menu_book Chapter 54

part three chapter thirteen of life and times of frederick douglas by frederick douglas this librivox recording is in the public domain part three chapter thirteen continued negotiations for the moulin-saint-nicholas at a meeting subsequent to the one already described application for a united states naval station at the mule santy nicholas was made in due form to mr firmin the haitian minister of foreign affairs at his request as already stated this application was presented to him in writing it was prepared on board the philadelphia the flagship of rear-admiral bancroft gerardi and bore his signature alone i neither signed it nor was asked to sign it although it met my entire approval i make this statement not in the way of complaint or grievance but simply to show what at the time was my part and what was not my part in this important negotiation the failure of which has unjustly been laid to my charge had the malay been acquired in response to this paper the credit of success according to the record would have properly belonged to the gallant admiral in whose name it was demanded for in it i had neither part nor lot

at this point curiously enough and unfortunately for the negotiations the haitian minister who is an able man and well skilled in the technicalities of diplomacy asked to see the commission of admiral girardi and to read his letter of instructions when these were presented to mr firman he after carefully reading them pronounced them insufficient and held that by them the government of the united states would not be bound by any convention which haiti might make with the admiral This position of Mr. Fuhrman's was earnestly and stoutly opposed by Admiral Girardi, who insisted that his instructions were full, complete, and amply sufficient. Unfortunately, however, he did not leave the matter in controversy

without intimating that he thought that Mr. Fuhrman might be insincere in raising such an objection, and that he was urging it simply with a view to cause unnecessary delay. This was more like the blunt Admiral than the discreet diplomat. Such an imputation was obviously out of place, and not likely to smooth the way to a successful proceeding. Quite the reverse.

Mr. Furman insisted that his ground was well and honestly taken. Here, therefore, the negotiation was brought to a sudden halt, and the question for us then was, what shall be done next? Three ways were open to us. First, to continue to insist upon the completeness of the authority of Admiral Girardi, second, to abandon the scheme of a naval station altogether, third, to apply to the

government at Washington for the required letter of credence. It was my opinion that it was hardly worthwhile to continue to insist upon the sufficiency of the Admiral's papers, since it seemed useless to contend about mere technicalities. More especially, as we were now in telegraphic connection with the United States, and could in the course of a few days easily obtain the proper and required papers. Besides, I held that a prompt compliance with the demand of the Haitian

government for a perfect letter of credence would be not only the easiest way out of the difficulty, but the wisest policy by which to accomplish the end we sought, since such compliance on our part, with even what might be fairly considered an unreasonable demand, would make refusal by Haiti to grant the Moulet all the more difficult. I did not understand Admiral Girardi to combat this opinion of mine, for he at once acted upon it, and caused an officer from his flagship

to go with me to my house and prepare a telegram to be sent to Washington for the required letter of credence. To this telegram he, two days thereafter, received answer, that such a letter would be immediately sent by a Clyde steamer to Gonneve, and thither the admiral went to receive his expected letter. But, from some unexplained cause, no such letter came by the Clyde steamer at the time appointed, and two months intervened before the desired credentials arrived. This

unexpected delay proved to be very mischievous and unfavorable to our getting the Molay, since it gave rise among the Haitian people to much speculation and many disquieting rumors prejudicial to the project. It was said that Admiral Girardi had left Port-au-Prince in anger, and had gone to take possession of the Molay without further parley, that the American flag was already floating over our new naval station, that the United States wanted the Molay as an

entering wedge to obtain possession of the whole island, with much else of like inflammatory nature. Although there was no truth in all this, it had the unhappy effect among the masses of stirring up suspicion and angry feelings toward the United States, and of making it more difficult than it might otherwise have been for the government of Haiti to grant the required concession. Finally, after this long interval of waiting, during which the flagship of Admiral

Girardi was reported at different points, sometimes at Gunev and sometimes at the Moulet, and sometimes at Kingston, Jamaica. The desired letter of credence arrived. The next day I was again summoned on board the Philadelphia, and there was shown me a paper, signed by the President of the United States and by the Secretary of State, authorizing myself as Minister Resident to Haiti and Rear Admiral Girardi as Special Commissioner to negotiate with such persons as Haiti might

appoint, for the purpose of concluding a convention by which we should obtain a lease of the Moulay-Sainti-Nicolas as a United States naval station. It may be here remarked that the letter of credence signed by President Harrison and by the Secretary of State differed in two respects from the former and rejected letter under which we had previously acted. First, it charged me, equally with Admiral Girardi, with the duty of negotiation, and secondly,

it was an application for a naval station, pure and simple, without limitation and without conditions. Before presenting to Haiti this new letter, which had the advantage of being free from the conditions specified in the old one, the question arose between the Admiral and myself as to whether or not we should begin our new negotiations, under our new commission, separate and entirely apart from all that had been attempted under the instructions contained in the old letter.

