin was told that if at any time he had trouble establishing his authority for being in a certain place or for having a weapon, he was to mention John Mitchell. In an outrageous insult to our law enforcement institutions, it was in the Attorney General's office on January 27, 1972, and on February 4, 1972, that Liddy's plan was presented, including expensive charts outlining mugging, bugging, burglary, kidnapping, and prostitution.
The Justice Department was not alone. Some of the most blatant attempts to pressure an agency charged with enforcing laws were aimed at the IRS. The conversation between the President and Messrs. Dean and Haldeman on September 15, 1972, states this clearly, criticizing the IRS for not being sufficiently responsive to personal and political demands. It is buttressed with evidence that the IRS was contacted in relation to cases involving Friends of the White House.
The confidential tax return information of Mr. Harold J. Gibbons, Vice President of the Teamsters, was turned over to Mr. Coulson. It is significant that the memo discussing Gibbon's taxes points out that he supported Senator McGovern. In fact, he was the only major Teamster official to support McGovern, and the only one whose taxes were apparently sent to the White House. The tax data for a prominent Jewish leader in Rhode Island was given to Mr. Dean's office,
along with confidential tax return information on a number of prominent entertainers. Tax audits of Democratic Party Chairman Lawrence O'Brien were sought in an attempt to come up with damaging information. In contrast, IRS contacts were used to help in audits of the president's friends, including actor John Wayne, the Reverend Billy Graham, and Mr. Charles G. Rebozo. A close friend of the president's, according to Mr. Dean,
thought he was being harassed by the agents of the Internal Revenue Service. Dean raised this with Mr. Walters, Commissioner of the IRS, who said that could not be the case. Dean kept checking the status of the case because he got questions on it with considerable regularity. Dean stated that it was Rosemary Woods who kept asking me the status of the case because this individual was seeing the president
a good deal. The case was referred to the criminal division of the Justice Department. Dean was told he had to do something about it, so he eventually saw Mr. Ralph Erickson at the Justice Department, who said, there is one more thing we can do. There are some weaknesses in the investigation, and we may send it back to the Internal Revenue Service for one last look to see if this follows. It really is a solid case, which to Dean's recollection was done. Nevertheless,
the president was not satisfied and suggested that changes be made at the IRS after the 1972 election. In addition, Mr. Dean prepared a briefing paper for Mr. Haldeman with respect to a meeting with the head of the IRS to make the IRS more responsive to the White House. Mr. Strahan testified that Mr. Haldeman discussed a more politically responsive commissioner of the IRS so that it could be used against political opponents, such as Clark Clifford. The IRS was not only contacted
with respect to individual cases, it was also the focal point of certain questionable policies. One of these policies was to punish groups, tax-exempt groups in particular, who were thought to hold ideological views different from the White House. There was no evidence that these organizations advocated or did anything illegal or unconstitutional, or that they in any way violated the tax laws.
Nevertheless, they were singled out for challenge as to the tax-exempt benefits they enjoyed under the law. Groups enjoying the same benefits who were sympathetic to the administration did not receive the same attack. Use of the Secret Service to spy on Senator McGovern has already been reviewed. The misuse of the CIA and the FBI have likewise been examined earlier. It is quite a
record for a law and order administration. C. Regulatory Agencies. The regulatory agencies, as much as any other area of government, fit the references in a White House memo which addressed the general problem of how to use the incumbency and power of the White House against opponents, or how we can use the available federal machinery to screw our political enemies. We have already reviewed numerous misuses of the IRS against political opponents.
We have likewise reviewed evidence of plans to make the IRS more responsive to White House problems and demands. A prime example of the distortion of regulatory power is contained in the record of the administration's plans to attack the media. The agency at the center of this plan was the FCC. The Federal Communications Commission licenses radio and television stations and is thereby in a unique position to hurt the networks or any other organization such as a newspaper that
owns a local station. The memos on this subject, which have been reviewed previously, were frightening at best. They demonstrate clear contempt for statutory restraints on the power given to the FCC by Congress. A good sample of the attitude towards agencies is a memo from Mr. Jeb Magruder to Mr. Ken Reitz, which notes that ACTION, the agency that coordinates government volunteer programs is an agency that we should be able to use politically. The memo recommends
a meeting with Actions Director to discuss how we use their recruiters, who talked to 450,000 young people last year, advertising program, public relations effort, and public contact people to sell the president and the accomplishments of the administration. We should be involved and aware of everything from the scheduled appearances of action's recruiters to the format and content of its advertising. D. The Departments. The variety and scope of evidence bearing on the
functions of the departments stretches all the way from fabricating a false historical record of the State Department in the Vietnam War to using the Department of Interior to punish a newscaster. The State Department incident shows the extremes that were followed to achieve the political ends of the White House. In apparent anticipation that Senator Kennedy would be the opposing nominee for the presidency, an attempt was made to falsify President Kennedy's role
in the assassination of President Diem early in the Vietnam War. The strategy used to implicate President Kennedy in Diem's death was to make up phony telegrams between the White House and South Vietnam during that critical period. One particular telegram indicated that Kennedy did not offer safe refuge to Diem, thereby ensuring his assassination. To be able to do this, the State Department was contacted by Mr. Young of the White House Plumbers, resulting in Hunt's authorization
to go over and review the appropriate cables between the United States and Saigon. Arrangements were made to leak the story to appropriate news persons. When Hunt's safe was opened on June 20, 1972, the bulk of the papers, according to testimony, were classified cables from the State Department relating to the early years of the Vietnam War. The Department of Commerce was more directly used. The Secretary of Commerce attended meetings on campaign matters and
campaign contributions while still in office. In order to put out a story demonstrating that help provided to the main sugar beet industry by Senator Muskie was going to cost taxpayers 13 million in defaults by that industry, the Department of Commerce was requested to provide the research material for that story. The correspondence flowed between the White House and Commerce until the White House feared that their respective roles might be discovered.
