The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume 1b by Jefferson Davis

1 01 - Part 3, Chapter 1 28:39

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part Chapter One.

Opening of the New Year. The people in advance of their representatives. Conciliatory conduct of Southern members of Congress. Sensational fictions. Misstatements of the Count of Paris. Obligations of a Senator. The Southern forts and arsenals. Pensacola Bay and Fort Pickens. The alleged caucus and its resolutions. Personal motives and feelings. The presidency not a desirable office. Letter from the Hon. C. C. Clay.

With the failure of the Senate Committee of Thirteen to come to any agreement, the last reasonable hope of a Pacific settlement of difficulties within the Union was extinguished in the minds of those most reluctant to abandon the effort. The year, 1861, opened, as we have seen, upon the spectacle of a general belief among the people of the planting states, in the necessity of an early secession, as the only possible alternative left them. It has already been shown that the calmness and deliberation with which the measures requisite for withdrawal were adopted and executed, afford the best refutation of the charge that they were the result of haste, passion, or precipitation. Still more contrary to the truth is the assertion, so often recklessly made and reiterated, that the people of the South were led into secession against their will and their better judgment by a few ambitious and discontented politicians.

The truth is that the Southern people were in advance of their representatives throughout, and that these latter were not agitators or leaders in the popular movement. They were in harmony with its great principles. But their influence, with very few exceptions, was exerted to restrain rather than to accelerate their application, and to allay rather than to stimulate excitement. As sentinels on the outer wall, the people had a right to look to them for warning of approaching danger. But as we have seen in that last session of the last Congress that preceded the disruption, Southern senators of the class generally considered extremists served on a committee of pacification, and strove earnestly to promote its objects.

Failing in this, they still exerted themselves to prevent the commission of any act that might result in bloodshed. Invention has busied itself, to the exhaustion of its resources, in the creation of imaginary cabals, conspiracies, and intrigues among senators and representatives of the South on duty in Washington at that time. The idle gossip of the public hotels, The sensational rumors of the streets, the canards of newspaper correspondents, whatever was floating through the atmosphere of that anxious period, however lightly regarded at the moment by the more intelligent, has since been drawn upon for materials to be used in the construction of what has been widely accepted as authentic history.

Nothing would seem to be too absurd for such uses. Thus it has been gravely stated that a caucus of Southern senators held in the early part of January resolved to assume to themselves the political power of the South, that they took entire control of all political and military operations, that they issued instructions for the passage of ordinances of secession, and for the seizure of forts, arsenals, and custom-houses with much more. of the like, groundless fiction. A foreign prince, who served for a time in the Federal Army, and has since undertaken to write a history of the Civil War in America, a history the incomparable blunders of which are redeemed from suspicion of willful misstatement only by the writer's ignorance of the subject, speaks of the Southern representatives as having kept their seats in Congress in order to be able to paralyze its action, forming at the same time a center whence they issued directions to their friends in the South to complete the dismemberment of the Republic.

And again, with reference to the secession of several states, he says that the word of command issued by the committee at Washington was promptly obeyed. Statements such as these are a travesty upon history. That the representatives of the South held conference with one another and took counsel together, as men having common interests and threatened by common dangers, is true, and is the full extent of the truth. That they communicated to friends at home information of what was passing is to be presumed, and would have been most obligatory if it had not been that the published proceedings rendered such communication needless. But that any such man, or committee of men, should have undertaken to direct the mighty movement then progressing throughout the South, or to control, through the telegraph and the mails, the will and the judgment of conventions of the people, assembled under the full consciousness of the dignity of that sovereignty which they represented, would have been an extraordinary degree of folly and presumption.

The absurdity of the statement is further evident from a consideration of the fact that the movements which culminated in the secession of the several states began before the meeting of Congress. They were not inaugurated, prosecuted, or controlled by the senators and representatives in Congress, but by the governors, legislators, and finally by the delegates of the people in conventions of the respective states. I believe I may fairly claim to have possessed a full share of the confidence of the people of the state, which I in part represented, and proof has already been furnished to show how little effect my own influence could have upon their action, even in the negative capacity of a brake upon the wheels, by means of which it was hurried on to consummation.

As for the imputation of holding our seats as a vantage-ground in plotting for the dismemberment of the Union, in connection with which the Count of Paris does me the honor to single out my name for special mention, it is a charge so dishonorable, if true, to its object, so disgraceful, if false, to its author, as to be outside of the proper limit of discussion, It is a charge which no accuser ever made in my presence, though I had in public debate more than once challenged its assertion and denounced its falsehood. It is enough to say that I always held, and repeatedly avowed, the principle that a senator in Congress occupied the position of an ambassador from the state which he represented to the government of the United States, as well as in some sense a member of the government, and that in either capacity it would be dishonorable to use his powers and privileges for the destruction or for the detriment of the government to which he was accredited.

Acting on this principle as long as I held a seat in the Senate, my best efforts were directed to the maintenance of the Constitution. The Union resulting from it, and to make the general government an effective agent of the states for its prescribed purpose. As soon as the paramount allegiance due to Mississippi forbade a continuance of these efforts, I withdrew from the position. To say that during this period I did nothing secretly, in conflict with what was done or professed openly, would be merely to assert my own integrity. which would be worthless to those who may doubt it, and superfluous to those who believe in it. What has been said on the subject for myself, I believe to be also true of my southern associates in Congress.

With regard to the forts, arsenals, etc., something more remains to be said. The authorities of the southern states, immediately after, and in some cases a few days before their actual secession, took possession in every instance without resistance or bloodshed, of forts, arsenals, custom-houses, and other public property within their respective limits. I do not propose at this time to consider the question of their right to do so. That may be more properly done hereafter. But it may not be out of place, briefly to refer to the statement, often made, that the absence of troops from the military posts in the South which enabled the states so quietly to take such possession, was the result of collusion and prearrangement between the southern leaders and the Federal Secretary of War, John B.

Floyd, of Virginia. It is a sufficient answer to this allegation to state the fact that the absence of troops from these posts, instead of being exceptional, was, and still is, their ordinary condition in time of peace. At the very moment when these sentences are being written, in 1880, although the Army of the United States is twice as large as in 1860, although four years of internal war, and a yet longer period of subsequent military occupation of the South, have habituated the public to the presence of troops in their midst, to an extent that would formerly have been startling, if not offensive. Although allegations of continued disaffection on the part of the southern people have been persistently reiterated for party purposes, yet it is believed that the forts and arsenals in the states of the Gulf are in as defenseless a condition and as liable to quiet seizure, if any such purpose existed, as in the beginning of the year, Certainly those within the range of my personal information are occupied, as they were at that time, only by ordnance sergeants or fort-keepers.

There were, however, some exceptions to this general rule, especially in the defensive works of the harbor of Charleston, the forts at Key West and the Dry Tortugas, and those protecting the entrance of Pensacola Bay. The events which occurred in Charleston Harbor will be more conveniently noticed hereafter. The island forts, near the extreme southern point of Florida, were too isolated and too remote from population to be disturbed at that time, but the situation long maintained at the mouth of Pensacola Bay affords a signal illustration of the forbearance and conciliatory spirit that animated southern councils. For a long time, Fort Pickens, on the island of Santa Rosa, at the entrance to the harbor, was occupied only by a small body of Federal soldiers and Marines, less than one hundred, all told.

Immediately opposite, and in possession of the other two forts and the adjacent Navy yard, was a strong force of volunteer troops of Florida and Alabama, which might, on short notice, have been largely increased, ready and anxious to attack and take possession of Fort Pickens. That they could have done so is unquestionable, and if mere considerations of military advantage had been consulted, it would surely have been done. But the love of peace, and the purpose to preserve it, together with a revulsion from the thought of engaging in fraternal strife, were more potent than considerations of probable interest. During the anxious period of uncertainty and apprehension which ensued, the efforts of the Southern senators in Washington were employed to dissuade—they could not command—from any aggressive movement, however justifiable, that might lead to collision.

These efforts were exerted Through written and telegraphic communications to the governors of Alabama and Florida, the commander of the Southern troops, and other influential persons near the scene of operations. The records of the telegraph office, if preserved, will no doubt show this to be a very moderate statement of those efforts. It is believed that by such influence alone a collision was averted, And it is certain that its exercise gave great dissatisfaction at the time to some of the ardent advocates of more active measures. It may be that they were right, and that we who counseled delay and forbearance were wrong. Certainly, if we could have foreseen the ultimate failure of all efforts for a peaceful settlement, and the perfidy that was afterward to be practiced in connection with them, Our advice would have been different.

Certain resolutions said to have been adopted in a meeting of senators held on the evening of the fifth of January have been magnified by the representations of artful commentators on the events of the period into something vastly momentous.

Subjoined are the resolutions referred to, adopted by the senators from Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. Messrs. Toombs of Georgia and Sebastian of Arkansas are said to have been absent from the meeting.

Resolved that, in our opinion, each of the states should, as soon as may be, secede from the Union. Resolved that... The provision should be made for a convention to organize a Confederacy of the seceding states, the convention to meet, not later than the 15th of February, at the city of Montgomery in the state of Alabama. Resolved that, in view of the hostile legislation that is threatened against the seceding states, and which may be consummated before the 4th of March, we ask instructions Whether the delegations are to remain in Congress until that date, for the purpose of defeating such legislation. Resolved, that a committee be, and are, hereby appointed, consisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, and Mallory, to carry out the objects of this meeting.

The significance of these resolutions was the admission that we could not Longer advised delay, and even that was unimportant under the circumstances, for three of the states concerned had taken final action on the subject before the resolutions could have been communicated to them. As an expression of opinion, they merely stated that of which we had all become convinced by the experience of the previous month, that our long-cherished hopes had proved illusory, that further efforts in Congress would be unavailing, and that nothing remained except that the states should take the matter into their own hands, as final judges of their wrongs and of the measure of redress. They recommended the formation of a Confederacy among the seceding states as early as possible after their secession, advice the expediency of which could hardly be questioned, either by friend or foe.

As to the instructions asked for with regard to the propriety of continuing to hold their seats, I suppose it must have been caused by some diversity of opinion, which then and long afterward continued to exist, and the practical value of which must have been confined to senators of states which did not actually secede. For myself, I can only say that no advice could have prevailed on me to hold a seat in the Senate after receiving notice that Mississippi had withdrawn from the Union. The best evidence that my associates thought likewise is the fact that, although no instructions were given them, they promptly withdrew on the receipt of official information of the withdrawal of the states which they represented.

It will not be amiss, here briefly, to state what were my position and feelings at the period now under consideration, as they have been the subject of gross and widespread misrepresentation. It is not only untrue, but absurd to attribute to me motives of personal ambition to be gratified by a dismemberment of the Union. Much of my life— had been spent in the military and civil service of the United States. Whatever reputation I had acquired was identified with their history, and if future preferment had been the object, it would have led me to cling to the Union as long as a shred of it should remain. If any, judging after the event, should assume that I was allured by the high office subsequently conferred upon me by the people of the Confederate States.

The answer to any such conclusion has been made by others to whom it was well known, before the Confederacy was formed, that I had no desire to be its president. When the suggestion was made to me, I expressed a decided objection, and gave reasons of a public and permanent character against being placed in that position. Furthermore, I then held the office of United States Senator from Mississippi, one which I preferred to all others. The kindness of the people had three times conferred it upon me, and I had no reason to fear that it would not be given again as often as desired. So far from wishing to change this position for any other, I had specially requested my friends, some of whom had thought of putting me in nomination, for the Presidency of the United States in 1860, not to permit my name to be used before the convention for any nomination whatever.

I had been so near the office for four years, while in the cabinet of Mr. Pierce, that I saw it from behind the scenes, and it was to me an office in no wise desirable. The responsibilities were great. The labor, The vexations, the disappointments, were greater. Those who have intimately known the official and personal life of our presidents cannot fail to remember how few have left the office as happy men as when they entered it, how darkly the shadows gathered around the setting sun, and how eagerly The multitude would turn to gaze upon another orb just rising to take its place in the political firmament.

Worn by incessant fatigue, broken in fortune, debarred by public opinion, prejudice or tradition from future employment, the wisest and best who have filled that office have retired to private life to remember Rather, the failure of their hopes than the success of their efforts. He must, indeed, be a self-confident man who could hope to fill the chair of Washington with satisfaction to himself, with the assurance of receiving on his retirement the mead awarded by the people to that great man, that he had lived enough for life and for glory, or even a feeling that the sacrifice of self had been compensated by the service rendered to his country. The following facts were presented in a letter written several years ago by the Hon.

C.C. Clay of Alabama, who was one of my most intimate associates in the Senate, with reference to certain misstatements to which his attention had been called by one of my friends.

The import is that Mr. Davis, disappointed and chagrined at not receiving the nomination of the Democratic Party for President of the United States in 1860, took the lead in the assembling of Congress in December 1860 in a conspiracy of Southern senators which planned the secession of the Southern states from the Union, and, on the night of January 5, 1861, framed the scheme of revolution which was implicitly and promptly followed at the South. In other words, that Southern senators, and chief among them Jefferson Davis, then and there instigated and induced the Southern states to secede. I am quite sure that Mr. Davis neither expected nor desired the nomination for the presidency of the United States in 1860.

He never evinced any such aspiration by word or sign to me with whom he was, I believe, as intimate and confidential as with any person outside his own family. On the contrary, he requested the delegation from Mississippi not to permit the use of his name before the convention. And after the nomination of both Douglas and Breckinridge, he conferred with them, at the instance of leading Democrats, to persuade them to withdraw, that their friends might unite on some second choice. An office he would never have undertaken had he sought the nomination or believed he was regarded as an aspirant.

Mr. Davis did not take an active part in planning or hastening secession. I think he only regretfully consented to it as a political necessity for the preservation of popular and state rights, which were seriously threatened by the triumph of a sectional party who were pledged to make war on them. I know that some leading men, and even Mississippians, thought him too moderate and backward, and found fault with him for not taking a leading part in secession. No plan of secession or scheme of revolution was, to my knowledge, discussed, certainly none matured at the caucus. Fifth of January, 1861, unless, forsooth, The resolutions appended hereto be so held. They comprise the sum and substance of what was said and done.

I never heard that the caucus advised the South to accumulate munitions of war, or to organize and equip an army of one hundred thousand men, or determined to hold on as long as possible to the Southern seats. So far from it, a majority of Southern senators seemed to think there would be no war, that the dominant party in the North— desired separation from the South, and would gladly let their erring sisters go in peace. I could multiply proofs of such a disposition. As to holding on to their seats, no Southern legislature advised it, no Southern senator who favored secession did so but one, and none others wished to do so, I believe. The plan of secession, if any, and the purpose of secession unquestionably originated Not in Washington City, or with the senators or representatives of the South, but among the people of the several states, many months before it was attempted.

They followed no leaders at Washington or elsewhere, but acted for themselves with an independence and unanimity unprecedented in any movement of such magnitude. Before the meeting of the caucus of January 5, 1861, South Carolina had seceded and Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas had taken the initial step of secession by calling conventions for its accomplishment. Before the election of Lincoln, all the southern states, excepting one or two, had pledged themselves to separate from the Union upon the triumph of a sectional party in the presidential election, by acts or resolutions of their legislatures, Resolves of both Democratic and Whig state conventions, and of primary assemblies of the people, in every way in which they could commit themselves to any future act.

Their purpose was proclaimed to the world through the press and telegraph, and criticized in Congress, in the northern legislatures, in press and pulpit, and on the hustings, during many months before Congress met in December 1860. Over and above all these facts, the reports of the United States Senate show that, prior to the 5th of January, 1861, Southern Senators united with Northern Democratic Senators in an effort to effect pacification and prevent secession, and that Jefferson Davis was one of a committee appointed by the Senate to consider and report such a measure. That it failed because the northern Republicans opposed everything that looked to peace. That Senator Douglas arraigned them as trying to precipitate secession, referred to Jefferson Davis as one who sought conciliation, and called upon the Republican senators to tell what they would do, if anything, to restore harmony and prevent disunion.

They did not even deign a response. Thus, by their sullen silence, they made confession without avoidance of their stubborn purpose to hold up no hand raised to maintain the union.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 3, Chapter 2. Tenure of Public Property ceded by the states. Sovereignty and eminent domain. Principles asserted by Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and other states. The Charleston Forts. South Carolina sends commissioners to Washington. Sudden Movement of Major Anderson. Correspondence of the commissioners with the President. Interviews of the author with Mr. Buchanan. Major Anderson. The Star of the West. The President's Special Message. Speech of the Author in the Senate. Further proceedings and correspondence relative to Fort Sumter. Mr. Buchanan's Rectitude in Purpose and Vacillation in Action.

The sites of forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other public property of the Federal Government were seated by the states, within whose limits they were, Subject to the condition either expressed or implied that they should be used solely and exclusively for the purposes for which they were granted. The ultimate ownership of the soil, or eminent domain, remains with the people of the state in which it lies, by virtue of their sovereignty. Thus the state of Massachusetts has declared that, quote, the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Commonwealth extend to all places, within the boundaries thereof, subject only to such rights of concurrent jurisdiction as have been or may be granted over any places ceded by the Commonwealth to the United States.

In the acts of cession of the respective states, the terms and conditions on which the grant is made are expressed in various forms, and with differing degrees of precision. The Act of New York granting the use of a site for the Brooklyn Navy Yard may serve as a specimen. It contains this express condition. The United States are to retain such use and jurisdiction so long as said tract shall be applied to the defense and safety of the city and port of New York, and no longer. But the jurisdiction hereby ceded, and the exemption from taxation herein granted, shall continue in respect to said property, and to each portion thereof, so long as the same shall remain the property of the United States, and be used for the purposes aforesaid, and no longer.

The cession of the site of the Watervillette Arsenal, is made in the same or equivalent terms, except that, instead of, defense and safety of the city and port of New York, etc., the language is, defense and safety of the said state, and no longer.

South Carolina, in 1805, by legislative enactment, ceded to the United States, in Charleston Harbor, and on Beaufort River, various forts and fortifications, and sites for the erection of forts, on the following conditions, viz., that if the United States shall not, within three years from the passing of this act, and notification thereof by the governor of this state to the executive of the United States, repair the fortifications now existing thereon, or build such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by the executive of the United States, on the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein. In such case, this grant or session shall be void, and of no effect. Statutes at Large of South Carolina.

It will hardly be contended that the conditions of this grant were fulfilled, and if it be answered that the State Did not demand the restoration of the forts or sites? The answer certainly fails after 1860, when the controversy arose and the unfounded assertion was made that those forts and sites had been purchased with the money, and were therefore the property of the United States. The terms of the cession sufficiently manifest that they were freewill offerings of such forts and sites, as belonged to the state, and public functionaries were bound to know that, by the United States Law of March 20th, 1794, it was provided, that no purchase shall be made where such lands are the property of a state.

Act to provide for the defense of certain ports and harbors of the United States.

The stipulations made by Virginia in ceding the ground for Fortress Monroe and the Rip Raps on the 1st of March, 1821, are as follows. An Act ceding to the United States the lands on Old Point Comfort and the Shoal called the Rip Raps. Whereas It is shown to the present General Assembly that the government of the United States is solicitous that certain lands at Old Point Comfort and at the Shoal called the Rip Raps should be, with the right of property and entire jurisdiction thereon, vested in the said United States for the purpose of fortification and other objects of national defense. I. Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that it shall be lawful and proper for the governor of this commonwealth, by conveyance or deeds in writing under his hand and the seal of the state, to transfer, assign, and make over unto the said United States the right of property and title, as well as all the jurisdiction which this commonwealth possesses over the lands and shoal at Old Point Comfort and the rip-raps.

Two. And be it further enacted that, Should the said United States at any time abandon the said lands and shoal, or appropriate them to any other purposes than those indicated in the preamble to this act, that then, and in that case, the same shall revert to and revest in this commonwealth.

By accepting such grants, under such conditions, The government of the United States assented to their propriety, and the principle that holds good in any one case is, of course, applicable to all others of the same sort, whether expressly asserted in the act of session or not. Indeed, no express declaration would be necessary to establish a conclusion resulting so directly from the nature of the case, and the settled principles of sovereignty and eminent domain.

A state withdrawing from the union would necessarily assume the control theretofore exercised by the general government over all public defenses and other public property within her limits. It would, however, be but fair and proper that adequate compensation should be made to the other members of the partnership or their common agent for the value of the works and for any other advantage obtained by the one party, or loss incurred by the other. Such equitable settlement, the seceding states of the South, without exception, as I believe, were desirous to make, and prompt to propose, to the Federal authorities.

On the secession of South Carolina. The condition of the defenses of Charleston Harbor became a subject of anxiety with all parties. Of the three forts, in or at the entrance of the harbor, two were unoccupied, but the third, Fort Moultrie, was held by a garrison of but little more than one hundred men, of whom only sixty-three were said to be effectives, under command of Major Robert Anderson of the First Artillery. About twelve days before the secession of South Carolina, the representatives in Congress from that state had called on the president to assure him, in anticipation of the secession of the state, that no purpose was entertained by South Carolina to attack, or in any way molest, the forts held by the United States in the harbor of Charleston, at least until opportunity could be had, for an amicable settlement of all questions that might arise with regard to these forts and other public property, provided that no reenforcement should be sent, and the military status should be permitted to remain unchanged.

The South Carolinians understood Mr. Buchanan as approving of this suggestion, although declining to make any formal pledge. It appears, nevertheless, from subsequent developments, that both before and after the secession of South Carolina, preparations were secretly made for reenforcing Major Anderson in case it should be deemed necessary by the government at Washington. On the Eleventh of December, instructions were communicated to him from the War Department, of which the following is the essential part.

You are carefully to avoid every act, which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression, and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the force in this harbor, and if attacked, you are to defend yourself, to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its power of resistance.

You are also authorized. To take similar defensive steps, whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

These instructions were afterward modified, as we are informed by Mr. Buchanan, so as, instead of requiring him to defend himself to the last extremity, to direct him to do so as long as any reasonable hope Remained of saving the fort. Immediately after the secession of the state, the Convention of South Carolina deputed three distinguished citizens of that state—messers Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr—to proceed to Washington, to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances within the limits of South Carolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held by the government of the United States, as agent of the Confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member, and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this commonwealth and the government at Washington.

The commissioners, in the discharge of the duty entrusted to them, arrived in Washington on the 26th of December. Before they could communicate with the president, however, indeed on the morning after their arrival, they were startled, And the whole country electrified by the news that, during the previous night, Major Anderson had, quote, secretly dismantled Fort Moultrie, end quote, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, and removed his command to Fort Sumter, which occupied a more commanding position in the harbor. This movement changed the whole aspect of affairs.

It was considered by the government and people of South Carolina as a violation of the implied pledge of a maintenance of the status quo. The remaining forts and other public property were at once taken possession of by the state, and the condition of public feeling became greatly exacerbated. An interview between the president and the commissioners was followed by a sharp correspondence, which was terminated on the 1st of January, 1861, by the return to the commissioners of their final communication, with an endorsement stating that it was of such a character that the president declined to receive it. The negotiations were thus abruptly broken off. This correspondence may be found in the appendix.

In the meantime, Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, had resigned his position early in December on the ground of the refusal of the president to send reinforcements to Charleston. On the occupation of Fort Sumter by Major Anderson, Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, taking the ground that it was virtually a violation of a pledge given or implied by the government, had asked that the garrison should be entirely withdrawn from the harbor of Charleston, and on the refusal of the president to consent to this, had tendered his resignation. which was promptly accepted.

This is believed to be a correct outline of the earlier facts with regard to the Charleston forts, and in giving it I have done so, as far as possible, without prejudice or any expression of opinion upon the motives of the actors.

The kind relations, both personal and political, which had long existed between Mr. Buchanan and myself, had led him occasionally during his presidency to send for me to confer with him on subjects that caused him anxiety, and warranted me in sometimes calling upon him to offer my opinion on matters of special interest or importance. Thus it was that I had communicated with him freely. In regard to the threatening aspect of events in the earlier part of the winter of 1860-61, when he told me of the work that had been done, or was doing, at Fort Moultrie, that is, the elevation of its parapet by crowning it with barrels of sand, I pointed out to him the impolicy, as well as inefficiency, of the measure.

It seemed to me impolitic. to make ostensible preparations for defense when no attack was threatened, and the means adopted were inefficient, because any ordinary field-piece would knock the barrels off the parapet, and thus, too, render them only hurtful to the defenders. He inquired whether the expedient had not been successful at Fort Brown on the Rio Grande in the beginning of the Mexican War, and was answered that the attack on Fort Brown had been made with small arms, or at great distance.

After the removal of the garrison to the stronger and safer position of Fort Sumter, I called upon him again to represent, from my knowledge of the people and the circumstances of the case, how productive the movement would be of discontent, and how likely to lead to collision. One of the vexed questions of the day was, by what authority the collector of the port should be appointed, and the rumor was that instructions had been given to the commanding officer of Fort Sumter not to allow vessels to pass unless under clearance from the United States collector. It was easy to understand that if a vessel were fired upon under such circumstances... It would be accepted as the beginning of hostilities, a result which both he and I desired to avert as the greatest calamity that could be foreseen or imagined.

My opinion was that the wisest and best course would be to withdraw the garrison altogether from the harbor of Charleston. The president's objection to this was that it was his bounden duty To preserve and protect the property of the United States. To this I replied, with all the earnestness the occasion demanded, that I would pledge my life that, if an inventory were taken of all the stores and munitions in the fort, and an ordnance-sergeant with a few men left in charge of them, they would not be disturbed. As a further guarantee, I offered to obtain from the governor of South Carolina full assurance that, In case any marauders, or lawless combination of persons, should attempt to seize or disturb the property, he would send from the Citadel of Charleston an adequate guard to protect it and to secure its keepers against molestation.

The President promised me to reflect upon this proposition. and to confer with his cabinet upon the propriety of adopting it. All cabinet consultations are secret, which is equivalent to saying that I never knew what occurred in that meeting to which my proposition was submitted. The result was not communicated to me, but the events which followed proved that the suggestion was not accepted.

Major Anderson, who commanded the garrison, had many ties and associations that bound him to the south. He performed his part like the true soldier and man of the finest sense of honor that he was. But that it was most painful to him to be charged with the duty of holding the fort as a threat to the people of Charleston is a fact known to many others as well as to myself. We had been cadets together. He was my first acquaintance in that corps, and the friendship then formed was never interrupted. We had served together in the summer and autumn of 1860, in a commission of inquiry into the discipline, course of studies, and general condition of the United States Military Academy. At the close of our labors, the commission had adjourned to meet again in Washington about the end of the ensuing November, to examine the report and revise it for transmission to Congress.

Major Anderson's duties in Charleston Harbor hindered him from attending this adjourned meeting of the Commission, and he wrote to me, its chairman, to explain the cause of his absence. That letter was lost when my library and private papers were captured from my home in Mississippi. If any one has preserved it as a trophy of war, Its publication would show how bright was the honor, how broad the patriotism of Major Anderson, and how fully he sympathized with me as to the evils which then lowered over the country.

In comparing the past and the present among the mighty changes which passion and sectional hostility have wrought, one is profoundly and painfully impressed by The extent to which public opinion has drifted from the landmarks set up by the sages and patriots who formed the Constitutional Union, and observed by those who administered its government down to the time when war between the states was inaugurated. Mr. Buchanan, the last president of the old school, would as soon have thought of aiding in the establishment of a monarchy among us, as of accepting the doctrine of coercing the states into submission to the will of a majority in mass of the people of the United States. When discussing the question of withdrawing the troops from the port of Charleston, he yielded a ready assent to the proposition that the cession of a site for a fort, for purposes of public defense, lapses Whenever that fort should be employed by the grantee against the state by which the session was made, with the familiar principle that any grant for a special purpose expires when it ceases to be used for that purpose.

Whether on this or any other ground, if the garrison of Fort Sumter had been withdrawn in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of the United States, from which the power to apply coercion to a state was deliberately and designedly excluded. And if this had been distinctly assigned as a reason for its withdrawal, the honor of the United States government would have been maintained intact, and nothing could have operated more powerfully to Quiet the apprehensions and allay the resentment of the people of South Carolina. The influence which such a measure would have exerted upon the states, which had not yet succeeded, but were then contemplating the adoption of that extreme remedy, would probably have induced further delay, and the mellowing effect of time with a realization of the dangers to be incurred, might have wrought mutual forbearance, if, indeed, anything could have checked the madness then prevailing among the people of the northern states in their thirst for power and forgetfulness of the duties of federation.

It would have been easy to concede this point. The little garrison of Fort Sumter served only as a menace, for it was utterly incapable of holding the fort, if attacked, and the poor attempt soon afterward made to reinforce and provision it by such a vessel as the Star of the West, might by the uncharitable be readily construed as a scheme to provoke hostilities. Yet, from my knowledge of Mr. Buchanan, I do not hesitate to say that he had no such wish or purpose. His abiding hope was to avert a collision, or at least to postpone it to a period beyond the close of his official term. The management of the whole affair was, what Talleyrand describes, as something worse than a crime, a blunder. Whatever treatment the case demanded should have been prompt.

To wait was fatuity.

The ill-advised attempt secretly to throw reinforcements and provisions into Fort Sumter by means of the steamer Star of the West resulted in the repulsion of that vessel at the mouth of the harbor by the authorities of South Carolina, On the morning of the ninth of January, on her refusal to heave to, she was fired upon and put back to sea, with her recruits and supplies. A telegraphic account of this event was handed me a few hours afterward, when stepping into my carriage to go to the Senate chamber. Although I had then, for some time, Cease to visit the president, yet under the impulse of this renewed note of danger to the country, I drove immediately to the executive mansion, and for the last time appealed to him to take such prompt measures as were evidently necessary to avert the impending calamity.

The result was even more unsatisfactory. than that of former efforts had been. On the same day, the special message of the President on the State of the Union, dated the day previous, 8th of January, was submitted to Congress. This message was accompanied by the first letter of the South Carolina commissioners to the President, with his answer, but of course not by their rejoinder, which he had declined to receive. Mr. Buchanan, in his memoirs, complains that, immediately after the reading of his message, this rejoinder, which he terms an insulting letter, was presented by me to the Senate, and by that body received and entered into its journal. The simple truth is that, regarding it as essential to a complete understanding of the transaction, and its publication as a mere act of justice to the commissioners, I presented and had it read in the Senate.

But its appearance upon the journal as part of the proceedings, instead of being merely a document introduced as part of my remarks, was the result of a discourteous objection made by a so-called Republican senator to the reading of the document by the clerk of the Senate at my request. This will be made manifest by an examination of the debate and proceedings which ensued. The discourtesy recoiled upon its author and supporters, and gave the letter a vantage-ground in respect of prominence, which I could not have foreseen or expected. The next day, January 10th, the speech was delivered, the greater part of which may be found in the appendix. The last that I ever made in the Senate of the United States, except in taking leave, and by the sentiments of which I am content that my career, both before and since, should be judged.

The history of Fort Sumter during the remaining period, until the organization of the Confederate government, may be found in the correspondence given in the appendix. From this it will be seen that the authorities of South Carolina still continue to refrain from any act of aggression and retaliation, under the provocation of the secret attempt to reinforce the garrison, as they had previously under that of its nocturnal transfer from one fort to another. Another commissioner, the Hon. I. W. Haney, was sent to Washington by the governor of South Carolina, To effect, if possible, an amicable and peaceful transfer of the fort, and settlement of all questions relating to property. This commissioner remained for nearly a month, endeavoring to accomplish the objects of his mission, but was met only by evasive and unsatisfactory answers, and eventually returned without having effected anything.

There is one passage in the last letter of Colonel Haney to the President, which presents the case of the occupancy of Fort Sumter by the United States troops so clearly and forcibly that it may be proper to quote it. He writes as follows, You say that the fort was garrisoned for our protection, and is held for the same purposes for which it has ever been held since its construction. Are you not aware? That to hold in the territory of a foreign power a fortress against her will, validly for the purpose of protecting her citizens, is perhaps the highest insult which one government can offer to another. But Fort Sumter was never garrisoned at all until South Carolina had dissolved her connection with your government.