On this point I differed from the Admiral. I took the position that we should ignore the past altogether, and proceed according to the instructions of the new letter alone, unencumbered by any terms or limitations contained in the old letter. I felt sure that there were features in the conditions of the old letter

which would be met by the representatives of Haiti with strong objections. but the admiral and his able lieutenant insisted that the present letter did not exclude the conditions of the old one but was in its nature only supplementary to them and hence that this was simply a continuation of what had gone before It was therefore decided to proceed with the negotiations on the basis of both the old and the new letter. Under the former letter of instructions, our terms were precise and explicit. Under the latter, we were left largely to our own discretion. We were simply to secure from the government of Haiti a lease of the Molay-Sainti-Nicolas for a naval station. The result is known. Haiti refused to grant the lease, and alleged that to do so was impossible under the hard terms imposed in the previous letter of instructions. I do not know that our

government would have accepted a naval station from Haiti upon any other or less stringent terms or conditions than those exacted in our first letter of instructions, but I do know that the main grounds alleged by Haiti for its refusal were the conditions set forth in this first letter of instructions, one of which is expressed as follows, that so long as the United States may be the lessee of the Molay-Santi-Nicolas, the government of Haiti will not lease or otherwise dispose of

any port or harbor or other territory in its dominions, or grant any special privileges or rights of use therein, to any other power, state, or government. This was not only a comprehensive limitation of the power of Haiti over our own territory, but a denial to all others of that which we claim for ourselves. But no one cause fully explains our failure to get a naval station at the Malay. One fundamental element in our non-success was found not in any aversion to

the United States, or in any indifference on my part, as has often been charged, but in the government of Haiti itself. It was evidently timid. With every disposition to oblige us, it had not the courage to defy the well-known, deeply rooted, and easily excited prejudices and traditions of the Haitian people. Nothing is more repugnant to the thoughts and feelings of the masses of that country than the alienation of a single rood of their territory to a foreign

power. This sentiment originated, very naturally, in the circumstances in which Haiti began her national existence. The whole Christian world was at that time against her. The Caribbean Sea was studded with communities hostile to her. They were slave-holding, she, by her bravery and her blood, was free. Her existence was, therefore, a menace to them, and theirs was a menace to her. France, England, Spain, Portugal and Holland, as well as the United States, were wedded to the slave system,

which Haiti had, by arms, thrown off, and hence she was regarded as an outcast and was outlawed by the Christian world. Though time and events have gone far to change this relation of hers to the outside world, the sentiment that originated in the beginning of her existence continues on both sides until this day. It was this that stood like a wall of granite against our success. Other causes cooperated, but this was the principal cause. Of course, our peculiar

and intense prejudice against the colored race was not forgotten. Our contrast to other nations in this respect is often dwelt upon in Haiti to our disadvantage. In no part of Europe will a Haitian be insulted because of his color, and Haitians well know that this is not the case in the United States. Another influence unfavorable to our obtaining the coveted naval station at the Mollet was the tone of the New York press on the subject. It more than hinted that, once in

possession of the Mollet, the United States would control the destiny of Haiti. Torn and rent by Revolution, as she has been and still is, Haiti yet has a large share of national pride, and scorns the idea that she needs or will submit to the rule of a foreign power. Some of her citizens would doubtless be glad of American rule, but the overwhelming majority would burn their towns and freely shed their blood over their ashes to prevent such a consummation. Not the least,

perhaps, among the collateral causes of our non-success, was the minotauri attitude assumed by us while conducting the negotiation. What wisdom was there in confronting Haiti at such a moment with a squadron of large ships of war, with a hundred cannon and two thousand men? This was done, and it was naturally construed into a hint to Haiti, that if we could not, by

appeals to reason and friendly feeling, obtain what we wanted, we could obtain it by a show of force. We appeared before the Haitians and before the world, with the pen in one hand and the sword in the other. This was not a friendly and considerate attitude for a great government like ours to assume when asking a concession from a small and weak nation like Haiti. It was ill-timed and out of all proportion to the demands of the occasion. It was also done

under a total misapprehension of the character of the people with whom we had to deal. We should have known that, whatever else the Haitian people may be, they are not cowards, and hence are not easily scared. In the face of all these obvious and effective causes of failure, it is not strange that our intelligent editors and our nautical newspaper writers could not have found for the

American government and people a more rational cause for the failure of the negotiations for the Malay-Sainti Nicholas than that of my color, indifference and incompetency to deal with a question of such a magnitude? Were I disposed to exchange the position of accused for that of accuser, I could find ample material to sustain me in that position. Other persons did much to create conditions unfavorable to our success,

but I leave to their friends the employment of such personal assaults. On the theory that I was the cause of this failure, we must assume that Haiti was willing to grant the Millais, that the timidity of the Haitian government was all right, that the American prejudice was all right, that the seven ships of war in the harbor of Port-au-Prince were all right, that Rear Admiral Girardi was all right, and that I alone was all wrong, and moreover, that but for me the Malais