Because of a rather hostile comment former newscaster Chet Huntley once made regarding the president, there was an effort to make it as difficult as possible for him to get his Big Sky project in Montana moving. Apparently, Huntley needed assistance from the Interior Department, which was periodically contacted by the White House in this regard. For whatever reason, Huntley eventually agreed to back the president in the 1972 campaign, and the attack was called off.
The Department of Agriculture announced on March 12, 1971, that price supports for milk would not be increased. Board members of the Commodity Credit Corporation, which has responsibility for clearing such a decision, was unanimous in its recommendation not to increase supports. On March 25, 1971, the President reversed the decision of the Agriculture Department. There is much evidence of White House awareness and attention at that time to a $2 million
campaign pledge by the milk producers. Whether or not the President's decision was the result of a dairy industry bribe, it is important to note that the legitimate functions of the agriculture department were circumvented and interfered with. In the reversal process, none of the assistant secretaries at agriculture or their staffs were consulted. These were the professionals who had the expertise, who knew the reasons for the initial decision,
who would have to enforce and live with the new decision by the president. Their opinion or expertise as to the president's reversal was never given. It was never solicited, even indirectly. Instead, at 10.30 a.m. on March 23, 1971, the president met with the milk producers saying, I know, too, that you are a group that are politically very conscious, and you are willing to do something about it.
After a flurry of meetings between other administration officials and milk producers' representatives, the president changed the Department of Agriculture's position on March 25, 1971. Thus, regardless of other issues involved, the acceptable processes of government were evaded for apparently personal and political interests. A memo was presented which revealed a cabinet session in which Mr. Fred Malik told the assembled cabinet members of a plan to make the departments
more responsive to the political needs of the administration. It was this program that led to some of the more unique abuses of the departments and agencies. It was this program that led to evidence of quid pro quos for the contracts from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Labor, the Department of Interior, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Minority Business Enterprise,
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association, the General Services Administration, Action, and the Veterans Administration. For example, a June 3, 1971 White House memo noted that the head of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has given a great deal of thought to and designed a sound economical plan to use federal resources, projects, contracts, etc. for advantage in 1972. A June 23, 1971 White House memo recommended that, in addition to designating must-grants
from pending applications, there may be occasions in which political circumstances require a grant be generated for a locality. This, of course, is in direct contravention of equal treatment under the laws that control federal awards, which are supported by taxpayer funds and are to be distributed only on the basis of merit and need by law. By March 1972, this program, according to a memo to Mr. Haldeman, citing success at the Commerce Department as an example, had resulted
in favorable grant decisions which otherwise would not have been made, involving roughly $1 million. It was then recommended that someone was needed to take the lead in the program to politicize the departments and agencies, and closely monitor the Grantsmanship Project to ensure maximum and unrelenting efforts. A December 23, 1971 memo to Mr. Haldeman noted that this program, even if done discreetly, will represent a substantial risk. Trying to pressure non-political civil servants
to partisanly support the president's re-election would become quickly publicized and undoubtedly backfire. Consequently, the strategy should be to work through the top and medium-level political appointees who exercise control over most of the departmental decisions and actions. By June 1972, Mr. Malik reported that he had reviewed the program with each cabinet officer, except Rogers, and with the heads of the key agencies, and had them name a top official who
would be the political contact for this program, as well as educate loyal appointees, thus forming a political network in each department. Aside from abuse of the laws which authorize federal grants, there are numerous indications that this program violated the Hatch Act. That act specifically protects against politicizing the government and makes such efforts criminally illegal. In addition, much of this conduct may have involved a conspiracy to defraud the United States
under the criminal laws of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, as well as criminal violations of at least three sections of the campaign laws. So much for our independent departments and agencies. The executive department diverted a substantial portion of its payroll, privileges, and power into non-governmental activities. Mr. Frederick Malek, for example, held an official position at the Committee to Re-elect the President as of June 1972.
while on the White House payroll until September 1, 1972. Mr. Gordon Strahan likewise was employed as a liaison to CRP while being paid as an assistant to the White House Chief of Staff. Political advertising was supervised from the office that was supposed to be the White House Chief of Staff. Mr. McCord testified that he took part in Watergate partly because the top legal officer in the White House had participated in the decision to undertake the operation.
The prerogatives granted the executive were misused, as has been detailed earlier. The effect is well summed up by Mr. McCord's testimony that he was told the President of the United States was aware of the meetings offering him payoffs and clemency, that the results of the meetings would be conveyed to the President, and that at a future meeting there would likely be a personal message from the President himself. This supplemented threats
that the president's ability to govern is at stake and the government may fall if Mr. McCord did not follow the game plan. Mr. Caulfield confirmed that when he met with Mr. Dean, that Dean wanted to transmit the message to McCord that the offer of executive clemency was made with the proper authority and that he made such representation to McCord. Not only were the department functions abused, but the executive power of appointing department officials was
likewise used. It was Herbert Porter who testified that he reminded the White House of the things he had done in the campaign when they dragged a bit in finding him a new job after the election. It was Jeb Magruder who was awarded with a high-ranking job at the Commerce Department for his misdeeds in the re-election campaign. These examples are minor compared to the general plans that were discussed to re-staff the departments after the election to make them
more subservient to the White House. As a final, rather tragic note, this is the White House that used its power over department appointments to nominate Mr. Gray to the FBI directorship, decided not to support him any longer, and rather than tell him of that fact, decided to let him hang there and twist slowly, slowly in the wind. End of section 34.