This garrison entered it in the night with every circumstance of secrecy After spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages and cutting down the flagstaff of an adjacent fort, which was then abandoned. South Carolina had not taken Fort Sumter into her own possession, only because of her misplaced confidence in a government which deceived her.

Thus, during the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's administration, Matters went rapidly from bad to worse. The old statesman, who with all his defects had long possessed, and was entitled still to retain, the confidence due to extensive political knowledge and love of his country in all its parts, who had, in his earlier career, looked steadily to the Constitution, as the mariner looks to the compass, for guidance. Retired to private life at the expiration of his term of office, having effected nothing to allay the storm which had been steadily gathering during his administration. Timid vacillation was then succeeded by unscrupulous cunning, and for futile efforts, without hostile collision, To impose a claim of authority upon people who repudiated it were substituted measures which could be sustained only by force.

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Withdrawal of Senators. Address of the author on taking leave of the Senate. Answer to certain objections. Mississippi was the second state to withdraw from the Union, her ordinance of secession being adopted on the 9th of January, 1861, She was quickly followed by Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 11th, and, in the course of the same month, by Georgia on the 18th, and Louisiana on the 26th. The conventions of these states, together with that of South Carolina, agreed in designating Montgomery, Alabama as the place, and the Fourth of February as the day, for the assembling of a congress of the seceding states, to which each state convention, acting as the direct representative of the sovereignty of the people thereof, appointed delegates.

Telegraphic intelligence of the secession of Mississippi had reached Washington some considerable time before the fact was officially communicated to me. This official knowledge I considered it proper to await before taking formal leave of the Senate. My associates from Alabama and Florida concurred in this view. Accordingly, having received notification of the secession of these three states about the same time, On the twenty-first of January, Messrs. Eulie and Mallory of Florida, Fitzpatrick and Clay of Alabama, and myself, announced the withdrawal of the states from which we were respectively accredited, and took leave of the Senate at the same time. In the action which she then took, Mississippi certainly had no purpose to levy war against the United States, or any of them.

As her senator, I endeavored plainly to state her position in the annexed remarks addressed to the Senate in taking leave of the body. I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announcing to the Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in convention assembled, has declared her separation from the United States. Under these circumstances, of course, my functions are terminated here. It has seemed to me proper, however, that I should appear in the Senate to announce that fact to my associates, and I will say but very little more. The occasion does not invite me to go into argument, and my physical condition would not permit me to do so if it were otherwise.

And yet it seems to become me to say something on the part of the state I here represent on an occasion so solemn as this. It is known to senators who have served with me here that I have for many years advocated, as an essential attribute of state sovereignty, the right of a state to secede from the Union, Therefore, if I had not believed there was justifiable cause, if I had thought that Mississippi was acting without sufficient provocation or without an existing necessity, I should still, under my theory of the government, because of my allegiance to the state of which I am a citizen, have been bound by her action. I, however, may be permitted to say that I do think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act.

I conferred with her people before that act was taken, counseled them then that, if the state of things which they apprehended should exist when their convention met, they should take the action which they have now adopted. I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine with the advocacy of the right of a state to remain in the Union, and to disregard its constitutional obligations by the nullification of the law. Such is not my theory. Nullification and secession, so often confounded, are indeed antagonistic principles. Nullification is a remedy which it is sought to apply within the Union and against the agent of the states. It is only to be justified when the agent has violated his constitutional obligations, and a state, assuming to judge for itself, denies the right of the agent thus to act, and appeals to the other states of the Union for a decision.

But, when the states themselves, and when the people of the states, have so acted as to convince us that they will not regard our constitutional rights, Then, and then for the first time, arises the doctrine of secession in its practical application. A great man who now reposes with his fathers, and who has often been arraigned for a want of fealty to the Union, advocated the doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It was because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union, his determination to find some remedy for existing ills short of a severance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other states, that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful, to be within the limits of state power, not to disturb the Union, but only to be a means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the states for their judgment.

Secession belongs to a different class of remedies, It is to be justified upon the basis that the States are sovereign. There was a time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again when a better comprehension of the theory of our government, and the inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent any one from denying that each State is a sovereign, and thus may reclaim the grants which it has made to any agent whomsoever. I therefore say I concur in the action of the people of Mississippi, believing it to be necessary and proper, and should have been bound by their action if my belief had been otherwise, and this brings me to the important point which I wish, on this last occasion, to present to the Senate.

It is by this confounding of nullification and secession that the name of a great man whose ashes now mingle with his mother earth has been evoked to justify coercion against a seceded State. The phrase, to execute the laws, was an expression which General Jackson applied to the case of a State refusing to obey the laws while yet a member of the Union. That is not the case which is now presented. The laws are to be executed over the United States, and upon the people of the United States. They have no relation to any foreign country. It is a perversion of terms, at least it is a great misapprehension of the case, which cites that expression for application to a state which has withdrawn from the Union.

You may make war on a foreign state. If it be the purpose of gentlemen, they may make war against a state which has withdrawn from the Union, but there are no laws of the United States to be executed within the limits of a seceded state. A state, finding herself in the condition in which Mississippi has judged she is, in which her safety requires that she should provide for the maintenance of her rights out of the Union, surrenders all the benefits, and they are known to be many, deprives herself of the advantages, and they are known to be great, severs all the ties of affection, and they are close and enduring, which have bound her to the Union, and thus divesting herself of every benefit, taking upon herself every burden, she claims to be exempt from any power to execute the laws of the United States within her limits.

I well remember an occasion when Massachusetts was arraigned before the Bar of the Senate And when the doctrine of coercion was rife, and to be applied against her, because of the rescue of a fugitive slave in Boston, my opinion then was the same that it is now. Not in a spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not influenced in my opinions because the case is my own, I refer to that time and that occasion as containing the opinion which I then entertained, and on which my present conduct is based. I then said that if Massachusetts, following her purpose through a stated line of conduct, chose to take the last step, which separates her from the Union, it is her right to go, and I will neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her back, but I will say to her, Godspeed, in memory of the kind associations which once existed between her and the other States.

It has been a conviction of pressing necessity, It has been a belief that we are to be deprived in the union of the rights which our fathers bequeathed to us, which has brought Mississippi to her present decision. She has heard proclaimed the theory that all men are created free and equal, and this made the basis of an attack upon her social institutions, and the sacred Declaration of Independence has been invoked to maintain the position of the equality of the races. That declaration of independence is to be construed by the circumstances and purposes for which it was made. The communities were declaring their independence. The people of those communities were asserting that no man was born, to use the language of Mr.

Jefferson, booted and spurred to ride over the rest of mankind, that men were created equal, meaning the men of political community. That there was no divine right to rule, that no man inherited the right to govern, that there were no classes by which power and place descended to families, but that all stations were equally within the grasp of each member of the body politic. These were the great principles they announced. These were the purposes for which they made their declaration. These were the ends to which their enunciation was directed. They have no reference to the slave. Else, how happened it that among the items of arraignment against George, the third, was that he endeavored to do just what the North has been endeavoring of late to do, to stir up insurrection among our slaves?

Had the declaration announced that the Negroes were free and equal, how was the Prince to be arraigned for raising up insurrection among them? And how was this to be enumerated among the high crimes which caused the colonies to sever their connection with the mother country? When our Constitution was formed, the same idea was rendered more palpable, for there we find provision made for that very class of persons as property. They were not put upon the footing of equality with white men, not even upon that of paupers and convicts, but, so far as representation was concerned, were discriminated against as a lower caste, only to be represented in the numerical proportion of three-fifths. So stands the compact which binds us together.

Then, senators, we recur to the principles upon which our government was founded, and when you deny them, and when you deny to us the right to withdraw from a government which, thus perverted, threatens to be destructive of our rights, we but tread in the path of our fathers when we proclaim our independence and take the hazard. This is done, not in hostility to others, not to injure any section of the country, not even for our own pecuniary benefit, but from the high and solemn motive of defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and which it is our duty to transmit unshorn to our children. I find in myself perhaps a type of the general feeling of my constituents toward yours, I am sure I feel no hostility toward you, senators from the North.

I am sure there is not one of you, whatever sharp discussion there may have been between us, to whom I cannot now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you well. And such, I am sure, is the feeling of the people whom I represent toward those whom you represent. I therefore feel that I but express their desire, when I say I hope, and they hope, for peaceable relations with you, though we must part. They may be mutually beneficial to us in the future, as they have been in the past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring disaster on every portion of the country, And, if you will have it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered them from the power of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear.

And thus, putting our trust in God, and in our firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may. In the course of my service here, associated at different times with a great variety of senators, I see now around me some with whom I have served long, There have been points of collision, but whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here. I carry with me no hostile remembrance. Whatever offense I have given which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction has not been demanded, I have, Senators, in this hour of our parting, to offer you my apology for any pain which, in the heat of discussion, I have inflicted. I go hence unencumbered by the remembrance of any injury received, and having discharged the duty of making the only reparation in my power for any injury offered.

Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement which the occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for me to bid you a final adieu."

There are some who contend that we should have retained our seats and fought for our rights in the Union. Could anything be less rational or less consistent than that a senator, an ambassador from his state, should insist upon representing it in a Confederacy from which the State has withdrawn? What was meant by fighting in the Union I have never quite understood. If it be to retain a seat in Congress for the purpose of crippling the government and rendering it unable to perform its functions, I can certainly not appreciate the idea of honor that sanctions the suggestion. Among the advantages claimed for this proposition by its supporters was that of thwarting the president in the appointment of his cabinet and other officers necessary for the administration of public affairs, Would this have been to maintain the union formed by the states?

Would such have been the government which Washington recommended as a remedy for the defects of the original confederation, the greatest of which was the paralysis of the action of the general agent by the opposition or indifference of the states? Sad as have been the consequences of the war which followed secession, disastrous in its moral, material, and political relations, Still we have good cause to feel proud that the course of the southern states has left no blot nor stain upon the honor and chivalry of her people. And if our children must obey, they must, but, thinking on our day, twill less debase them to submit.

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III. CHAPTER IV.

THREATS OF ARREST. DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON. Indications of public anxiety. Will there be war? Organization of the Army of Mississippi. Lack of preparations for defense in the South. Evidences of the good faith and peaceable purposes of the Southern people. During the interval between the announcement by telegraph of the secession of Mississippi and the receipt of the official notification which enabled me to withdraw from the Senate, rumors were in circulation of a purpose, on the part of the United States government, to arrest members of Congress preparing to leave Washington on account of the secession of the states which they represented. This threat received little attention from those most concerned.

Indeed, it was thought that it might not be an undesirable mode of testing the question of the right of a State to withdraw from the Union. No attempt, however, was made to arrest any of the retiring members, and, after a delay of a few days in necessary preparations, I left Washington for Mississippi, passing through southwestern Virginia, east Tennessee, a small part of Georgia, and north Alabama. A deep interest in the events which had recently occurred was exhibited by the people of these states, and much anxiety was indicated as to the future. Many years of agitation had made them familiar with the idea of separation. Nearly two generations had risen to manhood since it had begun to be discussed as a possible alternative.

Few, very few, of the Southern people had ever regarded it as a desirable event, or otherwise than as a last resort for escape from evils more intolerable. It was a calamity, which, however threatened, they had still hoped might be averted, or indefinitely postponed. And they had regarded with contempt, rather than anger, the ravings of a party in the North, which denounced the Constitution and the Union, and persistently defamed their brethren of the South. Now, however, as well in Virginia and Tennessee, neither of which had yet seceded, as in the more Southern states, which had already taken that step, The danger so often prophesied was perceived to be at the door, and eager inquiries were made as to what would happen next, especially as to the probability of war between the states.

The course which events were likely to take was shrouded in the greatest uncertainty. In the minds of many there was the not unreasonable hope, which had been expressed by the Commissioner sent from Mississippi to Maryland, that the secession of six Southern States, certainly soon to be followed by that of others, would so arouse the sober thought and better feeling of the Northern people as to compel their representatives to agree to a convention of the States, and that such guarantees would be given as would secure to the South the domestic There were others, and they the most numerous class, who considered that the separation would be final but peaceful. For my own part, while believing that secession was a right and properly a peaceable remedy, I had never believed that it would be permitted to be peaceably exercised.

Very few in the South at that time agreed with me. And my answers to queries on the subject were, therefore, as unexpected as they were unwelcome. On my arrival in Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, I found that the Convention of the State had made provision for a State Army, and had appointed me to the command with a rank of Major General. Four Brigadier Generals, appointed in like manner by the Convention, were awaiting my arrival for assignment to duty. After the preparation of the necessary rules and regulations, the division of the State into districts, the apportionment among them of the troops to be raised, and the appointment of officers of the General Staff, as authorized by the Ordinance of the Convention, such measures as were practicable were taken to obtain the necessary arms.

The State had few serviceable weapons, and no establishment for their manufacture or repair. This fact, which is true of other Southern States as of Mississippi, is a clear proof of the absence of any desire or expectation of war. If the purpose of the Northern States to make war upon us because of secession had been foreseen, preparation to meet the consequences would have been contemporaneous with the adoption of a resort to that remedy, a remedy the possibility of which had for many years been contemplated. Had the southern states possessed arsenals, and collected in them the requisite supplies of arms and munitions, such preparation would not only have placed them more nearly on an equality with the North in the beginning of the war, but might perhaps have been the best conservator of peace.

Let us the survivors, however, not fail to do credit to the generous credulity which could not understand how, in violation of the Compact of Union, a war could be waged against the States, or why they should be invaded because their people had deemed it necessary to withdraw from an association which had failed to fulfill the ends for which they had entered into it. and which, having been broken to their injury by the other parties, had ceased to be binding upon them. It is a satisfaction to know that the calamities which have befallen the Southern States were the result of their credulous reliance on the power of the Constitution, that, if it failed to protect their rights, it would at least suffice to prevent an attempt at coercion, if, in the last resort, they peacefully withdrew from the Union.

When, in aftertimes, the passions of the day shall have subsided, and all the evidence shall have been collected and compared, the philosophical inquirer, who asks why the majority of the stronger section invaded the peaceful homes of their late associates, will be answered by history. The lust of empire impelled them to wage against their weaker neighbors a war of subjugation.

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V. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume 1b. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis. Volume 1b, Part 3, Chapter 5. Meeting of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States. Adoption of a Provisional Constitution. Election of President and Vice President. Notification to the author of his election. His views with regard to it. Journey to Montgomery. Interview with Judge Sharkey. False reports of speeches on the way. Inaugural Address. Editor's Note.

The Congress of Delegates from the seceding states convened at Montgomery, Alabama, according to appointment, on the 4th of February, 1861. Their first work was to prepare a provisional constitution for the new Confederacy to be formed of the states which had withdrawn from the Union for which the style Confederate States of America was adopted. The powers conferred upon them were adequate for the performance of this duty. The immediate necessity for which was obvious and urgent. This Constitution was adopted on the 8th of February to continue in force for one year, unless superseded at an earlier date by a permanent organization. It is printed in an appendix, and for convenience of reference, the permanent Constitution, adopted several weeks afterward, is exhibited in connection with it, and side by side with the Constitution of the United States, After which it was modeled.

The attention of the reader is invited to these documents and to a comparison of them, although a more particular notice of the Permanent Constitution will be more appropriate hereafter. On the next day, 9th of February, an election was held for the Chief Executive Offices, resulting, as I afterward learned, in my election to the Presidency, with the Honorable Alexander H. Stevens of Georgia as Vice-President. Mr. Stevens was a delegate from Georgia to the Congress. While these events were occurring, having completed the most urgent of my duties at the capital of Mississippi, I had gone to my home, Briarfield, in Warren County, and had begun, in the homely but expressive language of Mr. Clay, to repair my fences.

While thus engaged, Notice was received with my election to the presidency of the Confederate States, with an urgent request to proceed immediately to Montgomery for inauguration.

As this had been suggested as a probable event, and what appeared to me adequate precautions had been taken to prevent it, I was surprised, and still more disappointed, for reasons which it is not now necessary to state. I had not believed myself as well suited to the office as some others. I thought myself better adapted to command in the field, and Mississippi had given me the position which I preferred to any other, the highest rank in her army. It was, therefore, that I afterward said, in an address delivered in the capital, before the legislature of the state, with reference to my election to the presidency of the Confederacy, that the duty to which I was thus called was temporary, and that I expected soon to be with the Army of Mississippi again.

While on my way to Montgomery, and waiting in Jackson, Mississippi, for the railroad train, I met the Hon. William L. Sharkey, who had filled with great distinction the office of Chief Justice of the State. He said he was looking for me to make an inquiry. He desired to know if it was true, as he had just learned, that I believed there would be war. My opinion was freely given that there would be war, long and bloody, and that it behooved everyone to put his house in order. He expressed much surprise, and said that he had not believed the report attributing this opinion to me. He asked how I supposed War could result from the peaceable withdrawal of a sovereign state. The answer was that it was not my opinion that war should be occasioned by the exercise of that right, but that it would be.

Judge Sharkey and I had not belonged to the same political party, he being a Whig, but we fully agreed with regard to the question of the sovereignty of the states. He had been an advocate of nullification, a doctrine to which I had never assented, and which had at one time been the main issue in Mississippi politics.

He had presided over the well-remembered Nashville Convention in 1849, and had possessed much influence in the state, not only as an eminent jurist, but as a citizen who had grown up with it, and held many offices of honor and trust. On the way to Montgomery, brief addresses were made at various places at which there were temporary stoppages of the trains in response to calls from the crowds assembled at such points. Some of these addresses were grossly misrepresented in sensational reports made by irresponsible persons, which were published in northern newspapers, and were not considered worthy of correction under the pressure of the lamentous duties then devolving upon me. These false reports, which represented me as invoking war and threatening devastation of the North, have since been adopted by partisan writers as authentic history.

It is a sufficient answer to these accusations to refer to my farewell address to the Senate, already given, as reported for the press at the time, and in connection therewith to my inaugural address at Montgomery, on assuming the office of President of the Confederate States on the eighteenth of February. These two addresses, delivered at an interval of a month during which no material change of circumstances had occurred, being one before and the other after the date of the sensational reports referred to, are sufficient to stamp them as utterly untrue. The inaugural was deliberately prepared and uttered as written, and, in connection with the farewell speech to the Senate, presents a clear and authentic statement of the principles and purposes which actuated me on assuming the duties of the high office to which I had been called.

Inaugural Address Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, Friends and fellow-citizens, call to the difficult and responsible station of Chief Magistrate of the provisional government which you have instituted. I approach the discharge of the duties assigned to me with humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism of the people. Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government, to take the place of this, which by its greater moral and physical power will be better able to combat with many difficulties that arise from the conflicting interests of separate nations.

I enter upon the duties of the office to which I have been chosen with the hope that the beginning of our career as a Confederacy May not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the separate existence and independence we have asserted, and which, with the blessing of providence, we intend to maintain. Our present political position has been achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations. It illustrates the American idea that governments rest on the consent of the governed And that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the ends for which they were established. The declared purpose of the compact of the union from which we have withdrawn was to establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

And when, In the judgment of the sovereign states composing this confederacy, it has been perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was established. A peaceful appeal to the ballot-box declared that, so far as they are concerned, the government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this They merely asserted the right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occasion of its exercise, they as sovereigns were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct. And he who knows the hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we have labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit.

The right, solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the United States, which has been solemnly affirmed and reaffirmed in the Bills of Rights of the States subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus, the sovereign states here represented have proceeded to form this Confederacy, and it is by abuse of language that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each state its government has remained so that the rights of persons and property have not been disturbed. The agent through which they communicated with foreign nations is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations.

Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform every constitutional duty, Moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war. We may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others, There can be no cause to doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States will be found equal to any measure of defense which their honor and security may require.

An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of commodities required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is peace. and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we would sell, and from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of these commodities. There can, however, be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such as the northeastern states of the American Union. It must follow, therefore, that mutual interest will invite to good-will and kind offices on both parts. If, however, passion or lust of dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those states, we must prepare to meet the emergency and maintain by the final arbitrament of the sword.

The position which we have assumed among the nations of the earth. We have entered upon the career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy with our late associates of the northern states, we have vainly endeavored to secure tranquility and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice. We have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our affairs, and the perpetuity of the confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled.

But if this be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed. It will but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke the blessing of providence on a just cause, as a consequence of our new condition and relations, and with a view to meet anticipated wants. It will be necessary to provide for the speedy and efficient organization of branches of the Executive Department Having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military affairs, and the postal service. For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia, but it is deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed and disciplined army, more numerous.

than would usually be required on a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our harbors, and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects will be required. But this, as well as other subjects appropriate to our necessities, have doubtless engaged the attention of Congress. With a constitution differing only from that of our fathers in so far, As it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from sectional conflicts which have interfered with the pursuit of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that states from which we have recently parted may seek to unite their fortunes to ours under the government which we have instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision.

But beyond this, If I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the states from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness of the Confederacy, it is requisite that there should be so much of homogeneity that the welfare of every portion shall be the aim of the whole. When this does not exist, Antagonisms are engendered which must, and should, result in separation.

Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights, and promote our own welfare, the separation by the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check, The cultivation of our fields have progressed as heretofore, and even should we be involved in war, there would be no considerable diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our exports, and which the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of the producer and consumer can only be interrupted by exterior force. which would obstruct the transmission of our staples to foreign markets, a course of conduct which would be as unjust as it would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad.

Should reason guide the action of the government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world, the northern states included, could not be dictated by even the strongest desire to inflict injury upon us. But if the contrary should prove true, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. In the meantime, there will remain to us, besides the ordinary means before suggested, the well-known resources for retaliation Upon the commerce of an enemy.

Experience in public stations of subordinate grade to this which your kindness has conferred, has taught me that toil and care and disappointment are the price of official elevation. You will see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate, but you shall not find in me either want of zeal or fidelity to the cause That is to me the highest in hope and of most enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction, one which I neither sought nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the performance of the duties required at my hands.

We have changed the constituent parts. But not the system of government. The Constitution framed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning.

Thus instructed as to the true meaning, and just interpretation of that instrument. And ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people, and that powers delegated are to be strictly construed, I will hope, by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the good will and confidence which welcomed my entrance into office. It is joyous in the midst of perilous times to look around upon a people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve animates and actuates the whole, where the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in the balance against honor and right and liberty and equality.

Obstacles may retard, but they cannot long prevent the progress of a movement sanctified By its justice and sustained by a virtuous people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our fathers, to guide and protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which by His blessing they were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to their posterity. With the continuance of His favor, ever gratefully acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success. To peace, and to prosperity.

Note, relative to the election of president of the Confederate States under the Provisional Constitution, and some other subjects referred to in the foregoing chapters, statements having been made seemingly to imply that I was a candidate for the presidency of the Confederate States, that my election was the result of a misunderstanding or of accidental complications, and also that I held extreme views, and entertained at that period an inadequate conception of the magnitude of the war, probably to be waged. Information on the subject has been contributed by several distinguished members of the Provisional Congress, who still survive. From a number of their letters, which have been published, the annexed extracts are given.

Parts being omitted which refer to matters not of historical interest. From a communication of the Hon. Alexander M. Clayton of Mississippi to the Memphis Appeal of June 21, 1870, quote, I was at the time a member of the Provisional Congress from Mississippi, believing that Mr. Davis was the choice of the South for the position of President before repairing to Montgomery. I addressed him a letter to ascertain if he would accept it. He replied that it was not the place he desired, that if he could have his choice, he would greatly prefer to be in active service as commander-in-chief of the army, but that he would give himself to the cause in any capacity whatever. That was the only letter of which I have any knowledge that he wrote on the subject, and that was known to only a very few persons.

and only when I was asked if Mr. Davis would accept the presidency. There was no electioneering, no management on the part of any one. Each voter was left to determine for himself in whose hands the destinies of the infant confederacy should be placed, by a law as fixed as gravitation itself, and as little disturbed by outside influences. The minds of members centered upon Mr. Davis. After a few days of anxious, intense labor, the provisional Constitution was framed, and it became necessary to give it vitality by putting someone at the head of the new government. Without any effort on the part of the friends of either Messrs. Davis or Stevens, the election was made without the slightest dissent.

Of the accidental complications referred to, I have not the least knowledge, and always thought that the election of Mr. Davis arose from the spontaneous conviction of his peculiar fitness. I have consulted no one on the subject, and have appended my name only to avoid resting an important fact upon anonymous authority. Very respectfully yours. Signed, Alexander M. Clayton.

From the Hon. J. A. P. Campbell of Mississippi, now a Justice of the Supreme Court of that state.

If there was a delegate from Mississippi or any other state who was opposed to the election of Jefferson Davis as President of the Confederate States, I never heard of the fact. I had the idea that Mr. Davis did not desire to be President. and preferred to be in the military service. But no other man was spoken of for president within my hearing. It is within my personal knowledge that the statement of the interview, that Mr. Davis did not have a just appreciation of the serious character of the contest between the seceding states and the Union, is wholly untrue. Mr. Davis, more than any man I ever heard talk on the subject, had a correct apprehension of the consequences of secession, and of the magnitude of the war to be waged to coerce the seceding states.

While at Montgomery he expressed the belief that heavy fighting must occur, and that Virginia was to be the chief battleground. Years prior to secession, in his address before the legislature and people of Mississippi, Mr. Davis had earnestly advised extensive preparation for the possible contingency of secession. After the formation of the Confederate States, he was far in advance of the Constitutional Convention and the Provisional Congress, and, as I believe of any man in it, in his views of the gravity of the situation and the probable extent and duration of the war, and of the provision which should be made for the defense of the seceding States, before secession. Mr. Davis thought war would result from it, and after secession he expressed the view that the war commenced would be an extensive one.

What he may have thought at a later day than the early part of 1862, I do not know, but it is inconceivable that the interview can be correct as to that. The idea that Mr. Davis was so extreme in his views is a new one. He was extremely conservative on the subject of secession. The suggestion that Mississippi would have preferred General Toons or Mr. Cobb for president has no foundation, in fact. My opinion is that no man could have obtained a single vote in the Mississippi delegation against Mr. Davis, who was then, as he is now, the most eminent and popular of all the citizens of Mississippi. Very respectfully, signed, J. A. P. Campbell.

From the Hon. Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana.

My recollections of what transpired at the time are very vivid and positive.

Who should be president was the absorbing question of the day. Did he engage the attention of all presidents? and elicited many letters from our respective constituencies. The general inclination was strongly in favor of Mr. Davis. In fact, no other name was so prominently or so generally mentioned. The name of Mr. Rett, of South Carolina, was probably more frequently mentioned than that of any other person next to Mr. Davis. The rule adopted at our election was that each state should have one vote, to be delivered in open session, viva voce, by one of the delegates as spokesman for his colleagues. The delegates of the different states met in secret session to select their candidate and spokesman.

Of what occurred in these various meetings, I cannot speak authoritatively as to other states, as their proceedings were considered secret. I can speak positively, however, of what took place at a meeting of the delegates from Louisiana. We, the Louisiana delegates, without hesitation and unanimously, after a very short session decided in favor of Mr. Davis. No other name was mentioned. The claims of no one else were considered or even alluded to. There was not the slightest opposition to Mr. Davis on the part of any of our delegation, Certainly none was expressed. All appeared enthusiastic in his favor, and, I have no reason to doubt, felt so. Nor was the feeling induced by any solicitation on the part of Mr.

Davis or his friends. Mr. Davis was not in or near Montgomery at the time. He was never heard from on this subject, so far as I knew. He was never announced as a candidate. We were seeking the best man to fill the position, and the conviction at the time, in the minds of a large majority of the delegates, that Mr. Davis was the best qualified from both his civil and military knowledge and experience, induced many to look upon Mr. Davis as the best selection that could be made. This conviction, coupled with his well-recognized conservative views, For in no sense did we consider Mr. Davis extreme, either in his views or purposes, was the deciding consideration which controlled the votes of the Louisiana delegation.

Of this I have not the least doubt. I remain respectfully, very truly yours, etc., signed Duncan F. Kenner.

From the Honorable James Chestnut of South Carolina.

Before leaving home, I made up my mind as to who was the fittest man to be president, and who to be vice-president. Mr. Davis for the first, and Mr. Stevens for the second. And this was known to all my friends, as well as to my colleagues. Mr. Davis, then conspicuous for ability, had long experience in civil service, was reputed a most successful organizer and administrator of the Military Department of the United States, when he was Secretary of War, and came out of the Mexican War with much a clat as a soldier. Possessing a combination of these high and needful qualities, he was regarded by nearly the whole South as the fittest man for the position. I certainly so regarded him, and did not change my mind on the way to Montgomery.

Georgia was a great state, great in numbers, comparatively great in wealth, and great in the intellectual gifts and experiences of many of her sons. Conspicuous among them were Stephens, Toombs, and Cobb. In view of these facts, it was thought by all of us expedient, nay, more positively right and just, that Georgia should have a corresponding weight in the counsels and conduct of the new government. Mr. Stephens was also a man of conceited ability, of high character, conservative, devoted to the rights of the states, and known to be a power in his own state. Hence all eyes turned to him to fill the second place. Howell Cobb became president of the convention, and General Toome Secretary of State.

These two gifted Georgians were called to their respective positions because of their experience, ability, and ardent patriotism. Mr. Rett was a very bold and frank man. So was Colonel Keat, and they, as always, avowed their opinions and acted upon them with energy. Nevertheless, the vote of the delegation was cast for Mr. Davis. Signed, James Chestnut.

From the Honorable W. Porcher Miles of Virginia, formerly of South Carolina, and a member of the Provisional Congress of 1861. To the best of my recollection, there was entire unanimity in the South Carolina delegation at Montgomery on the subject of the choice of a president. I think it very likely that Keats, from his warm personal friendship for Mr. Toomes, may at first have preferred him. I have no recollections of Chestnut's predilections. I think there was no question that Mr. Davis was the choice of our delegation and of the whole people of South Carolina. I do not think Mr. Rett ever attempted to influence the course of his colleagues, either in this or in matters generally before the Congress, nor do I think his personal influence in the delegation was as great as that of some other members of it.

If I were to select any one as having a special influence with us, I would consider Mr. Robert Barnwell as the one. His singularly pure and elevated character, entire freedom from all personal ambition, or desire for place or position, he declined Mr. Davis's offer of a seat in the cabinet, as well as his long experience in public life and admirably calm and well-balanced mind, All combined to make his influence with his colleagues very great. But neither could he be said to lead the delegation. He had no desire, and never made any attempt to do so. I think there was no delegation in the Congress, individual members of which were more independent in coming to their own conclusions of what was right and expedient to be done.

There was always the frankest and freest interchange of opinions among them, but everyone determined his own course for himself."

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume I-B, Part Chapter Six. The Confederate Cabinet.

After being inaugurated, I proceeded to the formation of my cabinet, that is, the heads of the executive departments authorized by the laws of the Provisional Congress. The unanimity existing among our people made this a much easier and more agreeable task than where the rivalries In the party of an executive have to be consulted and accommodated, often at the expense of highest capacity and fitness. Unencumbered by any other considerations than the public welfare, having no friends to reward or enemies to punish, it resulted that not one of those who formed my first cabinet had borne to me the relation of close personal friendship. or had political claims upon me. Indeed, with two of them I had no previous acquaintance.

It was my wish that the Hon. Robert W. Barnwell of South Carolina should be Secretary of State. I had known him intimately during a trying period of our joint service in the United States Senate, and he had won alike my esteem and regard. Before making known to him my wish in this connection, the delegation of South Carolina, of which he was a member, had resolved to recommend one of their number to be Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Barnwell, with characteristic delicacy, declined to accept my offer to him.