Santee Nicholas, like an overripe apple shaken by the wind, would have dropped softly into our national basket. I will not enlarge upon this absurd assumption, but will leave the bare statement of it to the intelligent reader, that it may perish by its flagrant contradiction of well-known facts and by its own absurdity. I come now to another cause of complaint against me, scarcely less serious in the minds of those who now assail me than the charge of having

defeated the lease of the Moulet-Sainti-Nicholas, namely, the failure of what is publicly known as the Clyde contract. Soon after my arrival in Haiti, I was put in communication with an individual calling himself the agent of the highly respectable mercantile firm of William P. Clyde and Company of New York. He was endeavoring to obtain a subsidy of a half million dollars from the government of Haiti to enable this firm to ply a line of steamers between New York and Haiti. From the first, this

agent assumed toward me a dictatorial attitude. He claimed to be a native of South Carolina, and it was impossible for him to conceal his contempt for the people whose good will it was his duty to seek. Between this agent and the United States Government I found myself somewhat in the position of a servant between two masters. Either one of them,

separately and apart, might be served acceptably. But to serve both satisfactorily at the same time and place might be a difficult task, if not an impossible one. There were times when I was compelled to prefer the requirements of the one to the ardent wishes of the other, and I thought as between this agent and the United States I chose to serve the

latter. The trouble between us came about in this way. Mr. Fuhrman, the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had objected to granting the Clyde concession, on the ground that, if it were granted and this heavy drain were made upon the Treasury of his country, Mr. Douglas stood ready to present and to press upon Haiti the payment of the claims of many other American

citizens, and that this would greatly embarrass the newly organized government of President Hippolyte. In view of this objection, the zealous agent in question came to me, and proposed that I should go to Mr. Fuhrman in my quality of minister-resident and Consul-General of the United States, and assure him that, if he would only grant the Clyde concession, I, on my part, would withhold and refrain from

pressing the claims of other American citizens. The proposition shocked me. It sounded like the words of Satan on the mountain, and I thought it time to call a halt. I was in favor of the Clyde contract, but I could not see what I had said or done to make it possible for any man to make to me a proposal so plainly dishonest and scandalous. I refused to do any such thing. Here was my first offence, and it at once stamped me as an unprofitable

servant. It did not seem to occur to this agent that he had made to me a shameful, dishonest, and shocking proposition. Blinded by zeal or by an influence still more misleading, he seemed to see in it only an innocent and proposal. He therefore looked upon me as an unworthy ally, and duly reported me as such to his master and to other influential persons. He could not

understand my conduct as proceeding from other or better motives than that of over-affection for the Haitians. In his eyes I was, from that time, more a Haitian than an American, and I soon saw myself so characterized in American journals. The refusal to compromise and postpone the just claims of other American

citizens for that of his master's contract was not, however, my only offence. On obtaining a leave of absence from my post, in July 1890, I of course, as was my duty, called upon President Hippolyte before my departure, for the purpose of paying to him my respects. This agent at once sought me and desired me to make use of this visit of mere ceremony

as an occasion to press anew the Clyde contract upon the attention of the President. This I could not properly do, especially as I had on previous occasions repeatedly urged its consideration upon him. The President also knew well enough my sense of the importance to Haiti of this measure, not only as a means of enlarging her commerce and of promoting her civilization, but also as a guarantee of the stability of her government. Nevertheless, my refusal to urge, in so unbecoming

a manner, a demand already repeatedly urged upon the attention of the Haitian government, was made use of by this agent to my injury, both at the State Department and with Mr. Clyde's firm. I was reported at Washington and to various persons in high places as unfriendly to this concession. When at last it appeared to the agent that the government of Haiti was, as he thought, stubbornly blind to its own interests, and that it would not grant the contract in question,

he called at the United States legation, and expressed to me his disappointment and disgust at the delay of Haiti in accepting his scheme. He said he did not believe that the government really intended to do anything for his firm, that he himself had spent much time and money in promoting the concession. And as he did not think that Mr. Clyde ought to be made to pay for the time thus lost, and the expenses incurred by the delay and dallying of the Haitian government,

he should therefore demand his pay of Haiti. This determination struck me as very odd, and I jocosely replied, Then, sir, as they will not allow you to put a hot poker down their backs, you mean to make them pay for heating it. This rejoinder was my final destruction in the esteem of this zealous advocate. He saw at once that he could not count upon my assistance in making this new demand. I was both surprised by his proposal and