I had intended to offer the Treasury Department to Mr. Toombs of Georgia, whose knowledge on subjects of finance had particularly attracted my notice when we served together in the United States Senate. Mr. Barnwell, having declined the State Department, and a colleague of his, said to be particularly qualified for the Treasury Department, having been recommended for it, Mr. Toombs was offered the State Department, for which others believed him to be well qualified. Mr. Mallory of Florida, Had been chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the United States Senate. Was extensively acquainted with the officers of the Navy, and for a landsman had much knowledge of nautical affairs. Therefore he was selected for Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Benjamin of Louisiana had a very high reputation as a lawyer, and my acquaintance with him in the Senate had impressed me with the lucidity of his intellect, his systematic habits, and capacity for labor. He was therefore invited to the post of Attorney General. Mr. Reagan of Texas, I had known for a sturdy, honest representative in the United States Congress, and his acquaintance with the territory included in the Confederate States was both extensive and accurate. These, together with his industry and ability to labor, indicated him as peculiarly fit for the office of Post-Master General. Mr. Memminger of South Carolina had a high reputation for knowledge of finance. He bore an unimpeachable character for integrity and close attention to duties, and on the recommendation of the delegation from South Carolina, he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury and proved himself entirely worthy of the trust.

Mr. Walker of Alabama was a distinguished member of the Bar of North Alabama, and was eminent among the politicians of that section. He was earnestly recommended by gentlemen intimately and favorably known to me, and was therefore selected for the War Department. His was the only name presented from Alabama.

The executive departments having been organized, my attention was first directed to preparation for military defense. For, though I, in common with others, desired to have a peaceful separation, and sent commissioners to the United States government to effect, if possible, negotiations to that end, I did not hold the common opinion that we would be allowed to depart in peace. and therefore regarded it as an imperative duty to make all possible preparation for the contingency of war.

End of chapter six, chapter seven, early acts of the Confederate Congress laws of the United States continued in force officers of customs and revenue continued in office Commission to the United States. Navigation of the Mississippi. Restrictions on the coasting trade. Removed. Appointment of commissioners to Washington.

The legislation of the Confederate Congress furnishes the best evidence of the temper and spirit which prevailed in the organization of the Confederate government. The very first enactment made on the 9th of February, 1861, the day after the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, was this, that all the laws of the United States of America in force and in use in the Confederate States of America on the first day of November last, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the Confederate States, be, and the same are hereby continued in force, until altered or repealed by the Congress.

The next act, adopted on the 14th of February, was one continuing in office until the 1st of April next, ensuing all officers connected with the collection of customs and the assistant treasurers entrusted with the keeping of the moneys arising therefrom. who were engaged in the performance of such duties within any of the Confederate States with the same powers and functions which they had been exercising under the government of the United States. The Provisional Constitution itself, in the Second Section of its Sixth Article, had ordained as follows, the government hereby instituted shall take immediate steps for the settlement of all matters between the states forming it and their other late confederates of the United States, in relation to the public property and public debt at the time of their withdrawal from them.

These states hereby declaring it to be their wish and earnest desire to adjust everything pertaining to the common property common liabilities, and common obligations of that union, upon the principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith.

In accordance with this requirement of the Constitution, the Congress, on the 15th of February, before my arrival at Montgomery, passed a resolution declaring, That it is the sense of this Congress that a commission of three persons be appointed by the President-elect as early as may be convenient after his inauguration and sent to the government of the United States of America for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations between that government and the Confederate States of America. and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith.

Persistent, and to a great extent, successful efforts were made to inflame the minds of the people of the northwestern states by representing to them that, in consequence of the separation of the states, they would lose the free navigation of the Mississippi River. At that early period in the life of the Confederacy, the intercourse between the North and South had been so little interrupted that the agitators, whose vocation it was to deceive the masses of the people, could not, or should not, have been ignorant that, as early as the 25th of February, 1861, an act was passed by the Confederate Congress, and approved by the president, to declare and establish the free navigation of the Mississippi River.

The act began with the announcement that, the peaceful navigation of the Mississippi River is hereby declared free to the citizens of any of the states upon its borders, or upon the borders of its navigable tributaries. And his provisions secured that freedom for all ships, boats, or vessels with their cargoes without any duty or hindrance except light money, pilotage, and other like charges. By an act approved on the Twenty Sixth of February, all laws which forbade the employment in the coasting trade of vessels not enrolled or licensed And all laws imposing discriminating duties on foreign vessels or goods imported in them were repealed. These acts, and all other indications, manifest the well-known wish of the people of the Confederacy to preserve the peace and encourage the most unrestricted commerce with all nations, surely not least with their late associates, the Northern States.

Thus far the hope that peace might be maintained was predominant. Perhaps the wish was father to the thought that there would be no war between the states lately united. Indeed, all the laws enacted during the first session of the Provisional Congress show how consistent were the purposes and actions of its members with their original avowal of a desire peacefully to separate from those with whom they could not live in tranquility, albeit the government had been established to promote the common welfare. Under this state of feeling, the government of the Confederacy was instituted. My own views and inclinations, as has already been fully shown, were in entire accord with the disposition manifested by the requirement of the provisional Constitution and the resolution of the Congress above recited, for the appointment of a commission to negotiate friendly relations with the United States, and an equitable and peaceable settlement of all questions which would necessarily arise under the new relations of the states toward one another.

Next to the organization of a cabinet, that of such a commission was accordingly One of the very first objects of attention. Three discreet, well-informed, and distinguished citizens were selected as said commissioners, and accredited to the President of the Northern States. Mr. Lincoln, to the end that by negotiation all questions between the two governments might be so adjusted as to avoid war, and perpetuate the kind relations which had been cemented by the common trials, sacrifices, and glories of the people of all the states. If sectional hostility had been engendered by dissimilarity of institutions, and by a mistaken idea of moral responsibilities, and by irreconcilable creeds, if the family could no longer live and grow harmoniously together, By patriarchal teaching older than Christianity, it might have been learned that it was better to part peaceably and to continue from one to another the good offices of neighbors who by sacred memories were forbidden ever to be foes.

The nomination of the members of the commission was made on the 25th of February, Within a week after my inauguration, and confirmed by Congress on the same day. The commissioners appointed were Messrs. A. B. Roman, of Louisiana, Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia, and John Forsyth, of Alabama. Mr. Roman was an honored citizen, and had been governor of his native state. Mr. Crawford had served with distinction in Congress for several years. Mr. Forsyth was an influential journalist, and had been ministered to Mexico under appointment of Mr. Pierce, near the close of his term, and continued so under that of Mr. Buckhamham. These gentlemen, moreover, represented the three great parties which had ineffectually opposed the sectionalism of the so-called Republicans.

Ex-governor Roman had been a Whig in former years, and one of the Constitutional Union, or Bell and Everett Party, in the canvas of 1860. Mr. Crawford, as a state-rights Democrat, had supported Mr. Breckinridge, and Mr. Forsyth had been a zealous advocate of the claims of Mr. Douglas. The composition of the commission was, therefore, such as should have conciliated the sympathy and cooperation of every element of conservatism with which they might have occasion to deal. Their commissions authorized and empowered them In the name of the Confederate States, to meet and confer with any person or persons duly authorized by the government of the United States, being furnished with like power and authority, and with him or them to agree, treat, consult, and negotiate, concerning all matters in which the parties were both interested.

No secret instructions were given them, for there was nothing to conceal. The objects of their mission were open and avowed, and its inception and conduct throughout were characterized by frankness and good faith. How this effort was received, how the commissioners were kept waiting, and while fair promises were held to the ear, how military preparations were pushed forward for the unconstitutional criminal purpose of coercing states, Let the shameful record of that transaction attest.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis Volume 1b, Part 3, Chapter 8. The Peace Conference. Demand for a little bloodletting. Plan proposed by the Conference. Its contemptuous reception and treatment in the United States Congress. Failure of last efforts at Reconciliation and Reunion.

Speech of General Lane of Oregon.

While the events which have just been occupying our attention were occurring, the last conspicuous effort was made within the Union to stay the tide of usurpation Which was driving the southern states into secession. This effort was set on foot by Virginia, the General Assembly of which state, on the 19th of January, 1861, adopted a preamble and resolutions deprecating disunion and inviting all such states as were willing to unite in an earnest endeavor to avert it, By an adjustment of the then existing controversies to appoint commissioners to meet in Washington, on the 4th of February, to consider, and if practicable, agree on some suitable adjustment.

Ex-president John Tyler, and Messrs. William C. Rivas, John W. Brockenbrew, George W. Summers, and James A. Seddon, five of the most distinguished citizens of the state, were appointed to represent Virginia in the proposed conference. If they could agree with the commissioners of other states upon any plan of settlement requiring amendments to the federal constitution, they were instructed to communicate them to Congress, with a view to their submission to the several states for ratification. The border states, in general, promptly acceded to this proposition of Virginia, and others followed, so that in the Peace Congress, or Conference which assembled, according to appointment, on the fourth, and adjourned on the twenty seventh of February, twenty-one states were eventually represented, Of which fourteen were northern, or non-slaveholding, and seven slaveholding states.

The six states which had already seceded were, of course, not of the number represented, nor were Texas and Arkansas, the secession of which, although not consummated, was obviously inevitable. Three of the northwestern states, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, and the two Pacific states, Oregon and California, also held aloof from the conference. In the case of these last two, distance and lack of time perhaps hindered action. With regard to the other three, their reasons for declining to participate in the movement were not officially assigned. and are therefore only subjects for conjecture. Some remarkable revelations were afterward made, however, with regard to the action of one of them.

It appears from correspondence read in the Senate on the twenty-seventh of February that the two senators from Michigan had at first opposed the participation of that state in the conference on the ground that it was, as one of them expressed it, quote, A step toward obtaining that concession which the imperious slave power so insolently demands.

That is to say, in plain terms, they objected to it because it might lead to a compromise and pacification. Finding, however, that most of the other northern states were represented, some of them by men of moderate and conciliatory temper, That writer had subsequently changed his mind, and at a late period of the session of the conference recommended the sending of delegations of true unflinching men, who would be in favor of the Constitution as it is, that is, who would oppose any amendment proposed in the interests of harmony and pacification. The other senator exhibits a similar alarm at the prospect of compromise and a concurrent change of opinion. He urges the sending of stiff-backed men to thwart the threatened success of the Friends of Peace, and concludes with an expression of the humane and patriotic sentiment that, without a little bloodletting, the Union would not be Worth a rush.

With such unworthy levity did these leaders of sectional strife express their exultation in the prospect of the conflict, which was to drench the land with blood and enshroud thousands of homes in mourning. Footnote, one thirty one. See, Congressional Globe. Utsupra. As this letter, last referred to, is brief and characteristic of the temper of the typical so-called Republicans of the period, it may be inserted entire. Washington, February 11th, 1861. My dear governor, Governor Bingham and myself telegraphed you on Saturday at the request of Massachusetts and New York to send delegates to the peace or compromise Congress. They admit that we were right, and that they were wrong, that no Republican state should have sent delegates, but they are here and cannot get away.

Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in, and there is danger of Illinois, and now they beg us, for God's sake, to come to their rescue and save the Republican Party from rupture. I hope you will send stiff-backed men, or none. The whole thing was gotten up against my judgment and advice, and will end in thin smoke. Still, I hope, as a matter of courtesy to some of our erring brethren, that you will send the delegates. Truly, your friend. Signed, Z. Chandler. His Excellency, Austin Blair. P.S. Some of the manufacturing states think that a fight would be awful. Without a little bloodletting, this union will not, in my estimation, be worth a rush.

The reader should not fall into the mistake of imagining that the erring brethren, toward whom a concession of courtesy is recommended by the writer of this letter, were the people of the seceding, or even of the border states. It is evident from the context that he means the people of those so-called Republican states which had fallen into the error of taking part in a plan for peace, which might have averted the blood-letting recommended.

It is needless to follow the course of the deliberations of the Peace Conference. It included among its members many men of distinction and eminent ability, and some of unquestionable patriotism, from every part of the Union. The venerable John Tyler presided, and took an active and ardent interest in the efforts made to effect a settlement and avert the impending disasters. A plan was finally agreed upon by a majority of the states represented, For certain amendments to the Federal Constitution, which it was hoped, might be acceptable to all parties and put an end to further contention. In its leading features, this plan resembled that of Mr. Crittenden, heretofore spoken of, which was still pending in the Senate, though with some variations which were regarded as less favorable to the South, It was reported immediately to both houses of the United States Congress.

In the Senate, Mr. Crittenden promptly expressed his willingness to accept it as a substitute for his own proposition, and eloquently urged its adoption. That the arrogance of a sectional majority inflated by recent triumph was too powerful to be allayed by the appeals of patriotism or the councils of wisdom. The plan of the Peace Conference was treated by the majority with the contemptuous indifference shown to every other movement for conciliation. Its mere consideration was objected to by the extreme radicals, and although they failed in this, it was defeated on a vote, as were the Crittenden propositions.

With the failure of these efforts which occurred on the eve of the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and the accession to power of a party founded on a basis of sectional aggression, and now thoroughly committed to its prosecution and perpetuation, expired the last hopes of reconciliation and union.

In the course of the debate in the Senate on these grave propositions, a manly and eloquent speech was made on the 2nd of March, 1861, of the Hon. Joseph Lane, a senator from Oregon, who had been the candidate of the Democratic State Rights Party for the Vice Presidency of the United States, in the canvas of 1860. Some passages of this speech seem peculiarly appropriate for insertion here. General Lane was replying to a speech of Mr. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, afterward President of the United States.

Mr. President, the senator from Tennessee complains of my remarks on his speech. He complains of the tone and temper of what I said. He complains that I replied at all, as I was a Northern Senator. Mr. President, I am a citizen of this Union and a Senator of the United States. My residence is in the North, but I have never seen the day, and I never shall, when I will refuse justice as readily to the South as to the North. I know nothing but my country, the whole country, the Constitution, and the equality of the States. The equal right of every man in the common territory of the whole country, and by that I shall stand. The senator complains that I replied at all, as I was a northern senator and a democrat whom he had supported at the last election for a high office.

Now I was, as I stated at the time, surprised at the senator's speech because I understood it to be for coercion, as I think it was understood by almost everybody else, except, as we are now told, by the senator himself, and I still think it amounted to a coercion speech, notwithstanding the soft and plausible phrases by which he describes it, a speech for the execution of the laws and the protection of the federal property. Sir, if there is, as I contend, The right of secession. Then, whenever a state exercises that right, this government has no laws in that state to execute, nor has it any property in any such state that can be protected by the power of this government. In attempting, however, to substitute the smooth phrases, executing the laws, and protecting public property, for coercion, for civil war, We have an important concession, that is, that this government dare not go before the people with a plain avowal of its real purposes and of their consequences.

No, sir, the policy is to inveigle the people of the North into civil war by masking the design in smooth and ambiguous terms.

Congressional Globe, Second Session, Thirty-Sixth Congress, Page 13, Forty-Seven, End of chapter 8, Recording by Phil Mosley, Lano County, Texas, U.S.A.

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Volume 1B. Part 3. Chapter Nine. Northern Protests Against Coercion. The New York Tribune, Albany Argus and New York Herald. Great Public Meeting in New York. Speeches of Mr. Thayer, ex-Governor Seymour, ex-Chancellor Walworth, and others. The Press in February 1861. Mr. Lincoln's inaugural The marvelous change or suppression of conservative sentiment. Historic precedence.

It is a great mistake or misstatement of fact to assume that at the period under consideration the southern states stood alone in the assertion of the principles which have been laid down in this work, with regard to the right of secession and the wrong of coercion. Down to the formation of the Confederate government. The one was distinctly admitted, the other still more distinctly disavowed and repudiated by many of the leaders of public opinion in the north of both parties. Indeed, any purpose of direct coercion was disclaimed by nearly all. If presented at all, it was in the delusive and ambiguous guise of The execution of the laws and protection of the public property.

The New York Tribune, the leading organ of the party which triumphed in the election of 1860, had said, soon after the result of that election was ascertained with reference to secession, quote, We hold, with Jefferson, to the inalienable right of communities to alter or abolish forms of government that have become oppressive or injurious, and if the cotton states shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede may be a revolutionary right, but it exists nevertheless, and we do not see how one party can have a right to do what another party has a right to prevent. We must ever resist the asserted right of any state to remain in the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof.

To withdraw from the Union is quite another matter, and whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep her in. We hope never to live in a Republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets.

The only liberty taken with this extract has been that of presenting certain parts of it in italics. Nothing that has ever been said by the author of this work, in the foregoing chapters, on the floor of the Senate, or elsewhere, more distinctly asserted the right of secession. Nothing that has been quoted from Hamilton or Madison or Marshall or John Quincy Adams more emphatically repudiates the claim of right to restrain or coerce a state in the exercise of its free choice. Nothing that has been said since the war which followed could furnish a more striking condemnation of its origin, prosecution, purposes, and Results. A comparison of the sentiments above quoted with the subsequent career of the party, of which that journal was and long had been the recognized organ, would exhibit a striking incongruity and inconsistency.

The Tribune was far from being singular among its northern contemporaries in the entertainment of such views, As Mr. Greeley, its chief editor, has shown by many citations in his book, The American Conflict. The Albany Argus, about the same time, said in language which Mr. Greeley characterizes as clear and temperate, quote, We sympathize with and justify the South as far as this. Their rights have been invaded to the extreme limit Possible within the forms of the Constitution, and beyond this limit. Their feelings have been insulted, and their interests and honor assailed by almost every possible form of denunciation and invective. And if we deemed it certain that the real animus of the Republican Party could be carried into the administration of the federal government, and become the permanent policy of the nation, we should think...

that all the instincts of self-preservation and of manhood rightfully impelled them to a resort to revolution and a separation from the Union, and we would applaud them and wish them Godspeed in the adoption of such a remedy.

Again, the same paper said, a day or two afterward, if South Carolina or any other state Through a convention of her people, shall formally separate herself from the Union. Probably both the present and the next executive will simply let her alone, and quietly allow all the functions of the federal government within her limits to be suspended. Any other course would be madness. As it would at once enlist all the southern states in the controversy and plunge the whole country into a civil war. As a matter of policy and wisdom, therefore, independent of the question of right, we should deem resort to force most disastrous.

The New York Herald, a journal which claimed to be independent of all party influences, about the same period said, Each state is organized as a complete government, holding the purse and wielding the sword, possessing the right to break the tie of the Confederation as a nation might break a treaty, and to repel coercion as a nation might repel invasion. Coercion, if it were possible, is out of the question."

On the 31st of January, 1861, after six states had already seceded, a great meeting was held in the city of New York, to consider the perilous condition of the country. At this meeting, Mr. James S. Thayer, an old-lined Whig, made a speech, which was received with great applause. The following extracts from the published report of Mr. Thayer's speech will show the character of the views which then commanded the cordial approval of that metropolitan audience.

We can at least, in an authoritative way and a practical manner, arrive at the basis of a peaceable separation. Cheers. We can, at least, by discussion, enlighten, settle, and concentrate the public sentiment in the state of New York upon this question. And save it from that fearful current which circuitously but certainly sweeps madly on through the narrow gorge of the enforcement of the laws to the shoreless ocean of civil war. Cheers. Against this, under all circumstances, in every place and form, we must now and at all times oppose a resolute and unfaltering resistance. The public mind will bear the avowal, and let us make it, that if a revolution of force is to begin, it shall be inaugurated at home, and if the incoming administration shall attempt to carry out the line of policy that has been foreshadowed, we announce that, when the hand of black republicanism turns to blood-red, and seeks from the fragment of the Constitution to construct a scaffolding for coercion, another name for execution.

We will reverse the order of the French Revolution, and save the blood of the people by making those who would inaugurate a reign of terror the first victims of a national guillotine.

Enthusiastic applause. And again, quote, It is announced that the Republican administration will enforce the laws against and in all the seceding states. A nice discrimination must be exercised in the performance of this duty. You remember the story of William Tell. Let an arrow winged by the Federal bow strike the heart of an American citizen, and who can number the avenging darts that will cloud the heavens in the conflict that will ensue? Prolonged applause. What, then, is the duty of the state of New York? What shall we say to our people when we come to meet this state of facts? That the Union must be preserved? But if that cannot be, what then? Peaceable separation. Applause. Painful and humiliating as it is, let us temper it with all we can of love and kindness.

so that we may yet be left in a comparatively prosperous condition in friendly relations with another Confederacy. Cheers!

At the same meeting, ex-governor Horatio Seymour asked the question, on which subsequent events have cast their own commentary, whether successful coercion by the North is less revolutionary, than successful secession by the South. Shall we prevent revolution, he added, by being foremost in overthrowing the principles of our government and all that makes it valuable to our people and distinguishes it among the nations of the earth?

The venerable ex-chancellor Walworth thus expressed himself.

It would be as brutal, in my opinion, to send men to butcher our own brothers of the southern states as it would be to massacre them in the northern states. We are told, however, that it is our duty to, and we must, enforce the laws. But why, and what laws are to be enforced? There were laws that were to be enforced in the time of the American Revolution. Did Lord Chatham go for enforcing those laws? No, he gloried in defense of the liberties of America. He made that memorable declaration in the British Parliament, quote, if I were an American citizen instead of being as I am an Englishman, I never would submit to such laws. Never, never, never, never, and quote, and quote, prolonged applause.

Other distinguished speakers expressed themselves in similar terms, varying somewhat in their estimate of the propriety of the secession of the southern states, but all agreeing in emphatic and unqualified reprobation of the idea of coercion. A series of conciliatory resolutions was adopted, one of which declares that, Civil War will not restore the Union, but will defeat forever its reconstruction.

At a still later period, sometime in the month of February, the Free Press, a leading paper in Detroit, had the following, quote, if there shall not be a change in the present seeming purpose to yield to no accommodation of the national difficulties, and if troops shall be raised in the north to march against the people of the south. A fire in the rear will be opened upon such troops, which will either stop their march altogether or wonderfully accelerate it.

The Union of Bangor, Maine spoke no less decidedly to the same effect.

The difficulties between the north and the south must be compromised Or the separation of the states shall be peaceable. If the Republican Party refuse to go the full length of the Crittenden Amendment, which is the very least the South can or ought to take, then here in Maine not a Democrat will be found who will raise his arm against his brethren of the South. From one end of the state to the other, let the cry of democracy be compromise or peaceable separation.

That these were not expressions of isolated or exceptional sentiment is evident from the fact that they were copied with approval by other northern journals. Mr. Lincoln, when delivering his inaugural address on the 4th of March 1861, had not so far lost all respect for the consecrated traditions of the founders of the Constitution, and for the majesty of the principle of state sovereignty, as openly to enunciate the claim of coercion. While arguing against the right to secede, and asserting his intention, quote, to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and collect the duties and imposts, end quote, He says that, "...beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere," and appends to this declaration the following pledge, "...where hostility to the United States shall be so great as to prevent competent resident citizens From holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object.

While the strict legal right may exist of the government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating and so nearly impracticable withal. that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices.

These extracts will serve to show that the people of the South were not without grounds for cherishing the hope to which they so fondly clung, that the separation would, indeed, be as peaceable, in fact, as it was, on their part, in purpose. That the conservative and patriotic feeling still existing in the North would control the elements of sectional hatred and bloodthirsty fanaticism, and that there would be really no war. And here the ingenuous reader may very naturally ask, what became of all this feeling? How was it that, In the course of a few weeks, it had disappeared like a morning mist. Where was the host of men who had declared that an army marching to invade the southern states should first pass over their dead bodies?

No new question had arisen. No change in the attitude occupied by the seceding states. No cause for controversy not already existing. when these utterances were made, and yet the sentiments which they expressed were so entirely swept away by the tide of reckless fury which soon afterward impelled an armed invasion of the South, that, with a few praiseworthy but powerless exceptions, scarcely a vestige of them was left. Not only were they obliterated, but seemingly Forgotten.

I leave to others to offer, if they can, an explanation of this strange phenomenon. To the student of human nature, however, it may not seem altogether without precedence. Many remember certain other instances, on record, of mutations in public sentiment equally sudden and extraordinary. Ten thousand swords that would have leaped from their scabbards as the English statesman thought, to avenge even a look of insult to a lovely queen hung idly in their places when she was led to the scaffold in the midst of the vilest taunts and execrations. The case that we have been considering was, perhaps, only an illustration of the general truth that, in times of revolutionary excitement, the higher And better elements are crushed and silenced by the lower and baser, not so much on account of their greater extent as of their greater violence.

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Volume 1B. Part 3. Chapter 10. Temper of the Southern people, indicated by the action of the Confederate Congress. The Permanent Constitution, modeled after the Federal Constitution. Variations and Special Provisions. Provisions with regard to slavery and the slave trade. A False Assertion Refuted. Excellence of the Constitution. Admissions of hostile or impartial criticism.

The conservative temper of the people of the Confederate states was conspicuously exhibited in the most important product of the early labors of their representatives in Congress assembled. The Provisional Constitution, although prepared only for temporary use, and, necessarily, in some haste, was so well adapted for the purposes which it was intended to serve, that many thought it would have been wise to continue it in force indefinitely, or at least until the independency of the Confederacy should be assured. The Congress, however, deeming it best that the system of government should emanate from the people, accordingly, on the Eleventh of March prepared the permanent constitution, which was submitted to and ratified by the people of the respective states.

Of this Constitution, which may be found in an appendix, side by side with the Constitution of the United States, the Hon. Alexander H. Stevens, who was one of its authors, very properly says, The whole document utterly negatives the idea which so many have been active in endeavoring to put in the enduring form of history. that the convention at Montgomery was nothing but a set of conspirators whose object was the overthrow of the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and the erection of a great slavery oligarchy instead of the free institutions thereby secured and guaranteed. This work of the Montgomery convention, with that of the Constitution for a provisional government, will ever remain, not only as a monument of the wisdom Forecast and statesmanship of the men who constituted it, but an everlasting reputation of the charges which have been brought against them.

These works together show clearly that their only leading object was to sustain, uphold, and perpetuate the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the United States.

The Constitution of the United States was the model followed throughout. with only such changes as experience suggested for better practical working or for greater perspicuity. The preamble to both instruments is the same in substance and very nearly identical in language. The words, we the people of the United States, in one, are replaced by, we the people of the Confederate States, in the other, And the gross perversion which has been made of the former expression is precluded in the latter merely by the addition of the explanatory clause, each state acting in its sovereign and independent character, an explanation which, at the time of the formation of the Constitution of the United States, would have been deemed entirely superfluous.

The official term of the president was fixed at six instead of four years, and it was provided that he should not be eligible for re-election. This was in accordance with the original draft of the Constitution of 1787. The president was empowered to remove officers of his cabinet, or those engaged in the diplomatic service, at his discretion, But in all other cases, removal from office could be made only for cause, and the cause was to be reported to the Senate. Congress was authorized to provide by law for the admission of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, or cabinet officers, to a seat upon the floor of either house, with the privilege of taking part in the discussion of subjects pertaining to his department.

This wise and judicious provision, which would have tended to obviate much delay in misunderstanding, was, however, never put into execution by the necessary legislation.

Protective duties for the benefit of special branches of industry, which had been so fruitful a source of trouble under the government of the United States, were altogether prohibited. So also were bounties from the Treasury and extra compensation for services rendered by officers, contractors, or employees of any description. A vote of two-thirds of each house was requisite for the appropriation of money from the Treasury, unless asked for by the chief of a department and submitted to Congress by the President, or for payment of the expenses of Congress, or of claims against the Confederacy judicially established and declared. The president was also authorized to approve any one appropriation and disapprove any other in the same bill.

With regard to the impeachment of federal officers, it was entrusted as formerly to the discretion of the House of Representatives. With the additional provision, however, that, in the case of any judicial or other officer exercising his functions solely within the limits of a particular state, impeachment might be made by the legislature of such state, the trial, in all cases, to be by the Senate of the Confederate States.

Any two or more states were authorized to enter into compacts with each other for the improvement of the navigation of rivers flowing between or through them. A vote of two-thirds of each house, the Senate voting by states, was required for the admission of a new state.

With regard to amendments of the Constitution, it was made obligatory upon Congress, on the demand of any three states, concurring in the proposed amendment or amendments, to summon a convention of all the states to consider and act upon them, voting by states, but restricted in its action to the particular propositions thus submitted.

If approved by such convention, the amendments were to be subject to final ratification by two-thirds of the states. Other changes or modifications worthy of special notice related to internal improvements, bankruptcy laws, duties on exports, suits in the federal courts, and the government of the territories.

With regard to slavery and the slave trade, the provisions of this constitution furnish an effectual answer to the assertion, so often made that the Confederacy was founded on slavery, that slavery was its cornerstone, etc. Property in slaves, already existing was recognized and guaranteed, just as it was by the Constitution of the United States, and the rights of such property in the common territories were protected against any such hostile discrimination as had been attempted in the Union. But the extension of slavery, in the only practical sense of that phrase, was more distinctly and effectually precluded by the Confederate than by the Federal Constitution. This will be manifest on a comparison of the provisions of the two relative to the slave trade.

These are found at the beginning of the Ninth Section of the First Article of each instrument. The Constitution of the United States has the following. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importations, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

The Confederate Constitution, on the other hand, ordained as follows. One, the importation of Negroes of the African race from any foreign country other than the slaveholding states or territories of the United States of America is hereby forbidden, and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the same. Two, Congress shall also have the power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of or territory not belonging to this Confederacy.

In the case of the United States, the only prohibition is against any interference by Congress with the slave trade for a term of years, and it was further legitimatized by the authority given to impose a duty upon it. The term of years, it is true, had long since expired, but there was still no prohibition of the trade by the Constitution. It was after 1808, Entirely within the discretion of Congress either to encourage, tolerate, or prohibit it.

Under the Confederate Constitution, on the contrary, the African slave trade was hereby forbidden. Positively and unconditionally, from the beginning. Neither the Confederate government, nor that of any of the states, could permit it, and the Congress was expressly required to enforce the prohibition. The only discretion in the matter entrusted to the Congress was whether or not to permit the introduction of slaves from any of the United States or their territories. Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, has said, I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.

Now, if there was no purpose on the part of the government of the United States to interfere with the institution of slavery within its already existing limits, a proposition which permitted its propagation within those limits by natural increase, And inasmuch as the Confederate Constitution precluded any other than the same natural increase, we may plainly perceive the disingenuousness and absurdity of the pretension by which a factitious sympathy has been obtained in certain quarters for the war upon the South, on the ground that it was a war in behalf of freedom against slavery.

As late as the twenty second of April, 1861, Mr. Seward, United States Secretary of State, in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, Minister to France, since made public, expressed the views and purposes of the United States government in the premise as follows. It may be proper to explain that. By what he is pleased to term the Revolution, Mr. Seward means the withdrawal of the Southern States, and that the words italicized are perhaps not so distinguished in the original. He says, quote, The territories will remain in all respects the same whether the Revolution shall succeed or shall fail. The condition of slavery in the several states will remain just the same, whether it succeed or fail. There is not even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffected states are to be conquered by the United States if the revolution fails.

For the rights of the states and the condition of every being in them will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms of administration. Whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail. In the one case, the states would be federally connected with the new Confederacy. In the other, they would, as now, be members of the United States. But their constitutions and laws, customs, habits, and institutions, in either case, will remain the same.

I had no direct part in the preparation of the Confederate Constitution. No consideration of delicacy forbids me, therefore, to say, in closing this brief review of that instrument, that it was a model of wise, temperate, and liberal statesmanship. Intelligent criticism, from hostile as well as friendly sources, has been compelled to admit its excellences, and has sustained the judgment of a popular northern journal, which said in a few days after it was adopted and published, The new Constitution is the Constitution of the United States, with various modifications, and some very important and most desirable improvements. We are free to say that the invaluable reforms enumerated should be adopted by the United States with or without a reunion of the seceded states, and as soon as possible.

But why not accept them with the propositions of the Confederate States on slavery as a basis of reunion? New York Herald, March 19th, 1861.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part III, Chapter 11. The Commission to Washington City. Arrival of Mr. Crawford. Mr. Buchanan's Alarm. Note of the Commissioners to the new Administration. Mediation of Justices Nelson and Campbell. The Difficulty about Forts Sumter and Pickens. Mr. Secretary Seward's Assurances. Duplicity of the Government at Washington. Mr. Fox's Visit to Charleston. Secret preparations for coercive measures. Visit of Mr. LeMond. Renewed assurances of good faith. Notification to Governor Pickens. Developments of secret history. Systematic and complicated perfidy exposed. The appointment of commissioners to proceed to Washington for the purpose of establishing friendly relations with the United States and effecting an equitable settlement of all questions related to the common property of the states and the public debt, has already been mentioned.

No time was lost in carrying this purpose into execution. Mr. Crawford, first of the commissioners, left Montgomery on or about the 27th of February and arrived in Washington two or three days before the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term of office as President of the United States. Besides his official credentials, he bore the following letter to the President of a personal or semi-official character intended to facilitate, if possible, the speedy accomplishment of the objects of his mission. To the President of the United States, Sir, being animated by an earnest desire to unite and bind together our respective countries by friendly ties, I have appointed Martin J. Crawford, one of our most esteemed and trustworthy citizens, as Special Commissioner of the Confederate States to the Government of the United States, and I have now the honor to introduce him to you, and to ask for him a reception and treatment corresponding to his station and to the purposes for which he is sent.

Those purposes he will more particularly explain to you. Hoping that through his agency these may be accomplished, I avail myself of this occasion to offer to you the assurance of my distinguished consideration. Jefferson Davis, Montgomery, February 27, 1861. It may here be mentioned, in explanation of my desire that the commission, or at least a part of it, should reach Washington before the close of Mr. Buchanan's term, that I had received an intimation from him Mr. Hunter of Virginia, that he would be happy to receive a commissioner or commissioners from the Confederate States, and would refer to the Senate any communication that might be made through such a commission. Mr. Crawford, now a judge of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the only surviving member of the commission, In a manuscript account, which he has kindly furnished of his recollection of the events connected with it, says that on arriving in Washington at the early hour of half past four o'clock in the morning, he was surprised to see Pennsylvania Avenue from the Old National to Willard's Hotel crowded with men hurrying, some toward the former, but most of the faces in the direction of the latter were the new president, Mr.

Lincoln, president-elect, The great political almoner, for the time being, had taken up his lodgings. At this point, continues Judge Crawford, the crowd swelled to astonishing numbers of expectant and hopeful men, awaiting an opportunity either to see Mr. Lincoln himself or to communicate with him through someone who might be so fortunate as to have access to his presence. Describing his reception in the Federal Capitol, Judge Crawford says, The feverish and emotional condition of affairs soon made the presence of the Special Commissioner at Washington known throughout the city. Congress was still, of course, in session. Senators and members of the House of Representatives, excepting those of the Confederate States who had withdrawn, were in their seats, and the manifestations of anxious care and gloomy forebodings were plainly to be seen on all sides.

This was not confined to sections, but existed among the men of the North and West, as well as those of the South. Mr. Buchanan, the President, was in a state of most thorough alarm, not only for his home in Wheatland, but for his personal safety. This statement is in accord with the remark which Mr. Buchanan made to the author at an earlier period of the same session with regard to the violence of Northern sentiment then lately indicated. That he thought it not impossible that his homeward route would be lighted by burning effigies of himself, and that on reaching his home he would find it a heap of ashes. End footnote. In the very few days which had elapsed between the time of his promise to receive a commissioner from the Confederate States and the actual arrival of the commissioner, he had become so fearfully panic-stricken that he declined either to receive him or to send any message to the Senate touching the subject matter of his mission.

The commissioner had been for several years in Congress before the administration of Mr. Buchanan, as well as during his official term, and had always been in close political and social relations with him. Yet he was afraid of a public visit from him. He said that he had only three days in official life left, and could incur no further dangers or reproaches than those he had already borne from the press and public speakers of the North. The intensity of the prevalent feeling increased as the vast crowds, arriving by every train, added fresh material, and hatred and hostility toward our new government were manifested in almost every conceivable manner. Another of the commissioners, Mr. Forsyth, having arrived in Washington on the 12th of March, eight days after the inauguration of Mr.

Lincoln, the two commissioners Then-Present, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford addressed to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, a note informing him of their presence, stating the friendly and peaceful purposes of their mission, and requesting the appointment of a day as early as possible for the presentation to the President of the United States of their credentials and the objects which they had in view. This letter will be found in the appendix, with other correspondence which ensued, published soon after the events to which it relates. The attention of the reader is specially invited to these documents, but as additional revelations have been made since they were first published, it will be proper, in order to a full understanding of the transactions to which they refer, to give here a brief statement of the facts.

No written answer to the note of the commissioners was delivered to them for 27 days after it was written. The paper of Mr. Seward, in reply, without signature or address, dated March 15, was filed, as he states on that day, in the Department of State, but a copy of it was not handed to the commissioners until the 8th of April. But an oral answer had been made to the note of the commissioners at a much earlier date, for the significance of which it will be necessary to bear in mind the condition of affairs at Charleston and Pensacola. Fort Sumter was still occupied by the garrison under command of Major Anderson, with no material change in the circumstances since the failure of the attempt made in January to reinforce it by means of the Star of the West.

This standing menace at the gates of the Chief Harbor of South Carolina had been tolerated by the government and the people of that state, and afterward by the Confederate authorities, in the abiding hope that it would be removed without compelling a collision of forces. Fort Pickens, on one side of the entrance to the harbor of Pensacola, was also occupied by a garrison of United States troops, while the two forts, Baranakis and McCree, on the other side were in possession of the Confederates. Communication by sea was not entirely precluded, however, in the case of Fort Pickens. The garrison had been strengthened, and a fleet of Federal men of war was lying outside of the harbor. The condition of affairs at these forts, especially at Fort Sumter, was a subject of anxiety with the Friends of Peace, and the hope of settling by negotiation the questions involved in their occupation had been one of the most urgent motives for the prompt dispatch of the commissioners to Washington.

The letter of the commissioners to Mr. Seward was written, as we have seen, on the 12th of March. The oral message, above mentioned, was obtained and communicated to the commissioners Through the agency of two judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, Justices Nelson of New York and Campbell of Alabama. On the 15th of March, according to the statement of Judge Campbell, Mr. Justice Nelson visited the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury and the Attorney General, M. Seward, Chase, and Bates, to dissuade them from undertaking to put in execution any policy of coercion. During the term of the Supreme Court, he had very carefully examined the laws of the United States to enable him to attain his conclusions, and from time to time he had consulted the Chief Justice, Taney, upon the questions which his examination had suggested.

His conclusion was that, without very serious violations of Constitution and statutes, coercion could not be successfully effected by the Executive Department. I had made, continued Judge Campbell, a similar examination And I concurred in his conclusions and opinions. As he was returning from his visit to the State Department, we casually met, and he informed me of what he had done. He said he had spoken to these officers at large, that he was received with respect and listened to with attention by all. with approbation by the Attorney General, and with great cordiality by the Secretary of State, that the Secretary had expressed gratification to find so many impediments to the disturbance of peace, and only wished there had been more.

He stated that the Secretary told him there was a present cause of embarrassment, that the Southern Commissioners had demanded recognition, and a refusal would lead to irritation and excitement in the Southern states, and would cause a counter-irritation and excitement in the Northern states, prejudicial to a peaceful adjustment. Justice Nelson suggested that I might be of service. The result of the interview between these two distinguished gentlemen, we are informed, was another visit by both of them to the State Department for the purpose of urging Mr. Seward to reply to the commissioners and assure them of the desire of the United States government for a friendly adjustment. Mr. Seward seems to have objected to an immediate recognition of the commissioners on the ground that the state of public sentiment in the North would not sustain it in connection with the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, which had been determined on.

The evacuation of Sumter, he said, is as much as the administration can bear. Judge Campbell adds, I concurred in the conclusion that the evacuation of Sumter involved responsibility and stated that there could not be too much caution in the adoption of measures so as not to shock or to irritate the public sentiment and that the evacuation of Sumter was sufficient for the present in that direction. I stated that I would see the commissioners and I would write to Mr. Davis to that effect. I asked him what I should say as to Sumter and as to Pickens. He authorized me to say that, before that letter could reach him, Mr. Davis, he would learn by telegraph that the order for the evacuation of Sumter had been made.

He said the condition of Pickens was satisfactory and that there would be no change made there. The italics in this extract are my own. The letter in which this promise was communicated to me has been lost, but it was given in substantially the terms above stated, as authorized by Mr. Seward, that the order for evacuation of the fort would be issued before the letter could reach me. The same assurance was given on the same day to the commissioners. Judge Campbell tells us that Mr. Crawford was slow to consent to refrain from pressing the demand for recognition. It was only after some discussion and the expression of some objections that he consented to do so. This consent was clearly one part of a stipulation, of which the other part was the pledge that the fort would be evacuated in the course of a few days.

Mr. Crawford required the pledge of Mr. Seward to be reduced to writing, with Judge Campbell's personal assurance of its genuineness and accuracy.

In the course of this conversation, I told Judge Crawford that it was fair to tell him that the opinion at Washington was, the succession movements were short-lived, that his government would wither under sunshine, and that the effect of these measures might be as opposed, that they might have a contrary effect, but that I did not consider the effect. I wanted, above all other things, peace. I was willing to accept whatever peace might bring, whether union or disunion. I did not look beyond peace. He said he was willing to take all the risks of sunshine. Letter of Judge Campbell to Colonel Munford as above.

This written statement was exhibited to Judge Nelson before its delivery and approved by him. The fact that the pledge had been given in his name and behalf was communicated to Mr. Seward the same evening by letter. He was cognizant of, consenting to, and in great part the author of, the whole transaction. It will be observed that not only the commissioners in Washington, but the Confederate government at Montgomery also were thus assured on the highest authority, that of the Secretary of State of the United States, the official organ of communication of the views and purposes of his government, of the intention of that government to order the evacuation of Fort Sumter within a few days from the 15th of March, and not to disturb the existing status at Fort Pickens.

Moreover, this was not the mere statement of a fact, but a pledge, given as the consideration of an appeal to the Confederate government and its commissioners to refrain from embarrassing the Federal Administration by prosecuting any further claims at the same time. As such a pledge, it was accepted, and while its fulfillment was quietly awaited, the commissioners forbore to make any further demand for reply to their note of the 12th of March. Five days having elapsed in this condition of affairs, the commissioners in Washington telegraphed Brigadier General Beauregard, commander of the Confederate forces at Charleston, inquiring whether the fort had been evacuated or any action taken by Major Anderson indicating the probability of an evacuation.

Answer was made to the dispatch that the fort had not been evacuated, that there were no indications of such a purpose, but that Major Anderson was still working on its defenses. This dispatch was taken to Mr. Seward by Judge Campbell. Two interviews occurred in relation to it, at both of which Judge Nelson was also present. Of the result of these interviews, Judge Campbell states, the last was full and satisfactory. The secretary was buoyant and sanguine. He spoke of his ability to carry through his policy with confidence. He accounted for the delay as accidental. and not involving the integrity of his assurance that the evacuation would take place, and that I should know whenever any change was made in the resolution in reference to Sumter or to Pickens.

I repeated this assurance in writing to Judge Crawford and informed Governor Seward in writing what I had said. It would be incredible, but for the ample proofs which have since been brought to light, that during all this period of reiterated assurances of a purpose to withdraw from the garrison from Fort Sumter, and of excuses for the delay on account of the difficulties which embarrassed it, the government of the United States was assiduously engaged in devising means for furnishing supplies and reinforcements to the garrison, with the view of retaining possession of the fort. Mr. G. V. Fox, afterward Assistant Secretary of the United States Navy, had proposed a plan for reinforcing and furnishing supplies to the garrison of Fort Sumter in February, during the administration of Mr.

Buchanan. In a letter published in the newspaper since the war, he gives an account of the manner in which the proposition was renewed to the new administration and its reception by them as follows. On the 12th of March, I received a telegram from Postmaster General Blair to come to Washington. I arrived there on the 13th. Mr. Blair, having been acquainted with the proposition I presented to General Scott under Mr. Buchanan's administration, sent for me to tender the same to Mr. Lincoln, informing me that Lieutenant General Scott had advised the President that the fort could not be relieved and must be given up. Mr. Blair took me at once to the White House, and I explained the plan to the President.

Thence, we adjourned to Lieutenant General Scott's office, where a renewed discussion of the subject took place. The General informed the President that my plan was practicable in February, but that the increased number of batteries erected at the mouth of the harbor since that time rendered it impossible in March. Finding that there was great opposition to any attempt at relieving Fort Sumter, and that Mr. Blair alone sustained the President in his policy of refusing to yield, I judged that my arguments in favor of the practicability of sending in supplies would be strengthened by a visit to Charleston and the Fort. The President readily agreed to my visit, if the Secretary of War and General Scott raised no objection.

Both these gentlemen consenting, I left Washington on the 19th of March and passing through Richmond and Wilmington, reached Charleston on the 21st. Thus we see that at the very moment when Mr. Secretary Seward was renewing to the Confederate government through Judge Campbell, his positive assurance that the evacuation would take place, this emissary was on his way to Charleston to obtain information and devise measures by means of which this promise might be broken. On his arrival in Charleston, Mr. Fox tells us that he sought an interview with Captain Hartstein of the Confederate Navy and through this officer obtained from Governor Pickens permission to visit Fort Sumter. He fails in his narrative to state what we learned from Governor Pickens himself, that this permission was obtained expressly upon the Pledge of Pacific Purposes.

Notwithstanding this pledge, he employed the opportunity afforded by his visit to mature the details of his plan for furnishing supplies and reinforcements to the garrison. He did not, he says, communicate his plan or purposes to Major Anderson, the commanding officer of the garrison, having discernment enough, perhaps, to divine that the instincts of that brave and honest soldier would have revolted at and rebuked the duplicity and perfidy of the whole transaction. The result of his visit was, however, reported at Washington. His plan was approved by President Lincoln, and he was sent to New York to make arrangements for putting it into execution. In a very few days after, says Governor Pickens in the message already quoted above, another confidential agent, Colonel LeMond, was sent by the President, Mr.

Lincoln, who informed me that he had come to try and arrange for the removal of the garrison and, when he returned from the fort, asked if a war vessel could not be allowed to remove them. I replied that no war vessel could be allowed to enter the harbor on any terms. He said he believed Major Anderson preferred an ordinary steamer, and I agreed that the garrison might be thus removed. He said he hoped to return in a very few days for that purpose. This, it will be remembered, occurred while Mr. Fox was making active, though secret, preparations for his relief expedition. Colonel, or Major, Lamont, as he is variously styled in the correspondence, did not return to Charleston as promised. About the 30th of March, which was Saturday, a telegram from Governor Pickens was received by the commissioners in Washington making inquiry with regard to Colonel Lamont and the meaning of the protracted delay to fulfill the promise of evacuation.

This was fifteen days after the original assurance of Mr. Seward that the garrison would be withdrawn immediately, and ten days after his explanation that the delay was accidental. The dispatch of Governor Pickens was taken by Judge Campbell to Mr. Seward, who appointed the ensuing Monday, 1st of April, for an interview and answer. At that interview, Mr. Seward informed Judge Campbell that the President was concerned about the contents of the telegram. There was a point of honor involved. That Lamont had no agency from him, nor title, to speak. This late suggestion of the point of honor would seem, under the circumstances, to have been made in a spirit of sarcastic pleasantry, like Sir John Falstaff celebrated discourse on the same subject.

The only substantial result of the conversation, however, was the written assurance of Mr. Seward to be communicated to the commissioners that the government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens. This, it will be observed, was a very material variation from the positive pledge previously given and reiterated to the commissioners, to Governor Pickens, and to myself directly, that the fort was to be forthwith evacuated. Judge Campbell, in his account of the interview, says, I asked him, Mr. Seward, whether I was to understand that there had been a change in his former communications. His answer was, none. About the close of the same week, the first in April, the patience of the commissioners having now been well-nigh exhausted and the hostile preparations of the government of the United States, notwithstanding the secrecy with which they were conducted, having become a matter of general rumor, a letter was addressed to Mr.

Seward upon the subject by Judge Campbell in behalf of the commissioners, again asking whether the assurances so often given were well or ill-founded. To this, the secretary returned answer in writing. Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see. This was on the 7th of April. The very next day, the 8th, the following official notification, without date or signature, was read to Governor Pickens of South Carolina and to General Beauregard in Charleston by Mr. Chu, an official of the State Department. Mr. Seward's in Washington, who said, as did Captain or Lieutenant Talbot, who accompanied him, that it was from the President of the United States, and delivered by him to Mr. Chu on the 6th, the day before Mr.

Seward's assurance of faith fully kept. I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that, if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice or in case of an attack upon the fort. Thus, this appeared the last vestige of the plighted faith and Pacific Pledges of the Federal Government. In order fully to appreciate the significance of this communication, and of the time and circumstances of its delivery, it must be borne in mind that the naval expedition, which had been secretly in preparation for some time at New York, under the direction of Captain Fox, was now ready to sail, and might reasonably be expected to be at Charleston almost immediately after the notification was delivered to Governor Pickens, and before preparation could be made to receive it.

Owing to cross-purposes or misunderstandings in the Washington Cabinet, however, and then to the delay caused by a severe storm at sea, this expectation was disappointed, and the Confederate commander at Charleston had an opportunity to communicate with Montgomery and to receive instructions for his guidance before the arrival of the fleet, which had been intended to be a surprise. In publications made since the war by members of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, it has been represented that during the period of the disgraceful transactions above detailed, there were dissensions and divisions in the cabinet, certain members of it urging measures of prompt and decided coercion, the Secretary of State favoring a pacific or at least a dilatory policy, and the President vacillating for a time between the two, but eventually adopting the views of the coercionists.

In these statements, it is represented that the assurances and pledges given by Mr. Seward to the Confederate government and its commissioners were given on his own authority and without the consent or approval of the President of the United States. The absurdity of any such attempt to disassociate the action of the President from that of his secretary and to relieve the former of responsibility for the conduct of the latter is too evident to require argument or comment. It is impossible to believe that during this whole period of nearly a month, Mr. Lincoln was ignorant of the communications that were passing between the Confederate Commissioners and Mr. Seward, though the distinguished member of the Supreme Court, still holding his seat as such, who was acting as an intermediary.

On the occasion, Judge Campbell informs us that the Secretary, in the midst of an important interview, excused himself for the purpose of conferring with the President before giving a final answer. and left his visitor for some time, awaiting his return from that conference, when the answer was given avowedly and directly proceeding from the President. If, however, it were possible to suppose that Mr. Seward was acting on his own responsibility and practicing a deception upon his own chief, as well as upon the Confederate authorities, in the pledges which he made to the latter, it is nevertheless certain that the principal facts were brought to light within a few days after the close of the efforts at negotiation.

Yet, the Secretary of State was not impeached and brought to trial for the grave offense of undertaking to conduct the most momentous and vital transactions that had been or could be brought before the government of the United States, without the knowledge and opposition to the will of the President, and for having involved the government in dishonor, if not in disaster. He was not even dismissed from office, but continued to be the chief officer of the cabinet and confidential adviser of the president as he was afterward of the ensuing administration, occupying that station during two consecutive terms. No disavowal of his action, no apology nor explanation was ever made. Politically and legally, the President is unquestionably responsible in all cases for the action of any member of his cabinet, and in this case it is as preposterous to attempt to dissever from him the moral as it would be impossible to relieve him of the legal responsibility that rests upon the government of the United States for the systematic series of frauds perpetrated by its authority.

On the other hand, Mr. Seward, throughout the whole negotiation, was fully informed of the views of his colleagues in the Cabinet and of the President. Whatever his real hopes or purposes may have been in the beginning, it is positively certain that long before the end, and while still reiterating his assurances that the garrison would be withdrawn, he knew that it had been determined, and that active preparations were in progress, to strengthen it. Mr. Gideon Wells, who was Secretary of the Navy in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, gives the following account of one of the transactions of the period. One evening in the latter part of the month of March, there was a small gathering at the Executive Mansion while the Sumter question was still pending.

The members of the Cabinet were soon individually and quietly invited to the Council Chamber, where, as soon as assembled, the President informed him that he had just been advised by General Scott that it was expedient to evacuate Fort Pickens as well as Fort Sumter, which last was assumed at military headquarters to be a determined fact, in conformity with the views of Secretary Seward and the General-in-Chief. A brief silence followed the announcement of the amazing recommendation of General Scott, when Mr. Blair, who had been much annoyed by the vacillating course of the General-in-Chief in regard to Sumter, remarked, looking earnestly at Mr. Seward, that it was evident the old General was playing politician in regard to both Sumter and Pickens, for it was not possible, if there was a defense, for the Rebels to take Pickens, and that the administration would not be justified if it listened to his advice and evacuated either.

Very soon thereafter, I think, at the next cabinet meeting, the president announced his decision that supplies should be sent to Sumter and issued confidential orders to that effect. All were gratified with this decision except Mr. Seward, who still remonstrated, but preparations were immediately commenced to fit out an expedition to forward supplies. This account is confirmed by a letter of Mr. Montgomery Blair. The date of the announcement of the President's final purpose is fixed by Mr. Wells in the neat paragraph to that above quoted as the 28th of March. This was four days before Mr. Seward's assurance given Judge Campbell, after conference with the President, that there would be no departure from the pledges previously given, which were that the fort would be evacuated, and ten days before his written renewal of the assurance, Faith, as to Sumter, fully kept wait and see.

This assurance, too, was given at the very moment when a messenger from his own department was on the way to Charleston to notify the Governor of South Carolina Faith would not be kept in the matter. It is scarcely necessary to say that the commissioners had, with good reason, ceased to place any confidence in the promises of the United States government before they ceased to be made. On the 8th of April, they sent the following dispatch to General Beauregard. General G.T. Beauregard, Accounts uncertain because of the constant vacillation of this government. We were reassured yesterday that the status of Sumter would not be changed without previous notice to Governor Pickens, but we have no faith in them.

The war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this time. M.J. Crawford. On the same day the announcement made to Governor Pickens through Mr. Chu was made known. The Commissioners immediately applied for a definitive answer to their note of March 12, which had been permitted to remain in abeyance. The paper of the Secretary of State, dated March 15, was thereupon delivered to them. This paper, with the final rejoinder of the Commissioners and Judge Campbell's letters to the Secretary of April 13 and April 20, respectively, will be found in the appendix. Negotiation was now at an end. And the commissioners withdrew from Washington and returned to their homes. Their last dispatch before leaving shows that they were still dependent upon public rumor and the newspapers for information as to the real purposes and preparations of the federal administration.

It was in these words, Washington, April 10, 1861. General G. T. Beauregard, the Tribune of today, declares the main object of the expedition to be the relief of Sumter, and that a force will be landed which will overcome all opposition. Roman, Crawford, and Forsyth. The annexed extracts from my message to the Confederate Congress at the opening of its special session on the 29th of April will serve as a recapitulation of the events above narrated with all of comment that it was then or is now considered necessary to add. Extracts from President's Message to the Confederate Congress of April 29, 1861. Scarce had you assembled in February last, when prior even to the inauguration of the Chief Magistrate you had elected, you expressed your desire for the appointment of commissioners and for the settlement of all questions of disagreements between two governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith.

It was my pleasure, as well as my duty, to cooperate with you in this work of peace. Indeed, in my address to you, on taking the oath of office, and before receiving from you the communication of this resolution, I had said that, as a necessity, not as a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separating, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us to peaceably pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will then have been fulfilled. It was in furtherance of these accordant views of the Congress and the Executive that I made choice of three discreet, able, and distinguished citizens who were repaired to Washington.

Aided by their cordial cooperation and that of the Secretary of State, every effort compatible with self-respect and the dignity of the Confederacy was exhausted, before I allowed myself to yield to the conviction that the Government of the United States was determined to attempt the conquest of this people, and that our cherished hopes of peace were unattainable. On the arrival of our commissioners in Washington on the 5th of March, Mr. Crawford, as we have seen, had arrived some days earlier. The statement in the message refers to the arrival of the full commission or a majority of it.

They postponed at the suggestion of a friendly intermediator, doing more than giving informal notice of their arrival. This was done with a view to afford time to the President of the United States, who had just been inaugurated, for the discharge of other pressing official duties in the organization of his administration before engaging his attention to the object of their mission. It was not until the 12th of the month that they officially addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of the purpose of their arrival, and stating in the language of their instructions their wish to make to the Government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations. Assuring the government of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States desired a peaceful solution of these great questions, that it was neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which was not founded on the strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure their late Confederates.

To this communication, no formal reply was received until the 8th of April. During the interval, the commissioners had consented to waive all questions of form with the firm resolve to avoid war, if possible. They went so far even as to hold, during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an intermediary whose high position and character inspired the hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were received from the government of the United States of its peaceful intentions, of its determination to evacuate for Sumter. And further, that no measure would be introduced changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate States, that in the event of any change in regard to Fort Pickens, notice would be given to the Commissioners.

The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the course of the United States government toward our Commissioners in Washington. For proof of this, I refer to the annexed documents marked Taken in connection with further facts, which I now proceed to relate. Early in April, the attention of the whole country was attracted to extraordinary preparations in New York and other northern ports for an extensive military and naval expedition. These preparations were commenced in secrecy for an expedition whose destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly completed. And on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, transports and vessels of war with troops, munitions, and military supplies sailed from northern ports bound southward.

Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, The commissioners requested the delivery of an answer to their official communication of the 12th of March, and the reply dated on the 15th of the previous month was obtained, from which it appears that during the whole interval, while the commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, The Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever, to refuse to even listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations.

That these assurances were given has been virtually confessed by the government of the United States by its act of sending a messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use force, if opposed in its attention of supplying Fort Sumter. No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the conduct of the government of the United States toward the Confederacy can be required than is contained in the circumstances which accompanied this notice. According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels composing the expedition and designed for the relief of Fort Sumter might be looked for in Charleston Harbor on the 9th of April. Yet our commissioners in Washington were detained under assurances that notice should be given of any military movement.

The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent to Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina, and the notice was given at a late hour on the 8th of April, the eve of the very day which the fleet might be expected to arrive. That this maneuver failed in its purpose was not the fault of those who controlled it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of the expedition and gave time to the commander of our forces at Charleston to ask and receive instructions of the government.

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W. Rushing. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 3, Chapter 12. Protests against the conduct of the government of the United States. Senator Douglas's proposition to evacuate the forts and extracts from his speech in support of it. General Scott's advice. Manly letters of Major Anderson protesting against the action of the federal government. Misstatements of the Count of Paris. Correspondence relative to the proposed evacuation of the fort. A crisis. The course pursued by the Government of the United States with regard to the forts had not passed without earnest remonstrance from the most intelligent and patriotic of its own friends during the period of the events which constitute the subject of the preceding chapter.

In the Senate of the United States, which continued in executive session for several weeks after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, it was the subject of discussion. Mr. Douglas of Illinois, who was certainly not suspected of sympathy with secession or of lack of devotion to the Union, on the 15th of March offered a resolution recommending the withdrawal of the garrisons from all forts within the limits of the states which had seceded except those at Key West and the Dry Tortugas. In support of this resolution, he said, quote, Much less the recapturing of those which have been taken, unless we intend to reduce those states themselves into subjection. I take it for granted, no man will deny the proposition that whoever permanently holds Charleston in South Carolina is entitled to the possession of Fort Sumter.

Whoever permanently holds Pensacola in Florida is entitled to the possession of Fort Pickens. Whoever holds the states in whose limits those forts are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless there is something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that makes it important for us to hold it for the general defense of the whole country, its commerce and interests, instead of being useful only for the defense of a particular city or locality. It is true that Forts Taylor and Jefferson at Key West and Tortugas Not so with Moultrie, Johnson, Castle Pinckney, and Sumter in Charleston Harbor. Not so with Pulaski on the Savannah River. Not so with Morgan and other forts in Alabama.

Not so with those other forts that were intended to guard the entrance of a particular harbor for local defense. We cannot deny that there is a Southern Confederacy, de facto, in existence, with its capital at Montgomery. We may regret it. I regret it most profoundly, but I cannot deny the truth of the fact, painful and mortifying as it is. I proclaim boldly the policy of those with whom I act. We are for peace."

Mr. Douglas, in urging the maintenance of peace as a motive for the evacuation of the forts, was no doubt aware of the full force of his words. He knew that their continued occupation was virtually a declaration of war. The General-in-Chief of the United States Army, also, it is well known, urgently advised the evacuation of the forts. But the most striking protest against the coercive measures finally adopted was that of Major Anderson himself. The letter in which his views were expressed has been carefully suppressed in the partisan narratives of that period and well-nigh lost sight of, although it does the highest honor to his patriotism and integrity. It was written on the same day on which the announcement was made to Governor Pickens of the purpose of the United States government to send supplies to the fort, and is worthy of reproduction here.

Letter of Major Anderson, United States Army. Protesting against Fox's plan for relieving Fort Sumter. Quote, Fort Sumter, South Carolina, April 8, 1861. To Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant General, United States Army. Colonel, I have the honor to report that the resumption of work yesterday, Sunday, at various points on Morris Island, and the vigorous prosecution of it this morning, apparently strengthening all the batteries which are under the fire of our guns, shows that they either have just received some news from Washington, which has put them on the K'Viv, or they have received orders from Montgomery to commence operations here. I am preparing, by the side of my Barbette guns, I had the honor to receive, by yesterday's mail, the letter of the Honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4th.

And confess that what he there states surprises me very greatly, following as it does, and contradicting so positively, the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was authorized to make. I trust that this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such would be attempted, would produce most disastrous results throughout our country. It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of Captain Fox. I fear that its result cannot fail to be disastrous to all concerned. Even with his boat at our walls, the loss of life, as I think I mentioned to Mr. Fox, and unloading her, will more than pay for the good to be accomplished by the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain possession of this work, Out of position, surrounded by strong works which must be carried to make this fort of the least value to the United States government.

We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern for one night. The boats will have to, therefore, rely at night entirely upon other marks. I ought to have been informed that this expedition was to come. Colonel Lehman's remark convinced me that the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be carried out. We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not I am, Colonel, very respectfully. Your obedient servant, Robert Anderson, Major, 1st Artillery, Commanding.

This frank and manly letter, although written with the reserve necessarily belonging to a communication from an officer to his military superiors, expressing dissatisfaction with orders, fully vindicates Major Anderson from all suspicion of complicity or sympathy with the bad faith of the government which he was serving. It accords entirely with the sentiments expressed in his private letter to me, already mentioned as lost or stolen, and exhibits him in the attitude of faithful performance of a duty inconsistent with his domestic ties and repugnant to his patriotism.

The Count of Paris libels the memory of Major Anderson and perverts the truth of history in this As he has done in other particulars by saying, with reference to the visit of Captain Fox to the fort, that, quote, "...having visited Anderson at Fort Sumter, a plan had been agreed upon between them for revictualling the garrison," unquote. Fox himself says in his published letter, quote, "...I made no arrangements with Major Anderson for supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of my plan," unquote. And Major Anderson, in the letter above, says the idea had been merely hinted at by Captain Fox and that Colonel LeMond had led him to believe that it had been abandoned. End of footnote. The relief squadron, as with unconscious irony it was termed, was already underway for Charleston, consisting, according to their own statement, of eight vessels carrying 26 guns and about 1,400 men.

including the troops sent for reinforcement of the garrison. These facts became known to the Confederate government, and it was obvious that no time was to be lost in preparing for, and if possible anticipating, the impending assault. The character of the instructions given General Beauregard in this emergency may be inferred from the ensuing correspondence, which is here reproduced from contemporary publications. Quote, Charleston, April 8, 1861. To L.P. Walker, Secretary of War, Confederate States of America.

An authorized messenger from President Lincoln just informed Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter peaceably or otherwise by force. Signed, G.T. Beauregard, Montgomery the 10th. To General G.T. Beauregard, Charleston. If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the Washington government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation and, if this is refused, proceed, in such a manner as you may determine, to reduce it. Answer. Signed, L.P. Walker, Secretary of War, Charleston, April 10th. 2. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War. The demand will be made tomorrow at 12 o'clock, signed G.