amused by it, and wondered that he could think it possible that he could get this pay. It seemed to me that Haiti would scout the idea at once. She had not sent for him. She had not asked him to stay. He was there for purposes of his own, and not for any purpose of hers. I could not see why Haiti should pay him for coming, going, or staying. But this gentleman knew better than I the

generous character of the people with whom he had to deal, and he followed them up till they actually paid him five thousand dollars in gold. But compliance with his demand proved a woeful mistake on the part of Haiti, and in fact nonsense. This man, after getting his money, went away. But he did not stay away. He was soon back again, to press his scheme with renewed vigor. His demands were

now to be complied with, or he would make, not Rome, but Haiti, howl. To him, it was nothing that Haiti was already wasted by repeated revolutions, nothing that she was already staggering under the weight of a heavy national debt, nothing that she herself ought to be the best judge of her ability to pour out a half million of dollars in this new and, to her, doubtful enterprise. Nothing that she had heard his arguments in its favor a hundred times over. Nothing that in her judgment

she had far more pressing needs for her money than the proposed investment in this steamship subsidy, as recommended by him. Nothing that she had told him plainly that she was afraid to add to her pecuniary burdens this new and onerous one, and nothing, that she had just paid him five thousand dollars in gold to get rid of his importunities. Now, while I was in favor of Hattie's granting the subsidy asked for in the name of Clyde and Company, and thought that it

would be in many ways a good thing for Hattie to have the proposed line of steamers for which a subsidy was asked, I had, and I now have, nothing but disgust for the method by which the scheme was pressed upon Haiti. I must say in conclusion that, while as already intimated, it does not appear certain that Haiti would have leased us the Mollet on any conditions whatever, it is certain that the application for it

was ill-timed in more respects than one. It was especially unfortunate for us that the Clyde concession was applied for in advance of our application for a lease of the Mollet. Whatever else may be said of the Haitians, this is true of them, they are quick to detect a fault and to distinguish a trick from an honest proceeding. To them, the preference given to the interests of an individual firm over those of the

United States seemed to wear a sinister aspect. In the opinion of many intelligent persons in Haiti, had a lease of the moulet been asked for in advance of the concession to Mr. Clyde, the application for it might have been successful. This, however, is not my opinion. I do not know think that any earthly power outside of absolute force could have gotten for us a naval station at the Moulay-Sainti-Nicolas. Still, to all appearances, the conditions of success were

more favorable before than after the Clyde contract was urged upon Haiti. Prior to this, the country, weary of war, was at peace. Ambitious leaders had not begun openly to conspire. the government under Hippolyte was newly organized. Confidence in its stability was unimpaired. It was, naturally enough, reaching out its hand to us for friendly recognition. Our good offices during the war

were fresh in its memory. France, England and Germany were not ready to give it recognition. In fact, all the conditions conspired to influence Haiti to listen to our request for a coaling station at the the Moulet-Sainti-Nicolas. But instead of a proposition for a coaling station at the Moulet-Sainti-Nicolas, there was presented one for a subsidy to an individual steamship

company. All must see that the effect of this was calculated to weaken our higher claim and to place us at a disadvantage before Haiti and before the world. And now, since the American people have been made thoroughly acquainted with one view of this question, I know of no interest which will suffer and no such obligation which will be impaired by the presentation of such facts as I have here submitted to the public judgment. If in this

my course is thought to be unusual, it should be remembered that the course pursued towards me by the press has been unusual, and that they who had no censure for the latter should have none for the former. I have nearly reached the end of the period of which, in the beginning, I purposed to write. And should I live to see the end of another decade, it is not at all likely that I shall feel disposed to add another word to this volume. I may therefore make this the

concluding chapter of this part of my autobiography. Contemplating my life as a whole, I have to say that, although it has at times been dark and stormy, and I have met with hardships from which other men have been exempted. Yet, my life has, in many respects, been remarkably full of sunshine and joy. Servitude, persecution, false friends, desertion, and depreciation have not robbed my life of happiness, or made it a burden. I have been, and still am, especially fortunate, and may

well indulge sentiments of warmest gratitude for the allotments of life that have fallen to me. While I cannot boast of having accomplished great things in the world, I cannot, on the other hand, feel that I have lived in vain. From first to last I have, in large measure, shared the respect and confidence of my fellow men. I have had the happiness of possessing many precious and long-enduring friendships with good men and women. I have been the recipient of many honors, among which my unsought appointment by President Benjamin Harrison to the Office of Minister-Resident and Consul-General to represent the United States at the capital of Haiti, and my equally unsought appointment by President Florville Hippolyte to represent Haiti among all the civilized nations of the globe at the World's Columbian Exposition are crowning honors to my

long career and a fitting and happy close to my whole public life.