T. Beauregard, Montgomery, April 10th. 2. General Beauregard, Charleston. Unless there are a special reasons connected with your condition, it is considered proper that you should make the demand at an early hour, signed L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, Charleston, April 10th. To L.P. Walker, Secretary of War, Montgomery. The reasons are special for 12 o'clock. Signed, G.T. Beauregard. From Headquarters Provisional Army, Confederate States of America, Charleston, South Carolina, April 11, 1861, 2 p.m. To Fort Sumter. Sir, the government of the Confederate States has hitherto forborne from any hostile demonstration against Fort Sumter. in the hope that the government of the United States, with a view to the amicable adjustment of all questions between the two governments, and to avert the calamities of war, would voluntarily evacuate it.

There was reason at one time to believe that such would be the course pursued by the government of the United States, and under that impression, my government has refrained from making any demand for surrender of the fort. But the Confederate States can no longer delay assuming actual possession of a fortification commanding the entrance of one of their harbors and necessary to its defense and security. I am ordered by the government of the Confederate States to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aides, Colonel Chestnut and Captain Lee, are authorized to make such demand of you. All proper facilities will be afforded for the removal of yourself and command, together with company arms and property, and all private property, to any post in the United States which you may elect.

The flag, which you have upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it down. Colonel Chestnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time, Await your answer. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, signed, G.T. Beauregard, Brigadier General, Commanding. From, Major Robert Anderson, Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, Headquarters, Fort Sumter, South Carolina, April 11th, 1861. General, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this fort. And to say in reply thereto that it is a demand which I regret that my sense of honor and of my obligations to my government prevents my compliance.

Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms proposed, and for the high compliment paid me, I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, signed, Robert Anderson, Major, U.S. Army, Commanding. To Brigadier General G.T. Beauregard. Commanding Provisional Army, Confederate States of America, Montgomery, April 11th. General Beauregard, Charleston. We do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter if Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that, in the meantime, he will not use his guns against us unless ours should be employed against Fort Sumter. You are thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable.

Signed, L.P. Walker, Secretary of War. Headquarters, Provisional Army, Confederate States of America. Charleston, April 11, 1861, 11 p.m. Major, in consequence of the verbal observations made to you by my aides, Messrs. Chestnut and Lee in relation to the condition of your supplies, and that you would in a few days be starved out if our guns did not batter you to pieces, or words to that effect, and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I communicated both the verbal observation and your written answer to my government. If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter and agree that in the meantime You will not use your guns against us, unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter.

We will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel Chestnut and Captain Lee are authorized by me to enter into such an agreement with you. You are therefore requested to communicate to them an open answer. I remain, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, signed G.T. Beauregard, Brigadier General. Major Robert Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston, SC. Headquarters, Fort Sumter, SC. 2.30 a.m. April 12, 1861. General, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your second communication of the 11th instant by Colonel Chestnut, and to state in reply that, cordially uniting with you in the desire to avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the fifteenth instant, should I not receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my government or additional supplies, and that I will not, in the meantime, open my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort, or the flag of my government.

By the forces under your command, or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort, or the flag it bears. I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant. Signed, Robert Anderson. Major. U.S. Army. Commanding. Two. Fort Sumter, South Carolina. April Twelfth, 1861. Three. Twenty. A. M. Sir. By authority of Brigadier General Beauregard, commanding the Provisional Forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time. We have the honor to be very respectfully your obedient servants. Signed, James Chestnut, Jr., aide-de-camp.

Signed, Stephen D. Lee, Captain, South Carolina Army and aide-de-camp. End of quote. It is essential to a right understanding of the last two letters to give more than a superficial attention to that of Major Anderson, bearing in mind certain important facts not referred to in the correspondence. Major Anderson had been requested to state the time at which he would evacuate the fort, if unmolested, agreeing in the meantime not to use his guns against the city and the troops defending it. Unless Fort Sumter should be first attacked by them. On these conditions, General Beauregard offered to refrain from opening fire upon him. In his reply, Major Anderson promises to evacuate the fort on the 15th of April, provided he should not, before that time, receive controlling instructions or additional supplies from his government.

He furthermore offers to pledge himself not to open fire upon the Confederates, unless in the meantime compelled to do so by some hostile act against the fort or the flag of his government. Inasmuch as it was known to the Confederate commander that the controlling instructions were already issued and that the additional supplies were momentarily expected, inasmuch also as any attempt to introduce the supplies, would compel the opening of fire upon the vessels bearing them under the flag of the United States, thereby releasing Major Anderson from his pledge. It is evident that his conditions could not be accepted. It would have been merely after the avowal of a hostile determination by the government of the United States to await an inevitable conflict with the guns of Fort Sumter and the naval forces of the United States in combination.

with no possible hope of averting it, unless in the improbable event of a delay of the expected fleet for nearly four days longer. In point of fact, it arrived off the harbor on the same day, but was hindered by a gale of wind from entering it. There was obviously no other course to be pursued than that announced in the answer given by General Beauregard. It should not be forgotten that, During the early occupation of Fort Sumter by a garrison, the attitude of which was at least offensive, no restriction had been put upon their privilege of purchasing in Charleston fresh provisions, or any delicacies or comforts not directly tending to the supply of the means needful to hold the fort for an indefinite time.

Austin, Texas.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 3, Chapter 13. A Pause and a Review. Attitude of the two parties. Sophistry exposed and shams torn away. Forbearance of the Confederate government. Who was the aggressor? Major Anderson's view, and that of a naval officer. Mr. Horace Greeley on the Fort Sumter case. The bombardment and surrender. Gallant action of ex-Senator Wigfall. Mr. Lincoln's statement of the case. Here, in the brief hour immediately before the outburst of the long-gathering storm, although it can hardly be necessary for the reader who has carefully considered what has already been written, we may pause for a moment to contemplate the attitude of the parties to the contest, and the grounds on which they respectively stand.

I do not refer to the original causes of controversy, to the comparative claims of statehood and union, or to the question of the right and wrong of secession, but to the proximate and immediate causes of conflict. The fact that South Carolina was a state, whatever her relations may have been to the other states, is not and cannot be denied. It is equally undeniable that the ground on which Fort Sumter was built was ceded by South Carolina to the United States in trust for the defense of her own soil and her own chief harbor. This has been shown by ample evidence to have been the principle governing all sessions by the states of sites for military purposes, but it applies with special force to the case of Charleston.

The streams flowing into that harbor, from source to mouth, lie entirely within the limits of the state of South Carolina. No other state or combination of states could have any distinct interest or concern in the maintenance of a fortress at that point, unless as a means of aggression against South Carolina herself. The practical view of the case was correctly stated by Mr. Douglas when he said, I take it for granted that whoever permanently holds Charleston in South Carolina is entitled to the possession of Fort Sumter. Whoever permanently holds Pensacola in Florida is entitled to the possession of Fort Pickens. Whoever holds the states in whose limits these forts are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless there is something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that makes it important for us to hold it for the general defense of the whole country, its commerce and interests, instead of being useful only for the defense of a particular city or locality."

No such necessity could be alleged with regard to Fort Sumter. The claim to hold it as public property of the United States was utterly untenable and unmeaning, apart from a claim of coercive control over the state. If South Carolina was a mere province in a state of open rebellion, the government of the United States had a right to retain its hold of any fortified place within her limits, which happened to be in its possession, and it would have an equal right to acquire possession of any other. It would have had the same right to send an army to Columbia to batter down the walls of the state capitol. The subject may at once be stripped of the sophistry, which would make a distinction between the two cases.

The one was as really an act of war as the other would have been. The right or the wrong of either depended entirely upon the question of the rightful power of the federal government to coerce a state into submission, a power which we have seen was unanimously rejected in the formation of the federal constitution, and which was still unrecognized by many, perhaps by a majority, even of those who denied the right of a state to secede. If there existed any hope or desire for a peaceful settlement of the questions at issue between the states, either party had a right to demand that, pending such settlement, there should be no hostile grasp upon its throat. This grip had been held on the throat of South Carolina for almost four months from the period of her secession, and no forcible resistance to it had yet been made.

Remonstrances and patient, persistent, and reiterated attempts at negotiation for its removal had been made with two successive administrations of the government of the United States, at first by the State of South Carolina and by the government of the Confederate States after its formation. These efforts had been met not by an open avowal of coercive purposes, but by evasion, prevarication, and perfidy. The agreement of one administration to maintain the status quo at the time when the question arose was violated in December by the removal of the garrison from its original position to the occupancy of a stronger. Another attempt was made to violate it in January by the introduction of troops concealed below the deck of the steamer Star of the West, but this was thwarted by the vigilance of the State Service.

See the report of her commander, Captain McGowan, who says he took on board in the harbor of New York four officers and two hundred soldiers. Arriving off Charleston, he says, quote, The soldiers were now all put below, and no one allowed on deck except our own crew. End quote. End quote. End quote.

The protracted course of fraud and prevarication practiced by Mr. Lincoln's administration in the months of March and April has been fully exhibited. It was evident that no confidence whatever could be reposed in any pledge or promise of the federal government as then administered. Yet, notwithstanding all this, no resistance, other than that of pacific protest and appeals for an equitable settlement was made, until after the avowal of a purpose of coercion, and when it was known that a hostile fleet was on the way to support and enforce it. At the very moment when the Confederate commander gave the final notice to Major Anderson of his purpose to open fire upon the fort, the fleet was lying off the mouth of the harbor, and hindered from entering only by a gale of wind.

The forbearance of the Confederate government under the circumstances is perhaps unexampled in history. It is carried to the extreme verge, short of a disregard of the safety of the people who had entrusted to that government the duty of their defense against their enemies. The attempt to represent us as the aggressors in the conflict which ensued is as unfounded as the complaint made by the wolf against the lamb in the familiar fable. He who makes the assault is not necessarily he that strikes the first blow or fires the first gun. To have awaited further strengthening of their position by land and naval forces, with hostile purpose now declared, for the sake of having them fire the first gun, would have been as unwise as it would be to hesitate to strike down the arm of the assailant, who levels a deadly weapon at one's breast, until he is actually fired.

The disingenuous rant of demagogues against firing on the flag might serve to rouse the passion of insensate mobs in times of general excitement, but will be impotent in impartial history to relieve the federal government from the responsibility of the assault made by sending a hostile fleet against the harbor of Charleston to cooperate with the menacing garrison of Fort Sumter. After the assault was made by the hostile descent of the fleet, the reduction of Fort Sumter was a measure of defense rendered absolutely and immediately necessary. Such clearly was the idea of the commander of the Pawnee when he declined, as Captain Fox informs us, without orders from a superior, to make any effort to enter the harbor, there to inaugurate civil war.

The straightforward simplicity of the sailor had not been perverted by the shams of political sophistry. Even Mr. Horace Greeley, with all his extreme partisan feeling, is obliged to admit that, quote, whether the bombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter shall or shall not be justified by posterity, it is clear that the Confederacy had no alternative but its own dissolution, end quote. According to the notice given by General Beauregard, fire was opened upon Fort Sumter from the various batteries which had been erected around the harbor at half-past four o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 12th of April, 1861. The fort soon responded, it is not the purpose of this work to give minute details of the military operation, as the events of the bombardment have often been related and are generally well known, with no material discrepancy in matters of fact among the statements of the various participants.

It is enough, therefore, to add that the bombardment continued for about 33 to 34 hours. The fort was eventually set on fire by shells, after having been partly destroyed by shot, and Major Anderson, after a resolute defense, finally surrendered on the 13th, the same terms being according to him which had been offered two days before. It is a remarkable fact, probably without precedent in the annals of war, that notwithstanding the extent and magnitude of the engagement, the number and caliber of the guns, and the amount of damage done to inanimate material on both sides, especially to Fort Sumter, nobody was injured on either side by bombardment. The only casualty attended upon the affair was the death of one man and the wounding of several others by the explosion of a gun and the firing of a salute to their flag by the He was a very good person on evacuating the fort the day after the surrender.

A striking incident marked the close of the bombardment. Ex-Senator Louis T. Wigfall of Texas, a man as generous as he was recklessly brave, when he saw the fort on fire, supposing the garrison to be hopelessly struggling for the honor of the flag, voluntarily and without authority, went under fire in an open boat to the fort, and climbing through one of his embrasures, asked for Major Anderson, and insisted that he should surrender a fort. Which it was palpably impossible that he could hold. Major Anderson agreed to surrender on the same terms and conditions that had been offered him before his works were battered in breach. And the agreement between them to that effect was promptly ratified by the Confederate commander.

Thus unofficially was inaugurated the surrender and evacuation of the fort. The President of the United States, in his message of July 4th, 1861, to the Federal Congress convened in extra session, said, It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew, they were expressly notified, that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more."

Mr. Lincoln well knew that if the brave men of the garrison were hungry, they had only him and his trusted advisers to thank for it. They had been kept for months in a place where they ought not to have been, contrary to the judgment of the general-in-chief of his army, contrary to the counsels of the wisest statesmen of his confidence, and the protests of the commander of the garrison. A word from him would have relieved them at any moment in the manner most acceptable to them, and most promotive of peaceful results. But suppose the Confederate authorities had been disposed to yield, and to consent to the introduction of supplies for the maintenance of the garrison. What assurance would they have had that nothing further would be attempted?

What reliance could be placed on any assurances of the government of the United States after the experience of the attempted ruse of the Star of the West, and the deceptions practiced upon the Confederate commissioners in Washington? He says we were expressly notified that nothing more would, on that occasion, be attempted. The words in italics themselves, on that occasion, constituting a very significant, though unobtrusive and innocent-looking limitation. But we had been just as expressly notified long before that the garrison would be withdrawn. It would be as easy to violate the one pledge as it had been to break the other. Moreover, the so-called notification was a mere memorandum, without date, signature, or authentication of any kind sent to Governor Pickens, not by an accredited agent, but by a subordinate employee of the State Department.

Like the oral and written pledges of Mr. Seward, given through Judge Campbell, it seemed to be carefully and purposely divested of every attribute that could make it binding and valid. in case its author should see fit to repudiate it. It was as empty and worthless as the complaint against the federal government based upon it is disingenuous.

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Volume 1b. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, please visit the website at www.LibriVox.org.

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis. Volume 1b. Part Four, Chapter One. The War.

Contents. Failure of the Peace Congress. Treatment of the Commissioners. Their withdrawal. Notice of an armed expedition. Action of the Confederate government. Bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter. Its reduction, required by the exigency of the case. Disguise thrown off. President Lincoln's call for 75,000 men, his fiction of combinations, palpable violation of the Constitution, action of Virginia, of citizens of Baltimore, the charge of precipitation against South Carolina, action of the Confederate government, the universal feeling.

The Congress, initiated by Virginia for the laudable purpose of endeavoring by constitutional means to adjust all the issues which threatened the peace of the country, failed to achieve anything that would cause or justify a reconsideration by the seceded states of their action to reclaim the grants they had made to the general government and to maintain for themselves a separate and independent existence. The commissioners, sent by the Confederate government after having been shamefully deceived, as has been heretofore fully set forth, left the United States Capitol to report the result of their mission to the Confederate government. The notice received that an armed expedition had sailed for operations against the state of South Carolina in the harbor of Charleston, induced the Confederate government to meet, as best it might, this assault, In the discharge of its obligation to defend each state of the Confederacy, to this end the bombardment of the formidable work Fort Sumter was commenced, in anticipation of the reinforcement which was then moving to unite with its garrison for hostilities against South Carolina.

The bloodless bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter occurred on April 13, 1861. The garrison was generously permitted to retire with the honors of war. The evacuation of that fort commanding the entrance to the harbor of Charleston, which, if in hostile hands, was destructive of its commerce, had been claimed as the right of South Carolina. The voluntary withdrawal of the garrison by the United States government had been considered, and those best qualified to judge believed it had been promised. Yet, when instead of the fulfillment of just expectations, Instead of the withdrawal of the garrison, a hostile expedition was organized and sent forward. The urgency of the case required its reduction before it should be reinforced.

Had there been delay, the more serious conflict between larger forces, land and naval, would scarcely have been bloodless, as the bombardment fortunately was. The event, however, was seized upon to inflame the mind of the northern people. and the disguise which had been worn in the communications with the Confederate commissioners was now thrown off, and it was cunningly attempted to show that the South, which had been pleading for peace and still stood on the defensive, had by this bombardment inaugurated a war against the United States. But it should be stated that the threats implied in the declarations that the Union could not exist part slave and part free, and that the Union should be preserved, and the denial of the right of a state peaceably to withdraw were virtually a declaration of war, and the sending of an army and navy to attack was the result to have been anticipated as the consequence of such declaration of war.

On the fifteenth day of the same month, President Lincoln, introducing his farce of combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, called forth the military of the several states to the number of seventy-five thousand, and commanded the persons composing the combinations to disperse, etc. It can but surprise anyone in the least degree conversant with the history of the Union to find states referred to as persons composing combinations, and that the sovereign creators of the federal government, the state of the Union, should be commanded by their agent to disperse, The levy of so large an army could only mean war, but the power to declare war did not reside in the president.

It was delegated to the Congress only. If, however, it had been a riotous combination or an insurrection, it must have been, according to the Constitution, against the state. And the power of the president to call forth the militia to suppress it was dependent upon an application from the state for that purpose, It could not precede such an application, and still less could it be rightfully exercised against the will of a State. The authorities on this subject have been heretofore cited and need not be referred to again. Suffice it to say that, by section four, article four of the Constitution, the United States are bound to protect each State against invasion and against domestic violence, whenever application shall have been made by the legislature.

or by the executive when the legislature cannot be convened, and that to fail to give protection against any invasion whatsoever should be a dereliction of duty. To add that there could be no justification for the invasion of a state by an army of the United States is but to repeat what has been said on the absence of any authority in the general government to coerce a state In any possible view of the case, therefore, the conclusion must be that the calling on some of the states for seventy-five thousand militia to invade other states which were asserted to be still in the Union was a palpable violation of the Constitution and the usurpation of undelegated power, or, in other words, of power reserved to the states or to the people.

It might, therefore, have been anticipated that Virginia, One of whose sons wrote the Declaration of Independence, another of whose sons led the armies of the United States in the Revolution which achieved their independence, and another of whose sons mainly contributed to the adoption of the Constitution of the Union, would not have been slow in the face of such events to reclaim the grants she had made to the General Government, and to withdraw from the Union to the establishment of which she had been so largely contributed. Two days had elapsed between the surrender of Fort Sumter and the proclamation of President Lincoln calling for seventy-five thousand militia as before stated. Two other days elapsed, and Virginia passed her ordinance of secession, and two days thereafter the citizens of Baltimore resisted the passage of troops through that city on their way to make war upon the southern states.

Thus rapidly did the current of events bear us onward from peace to the desolating war, which was soon to ensue. The manly effort of the unorganized, unarmed citizens of Baltimore to resist the progress of armies for the invasion of her Southern sisters was worthy of the fair fame of Maryland, becoming the descendants of the men who so gallantly fought for the freedom, independence, and sovereignty of the States. The bold stand, then and thereafter taken, extorted a promise from the executive authorities that no more troops should be sent to the city of Baltimore, which promise, however, was only observed until, by artifice, power had been gained to disregard it. Virginia, as has been heretofore stated, passed her ordinance of secession on the seventeenth of April.

It was, however, subject to ratification by the people at an election to be held on the fourth Thursday of May. She was, in the meantime, like her Southern sisters, the object of Northern hostilities, and having a common cause with them, properly anticipated the election of May by forming an alliance with the Confederate States, which was ratified by the Convention on the 25th of April. The convention for that alliance set forth that Virginia, looking to a speedy union with the Confederate States, and for the purpose of meeting pressing exigencies, agreed that the whole military force and military operations, offensive and defensive, of said Commonwealth in the impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief control and direction of the President of the said Confederate States.

The whole was made subject to the approval and ratification of the proper authorities of both governments, respectively. To those who criticized South Carolina as having acted precipitately in withdrawing from the Union, it may be answered that intervening occurrences show that her delay could not have changed the result, and, further, that her prompt action had enabled her better to prepare for the contingency which it was found impossible to avert, Thus, she was prepared in her first necessities of Virginia to send to her troops organized and equipped. Before the convention for cooperation with the Confederate States had been adopted by Virginia, that nightly soldier, General Bonham, of South Carolina, went with his brigade to Richmond.

And throughout the southern states, there was a prevailing desire to rush to Virginia, where it was foreseen that the first great battles of the war were to be fought. So that, as early as the twenty-second of April, I telegraphed to Governor Letcher that, in addition to the forces heretofore ordered, requisitions had been made for thirteen regiments, eight to rendezvous at Lynchburg, four at Richmond, and one at Harper's Ferry. Referring to an application that had been made to him from Baltimore, I wrote, "'Sustain Baltimore, if practicable. We will reinforce you.' The universal feeling was that of a common cause and common destiny. There was no selfish desire to linger around home, no narrow purpose to separate local interests from the common welfare, and the object was to sustain a principle.

The broad principle of constitutional liberty, the right of self-government. The early demonstrations of the enemy showed that Virginia was liable to invasion from the north, from the east, and from the west. The larger preparation indicated that the most serious danger to be apprehended was from the line of the Potomac. The first conflicts occurred in the East. The narrow peninsula between the James and York Rivers had topographical features well adapted to defense. It was held by General John B. Magruder, who skillfully improved its natural strength by artificial means. And there, on the ground memorable as the field of the last battle of the Revolution, in which General Washington compelled Lord Cornwallis to surrender, Magruder was a small force held for a long time the superior forces of the enemy at check.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4. Chapter Two.

Contents. The supply of arms of men. Love of the Union. Secessionists few. Efforts to prevent the final step. Views of the people. Effect on their agriculture. Aid from African servitude. Answer to the clamors on the horrors of slavery. Appointment of a commissary general. His character and capacity. Organization, instruction, and equipment of the Army. Action of Congress, the law, its signification, the hope of a peaceful solution early entertained rapidly diminished. Further action of Congress. Policy of the government for peace. Position of officers of United States Army. The Army of the States, not of the government. The Confederate law observed by the government. Officers retiring from United States Army.

Organization of bureaus. End of contents. The question of supplying arms and munitions of war was the first considered, because it was the want for which it was the most difficult to provide. Of men willing to engage in the defense of their country, there were many more than we could arm. Though the prevailing sentiment of the Southern people was a cordial attachment to the Union as it was formed by their fathers, their love was for the spirit of the compact, for the liberties it was designed to secure, for the self-government and state sovereignty which had been won by separation from the mother country, and transmitted to them by their revolutionary sires as a legacy for their posterity forever.

The number of those who desired to dissolve the Union, even though the Constitution should be faithfully observed, those who in the language of the day were called secessionists per se, was so small as not to be felt in any popular decision. But the number of those who held that the states had surrendered their sovereignty and had no right to secede from the Union was so inappreciably small If indeed any such existed, that I cannot recall the fact of a single Southern advocate of that opinion. The assertion of the right is not to be confounded with the readiness to exercise it. Many who had no doubt as to the right looked upon its exercise with reluctance amounting to sorrow, and claimed that it should be the last resort, only to be adopted as the alternative to a surrender of the equality in the union of states, free, Sovereign and Independent.

Of that class forming a large majority of the people of Mississippi, I may speak with the confidence of one who belonged to it. Thus, after the legislature of Mississippi had enacted a law for a convention which, representing the sovereignty of the state, should consider the propriety of passing an ordinance to reassume the grants made to the general government and withdraw from the Union, I, as a United States Senator of Mississippi, retained my position in the Senate and sought by every practicable mode to obtain such measures as would allay the excitement and afford to the South such security as would prevent the final step, the Ordinance of Secession from the Union. When the last hope of preserving the Union of the Constitution was extinguished, and the Ordinance of Secession was enacted by the Convention of Mississippi, which was the highest authority known under our form of government, The question of the expediency of adopting that remedy was no longer open to inquiry by one who acknowledged his allegiance as due to the state of which he was a citizen.

To evade the responsibilities resulting from the decree of his sovereign, the people, would be craven. To resist it would be treason. The instincts and affections of the citizens of Mississippi led them with great unanimity to the duty of maintaining and defending their state. Without pausing to ask what would be the consequences of refusing obedience to its mandate. A like feeling pervaded all of the seceding states, and it was not only for the military service, but for every service which would strengthen and sustain the Confederacy, that an enthusiasm pervading all classes, sexes, and ages was manifested. Though our agricultural products had been mainly for export, In so much that in the planting states the necessary food supplies were to a considerable extent imported from the west, and it would require that the habits of the planters should be changed from the cultivation of staples for export to the production of supplies adequate for home consumption and the support of armies in the field.

Yet, even under the embarrassments of war, this was expected. And for a long time, the result justified the expectation, extraordinary as it may appear when viewed by comparison with other people who have been subjected to a like ordeal. Much of our success was due to a much-abused institution of African servitude, for it enabled the white man to go into the army And leave the cultivation of their fields and the care of their flocks, as well as of their wives and children, to those who in the language of the Constitution were held to service or labor. A passing remark may here be appropriate as to answer thus afforded to the clamor of the horrors of slavery. Had these Africans been a cruelly oppressed people, restlessly struggling to be freed from their bonds, Would their masters have dared to leave them as was done, and would they have remained as they did, continuing their usual duties?

Or could the Proclamation of Emancipation have been put on the plea of a military necessity if the fact had been that the Negroes were forced to serve and desired only an opportunity to rise against their masters? It will be remembered that, when the Proclamation was issued, It was confessed by President Lincoln to be a nullity beyond the limit within which it could be enforced by the Federal troops. To direct the production, preservation, collection, and distribution of food for the Army required a man of rare capacity and character at the head of the subsistence department. It was our good fortune to have such an one in Colonel L.B. Northrop. who was appointed Commissary General at the organization of the bureaus of the Executive Department of the Confederate government.

He had been an officer of the United States Army, had served in various parts of the South, had been for some time on duty in the Commissariat, and to the special and general knowledge thus acquired, added strong practical sense and incorruptible integrity. Of him and the operations of the subsistence department, I shall have more to say hereafter when treating of the bureaus of the Confederacy. Assured of an army as large as the population of the Confederate States could furnish, and a sufficient supply of subsistence for such an army, at least until the chances of war should interfere with production and transportation, the immediate object of attention was the organization, instruction, and equipment of the army.

As heretofore stated, there was a prevailing belief that there would be no war, or, if any, that it would be of a very short duration. Therefore, the first bill which passed the Provisional Congress provided for receiving troops for short periods, as my memory serves, for sixty days. The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, the heroic Colonel Bartow, who sealed his devotion to the cause with his life's blood on the field of Manassas, In deference to my earnest remonstrance against such a policy, returned with the bill to the House, the Congress then consisted of but one House, and procured a modification by which the term of service was extended to twelve months, unless sooner discharged.

I had urged upon him in our conference the adoption of a much longer period, but he assured me that one year was as much as the Congress would agree to. On this, as on other occasions, that Congress showed a generous desire to yield their preconceived opinions to my objections as far as they consistently could. And, there being but one House, it was easier to change the terms of a bill after conference with the Executive than when, under the permanent organization, objections had to be formally communicated in a message to that branch of Congress in which the bill originated. and when the whole proceeding was of record. This first act to provide for the public defense became a law on the 28th of February, 1861, and its fifth section so clearly indicates the opinions and expectations prevailing when the Confederation was formed, that it is inserted here.

That the President be further authorized to receive into the service of this government such forces now in the service of said states Confederate states, as may be tendered, or who may volunteer by consent of their state in such numbers as he may require The supremacy of the states is the controlling idea. The President was authorized to receive from the several states the arms and munitions which they might desire to transfer to the government of the Confederate states. And he was also authorized to receive the forces which the states might tender, or any which should volunteer by the consent of their state for any time not less than 12 months unless sooner discharged. And such forces were to be received with their officers by companies, battalions, or regiments, and the President, by and with the advice and consent of Congress, was to appoint such general officer or officers for said forces as might be necessary for their service.

It will be seen that the arms and munitions within the limits of the several states were regarded as entirely belonging to them. That the forces which were to constitute the Provisional Army could only be drawn from the several states by their consent, and that these were to be organized under state authority and to be received with their officers so appointed. That the lowest organization was to be that of a company, and the highest that of a regiment. And that the appointment of general officers to command these forces was confided to the government of the Confederate States should the assembling of large bodies of troops require organization above that of a regiment. And it will also be observed that provision was made for the discharge of the forces so provided for before the term of service fixed by the law.

No one will fail to perceive how little was anticipated a war of the vast proportions and great duration which ensued, and how tenaciously the sovereignty and self-government of the states were adhered to. At a later period, March 16, 1861, the Congress adopted resolutions recommending to the respective states to cede the forts, arsenals, navy yards, dockyards, and other public establishments within their respective limits to the Confederate states, etc. The hope which was early entertained of a peaceful solution of the issues pending between the Confederate States and the United States rapidly diminished, so that we find on the 6th of March that the Congress, in its preamble to an act to provide for the public defense, begins with the declaration that, in order to provide speedily forces to repel invasion, etc.

Authorized the President to employ the militia and to ask for and accept the services of any number of volunteers not exceeding 100,000, and to organize companies into battalions, battalions into regiments, and regiments into brigades and divisions. As in the first law, the president was authorized to appoint the commanding officers of such brigades and divisions, the commissions only to endure while the brigades were in service. On the same day, March 6, 1861, was enacted the law for the establishment and organization of the Army of the Confederate States of America, this being in contradistinction to the Provisional Army, which was to be composed of troops tendered by the states, as in the first act.

And volunteers received, as in the Second Act, to constitute a provisional army. That the wish and policy of the government was peace is again manifested in this Act, which in providing for the military establishment of the Confederacy fixed the number of enlisted men of all arms at 9,420. Due care was taken to prevent the appointment of incompetent or unworthy persons to be officers of the Army, and the right to promotion up to and including the grade of Colonel was carefully guarded. And beyond this, the professional character of the Army was recognized as follows. Appointments to the rank of Brigadier General, after the Army is organized, shall be made by selection from the Army. There, being no right of promotion above the grade of Colonel in the Army of the United States, selection for appointment to the rank of General had no other restriction than the necessity for confirmation by the Senate.

The provision just quoted imposed the further restriction of requiring the person nominated by selection to have previously been an Officer of the Army of the Confederate States. Regarding the Army of the United States as belonging neither to a section of the Union nor to the general government, but to the states conjointly while they remained united, it follows as a corollary of the proposition that, when disintegration occurred, the undivided personnel composing the Army would be left free to choose their future place of service. Therefore, provision was made for securing to officers who should leave the Army of the United States and join that of the Confederate States the same relative rank in the latter which they held in the former.

Be it further enacted that all officers who have resigned, or who may within six months tender their resignations from the Army of the United States, and who have been or may be appointed to original vacancies in the Army of the Confederate States, the commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that the relative rank of officers of each grade shall be determined by their former commissions The provisions hereof are in the view entertained that the army was of the states, not of the government, and was to secure to officers adhering to the Confederate states the same relative rank which they had before those states had withdrawn from the Union. It was clearly the intent of the law to embrace in this position only those officers who had resigned Or who should resign from the United States Army to enter the service of the Confederacy, or who, in other words, should thus be transferred from one service to the other.

It is also to be noted that in the eleventh section of the Act to which this was a mandatory, the right of promotion up to the grade of Colonel in established regiments and corps was absolutely secured. But that the appointments to the higher grade should be by selection at first without restriction, but after the army had been organized, the selection was confined to the army, thus recognizing the profession of arms and relieving officers from the hazard beyond the limit of their legal right to promotion of being superseded by civilians through favoritism or political influence. How well the government of the Confederacy observed both the letter and the spirit of the law will be seen by reference to its action in the matter of appointments.

It is a noteworthy fact that the three highest officers in rank, and whose fame stands unchallenged either for efficiency or zeal, were all so indifferent to any question of personal interest that they had received their appointment before they were aware it was conferred. Each brought from the army of the United States an enviable reputation, such as would have secured to him, had he chosen to remain in it, after the war commenced, any position his ambition could have coveted. Therefore, against considerations of self-interest and impelled by devotion to principle, they severed the ties, professional and personal, which had bound them from their youths up to the time when the Southern States, asserting the consecrated truth that all governments rest on the consent of the governed, decided to withdraw from the Union they had voluntarily entered, and the Northern States resolved to coerce them to remain in it against their will.

These officers were, first, Samuel Cooper, a native of New York, graduate of the United States Military Academy in 1815, and who served continuously in the Army until March 7, 1861, with such distinction as secured to him the appointment of Adjutant General of the United States Army. A native of Kentucky, a graduate of the United States Military Academy in 1826, served conspicuously in the Army until 1834, then served in the Army of the Republic of Texas, and then, in the United States, volunteers in the war with Mexico. Subsequently, he reentered the United States Army and, for meritorious conduct, attained the rank of Brevet Brigadier General. After the secession of Texas, his adopted state, he resigned his commission in the United States Army, May 3, 1861, and traveled by land from California to Richmond to offer his services to the Confederacy.

Third, Robert E. Lee. A native of Virginia, a graduate of the United States Military Academy in 1829, when he was appointed in the Engineer Corps of the United States Army, and served continuously and with such distinction as to secure for him in 1847 brevets of three grades above his corps commission. He resigned from the Army of the United States April 25th, 1861, upon the secession of Virginia, in whose army he served until it was transferred to the Confederate States. Samuel Cooper was the first of these to offer his services to the Confederacy at Montgomery. Having known him most favorably and intimately as Adjutant General of the United States Army when I was Secretary of War, the value of his services in the organization of a new army was considered so great that I invited him to take the position of Adjutant General of the Confederate Army, which he accepted without a question either as to relative rank or anything else.

The highest grade then authorized by law was that of Brigadier General, and that commission was bestowed upon him. When General Albert Sidney Johnston reached Richmond, he called upon me, and for several days at various intervals, we conversed with the freedom and confidence belonging to the close friendship which had existed between us for many years. Consequent upon a remark made by me, he asked to what duty I would assign him. And when answered to serve in the West, he expressed his pleasure at service in that section, but inquired how he was to raise his command, and for the first time learned that he had been nominated and confirmed. The third, General Robert E. Lee, had been commissioned by the State of Virginia as Major General and Commander of her Army.

When that army was transferred after the accession of Virginia to the Confederate States, he was nominated to be Brigadier General in the Confederate Army, but was left for obvious reasons in command of the forces in Virginia. After the seat of government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond, the course of events on the southern Atlantic coast induced me to direct General Lee to repair thither. Before leaving, he said that, while he was serving in Virginia, he had never thought it needful to inquire about his rank. But now, when about to go into other states and to meet officers with whom he had not been previously connected, he would like to be informed upon that point. Under recent laws authorizing appointments to higher grades than that of his first commission, he had been appointed a full general.

But so wholly had his heart and mind been consecrated to the public service that he had not remembered if he ever knew of his advancement. In organizing the bureaus, it was deemed advisable to select, for the chief of each, officers possessing special knowledge of the duties to be performed. The best assurance of that qualification was believed to be service creditably rendered in the several departments of the United States Army before resigning from it. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Myers, who had held many important trusts in the United States Quartermaster's Department, was appointed Quartermaster General of the Confederacy with the rank of Colonel. Captain L.B. Northrop, a gallant officer of the United States Dragoons, and who by reason of a wound disabling him to perform regimental duty had been employed in the subsistence department, was after resigning from the United States Army appointed Commissary General of the Confederate States Army with the rank of Colonel.

I have heretofore alluded to the difficult task thus imposed on him, and the success with which he performed it. and would be pleased here to enter into a fuller recital, but if not the needful information in regard to his administration of that department. Surgeon L.P. Moore, an officer of recognized merit in the United States Medical Department, from which he had resigned to join the Confederacy, was appointed the Surgeon General of the Confederate States Army. As in the case of other departments, there was in this a want of the storage requisite, as well for the field as the hospital. To supply medicines which were declared by the enemy to be contraband of war, our medical department had to seek in the forest for substitutes, and to add surgical instruments and appliances to the small stock on hand as best they could.

It would be quite beyond my powers to do justice to the skill and knowledge with which the medical corps performed their arduous task, and regret that I have no report from the Surgeon General Moore which would enable me to do justice to the officers of his corps as well in regard to their humanity as to their professional skill. In no branch of our service were our needs so great and our means to meet them relatively so small as in the matter of ordinance and ordnance stores. The Chief of Ordinance, General Gorgas, had been an ordnance officer of the United States Army and resigned to join the Confederacy. He has favored me with a succinct, though comprehensive statement. Which has enabled me to write somewhat fully of that department, but for the better understanding of its operations, the reader is referred to the ordinance report elsewhere.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 3. Contents. Commissioners to purchase arms and ammunition. My letters to Captain Seams. Resignations of officers of United States Navy. Our destitution of accessories for the supply of naval vessels. Secretary Mallory. Food supplies. The Commissariat Department. The Quartermaster's Department. The disappearance of delusions. The supply of powder. Saltpetre. Sulfur. Artificial niter beds. Services of General G. W. Reigns. Destruction at Harper's Ferry of Machinery. The Master Armorer. Machinery secured. Want of skillful employees. Difficulties encountered by every department of the executive branch of the government.

End of contents. On the third day after my inauguration at Montgomery, an officer of extensive information and high capacity was sent to the North. to make purchases of arms, ammunition, and machinery. And soon afterward, another officer was sent to Europe to buy in the market as far as possible, and furthermore to make contracts for arms and munitions to be manufactured. Captain, afterward Admiral, seems, the officer who was sent to the north, would have been quite successful but for the intervention of the civil authorities preventing the delivery of the various articles contracted for. The officer who was sent to Europe, Major Hughes, found few serviceable arms upon the market. He, however, succeeded in making contracts for the manufacture of large quantities, being in advance of the agents sent from the Northern Government for the same purpose.

For further and more detailed information, reference is made to the monograph of the Chief of Ordnance. My letter of instructions to Captain Seams was as follows. Montgomery, Alabama. February 21, 1861. Dear Sir, As agent of the Confederate States, you are authorized to proceed, as hereinafter set forth, to make purchases and contracts for machinery and munitions, or for the manufacture of arms and munitions of war. Of the proprietor of the ... powder company, in ... you will probably be able to obtain cannon and musket powder, The former to be of the coarsest grain, and also to engage with him for the establishment of a powder mill at some point in the limits of our territory. The quantity of powder to be supplied immediately will exceed his stock on hand, and the arrangement for further supply should, if possible, be by manufacture in our own territory.

If this is not practicable, means must be sought for further shipments from any and all sources which are reliable. At the Arsenal at Washington, you will find an artisan named blank, who has brought the cap-making machine to its present state of efficiency, and who might furnish a cap machine and accompany it to direct its operations. If not in this, I hope you may in some other way be able to obtain a cap machine with little delay and have it sent to Mount Vernon Arsenal, Alabama. We shall require a manufactory for friction primers, and you will, if possible, induce some capable person to establish one in our country. The demand of the Confederate States will be the inducement in this as in the case of the powder mill proposed.

A short time since, the most improved machinery for the manufacture of rifles intended for the Harpers Ferry Armoury was, it was said, for sale by the manufacturer. If it be so at this time, you will procure it for this government, and use the needful precaution in relation to its transportation. Mr. of the Harper's Ferry Armory can give you all the information in that connection which you may require. Mr. Ball, the master armorer at Harper's Ferry, is willing to accept service under our government, and could probably bring with him skilled workmen. If we get the machinery, this will be important. Machinery for grooving muskets and heavy guns is, I hope, to be purchased ready-made. If not, you will contract for its manufacture and delivery.

You will endeavor to obtain the most improved shot for rifle cannon and persons skilled in the preparation of that and other fixed ammunition. Captain G.W. Smith and Captain Lovell, late of the United States Armory and now of New York City, may aid you in your task, and you will please say to them that we will be happy to have their services in our Army. You will make such inquiries as your very knowledge will suggest in relation to the supply of guns of different calibers, especially the largest. I suggest the advantage, if to be obtained, of having a few of the 15-inch guns, like the ones cast at Pittsburgh. I have not sought to prescribe so as to limit your inquiries, either as to object or place, but only to suggest for your reflection and consideration the points which have chance to come under my observation.

You will use your discretion in visiting places where information of persons or things is to be obtained for the furtherance of the object and view. Any contracts made will be sent to the Honorable L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, for his approval, and the contractor need not fear that delay will be encountered in the action of this government. Very respectfully yours, etc.

Captain Seams had also been directed to seek for vessels which would serve for naval purposes, and after his return reported that he could not find any vessels which, in his judgment, were, or could be made, available for our uses. The southern officers of the Navy, who were in command of United States vessels abroad, under an idea more creditable to their sentiment than to their knowledge of the nature of our constitutional union, brought the vessels they commanded into the ports of the North, and having delivered them to the authorities of the United States government, generally tendered their resignations and repaired to the states for which they had been commissioned in the Navy, to serve where they held their allegiance to be due.

The theory that they owed allegiance to their respective states was founded on the fact that the federal government was of the states. The sequence was that the Navy belonged to the states, not to their agent, the federal government, and When the states ceased to be united, the naval vessels and armament should have been divided among the owners. While we honor the sentiment which caused them to surrender their heartbound associations, and the profession to which they were bred, on which they relied for subsistence, to go with nothing saving their sores and faithful hearts to fight, to bleed, and to die if need be, in defense of their homes and righteous cause, we can but remember how much was lost by their view of what their honor and duty demanded.

Far, however, be it from their countrymen, for that or any other consideration, to wish that their fidelity to the dictates of a conscientious belief should have yielded to any temptation of interest. The course they pursued shows how impossible it was that they should have done so, for what did they not sacrifice to their sense of right? We were doubly bereft by losing our share of the navy we had contributed to build, and by having it all employed to assail us. The application of the appropriations for the Navy of the United States had been such that the construction of vessels had been at the north, though much of the timber used and other material employed was transported from the south to northern shipyards.

Therefore we were without the accessories needful for the rapid supply of naval vessels. While attempting whatever was practicable at home, we sent a competent, well-deserving officer of the Navy to England to obtain there and elsewhere, by purchase or by building, Vessels which could be transformed into ships of war. These efforts and the results will be noticed more fully hereafter. It may not be amiss to remark here that if the anticipations of our people were not realized, it was not from any lack of the zeal and ability of the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory. As was heretofore stated, his fondness for and aptitude in nautical affairs had led him to know much of vessels, their construction and management, And as chairman of the Committee on the United States Naval Affairs, he had superadded to this a very large acquaintance with officers of the United States Navy, which gave him the requisite information for the most useful employment of the instructed officers who joined our service.

At the north, many had been deceived by the fictions of preparations at the south for the war of the sections, and among ourselves were few who realized how totally deficient the southern states were in all which was necessary to the active operations of an army, however gallant the men might be, and however able were the generals who directed and led them. From these causes, operating jointly, resulted undue caution at the north and overweening confidence at the south. The habits of our people in hunting and protecting their stock in fields from the ravages of ferocious beasts caused them to be generally supplied with the arms used for such purposes. The facility with which individuals traveled over the country led to very erroneous ideas as to the difficulties of transporting an army.

The small amount of ammunition required in time of peace gave no measure of the amount requisite for warlike operations. and the products of a country which insufficiently supplied food for its inhabitants when peaceful pursuits were uninterrupted, would serve but a short time to furnish the commissariat of a large army. It was, of course, easy to foresee that, if war was waged against the seceding states by all of those which remained in the Union, the large supply of provisions which had been annually sent from the Northwest to the South could not, under the altered circumstances, be relied on. That our people did not more immediately turn their attention to the production of food supplies may be attributed to the prevailing delusion that secession would not be followed by war.

To the able officer then at the head of the commissary department, Colonel L. B. Northrup, much credit is due for his well-directed efforts to provide both for immediate and prospective wants. It gives me the greater pleasure to say this because those less informed of all he did and skilfully tried to do have been profuse of criticism, and sparing indeed of the mead justly his due. Adequate facilities for transportation might have relieved the local want of supplies, especially in Virginia, where the largest bodies of troops were assembled, but unfortunately the quartermaster's department was scarcely less provided than that of the commissary. Not only were the railroads insufficient in number, But they were poorly furnished with rolling stock and had been mainly dependent upon northern foundries and factories for their rails and equipment.

Even the skilled operatives of the railroads were generally northern men, and their desertion followed fast upon every disaster which attended the Confederate arms. In addition to other causes which have been mentioned, the idea that cotton was king and would produce foreign intervention, as well as a desire of the northern people for the return of peace, and the restoration of trade exercised a potent influence in preventing our agriculturalists from directing at an early period their capital and labor to the production of food supplies, rather than that of our staple for export. As one after another, the illusions vanished, and the material necessities of a great war were recognized by our people, Never did patriotic devotion exhibit brighter examples of the sacrifice of self-interest and the abandonment of fixed habits and opinions or a more effective and untiring effort to meet the Herculean task which was set before them.

Being one of the few who regarded secession and war as inevitably connected, and the procurement and preparation of the munitions of war, if our people had not gone to war without counting the cost, they were, nevertheless, involved in it without means of providing for its necessities. It has been heretofore stated that we had no powder mills. It would be needless to say that the newborn government had no depots of powder, but it may be well to add that, beyond the small supply required for sporting purposes, our local traders had no stock on hand. Having no manufacturing industries which required saltpeter, very little of that was purchasable in our markets. The same would have been the case in regard to sulfur, but for the fact that it had been recently employed in the clarification of sugar-cane juice, and thus a considerable amount of it was found in New Orleans, prompt measures were taken to secure a supply of sulfur, and parties were employed to obtain saltpetre from the caves, as well as from the earth, of old tobacco houses and cellars, and artificial niter beds were made to provide for prospective wants.

Of softwood for charcoal there was abundance, and thus materials were procured for the manufacture of gunpowder to meet the demand which would arise when the limited quantity purchased by the Confederate government at the North should be exhausted. It was our good fortune to secure the services of an able and scientific soldier, General G. W. Rains, who, to a military education, added experience in a large manufacturing establishment, And to him was confided the construction of a powder mill, and the manufacture of powder, both for artillery and small arms. The appalling contemplation of the inauguration of a great war, without powder or a navy to secure its importation from abroad, was soon relieved by the extraordinary efforts of the Ordnance Department and the well-directed skill of General Rains, to whom it is but a just tribute to say that, beginning without even instructed workmen, he had, Before the close of the war, made what, in the opinion of competent judges, has been pronounced to be the best powder mill in the world, and in which powder of every variety of grain was manufactured of materials which had been purified from those qualities which caused its deterioration under long exposure to a moist atmosphere.

The avowed purpose and declared obligation of the federal government was to occupy and possess the property belonging to the United States, Yet one of the first acts was to set fire to the armory at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, the only establishment of the kind in the southern states, and the only southern depository of the rifles which the general government had on hand. What conclusion is to be drawn from such action? To avoid attributing a breach of solemn pledges, it must be supposed that Virginia was considered as out of the Union and a public enemy. in whose borders it was proper to destroy whatever might be useful to her of the common property of the states lately united. As soon as the United States troops had evacuated the place, the citizens and armorers went to work to save the armory as far as possible from destruction, and to secure valuable materials stored in it.

The master armorer, Armistead Ball, so bravely and skillfully directed these efforts that a large part of the machinery and materials was saved from the flames. The subduing of the fire was a dangerous and difficult task, and great credit is due to those who, under the order of Master Armourer Bell, attempted and achieved it. When the fire was extinguished, the work was continued and persevered in until all the valuable machinery and material had been collected, boxed, and shipped to Richmond, about the end of the summer of 1861. The machinery thus secured was divided between the arsenals at Richmond, Virginia, and Fayetteville, North Carolina, and when repaired and put in working condition, supplied to some extent the want which existed in the South of means for the alteration and repair of old or injured arms, and finally contributed to increase the The practice of the Federal Government, which had kept the construction and manufacture of the material of war at the North, Had consequently left the South without the requisite number of skilled workmen by whose labor machinery could at once be made fully effective if it were obtained.

Indeed, the want of such employees prevented the small amount of machinery on hand from being worked to its full capacity. The gallant master Armourer Bell, whose capacity, zeal, and fidelity deserved more than a passing notice, was sent with that part of the machinery assigned to the Fayetteville Arsenal. The toil, the anxiety, and responsibility of his perilous position at Harper's Ferry, where he remained long after the protecting force of the Confederate Army retired, had probably undermined a constitution so vigorous that in the face of a great exigency, no labor seemed too great or too long for him to grapple with and endure. So like a ship which, after having weathered the storm, goes down in the calm, the master armor, soon after he took his quiet post at Fayetteville, was found dead in his bed.

The difficulties which on every side met the several departments of the executive branch of the government one must suppose were but little appreciated by many, whose opportunities for exact observation were the best, as one often meets with self-complacent expressions as to modes of achieving readily what prompt, patient, zealous effort proved to be insurmountable. In the progress of this work, it is hoped, will be presented not only the magnitude of the obstacles, but the spirit and capacity with which they were encountered by the unseen and much undervalued laborers of the officers of the several departments, on whom devolved provision for the civil service, as well as for the armies in the field.

Already has the report of General St. John, Commissary General of Subsistence, of the operations of that department, Just before the close of the war exposed the hollowness of many sensational pictures intended to fix gross neglect or utter incapacity on the executive. The hoped-for and expected monograms of other chiefs of bureaus will silence light criticisms on each, so far as they are made by those who are not willfully blind or maliciously intent on the circulation of falsehood. Timothy Lucas.

16 16 - Part 4, Chapter 4 24:33

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 4. The Proclamation for 75,000 Men by President Lincoln further examined. The reasons presented by him to mankind for the justification of his conduct shown to be mere fictions, having no relation to the question. What is the value of constitutional liberty, of bills of rights, of limitations of powers, if they may be transgressed at pleasure? Secession of South Carolina. Proclamation of Blockade. Session of Congress at Montgomery. Extracts from the President's Message. Acts of Congress. Spirit of the People. Secession of Border States. Destruction of United States property by order of President Lincoln.

If any further evidence had been required to show that it was the determination of the Northern people not only to make no concessions to the grievances of the Southern states, but to increase them to the last extremity, it was furnished by the Proclamation of President Lincoln issued on April 15, 1861. This proclamation, which has already been mentioned, The war requires a further examination, as it was the official declaration on the part of the government of the United States of the war which ensued. In it, the President called for 75,000 men to suppress combinations opposed to the laws, and obstructing their execution in seven sovereign states which had retired from the Union. 75,000 men organized and equipped are a powerful army, and when raised to operate against these states, nothing else than war could be intended.

The words in which he summoned this force were these. Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed and the execution thereof obstructed in the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals by law. Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, by virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and laws, etc. The power granted in the Constitution is thus expressed. The Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

It was to the Congress, not the executive, to whom the power was delegated. And thus early was commenced a long series of usurpations of powers inconsistent with the purposes for which the Union was formed, and destructive of the fraternity it was designed to perpetuate. On November 6, 1860, the legislature of South Carolina assembled and gave the vote of the state for electors of a President of the United States. On the next day, an act was passed calling a state convention to assemble on December 17. to determine the question of the withdrawal of the state from the United States. Candidates for membership were immediately nominated. All were in favor of secession. The convention assembled on December 17th, and on the 20th passed an ordinance to The ordinance began with these words.

The state authorities immediately conformed to this action of the convention, and the laws and authority of the United States ceased to be obeyed within the limits of the state. About four months afterward, when the state, in union with others which had joined her, had possessed herself of the forts within her limits, which the United States government had refused to evacuate, President Lincoln issued the above-mentioned proclamation. The state of South Carolina is designated in the proclamation as a combination too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law. This designation does not recognize the state or manifest any consciousness of its existence, whereas South Carolina was one of the colonies that had declared her independence, and, after a long and bloody war, she had been recognized as a sovereign state by Great Britain.

The only power to which she had ever owed allegiance. The fact that she had been one of the colonies in the original Congress, had been a member of the Confederation, and subsequently of the Union, strengthens but surely cannot impair her claim to be a state. Though President Lincoln designated her as a combination, it did not make her a combination. Though he refused to recognize her as a state, it did not make her any less a state. By assertion, he attempted to annihilate seven states. And the war which followed was to enforce a revolutionary edict and to establish the supremacy of the general government on the ruins of the blood-bought independence of the states. By designating the state as a combination, and considering that under such a name it might be in a condition of insurrection, he assumed to have authority to raise a great military force and attack the state.

Yet, even if the fact had been as assumed, If an insurrection had existed, the President could not lawfully have derived the power he exercised from such condition of affairs. The provision of the Constitution is as follows. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and an application of the legislature or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence. So the guarantee availed not at all to justify the act which it was presented to excuse, the fact being that a state, and not an unlawful combination, as asserted, was the object of assault and the case one of making war.

For a state or union of states to attack with military force another state is to make war. By the Constitution, the power to make war is given solely to Congress. Congress shall have power to declare war, says the Constitution. And again, to raise and support armies. Thus, under a perverted use of language, the executive at Washington did that which he undeniably had no power to do, under a faithful observance of the Constitution. To justify himself to Congress and the people, or rather before the face of mankind, for this evasion of the Constitution of his country, President Lincoln, in his message to Congress of July 4th, 1861, resorted to the artifice of saying, It, meaning the proceedings of the Confederate States, presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy, a government of the people by the same people, can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes.

The answer to this question is very plain. In the nature of things, no union can be formed except by separate, independent, and distinct parties. Any other combination is not a union. And upon the destruction of any of these elements in the parties, the union ipso facto ceases. If the government is the result of a union of states, then these states must be separate, sovereign, and distinct to be able to form a union, which is entirely an act of their own volition. Such a government as ours has no power to maintain its existence any longer than the contracting parties pleased to cohere, because it was founded on the great principle of voluntary federation, an organized to establish justice and ensure domestic tranquility.

Any departure from this principle by the general government not only perverts and destroys its nature, but furnishes a just cause to the injured state to withdraw from the Union. A new Union might subsequently be formed, but the original one could never by coercion be restored. Any effort on the part of the others to force the seceding state to consent to come back is an attempt at subjugation. It is a wrong which no lapse of time or combination of circumstances can ever make right. A forced union is a political absurdity. No less absurd is President Lincoln's effort to dissever the sovereignty of the people from that of the state, as if there could be a state without a people, or a sovereign people without a state.

But the question which Mr. Lincoln presents to the whole family of man deserves a further notice. The answer which he seems to infer would be given by the whole family of man is that such a government, as he supposes, can maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes, and therefore, he concluded, that he was right in the judgment of the whole family of man in commencing hostilities against us. He says, so viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the government, that is, the power to make war against foreign nations For the government has no other war power. Planting himself on this position, he commenced the devastation and bloodshed which followed to effect our subjugation.

Nothing could be more erroneous than such views. The supposed case which he presents is entirely unlike the real case. The government of the United States is like no other government. It is neither a constitutional republic or democracy, nor has it ever been thus called. Neither is it a government of the people by the same people. But it is known and designated as the Government of the United States. It is an anomaly among governments. Its authority consists solely of certain powers delegated to it as a common agent by an association of sovereign and independent states. These powers are to be exercised only for certain specified objects, and the purposes declared in the beginning of the deed or instrument of delegation were to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, Provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

The beginning and the end of all the powers of the government of the United States are to be found in that instrument of delegation. All its powers are there expressed, defined, and limited. It was only to that instrument Mr. Lincoln, as President, should have gone to learn his duties. That was the chart which he had just solemnly pledged himself to the country faithfully to follow. He soon deviated widely from it, and fatally erroneous was his course. The administration of the affairs of a great people, at a most perilous period, is decided by the answer which, it is assumed, the whole family of man would give to a supposed condition of human affairs which did not exist and which could not exist.

This is the ground upon which the rectitude of his cause was placed. He says, No choice was left but to call out the war power of the government. And so to resist force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation. Here, he says, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the government. For what purpose must he call out this war power? He answers by saying, and so to resist force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation. But this which he asserts is not a fact. There was no force employed for its destruction. Let the reader turn to the record of the facts in Part III of this work and peruse the fruitless efforts for peace which were made by us and which Mr.

Lincoln did not deign to notice. The assertion is not only incorrect in stating that force was employed by us, but also in declaring that it was for the destruction of the government of the United States. On the contrary, we wished to leave it alone. Our separation did not involve its destruction. To such fiction was Mr. Lincoln compelled to resort to give even apparent justice to his cause. He now goes to the Constitution for the exercise of his war power, and here we have another fiction. On April 19th, four days later, President Lincoln issued another proclamation announcing a blockade of the ports of seven confederated states, which was afterward extended to North Carolina and Virginia. It further declared that all persons who should under their authority molest any vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board, should be treated as pirates.

In their efforts to subjugate us, the destruction of our commerce was regarded by the authorities at Washington as a most efficient measure. It was early seen that although acts of Congress established ports of entry where commerce existed, they might be repealed and the ports nominally closed or declared to be closed. Yet such a declaration would be of no avail unless sustained by a naval force, as these ports were located in territory not subject to the United States. An act was subsequently passed authorizing the President of the United States, in his discretion, to close their ports. But it was never executed. The scheme of blockade was resorted to, and a falsehood was asserted on which to base it.

Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Dallas, He will say to Lord John Russell that by our own laws and the laws of nature and the laws of nations, this government has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have been seized by insurgents in the equitable form of blockade is a proper means to that end. This is the same doctrine of combinations fabricated by the authorities at Washington to serve as the basis of a bloody revolution. Under the laws of nations, separate governments, when at war, blockade each other's ports. This is decided to be justifiable. But the government of the United States could not consent to justify its blockade of our ports on this ground, as it would be an admission that the Confederate States were a separate and distinct sovereignty, and that the war was prosecuted only for subjugation.

It therefore assumed that the withdrawal of the Southern States from the Union was an insurrection. Was it an insurrection? When certain sovereign and independent States form a Union with limited powers for some general purposes, And any one or more of them in the progress of time suffer unjust and oppressive grievances for which there is no redress but in a withdrawal from the association. Is such withdrawal an insurrection? If so, then of what advantage is the compact of union to states? Within the union are oppressions and grievances, and the attempt to go out brings war and subjugation. The ambitious and aggressive states obtain possession of the central authority which, having grown strong in the lapse of time, If this action is once tolerated, where will it end?

Where is the value of constitutional liberty? What strength is there in bills of rights, in limitations of power? What new hope for mankind is to be found in written constitutions? What remedy which did not exist under kings or emperors? If the doctrines thus announced by the government of the United States are conceded, then look through either end of the political telescope and one sees only an empire, and the once famous Declaration of Independence trodden in the dust as a glittering generality, and the Compact of Union denounced as a flaunting lie. Those who submit to such consequences without resistance are not worthy of the liberties and the rights to which they were born, and deserve to be made slaves.

Such must be the verdict of mankind. Men do not fight to make a fraternal union, neither do nations. These military preparations of the government of the United States signify nothing less than the subjugation of the southern states, so that, by one devastating blow, the North might grasp forever that supremacy it had so long coveted. To be prepared for self-defense, I called Congress together at Montgomery on April 29th. And in the message of that date, thus spoke of the proclamation of the President of the United States. Apparently contradictory as are the terms of this singular document, one point is unmistakably evident. The President of the United States calls for an army of 75,000 men, whose first service is to be the capture of our forts.

It is a plain declaration of war. I then proceeded to say that I did not feel at liberty to disregard the fact that many of the states seemed quite content to submit to the exercise of the powers assumed by the President of the United States and were actively engaged in levying troops for the purpose indicated in the proclamation. Meantime, being deprived of the aid of Congress, I had been under the necessity of confining my action to a call of the states for volunteers for the common defense, in accordance with authority previously conferred on me. I stated that there were then in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Fort Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, 19,000 men and 16,000 more were on their way to Virginia, that it was proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action in view of the existing exigencies of the country.

An army of 100,000 men, and that, if a further force should be needed, Congress would be appealed to for authority to call it into the field. Finally, that the intent of the President of the United States, already developed, to invade our soil, capture our forts, blockade our ports, and wage war against us, rendered it necessary to raise means to a much larger amount than had been done, to defray the expenses of maintaining independence and repelling invasion. A brief summary of the internal affairs of the government followed, and notwithstanding frequent declarations of the peaceful intentions of the withdrawing states had been made in the most solemn manner, it was deemed not to be out of place to repeat them once more, and, therefore, the message closed with these words.

We protest solemnly in the face of mankind that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor. In independence we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, No concession of any kind from the states with which we have lately been confederated. All we ask is to be let alone, that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, we must, resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that cannot but be mutually beneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a firm reliance on that divine power which covers with its protection the just cause, we must continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-government.

At this session, Congress passed acts authorizing the President to use the whole land and naval force to meet the necessities of the war thus commenced, to issue to private armed vessels letters of mark, in addition to the volunteer force authorized to be raised, To accept the services of volunteers to serve during the war. To receive into the service various companies of the different arms. To make a loan of fifty millions of dollars in bonds and notes. And to hold an election for officers of the permanent government under the new constitution. An act was also passed to provide revenue from imports, another relative to prisoners of war, and such others as were necessary to complete the internal organization of the government.

And established the administration of public affairs. In every portion of the country there was exhibited the most patriotic devotion to the common cause. Transportation companies freely tendered the use of their lines for troops and supplies. Requisitions for troops were met with such alacrity that the number offering their services at every instance greatly exceeded the demand and the ability to arm them. Men of the highest official and social position served as volunteers in the ranks. The gravity of age and the zeal of youth rivaled each other in the desire to be foremost in the public defense. The appearance of the proclamation of the President of the United States calling out 75,000 men was followed by the immediate withdrawal of the states of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and their union with the Confederate states.

The former state, thus placed on the frontier and exposed to invasion, began to prepare for a resolute defense. Volunteers were ordered to be enrolled and held in readiness in every part of the state. Colonel Robert E. Lee, having resigned his commission in the United States Cavalry, was on April 22nd nominated and confirmed by the State Convention of Virginia as Commander-in-Chief of the Military and Naval Forces of the Commonwealth. Already the Northern officer in charge had evacuated Harper's Ferry after having attempted to destroy the public buildings there. His report says, I gave the order to apply the torch. In three minutes or less, both of the arsenal buildings, containing nearly 15,000 stand of arms, together with the carpenter's shop, which was at the upper end of a long and connected series of workshops of the armory proper, were in a blaze.

There was every reason for believing the destruction was complete. Mr. Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War on April 22nd, replied to this report in these words. I am directed by the President of the United States to communicate to you And through you to the officers and men under your command at Harper's Ferry Armory, the approbation of the government, of your and their judicious conduct there, and to tender you and them the thanks of the government for the same. At the same time, the shipyard at Norfolk was abandoned after an attempt to destroy it. About midnight of April 20th, a fire was started in the yard, which continued to increase, and before daylight the work of destruction extended to two immense ship houses.

One of which contained the entire frame of a 74-gun ship, and to the long ranges of stores and offices on each side of the entrance. The great ship Pennsylvania was burned, and the frigates Miramac and Columbus, and the Delaware, Raritan, Plymouth, and Germantown were sunk. A vast amount of machinery, valuable engines, small arms, and chronometers was broken up and rendered entirely useless. The value of the property destroyed was estimated at several millions of dollars. This property thus destroyed had been accumulated and constructed with laborious care and skillful ingenuity during a course of years to fulfill one of the objects of the Constitution, which was expressed in these words, to provide for the common defense.

See Preamble of the Constitution. It had belonged to all the states in common, and to each one equally with the others. If the Confederate states were still members of the Union, as the President of the United States asserted, Where can he find a justification of these acts? In explanation of his policy to the commissioners sent to him by the Virginia State Convention, he said, referring to his inaugural address, As I then and therein said, I now repeat, the power confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess property and places belonging to the government. Yet he tendered the thanks of the government to those who applied the torch to destroy this property, belonging as he regarded it.

To the government. How unreasonable, how blind with rage must have been that administration of affairs which so quickly brought the government to the necessity of destroying its own means of defense in order, as it publicly declared, to maintain its life. It would seem as if the passions that ruled the savage had taken possession of the authorities at the United States Capitol. In the conflagrations of vast structures, the wanton destruction of public property And still more in the issue of lettre de cachet by the Secretary of State, who boasted of the power of his little bell over the personal liberties of the citizen, the people saw, or might have seen, the rapid strides toward despotism made under the mask of preserving the Union.

Yet these and similar measures were tolerated because the sectional hate dominated in the northern states over the higher motives of constitutional and moral obligation.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part IV. Chapter Five. Maryland first approached by Northern invasion. Denies to United States troops the right of way across her domain. Mission of Judge Handy. Views of Governor Hicks. His proclamation. Arrival of Massachusetts troops at Baltimore. Passage through the city disputed. Activity of the police. Burning of bridges. Letter of President Lincoln to the Governor. Visited by Citizens. Action of the State Legislature. Occupation of the Relay House. The City Arms Surrendered. City in Possession of United States Troops. Remonstrances of the City to the Passage of Troops Disregarded. Citizens Arrested. Also Members of the Legislature.

Accumulation of Northern forces at Washington. Invasion of West Virginia by a force under McClellan. Attack at Philippi. At Laurel Hill. Death of General Garnet. The border state of Maryland was the outpost of the South on the frontier, first to be approached by Northern invasion. The first demonstration against State sovereignty was to be made there, and in her fate were the other slave-holding states of the border to have warning of what they were to expect. She had chosen to be, for the time at least, neutral in the impending war, and had denied to the United States troops the right of way across her domain in their march to invade the southern states. The governor, Hicks, avowed a desire not only that the State should avoid war, but that she should be a means for pacifying those more disposed to engage in combat.

Judge Handy, a distinguished citizen of Mississippi, who was born in Maryland, had, in December 1860, been sent as a commissioner from the state of his adoption to that of his birth, and presented his views and the object of his mission to Governor Hicks, who, in his response, December 19, 1860, declared his purpose to act in full concert with the other border states, adding, "'I do not doubt the people of Maryland are ready to go with the people of those states for weal or woe.' Subsequently, in answer to appeals for and against the proclamation assembling the legislature in order to have a call for a state convention, Governor Hicks issued an address in which, arguing that there was no necessity to define the position of Maryland, he wrote, If the action of the legislature would be simply to declare that Maryland was with the South in sympathy and feeling, and that she demands from the North the repeal of offensive, unconstitutional statutes, and appeals to it for new guarantees, that she will wait a reasonable time for the North to purge her statute books and do justice to her Southern brethren, and if her appeals are in vain, will make common cause with her sister border states in resistance to tyranny, it need be it would only be saying what the whole country well knows, etc.

On the 18th of April, 1861, Governor Hicks issued a proclamation. invoking them to preserve the peace, and said, I assure the people that no troops will be sent from Maryland unless it may be for the defense of the national capital. On the same day, Mayor Brown of the city of Baltimore issued a proclamation, in which, referring to that of the governor above-sided, he said, I cannot withhold my expression of satisfaction at his resolution that no troops shall be sent from Maryland to the soil of any other state. It will be remembered that the capital was on a site which originally belonged to Maryland, and was ceded by her for a special use, so that troops to defend the capital might be considered as not having been sent out of Maryland.

It will be remembered that these proclamations were three days after the requisition made by the Secretary of War on the States, which had not seceded for their quota of troops to serve in the war about to be inaugurated against the South, and that rumors existed at the time in Baltimore that troops from the Northeast were about to be sent through that city toward the South. On the next day, that is, the 19th of April, 1861, A body of troops arrived at the railroad depot. The citizens assembled in large numbers, and, though without arms, disputed the passage through the city. They attacked the troops with loose stones found in a street which was undergoing repair, and with such determination and violence that some of the soldiers were wounded, and they fired upon the multitude, killing a few and wounding many.

The police of Baltimore were very active in their efforts to prevent conflict and preserve the peace. They rescued the baggage and munitions of the troops, which had been seized by the multitude, and the rear portion of the troops was, by direction of Governor Hicks, sent back to the borders of the state. The troops who had got through the city took the railroad at the Southern Depot and passed on. The militia of the city was called out, By evening, quiet was restored. During the night, on a report that more northern troops were approaching the city by the railroads, the bridges nearest to the city were destroyed, as it was understood, by orders from the authorities of Baltimore. On the 20th of April, President Lincoln wrote in reply to Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown, saying, For the future, troops must be brought here, but I make no point of bringing them through Baltimore.

On the next day, the 21st, Mayor Brown and the other influential citizens, by request of the President, visited him. The interview took place in the presence of the Cabinet and General Scott, and was reported to the public by the Mayor after his return to Baltimore. From that report, I make the following extracts, referring to the President. The mayor uses the following language. The protection of Washington, he asseverated with great earnestness, was the sole object of concentrating troops there, and he protested that none of the troops brought through Maryland were intended for any purposes hostile to the state, or aggressive as against the southern states. He called on General Scott for his opinion, which the general gave at great length, To the effect that troops might be brought through Maryland without going through Baltimore, etc., the interview terminated with the distinct assurance on the part of the President that no more troops would be sent through Baltimore, unless obstructed in their transit in other directions, and with the understanding that the city authorities should do their best to restrain their own people.

The Mayor and his companions avail themselves of the President's full discussion of the questions of the day to urge upon him respectfully, but in the most earnest manner, a course of policy which would give peace to the country, and especially the withdrawal of all orders contemplating the passage of troops through any part of Maryland. The legislature of the State of Maryland appointed commissioners to the Confederate government to suggest to it the cessation of impending hostilities until the meeting of Congress at Washington in July. Commissioners with like instructions were also sent to Washington. In my reply to the commissioners, dated 25th of May, 1861, I referred to the uniform expression of desire for peace on the part of the Confederate government, and added, in deference to the State of Maryland, it again asserts in the most emphatic terms that its sincere and earnest desire is for peace.

But that, while the government would readily entertain any proposition from the government of the United States, tending to a peaceful solution of the present difficulties, the recent attempts of this government to enter into negotiations with that of the United States were attended with results which forbid any renewal of proposals from it to that government. Its policy cannot be but peace, peace with all nations and people. On the 5th of May, the Relay House, at the junction of the Washington and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads, was occupied by United States troops under General Butler, and on the 13th of the same month, he moved a portion of the troops to Baltimore and took position on Federal Hill.

Thus was consummated the military occupation of Baltimore. On the next day, reinforcements were received, and on the same day, the Commanding General Issued a proclamation to the citizens in which he announced to them his purpose and authority to discriminate between citizens, those who agreed with him being denominated well-disposed, and the others described with many offensive epithets. The initiatory step of the policy, subsequently developed, was found in one sentence. Therefore all manufacturers of arms and munitions of war are hereby requested to report to me forthwith, so that the lawfulness of their occupations may be known and understood, and all misconstruction of their doings avoided.

There soon followed a demand for the surrender of the arms stored by the city authorities in a warehouse. The police refused to surrender them without the orders of the police commissioners. The police commissioners, upon representation at the demand of General Butler, as by order of the President, decided to surrender the arms under protest, and they were accordingly removed to Fort McHenry. Baltimore was now disarmed. The Army of the United States had control of the city. There was no longer necessity to regard the remonstrances of Baltimore against sending troops to the city, and that more convenient route was henceforth to be employed. George P. Cain, Marshal of the Police of Baltimore, who had rendered most efficient service for the preservation of peace, as well in the city of Baltimore as at Locust Point, where troops were disembarked to be dispatched to Washington, was arrested at home by a military force and sent to Fort McHenry, and a provost-marshal was appointed by General Banks, who had succeeded to the command.

The excuse given for the arrest of Marshal Kane was that he was believed to be cognizant of combinations of men waiting for an opportunity to unite with those in rebellion against the United States government. Whether the suspicion were well or ill-founded, it constituted a poor excuse for depriving a citizen of his liberty without legal warrant and without proof. But this was only the beginning of unbridled despotism and a reign of terror. The mayor and police commissioners, Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, and John W. Davis, held a meeting, and after preparing a protest against the suspension of their functions in the appointment of a provost-marshal, Resolved that, while they would do nothing to, quote, obstruct the execution of such measures as Major General Banks may deem proper to take on his own responsibility for the preservation of the peace of the city and of public order, they cannot consistently with their views of official duty and of the obligations of their oaths of office recognize the right If any of the officers and men of the police force as such to receive orders or directions from any other authority than from this board, and that in the opinion of the board, the forceful suspension of their functions suspends at the same time the active operations of the police law."

The provost-marshal, with the plenary powers conferred upon him, commenced a system of search and seizure in private houses of arms and munitions of every description. On the 1st of July, General Banks announced that, quote, "...in pursuance of orders issued from the headquarters at Washington for the preservation of public peace in this department, I have arrested and do detain in custody of the United States the late members of the Board of Police, Messieurs Charles Howard, William H. Catchell, Charles D. Hinks, and John W. Davis." If the object had been to preserve order by any proper and legitimate method, the effect of Meads would probably have been to rely upon men whose influence was known to be great, and whose integrity was certainly unquestionable.

The first name to the Commissioner, as I knew well, he was of an old Berylin family, honored for their public services, and himself adorned by every social virtue. Old, unambitious, hospitable, gentle, Loving, he was beloved by the people among whom his long life had been passed. Could such a man be the just object of suspicion, if when the laws had been silenced, suspicion could justify arrest and imprisonment? Those who knew him will accept as a just description, in action faithful and in honor clear, who broke no promise, served no private end, who gained no title, and who lost no friend. Thereafterward, arrests of the most illustrious became to rule. In a land where freedom of speech was held to be an unquestioned right, freedom of thought ceased to exist, and men were incarcerated for opinion's sake.

In the Maryland legislature, the Honorable S. Teakle Wallace, From a committee to whom was referred the memorial of the police commissioners, arrested in Baltimore made a report upon the unconstitutionality of the Act, and, quote, appealed in the most earnest manner to the whole people of the country of all party sections and opinions to take warnings by the usurpations mentioned and come to the rescue of the free institutions of the country, end quote. For no better reason So far as the public was informed, then a vote in favor of certain resolutions, General Banks sent his provost-marshal to Frederick, where the legislature was in session. A cordon of pickets was placed around the town to prevent anyone from leaving it without a written permission from the member of the General Banks staff.

Police detectives from Baltimore then went into the town and arrested some twelve or thirteen members. And several officers of the legislature, which thereby left without a quorum, was prevented from organizing, and it performed the only act which it was competent to do, that is, adjourned. S. Tico Wallace, the author of the report in defense of the constitutional rights of citizens, was among those arrested. Henry May, a member of Congress, who had introduced a resolution which he hoped would be promotive of peace, was another of those arrested and thrown into prison. Senator Kennedy of the same state presented a report of the legislature to the United States Senate, reciting the outrage afflicted upon Maryland in the persons of her municipal officers and citizens, and after some opposition merely obtained an order to have it printed.

His promises had been so cheering in the beginning of the year, sent his final message to the Legislature on December 3, 1861. In that, referring to the action of the Maryland Legislature at its several sessions before that, when the arrest of its members prevented an organization, he wrote, This continued until the General Government had ample reason to believe that it was about to go through the farce of enacting an ordinance of secession. when the treason was summarily stopped by the dispersion of the traitors. After referring to the elections of the 13th of June and the 6th of November, he says, the people have, declared in the most emphatic tones that I have never doubted that Maryland has no sympathy with the rebellion and desires to do her full share in the duty of suppressing it.

It would be more easy than gracious to point out the inconsistency between his first statements and his last. The conclusion is inevitable that he kept himself an equipoise, and fell at last, as men without convictions usually do, upon the stronger side. Henceforth the story of Maryland is sad to the last degree, only relieved by the gallant men who left their homes to fight in the battle of states' rights When Maryland no longer furnished them a field on which they could maintain the rights their fathers left them. This was a fate doubly sad to the sons of the heroic men who, under the designation of the Maryland Line, did so much in our revolutionary struggle to secure the independence of the states of the men who, at a later day, fought the battle of North Point, and the people of a land which had furnished so many heroes and statesmen, and gave the great Chief Justice Taney to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Though Marilyn did not become one of the Confederate States, she was endeared to the people thereof by many most enduring ties. Last in order, but first in cordiality, were the tender ministrations of her noble daughters to the sick and wounded prisoners who were carried through the streets of Baltimore, and it is with shame we remember that brutal guards upon several occasions inflicted wounds upon gentle women who approached these suffering prisoners to offer them the relief of which they so evidently stood in need. The accumulation of northern forces at and near Washington City made it evident that the great effort of the invasion would be from that point While assaults of more or less vigor might be expected upon all important places which the enemy, by his facilities for transportation, could reach.

The concentration of Confederate troops in Virginia was begun, and they were sent forward as rapidly as practicable to the points threatened with attack. It was soon manifest that, besides the army at Washington, which threatened Virginia, There was a second one at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, under Major General Patterson, designed to move through Williamsport and Martinsburg, and another forming in Ohio, under the command of Major General McClellan, destined to invade the western counties of Virginia. This latter force, having landed at Wheeling on May 26, advanced as far as Grafton on the 29th. At this time, Colonel Porterfield, With a small force of seven hundred men, sent forward by Governor Lecter of Virginia, was at Philippi.

On the night of June 2nd, he was attacked by General McClellan with a strong force, and withdrew to Laurel Hill. Reinforcements under General Garnet were sent forward and occupied the hill, while Colonel Piggeram, the second in command, held Rich Mountain. On July 11th the latter was attacked by two columns of the enemy, and after a vigorous defense fell back on the 12th, losing many of his men who were made prisoners. General Garnett, hearing of this reverse, attempted to fall back, but was pursued by McClellan, and while striving to rally his rear guard was killed. Five hundred of his men were taken prisoners. This success left the northern forces in possession of that region. The difficult character of the country in which the battle was fought, as well from mountain acclivity as dense wood, rendered a minute knowledge of the roads of vast importance.

There is reason to believe that competent guides led the enemy, by roads unknown to our army, to the flank and rear of its position, and thus caused the sacrifice of those who had patriotically come to repel the invasion of the very people who furnished the guides to the enemy. It was treachery, confounding the counsels of the brave. Thus occurred the disaster of Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill. General Robert Garnett was a native of Virginia and graduated the United States Military Academy. He served in Mexico on the staff of General Z. Taylor, and was conspicuous for gallantry and good conduct, especially in the battles of Monterey and Buena Vista. Recognizing his allegiance as due to the State of Virginia, from which he was appointed a cadet, and thence won his various promotions in the Army, he resigned his commission when the State withdrew from the Union, and earnestly and usefully served as aide-de-camp to General R.

E. Lee, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Virginia, until she acceded to the Confederacy. When Western Virginia was invaded, he offered his services to go to her defense, and relying confidently on the sentiment so strong in his own heart of devotion to the state by all Virginians, he believed it was only needful for him to have a nucleus around which the people could rally to resist the invasion of their country. How sadly he was disappointed, And how bravely he struggled against adverse fortune, and how gallantly he died in the discharge of his duty, or memories which, though sad, bare with them to his friends the consolation that the manner of his death was worthy of the way in which he lived, and that even his life was an offering he was not unwilling to make for the welfare and honor of Virginia.

He fell, while commanding the rear guard, To save his retreating army, thus exemplifying the highest quality of man, self-sacrifice for others, and such devotion and fortitude as made Ney the grandest figure in Bonaparte's retreat from Moscow.

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XIII.

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis.

6. Removal of the seat of government to Richmond. Message to Congress at Richmond. Confederate forces in Virginia. Forces of the enemy. Letter to General Johnston. Combat at Bethel Church. Affair at Romney. Movements of McDowell. Battle of Manassas.

The Provisional Congress, in session at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 21st of May, 1861, resolved, quote, that this Congress will adjourn on Tuesday next to meet again on the 20th day of July at Richmond, Virginia, and quote, the resolution further authorized the president to have the several executive departments with their archives removed at such intermediate time as he might determine, and added a proviso that, if any public emergency should render it impolitic to meet in Richmond, he should call the Congress together at some other place to be selected by him. The hostile demonstrations of the United States government against Virginia caused the President, an early day after the adjournment of Congress, to proceed to Richmond and to direct the executive departments with their archives to be removed to that place as soon as could be conveniently done.

In the message delivered to the Congress at its meeting in Richmond, according to adjournment, I gave the following explanation of my conduct under the resolution above cited. Immediately after your adjournment, the aggressive movement of the enemy required prompt, energetic action. The accumulation of his forces on the Potomac sufficiently demonstrated that his efforts were to be directed against Virginia, and from no point could necessary measures for her defense and protection be so effectively decided as from her own capital.

On my arrival in Richmond, General R. E. Lee, as commander of the Army of Virginia, was found there, where he had established his headquarters. He possessed my unqualified confidence, both as a soldier and a patriot, and the command he had exercised over the army of Virginia before her accession to the Confederacy gave him that special knowledge which at the time was most needful. As has been already briefly stated, troops had previously been sent from other states of the Confederacy to the aid of Virginia. The forces there assembled were divided into three armies at positions the most important and threatened. One under General J. E. Johnston at Harpers Ferry, covering the valley of the Shenandoah.

Another under General P. G. T. Beauregard at Manassas, covering the direct approach from Washington to Richmond, and the third under Generals Huger and Magruder at Norfolk and on the peninsula between the James and York Rivers, Covering the approach to Richmond from the seaboard.

The first and second of these armies, though separated by the Blue Ridge, had such practicable communication with each other as to render their junction possible when the necessity should be foreseen. They both were confronted by forces greatly superior in numbers to their own, and it was doubtful which would first be the object of attack. Harper's Ferry, was an important position, both for military and political considerations, and though unfavorably situated for defense against an enemy which should seek to turn its position by crossing the Potomac above, it was desirable to hold it as long as was consistent with safety. The temporary occupation was especially needful for the removal of the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there, and which the enemy had failed to destroy Though he had for that purpose fired the buildings before his evacuation of the post.

The demonstrations of General Patterson, commanding the Federal Army in that region, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on being allowed to retire to a position nearer to Winchester. Under these circumstances, an official letter was addressed to him from which the following extract is made. Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Richmond, June 13, 1861, to General J. E. Johnston, Commanding, Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Sir. You had been heretofore instructed to exercise your discretion as to retiring from your position at Harpers Ferry, and taking the field to check the advance of the enemy. The ineffective portion of your command, together with the baggage and whatever else would impede your operations in the field, it would be well to send without delay to the Manassas Road.

Should you not be sustained by the population of the valley, so as to enable you to turn upon the enemy before reaching Winchester, you will continue slowly to retire to the Manassas Road, upon some of the passes of which it is hoped You will be able to make an effective stand, even against a very superior force. To this end, it might be well to send your engineer to make a reconnaissance and construct such temporary works as may be useful and proper. For these reasons, it has been with reluctance that any attempt was made to give you specific instructions, and you will accept assurances of the readiness with which the freest exercise of discretion on your part will be sustained. Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General.

The earliest combat in this quarter, and which, in the inexperience of the time, was regarded as a great battle, may claim a passing notice as exemplifying the extent to which the individuality, self-reliance, and habitual use of small arms by the people of the South, was a substitute for military training, and, on the other hand, how the want of such training made the northern new levies inferior to the like kind of southern troops. A detached work on the right of General Magruder's line was occupied June 11th, 1861, by the 1st Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers and three hundred and sixty Virginians under the command of an educated, vigilant, and gallant soldier, then Colonel D. H. Hill, 1st Regiment North Carolina Volunteers, subsequently a Lieutenant General in the Confederate service.

He reports that this small force was engaged for five and a half hours with four and a half regiments of the enemy at Bethel Church, nine miles from Hampton. The enemy made three distinct and well-sustained charges, but were repulsed with heavy loss. Our cavalry pursued them for six miles, when their retreat became a total rout. On the other side, Frederick Townsend, Colonel of the Third Regiment of the enemy's forces, after stating with much minuteness the orders and line of march, describes how, about five or six miles from Hampton, a heavy and well-sustained fire of canister and small arms was opened upon the regiment, and how it was afterward discovered to be a portion of their own column which had fired upon them.

After due care for the wounded and a recognition of their friends, the column proceeded, and the colonel describes his regiment as moving to the attack, in line of battle, as if on parade, in the face of a severe fire of artillery and small arms. Subsequently the description proceeds, A company of my regiment had been separated from the regiment by a thickly hedged ditch, and marched in the adjoining field in line with the main body. Not being aware of the separation of that company, the colonel states that, therefore, upon seeing among the brakes in the hedge the glistening of bayonets in the adjoining field, I immediately concluded that the enemy were outflanking, and conceived it to be my duty to immediately retire and repel that advance.

Without knowing anything of the subsequent career of the colonel, from whose report these extracts have been made, or of the officers who opened fire upon him while he was marching to the execution of the orders under which they were all acting, it is fair to suppose that, after a few months' experience, such scenes as are described could not have occurred, and these citations have been made to show the value of military training. In further exemplification of the difference between the troops of the Confederate States and those of the United States, before either had been trained in war, I will cite an affair which occurred on the Upper Potomac. Colonel A. P. Hill, commanding a brigade at Romney in Western Virginia, having learned that the enemy had a command at the Twenty First Bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, decided to attack it and to destroy the bridge, so as to interrupt the use of that important line of the enemy's communication.

For this purpose, he ordered Colonel John C. Vaughan of the Third Tennessee Volunteers to proceed with the detachment of two companies of his regiment and two companies of the Thirteenth Virginia Volunteers to the position where the enemy were reported to be posted. Colonel Vaughan reports that on June 18th, 1861, at 8 p.m., he moved with his command as ordered, marched 18 miles, and at 5 a.m. the next morning, found the enemy on the north bank of the Potomac in some strength of infantry and with two pieces of artillery. He had no picket guards. After reconnaissance, the order to charge was given. It was necessary in the execution of the order to ford the river waist-deep, which, Colonel Vaughan reports, was gallantly executed in good order, but with great enthusiasm.

As we appeared in sight at a distance of four hundred yards, the enemy broke and fled in all directions, firing as they ran only a few random shots. The enemy did not wait to fire their artillery, which we captured, both guns loaded. They were, however, spiked by the enemy before he fled. From the best information, Their number was between two and three hundred.

Colonel Vaughan further states that, in pursuance of orders, he fired the bridge and then retired, bringing away the two guns and the enemy's flag, and other articles of little value which had been captured, and arrived at brigade headquarters in the evening with his command in high spirits, good condition. Colonel A. P. Hill, the Energetic Brigade Commander, who directed this expedition, left the United States Army when the State, which had given him to the military service of the General Government, passed her ordinance of secession. The vigilance and enterprise he manifested on this early occasion in the War of the States gave promise of the brilliant career which gained for him the high rank of a Lieutenant General.

and which there was nothing for his friends to regret, save the honorable death which he met upon the field of battle. Colonel Vaughan, the commander of the detachment, was new to war. His paths had been those of peace, and his home in the mountains of East Tennessee might reasonably have secured him from any expectation that it would ever be the theater on which armies were to contend, and that he in the mutation of human affairs would become a soldier. He lived until the close of the war, and on larger fields than that on which he first appeared, proved that, though not educated for a soldier, he had endowments which compensated for that disadvantage. The activity and vigilance of Stuart, afterwards so distinguished as commander of cavalry in the Army of Virginia, and the skill and daring of Jackson, soon by greater deeds to become immortal, checked, punished, and embarrassed the enemy in his threatened advances, and his movements became so devoid of a definite purpose that one was at a loss to divine the object of his campaign, unless it was to detain General Johnston with his forces in the valley of the Shenandoah, while General MacDowell, profiting by the feint, Should make the real attack upon General Beauregard's army at Manassas.

However that may be, the evidence finally became conclusive that the enemy under General MacDowell was moving to attack the army under General Beauregard. The contingency had, therefore, arisen for that junction which was necessary to enable us to resist the vastly superior numbers of our assailant, For, though the most strenuous and not wholly unsuccessful exertions had been made to reinforce both the armies of the Shenandoah and of the Potomac, they yet remained far smaller than those of the enemy confronting them, and made a junction of our forces indispensable whenever the real point of attack should be ascertained. For this movement we had the advantage of an interior line, So that if the enemy should discover it after it commenced, he could not counteract it by adopting the same tactics.

The success of this policy, it will readily be perceived, depended upon the time of execution, for, though from different causes, failure would equally result if done too soon or too late. The determination as to which army should be reinforced from the other, and the exact time of the transfer, must have been a difficult problem, as both the generals appear to have been unable to solve it, each asking reinforcements from the other. On the 9th of July, General Johnston wrote an official letter, from which I make the following extracts. Headquarters, Winchester, July 9th, 1861. General, similar information from other sources gives me the impression that the reinforcements arriving at Martinsburg Amount to seven or eight thousand.

I have estimated the enemy's force hitherto, you may remember, at eighteen thousand. Additional artillery has also been received. They were greatly superior to us in that arm before. The object of reinforcing General Patterson must be an advance upon this place. Fighting here against great odds seems to me more prudent than retreat. I have not asked for reinforcements. Because I suppose that the War Department, informed of the state of affairs everywhere, could best judge where the troops at its disposal are most required. Most respectfully, your obedient servant, signed, Joseph E. Johnston, Brigadier General, etc. If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest, as soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might with great expedition furnish five or six thousand men, for a few days.

As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of the enemy's movement, I wrote to General Johnston, urging him to make preparations for a junction with General Beauregard, and to his objections and the difficulties he presented, replied at great length, endeavoring to convince him that the troops he described as embarrassing a hasty march might be withdrawn in advance of the more effective portion of his command. Writing with entire confidence, I kept no copy of my letters, and when subsequent events caused the wish to refer to them, I requested General Johnston to send me copies of them. He replied that his tent had been blown down and his papers had been scattered. His letters to me, which would show the general purport of mine to him, have shared the fate which during or soon after the close of the war befell most of the correspondence I had preserved, and his retained copies, if still in his possession, do not appear to have been deemed of sufficient importance to be inserted in his published narrative.

On the 17th of July, 1861, the following telegram was sent by the Adjutant General. Richmond, July 17th, 1861 to General J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Virginia. General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court House, either by Railroad or by Warrington. In all the arrangements, exercise your discretion. S. Cooper. Adjutant and Inspector General.

The confidence reposed in General Johnston, sufficiently evinced by the important command entrusted to him, was more than equal to the expectation that he would do all that was practicable to execute the order for a junction, as well as to secure his sic and baggage, for the execution of the one great purpose. that he would allow no minor question to interfere with that which was of vital importance, and for which he was informed all his effective force would be needed. The order referred to was the telegram inserted above, in which the sending the sick to Culpeper Court House might have been after or before the effective force had moved to the execution of the main and only positive part of the order.

All the arrangements were left to the discretion of the general. It seems strange that anyone has construed this expression as meaning that the movement for a junction was left to the discretion of that officer, and that the forming of a junction, the imperious necessity, should have been termed in the order, all the arrangement, instead of referring that word to its proper connection, the route and mode of transportation. The general had no margin on which to institute a comparison as to the importance of his remaining in the valley, according to his previous assignment, or going where he was ordered by competent authority.

He gives me pleasure to state that, from all the accounts received at the time, the plans of General Johnston for masking his withdrawal to form a junction with General Beauregard were conducted with marked skill, And though all of his troops did not arrive as soon as expected and needed, he has satisfactorily shown that the failure was not due to any defect in his arrangements for their transportation.

The great question of uniting the two armies had been decided at Richmond. The time and place depended on the enemy, and when it was seen that the real attack was to be against the position at Manassas, The order was sent to General Johnston to move to that point. His letters of the Twelfth and Fifteenth Instance expressed his doubts about his power to retire from before the superior force of General Patterson. Therefore, the word practicable was in this connection the equivalent of possible. That it was at the time so understood by General Johnston is shown by his reply to the telegram. Headquarters, Winchester, July 18th, 1861. General, I have had the honor to receive your telegram of yesterday.

General Patterson, who had been at Bunker Hill since Monday, seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, 23 miles to the east of Winchester. Unless he prevents it, we shall move toward General Beauregard today. Signed, Joseph E. Johnston, General S. Cooper.

After General Johnston commenced his march to Manassas, he sent to me a telegram, the substance of which, as my memory serves and the reply indicates, was an inquiry as to the relative position he would occupy toward General Beauregard. I returned the following answer. Richmond, July 20th, 1861, General J. E. Johnston, Manassas, Junction, Virginia. You are a general in the Confederate Army. Possessed of the power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard as well of the ground as of the troops and preparation availed for the success of the object in which you cooperate. The zeal of both assures me of harmonious action. S. Jefferson Davis.

General Johnston, by his promotion to the grade of general, as well as his superior rank as a brigadier over Brigadier-General Beauregard, gave him precedence, so there was no need to ask which of the two would command the whole, when their troops should join and do duty together. Therefore his inquiry, as it was revolved in my mind, created an anxiety not felt before. Lest there should be some unfortunate complication or misunderstanding between these officers when their forces should be united. Regarding the combat of the Eighteenth of July as the precursor of a battle, I decided at the earliest moment to go in person to the Army.

As has been heretofore stated, Congress was to assemble on the Twentieth of July to hold its first session at the new Capitol, Richmond, Virginia. My presence on that occasion and the delivery of a message were required by usage and law. After the delivery of the message to Congress on Saturday, the 20th of July, I intended to leave in the afternoon for Manassas, but was detained until the next morning, when I left by rail, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Colonel J. R. Davis, to confer with the generals on the field. As we approached Manassas Railroad Junction, a cloud of dust was visible a short distance to the west of the railroad. It resembled one raised by a body of marching troops, and recalled to my remembrance the design of General Beauregard to make the Rappahannock his second line of defense.

It was, however, subsequently learned that the dust was raised by a number of wagons, which had been sent to the rear for greater security against the contingencies of the battle. The sound of the firing had now become very distinct, so much so as to leave no doubt that a general engagement had commenced. Though that event had been anticipated as being near at hand after the action of the Eighteenth, it was both hoped and desired that it would not occur quite so soon, the more so as it was not known whether the troops from the valley had yet arrived. On reaching the railroad junction, I found a large number of men, bearing the usual evidence of those who leave the field of battle under a panic.

They crowded around the train with fearful stories of a defeat of our army. The railroad conductor announced his decision that the railroad train should proceed no further. Looking among those who were about us, for one whose demeanor gave reason to expect from him a collected answer, I selected one whose gray beard and calm face gave vast assurance. He, however, could furnish no encouragement. Our line, he said, was broken. All was confusion. The army routed, and the battle lost. I asked for Generals Johnston and Beauregard. He said they were on the field when he left it. I returned to the conductor and told him that I must go on, that the railroad was the only means by which I could proceed, and that until I reached the headquarters I could not get a horse to ride to the field where the battle was raging.

He finally consented to detach the locomotive from the train, and for my accommodation to run it as far as the Army headquarters. In this manner, Colonel Davis, aide-de-camp, and myself proceeded. At the headquarters we found the quartermaster-general, W. L. Cabell, and the Adjutant-General, Jordan, of General Beauregard's staff, who courteously agreed to furnish us horses, and also to show us the route. While the horses were being prepared, Colonel Jordan took occasion to advise my aide-de-camp, Colonel Davis, of the hazard of going to the field, and the impropriety of such exposure on my part. The horses were, after a time, reported ready, and we started to the field. The stragglers soon became numerous, and warnings as to the fate which awaited us if we advanced were not only frequent, but evidently sincere.

There were, however, many who turned back, and the wounded generally cheered upon meeting us. I well remembered one, a mere stripling who, supported on the shoulders of a man who was bearing him to the rear, took off his cap and waved it with a cheer, That showed within that slender form beat the heart of a hero. Breed the spirit that would dare the labors of Hercules. As we advanced, the storm of the battle was rolling westward, and its fury became more faint. When I met General Johnston, who was upon a hill which commanded a general view of the field of the afternoon's operations, and inquired of him as to the state of affairs, He replied that we had won the battle. I left him there, and rode still farther to the west.

Several of the volunteers on General Beauregard's staff joined me, and a command of cavalry, the gallant leader of which Captain John F. Lay, insisted that I was too near the enemy to be without an escort. We, however, only saw one column near to us that created a doubt as to which side it belonged. And as we were riding toward it, it was suggested that we should halt until it could be examined with a field-glass. Colonel Chestnut dismounted, so as the better to use his glass, and at that moment the column formed into line, by which the wind struck the flag so as to extend it, and it was plainly revealed to be that of the United States. Our cavalry, though there was present but the squadron previously mentioned, and from a statement of the commander, of which I will make some extracts, dashed boldly forward to charge.

The demonstration was followed by the immediate retreat of what was, I believe, the last, thereabout, of the enemy's forces maintaining their organization, and showing a disposition to dispute the possession of the field of battle. In riding over the ground, it seemed quite possible to mark the line of a fugitive's flight. Here was a musket, there a cartridge-box, there a blanket or overcoat, a haversack, etc., as if the runner had stripped himself as he went of all impediments to speed. As we approached toward the left of our line, the signs of an utter rout of the enemy were unmistakable, and justified the conclusion that the watchword of, on to Richmond, had been changed to, off for Washington.

On the extreme left of our field of operations, I found the troops whose opportune arrival had averted impending disaster, and had so materially contributed to our victory. Some of them had, after arriving at the Manassas Railroad Junction, hastened to our left. Their Brigadier General, E. K. Smith, was wounded soon after getting into action, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Elsie, By whom it was gallantly and skilfully led to the close of the battle. Others, under the command of General, then Colonel, early, made a rapid march, under the pressing necessity, from the extreme right of our line to and beyond our left, so as to attack the enemy in flank, thus inflicting on him the discomfiture his oblique movement was designed to inflict on us.

All these troops and the others near to them had hastened into action without supplies or camp equipage. Weary, hungry, and without shelter, night closed around them where they stood, the blood-stained victors on a hard-fought field.

It was reported to me that some of the troops had been so long without food as to be suffering severe hunger, and that no supplies could be got where they were. I made several addresses to them, all to the effect that their position was that best adapted to a pursuit of the enemy, and that they should therefore remain there, adding that I would go to the headquarters and direct that supplies should be sent to them promptly.

General, then Colonel, Early, commanding a brigade, informed me of some wounded who required attention. One, Colonel Gardner, was, he said, at a house not far from where we were. I rode to see him, found him in severe pain, and from the twitching visible and frequent seemed to be threatened with tetanus. A man sat beside him whose uniform was that of the enemy, but he was gentle and appeared to be solicitously attentive. He said that he had no morphine, and did not know where to get any. I found in a short time a surgeon who went with me to Colonel Gardner, having the articles necessary in the case. Before leaving Colonel Gardner, he told me that the man who was attending to him might without hindrance have retreated with his comrades, but had kindly remained with him, and he therefore asked my protection for the man.

I took the name and the state of the supposed good Samaritan, and at Army Headquarters directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner. The sequel will be told hereafter. It was then late, and we rode back in the night, say, seven miles, to the Army Headquarters. I had not seen General Beauregard on the field, and did not find him at his quarters when we returned. The promise made to the troops was therefore communicated to a staff officer, who said he would have the supplies sent out. At a later hour, when I met General Beauregard and informed him of what had occurred, he stated that because of a false alarm which had reached him, he had ordered the troops referred to from the left to the right of our line, so as to be in position to repel the reported movement of the enemy against that flank.

That such an alarm should have been credited, and a night march ordered on account of it, shows how little the completeness of the victory was realized.

End of chapter six. Recording by Bill Moseley. Lastly, Llano County, Texas, USA.

19 19 - Part 4, Chapter 7a 42:49

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 7a. Conference with the Generals after the Battle. Order to pursue the enemy. Evidences of a thorough route. Sweet to die for such a cause. Movements of the next day. What more it was practicable to do. Charge against the President of preventing the capture of Washington. The failure to pursue. Reflection on the President. General Beauregard's report. Endorsement upon it. Strength of the opposing forces. Extracts relating to the battle from the narrative of General Early, resolutions of Congress, efforts to increase the efficiency of the army. At a late hour of the night, I had a conference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard.

The adjutant general of the latter, Colonel Jordan, was present and sat opposite to me at the table. When, after some preliminary conversation, I asked whether any troops had been sent in pursuit of the enemy, I was answered in the negative. Upon further inquiry as to what troops were in the best position for pursuit, and had been least fatigued during the day, General Bonham's brigade was named. I then suggested that he should be ordered in pursuit. A pause ensued until Colonel Jordan asked me if I would dictate the order. I at once dictated an order for immediate pursuit. Some conversation followed, the result of which was a modification of the order by myself, so that, instead of immediate pursuit, It should be commenced at early dawn.

Colonel Jordan spoke across the table to me, saying, If you will send the order as you first dictated it, the enemy won't stop till he gets into the Potomac. I believe I remember the words very nearly, and I'm quite sure that I do remember them substantially. On the 25th of March, 1878, I wrote to General Beauregard as follows, quote, Dear Sir, permit me to ask you to recall the conference held between General Johnston, yourself, and myself. On the night after the close of the Battle of Manassas, and to give me, if you can, a copy of the order which I dictated, and which your Adjutant General, T. J. Jordan, wrote at my dictation, directing Brigadier General Bonham to follow To this letter, General Beauregard courteously replied, That his order book was in New York, in the hands of a friend, to whom he would write for a copy of the order desired if it should be in said book, and that he would also write to his adjutant, General Jordan, for his recollection of the order if it had not been inscribed in the order book.

On the 24th of April, General Beauregard forwarded to me the answer to his inquiries in my behalf, as follows. My dear General, in answer to your note, I hasten to say that properly Mr. Davis is not to be held accountable for our failure to pursue McDowell from the field of Manassas the night of the twenty-first of July, eighteen sixty-one. As to the order to which I presume Mr. Davis refers in his note to you, I recollect the incident very distinctly. The night of the battle, as I was about to ascend to your quarters over my office, Captain E. P. Alexander of your staff informed me that Captain Blank, attached to General Johnston's army of the Shenandoah, reported that he had been as far forward as Centerville, where he had seen the Federal army completely routed and in full flight toward Washington.

This statement I at once repeated to Mr. Davis, General Johnston, and yourself, whom I found seated around your table. Mr. Davis at the moment writing a dispatch to General Cooper. As soon as I had made my report, Mr. Davis, with much animation, asserted the necessity for an urgent pursuit that night by Bonham, who, with his own brigade and that of Longstreet, was in close proximity to Centerville at the moment. So I took my seat at the same table with you, and wrote the order for pursuit, substantially at the dictation of Mr. Davis. But while writing, either I happen to remember or Captain Alexander himself, as I am inclined to believe, He called me aside to remind me that his informant was known among us of the old army as because of eccentricities and in contradistinction with others of the same name.

When I repeated this reminder, Mr. Davis recalled the sobriquet as he had a precise personal knowledge of the officers of the old army. He laughed heartily, as did all present. The question of throwing General Bonham forward that night upon the unverified report of Captain . . . was now briefly discussed, with the unanimous decision against it. Therefore the order was not dispatched. It is proper to add in this connection that, so far as I am aware, and I had the opportunity of knowing what occurred, this was the only instance during Mr. Davis's stay at Manassas in which he exercised any voice as to the movement of the troops. Profoundly pleased with the results achieved by the happy juncture of the two Confederate armies upon the very field of battle, His bearing toward the generals who commanded them was eminently proper, as I have testified on a former occasion, and, I repeat, he certainly expressed or manifested no opposition to a forward movement, nor did he display the least disposition to interfere by opinion or authority, touching what the Confederate forces should or should not do.

You, having at the close of the day surrendered the command which had been left in your hands over both Confederate armies during the engagement, General Johnston was that night in chief command. He was decidedly averse to an immediate offensive and emphatically discountenanced it as impracticable. Very truly, your friend signed Thomas Jordan, General P.G.T. Beauregard, New Orleans, Louisiana." General Beauregard, in his letter forwarding the above, wrote, The account given herewith by General Jordan of what occurred there respecting further pursuit that night agrees with my own recollection. It was a matter of importance as I regarded it to follow closely on the retreating enemy, but it was of no consequence then or now as to who issued the order for pursuit, and unless requested, I should not have dictated one, preferring that the generals to whom the operations were confided should issue all orders to the troops.

I supposed the order, as modified by myself, had been sent. I have found, however, since the close of the war, that it was not, but that an order to the same effect was sent on the night of the 21st of July, for a copy of which I am indebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier and patriot, General Bonham. It is as follows. Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. Manassas, July 21st, 1861. Special Orders No. 140. One. General Bonham will send, as early as practicable in the morning, a command of two of his regiments of infantry, a strong force of cavalry, and one field battery to scour the country and roads to his front, toward Centerville. He will carry with him abundant means of transportation for the collection of our wounded, all the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital stores, subsistence, and baggage.

Which will be sent immediately to these headquarters. General Bonham will advance with caution, throwing out an advanced guard and skirmishers on his right and left, and the utmost caution must be taken to prevent firing into our own men. Should it appear, while this command is occupied as directed, that it is insufficient for the purposes indicated, General Bonham will call on the nearest brigade commander for support. 2. Colonel P. St. George Koch. Commanding, will dispatch at the same time for similar purposes a command of the same size and proportions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the road via Stonebridge, and another command of two companies of infantry and one of cavalry on the road.

End quote.

Impressed with the belief that the enemy was very superior to us, both at numbers and appointments, I had felt apprehensive that, unless pressed, he would recover from the panic under which he fled from the field, rally on his reserves, and renew the contest. Therefore, it was that I immediately felt the necessity for a pursuit of the fugitives, and insisted that the troops on the extreme left should retain their position during the night of the 21st, as has been heretofore stated. In conference with the generals at night, this subject was considered, and I dictated an order for a movement on the rear of the enemy at early dawn, which, on account of the late hour at which it was given, differed very little from one for an immediate movement.

A rainfall extraordinary for its violence and duration occurred on the morning of the succeeding day, so that, over places where during the battle one could scarcely get a drink of water, rolled torrents which, in the afternoon of the 22nd, It was difficult to cross. From these and other causes, the troops were scattered to such an extent that but few commands could have been assembled for immediate service. It was well for us that the enemy, instead of retiring in order, so as to be rallied and again brought to the attack, left Hope behind and fled in dismay to seek for safety beyond the Potomac. Each hour of the day following the battle added to the evidence of a thorough rout of the enemy.

Abandoned wagons, stores, guns, caissons, small arms, and ammunition proved his complete demoralization. As far as our cavalry went, no hostile force was met, and all the indications favored the conclusion that the purpose of invasion had, for the time, been abandoned. The victory, though decisive and important, both in its moral and physical effect, had been dearly bought by the sacrifice of the lives of many of our bravest and best. Who, at the first call of their country, had rushed to its defense. When riding to the front, I met an ambulance bearing General Barnard B. from the field, where he had been mortally wounded, after his patriotism had been illustrated by conspicuous exhibitions of skill, daring, and fortitude.

Soon after, I learned that my friend, Colonel Bartow, had heroically sealed with his lifeblood his faith in the sanctity of our cause. He had been the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in the Provisional Congress, and after the laws were enacted to provide for the public defense, he went to the field to maintain them. It is to such virtuous and devoted citizens that a country is indebted for its prosperity and honor, as well in peace as in war. Reference has been made to the dispersion of our troops after the battle, and in this connection the following facts are mentioned. In the afternoon of the 22nd with the guide, Supposed to be cognizant of the positions at which the different commands would be found, I went to visit the wounded, and among them a youth of my family, who, it was reported to me, was rapidly sinking.

After driving many miles and witnessing very painful scenes, but seldom finding the troops in the position where my guide supposed them to be, and always disappointed in not discovering him I particularly sought, I was, at the approach of night, about to abandon the search. When accidentally meeting an officer of the command to which the youth belonged, I was directed to the temporary hospital to which the wounded of that command had been removed. It was too late. The soul of the young soldier had just left his body. The corpse lay before me. Around him were many gentle boys suffering in different degrees from the wounds they had received. One bright, refined-looking youth from South Carolina, severely if not fatally wounded, Responded to my expression of sympathy by the heroic declaration that it was, "'Sweet to die for such a cause.' Many kindred spirits ascended to the Father from that field of their glory.

The role need not be recorded here. It has a more enduring depository than the pen can make, the traditions of a grateful people." The victory at Manassas was certainly extraordinary, not only on account of the disparity of numbers and the inferiority of our arms, But also because of many other disadvantages under which we labored. We had no disciplined troops, and though our citizens were generally skilled in the use of small arms, which, with their high pride and courage, might compensate for the want of training while in position, these inadequately substituted military instruction when maneuvers had to be performed under fire, and could not make the old-fashioned musket equal to the long-range, new-model muskets with which the enemy was supplied.

The disparity in artillery was still greater, both in the number and kind of guns. But thanks to the skill and cool courage of the Reverend Captain W. N. Pendleton, his battery of light smoothbore guns, manned principally by the youths whose rector he had been, proved more effective in battle than the long-range rifle guns of the enemy. The character of the ground brought the forces into close contact, and the ricochet of the round balls carried havoc into the columns of the enemy. While the bolts of their rifle guns, if they missed their object, penetrated harmlessly into the ground. The field was very extensive, broken, and wooded. The senior general had so recently arrived that he had no opportunity minutely to learn the ground, and the troops he brought were both unacquainted with the field and with those with whom they had to cooperate.

To all this must be added the disturbing fact that the plan of battle, as originally designed, The plan was entirely changed by the movement of the enemy on our extreme left, instead of right and center, as anticipated. The operations, therefore, had to be conducted against the plan of the enemy, instead of on that which our generals had prepared and explained to their subordinate commanders. The promptitude with which the troops were moved, and the readiness with which our generals modified their preconceived plans to meet the necessities as they were developed, Entitled them to the commendation so liberally bestowed at the time by their countrymen at large. General Johnston had been previously promoted to the highest grade in our army, and I deemed it but a fitting reward for the services rendered by General Beauregard that he should be promoted to the same grade.

Therefore, I addressed to him the following letter. Manassas, Virginia, July 21st, 1861. Sir, appreciating your services in the Battle of Manassas, And on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are promoted to be a general in the Army of the Confederate States of America. And with the consent of the Congress will be duly commissioned accordingly. Yours, et cetera, signed Jefferson Davis, General P.G.T. Beauregard, et cetera, end quote. The 22nd, the day after the battle, The supplies of the army were on a scale of such luxurious extravagance as to excite the surprise of those accustomed only to our rigid economy.

The anticipation of an easy victory had caused many to come to the battle as to a joyous feast, and the signs left behind them of the extent to which they had been disappointed in the entertainment Constituted the staple of many laughable stories, which were not without their value because of the lesson they contained as to the uncertainties of war and the mortification that usually follows vain boasting. Among the articles abandoned by the enemy in his flight were some which excited a just indignation and which indicated the shameless disregard of all the usages of honorable warfare. They were handcuffs, the fit appendage of a policeman. But not of a soldier who came to meet his foemen hilt to hilt.

These were reported to have been found in large numbers. Some of them were sent to Richmond. On the night of the 22nd, I held a second conference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard. All the revelations of the day were of the most satisfactory character as to the completeness of our victory. The large amount gained of fine artillery, small arms, and ammunition. All of which were much needed by us was not the least gratifying consequence of our success. The generals, like myself, were well content with what had been done. I propounded to them the inquiry as to what more it was practicable to do. They concurred as to their inability to cross the Potomac, and to the further inquiry as to an advance to the south side of the Potomac, General Beauregard promptly stated that there were strong fortifications there, occupied by garrisons, which had not been in the battle, And were therefore not affected by the panic which had seized the defeated army.

He described those fortifications as having wide, deep ditches, with palisades, which would prevent the escalade of the works. Turning to General Johnston, he said, They have spared no expense. It was further stated in explanation that we had no sappers and miners, nor even the tools requisite to make regular approaches. If we had possessed both, The time required for such operations would have more than sufficed for General Patterson's army and other forces to have been brought to that locality in such numbers as must have rendered the attempt with our present means futile. This view of the matter rests on the supposition that the fortifications and garrisons described did actually exist, of which there seemed then to be no doubt.

If the reports which have since reached us be true, That there were, at that time, neither fortifications nor troops stationed on the south bank of the Potomac. That all the enemy's forces fled to the north side of the river, and even beyond. That the panic of the routed army infected the whole population of Washington City, and that no preparation was made or even contemplated for the destruction of the bridge across the Potomac. Then it may have been, as many have asserted, that our army, following close upon the flying enemy, Could have entered and taken possession of the United States Capitol. These reports, however, present a condition of affairs altogether at variance with the information on which we had to act.

Thus it was, and so far as I knew, for the reasons above stated, that an advance to the south bank of the Potomac was not contemplated as the immediate sequence of the victory at Manassas. What discoveries would have been made, and what results would have ensued? From the establishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river, to open fire upon the capital, are speculative questions upon which it would be useless to enter. After the conference of the 22nd, and because of it, I decided to return to Richmond, and employ all the power of my office to increase the strength of the army, so as the better to enable it to meet the public need, whether in offensive, defensive, or purely defensive operations, as opportunity should offer for the one.

The man was given, Holbert of Connecticut. I had forgotten the name he gave me when I saw him, but believing that I would recognize the person who had attended to Colonel Gardiner, and to whom only such a promise had been given, the officer in charge was directed to send him to me. When he came, I had no doubt of his identity, and explained to him that I had directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner, but that, in the multitude of those wearing the same uniform as his, some neglect or mistake had arisen, for which I was very sorry, and that he should be immediately released and sent down the river to the neighborhood of Fortress Monroe, where he would be among his own people. He then told me that he had a sister residing a few miles in the country.

Whom he would be very glad to visit. Permission was given him to do so, and a time fixed at which he was to report for transportation. And so he left, with manifestations of thankfulness for the kindness with which he had been treated. In due time a newspaper was received, containing an account of his escape, and how he had lingered about the suburbs of Richmond and made drawings of the surrounding fortifications. The treachery was as great as if his drawings had been valuable, Which they could not have been, as we had only then commenced the detached works which were designed as a system of defenses for Richmond. When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field of Manassas, and the rejoicing of the victory had spread over the land and spread its exuberance, some who, like Job's war-horse, snuffed the battle from afar, but in whom the likeness there ceased, censoriously asked why the fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington City.

Then some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that battle, instead of the easier task of justification, chose the harder one of exculpation for the imputed failure. Their ill-advised zeal, combined perhaps with malice against me, induced the allegation that the president had prevented the generals from making an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the routed enemy. This, as other stories had been, was left to the correction which time, it was hoped, would bring. The sooner because it was expected to be refuted by the reports of the commanding generals with whom I had conferred on that subject immediately after the battle. After a considerable time had elapsed, it was reported to me that a member of Congress who had served on that occasion as a volunteer aide to General Beauregard had stated in the House of Representatives that I had prevented the pursuit of the enemy after his defeat at Manassas.

This gave to the rumors such official character and dignity As seemed to me to entitle it to notice not theretofore given. Wherefore, I addressed to General Johnston the following inquiry, which, though restricted in its terms to the allegation, was of such tenor as lifted to his option to state all the facts connected with the slander. If he should choose to do me that justice, or should see the public interest involved in the correction, which, as stated in my letter to him, was that which gave it, in my estimation, its claim to consideration. And had caused me to address him on the subject. Quote, Richmond, Virginia, November 3rd, 1861. General J. E. Johnston, Commanding Department of the Potomac.

Sir, reports have been and are being widely circulated to the effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the Battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. Though such statements may have been made merely for my injury, And in that view might be postponed to a more convenient season. They have acquired importance from the fact that they have served to create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass the administration in its further efforts to reinforce the armies of the Potomac, and generally to provide for the public defense. For these public considerations, I call upon you as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on the 21st and 22nd of July.

To say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Banassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other act of operation which it was feasible for the Army to undertake. Very respectfully yours, etc., signed Jefferson Davis.

Headquarters, Centerville, November 10, 1861. To His Excellency the President. Sir, I have had the honor to receive your letter of the third inst. In which you call upon me, as a commanding general and as a party to all the conferences held by you on the twenty-first and twenty-second of July, to say whether you obstructed the pursuit after the victory of Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other act of operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake. To the first question, I reply, no. The pursuit was obstructed by the enemy's troops at Centerville, as I have stated in my official report. In that report, I have also said why no advance was made upon the enemy's capital for reasons as follows.

The apparent freshness of the United States troops at Centerville, which checked our pursuit, the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria, the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of more than 30,000 sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition To the second question I replied that it has never been feasible for the Army to advance farther than it has done. To the line of Fairfax Courthouse, with its advanced posts at Upton's, Munson's, and Mason's Hills. After a conference at Fairfax Courthouse with the three senior general officers, you announced it to be impracticable to give this Army the strength which those officers considered necessary.

End quote.

This answer to my inquiry was conclusive as to the charge which had been industriously circulated that I had prevented the immediate pursuit of the enemy and had obstructed active operations after the Battle of Manassas, and thus had caused the failure to reap the proper fruits of the victory. No specific inquiry was made by me as to the part I took in the conferences of the 21st and 22nd of July, but a general reference was made to them. The entire silence of General Johnston in regard to those conferences is noticeable from the fact that, while his answer was strictly measured by the terms of my inquiry as to pursuit, he added a statement about a conference at Fairfax Courthouse, which occurred in the autumn, say, October.

And could have had no relation to the question of pursuit of the enemy after the victory of Manassas, or other active operations therewith connected. The reasons stated in my letter for making an inquiry, naturally pointed to the conferences of the twenty-first and twenty-second of July, but surely not to a conference held months subsequent to the battle, and on a question quite different from that of hot pursuit, in regard to the matter of the subsequent conference, I shall have more to say hereafter. I left the field of Manassas, Proud of the heroism of our troops in battle, and of the conduct of the officers who led them. Anxious to recognize the claim of the army on the gratitude of the country, it was my pleasing duty to bear testimony to their merit in every available form.

Those who left the field and did not return to share its glory, it was wished, should only be remembered as exceptions proving a rule. With all the information possessed at the time by the commanding generals, the propriety of maintaining our position While seeking objects more easily attained than the capture of the United States Capitol, seemed to me so demonstrable as to require no other justification than the statements to which I have referred in connection with the conference of the 22nd of July. It would have seemed to me then, as it does now, to be less than was due to the energy and fortitude of our troops to plead a want of transportation and supplies for a march of about twenty miles through a country.

Which had not then been denuded by the ravages of war. Under these impressions, and with such feelings, I wrote to General Beauregard as follows. Richmond, Virginia, August 4th, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas, Virginia. My dear sir, I think you are unjust to yourself in putting your failure to pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of short supplies of subsistence and transportation. Under the circumstances of our army, And in the absence of the knowledge since acquired, if indeed the statements be true, it would have been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed. You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you in the night of the 21st to repel a supposed attack upon our right, and that the next day's operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's panic.

Enough was done for glory. And the measure of duty was full. Let us rather show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable, than by dwelling on possibilities recently developed, give form and substance to the criticisms always easy to those who judge. I had declared myself content and gratified with the conduct of the troops and the officers, and supposed the generals... In recognition of my efforts to aid them by increasing their force and munitions, as well as by my abstinence from all interference with them upon the field, would have neither cause nor motive to reflect upon me in their reports, and it was with equal surprise and regret that in this I found myself mistaken. General Johnston, in his report, represented the order to him to make a junction with General Beauregard as a movement left to his discretion, with the condition that, if made, He should first send his sick and baggage to Culpeper Courthouse.

I felt constrained to put upon his report when it was received the following endorsement. The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report, as received by him about one o'clock on the morning of the 18th of July, is inaccurately reported. The following is a copy. Richmond, July 17th, 1861. General J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Virginia. General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Courthouse, either by railroad or by Warrington. In all the arrangements, exercise your discretion. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. The word after is not found in the dispatch before the words sending your sick as is stated in the report.

So that the argument based on it requires no comment. The order to move, if practicable, had reference to General Johnston's letters of the 12th and 15th of July, representing the relative strength and positions of the enemy under Patterson and of his own forces to be such as to make it doubtful whether General Johnston had the power to effect the movement." Upon the receipt of General Beauregard's report of the Battle of Manassas, I found that it contained matter which seemed to me out of place. And therefore addressed to him the following letter. Quote, Richmond, Virginia, October 30th, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas, Virginia. Sir, yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper publications purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to be a synopsis of your report of the Battle of the 21st of July last.

And in which it is represented that you have been overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and the liberation of Maryland. I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has been today submitted to my inspection. It appears by official endorsement to have been received by the Adjutant General on the 18th of October, though it is dated August 26, 1861. With much surprise, I found that the newspaper's statements were sustained by the text of your report. I was surprised because, if we did differ in opinion as to the measure and purposes of contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate place in the report of a battle.

Further, because it seemed to be an attempt to exalt yourself at my expense, and especially because no such plan as that described was submitted to me, it is true that sometime before it was ordered, You expressed a desire for the junction of General Johnston's army with your own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the enemy rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby practicable to make it with safety to the Valley of Virginia. Hence, I believe, was secured the success by which it was attended. If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which you say was submitted to me through Colonel Chestnut, allow me to request that you will furnish me with the duplicate of it.

Very respectfully yours, etc., signed Jefferson Davis. As General Beauregard did not think proper to omit that portion of his report to which objection was made, it necessitated, when the entire report was transmitted to Congress, the placing of an endorsement upon it, reviewing that part of the report which I considered objectionable. The Congress, in its discretion, ordered the publication of the report except that part to which the endorsement referred. Thereby judiciously suppressing both the endorsement and the portion of the report to which it related. In this case, and every other official report ever submitted to me, I made neither alteration nor erasure. That portion of the report which was suppressed by the Congress has, since the war, found its way into the press, but the endorsement which belonged to it has not been published.

As part of the history of the time, I will here present both in their proper connection. Quote, General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Virginia. Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations in the presence of the enemy on July 21st, I propose, I hope not unreasonably, first to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the battle. Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy with the decidedly superior force Both as to numbers and more equipage, to attack or turn my position in this quarter was immediately impending. I dispatched on July 13th one of my staff, Colonel James Chestnut of South Carolina, to submit for the consideration of the President a plan of operations substantially as follows.

I proposed that General Johnston should unite as soon as possible the bulk of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of the Potomac. Then, under my command, Leaving only sufficient force to garrison his strong works at Winchester, and to guard the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold Patterson in check. At the same time, Brigadier General Holmes was to march hither with all of his command not essential for the defense of the position of Aquiac Creek. These junctions having been effected at Manassas, an immediate, impetuous attack of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow. As soon as he approached my advanced position at and around Fairfax Courthouse with the inevitable result, as I submitted, of his complete defeat and the destruction or capture of his army.

This accomplished, the army of the Shenandoah under General Johnston increased with a part of my forces and rejoined as he returned by the detachment left to hold the mountain passes, as to march back rapidly into the valley, fall upon and crush Patterson with the superior force. Weresoever he might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could be achieved within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from Winchester for Manassas. Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this side of the Potomac, if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to enable me to enter them with him, or, if not, to retire again for a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson, having been virtually destroyed, Then General Johnston would reinforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to his opponent, General McClellan, and able to defeat that officer.

This done, General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights, and the defense of their homes and families from an offensive invader. And then marched to the investment of Washington, in the rear, while I resumed the offensive in front. This plan of operations, you are aware, was not acceptable at the time, from considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than counterbalance its proposed advantages. Informed of these views and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my preparations for the stoutest practicable defense of the line of Bull Run, the enemy having developed his purpose by the advance on and occupation of Fairfax Courthouse.

End quote. End quote.

End quote. End quote. End quote. End quote. The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was not, as herein reported, to form a junction, should the movement in his judgment be deemed advisable. The following is an accurate copy of the order. General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Courthouse, either by railroad or by Warrington. In all the arrangements, exercise your discretion. The words, if practicable, had reference to letters of General Johnston of the 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as compared with his own.

The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department, cannot be found among its files. Nor any reference to any decision made upon it, and it was not known that the army had advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message to be verbally delivered was sent by Honorable Mr. Chestnut. If the conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested on the accomplishment of one great condition. Namely, that a junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a victory.

The junction was made, the victory was won, but the consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why no such consequences could result are given in the closing passages of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the responsibility cannot be transferred to the government at Richmond, which certainly would have united In any feasible plan to accomplish such desirable results. If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been presented in a written communication, and in sufficient detail to permit proper investigation, it must have been pronounced to be impossible at that time, and its proposal could only have been accounted for by the want of information of the forces and positions of the armies in the field.

The facts that rendered it impossible are the following. One. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chestnut, on the supposition of drawing a force of about 25,000 men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General Johnston show his effective force to have been only 11,000, with an enemy 30,000 strong in his front, ready to take possession of the Valley of Virginia on his withdrawal. Two. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett in western Virginia. General Garnett's forces amounted only to three or four thousand men, then known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chestnut's arrival in Richmond.

Three. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail. Four. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battlefield would enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, garrisoned, and within supporting distance of fresh troops, nor, after the actual battle and victory, Did the generals on the field propose an advance on the capital? Nor does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a condition to attempt such a movement. It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on file in the War Department As recited at the close of the report, showing what were the causes which prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac.

Signed, Jefferson Davis. End quote. It has not been my purpose to describe the battles of the war. To the reports of the officers serving on the field in the armies of both governments, the student of history must turn for knowledge of the details, and it will be the task of the future historian from comparison of the whole to deduce the truth. It is fortunate for the cause of justice that error and misrepresentation have in their inconsistencies and improbabilities the elements of self-destruction. While truth is, in its nature, consistent and therefore self-sustaining. To such general remarks in regard to campaigns, sieges, and battles as may seem to me appropriate to the scope and object of my work, I shall append or insert, from time to time, the evidence of reliable actors in those affairs, as well to elucidate obscurity as to correct error.

20 20 - Part 4, Chapter 7b 31:26

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 7b. Strength of the Opposing Forces Extracts relating to the battle from the narrative of General Early, resolutions of Congress, efforts to increase the efficiency of the army. From the official reports, it appears that the strength of the two armies was Confederate, 30,167 men of all arms with 29 guns, Federal, 35,732 men with a body of cavalry, of which only one company is reported, and a large artillery force. Not shown in the tabular statement. Of these troops, some on both sides were not engaged in the battle. This, it is believed, was the case to a much larger extent on our side than on that of the enemy.

He selected the point of attack and could concentrate his troops for that purpose. But we were guarding a line of some seven miles front and therefore widely dispersed. For the purpose above stated, extracts are herein inserted from a narrative in the operations on the line of Bull Run. In June and July 1861, including the First Battle of Manassas, the name of the author, J. A. Early, will, to all who know him, be a sufficient guarantee for the accuracy of the statements, and for the justice of the conclusions announced. To those who do not know him, it may be proper to state that he was educated as a soldier after leaving the army became a lawyer, but when his country was involved in war with Mexico, He volunteered and served in a regiment of his native state, Virginia.

After that war terminated, he returned to the practice of his profession, which he was actively pursuing when the controversy between the sections caused the call of a convention to decide whether Virginia should secede from the Union. He was sent by the people of the country in which he resided to represent them in that convention. There, he opposed to the last the adoption of the ordinance for secession. But when it was decided against his opinion to resort to the remedy of withdrawal from the Union, he, true to his allegiance to the state of which he was a citizen, paused not to cavil or protest, but at once stepped forth to defend her against a threatened invasion. The sword that had rusted in peace gleamed brightly in war.

He rose to the high grade of lieutenant-general. None have a more stainless record as a soldier. None have shown a higher patriotism or purer fidelity through all the bitter trials to which we have been subjected since open war was ended and nominal peace began. Extracts from the narrative of General J. E. Early of events occurring when he was Colonel of the 24th Regiment of Virginia Infantry and commanding a brigade. Quote, On June 19th, 1861, I arrived at Manassas Junction and reported to General P. G. T. Beauregard. The 24th Virginia Regiment, having been previously sent to him, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hairston from Lynchburg, where I had been stationed under the orders of General Robert E.

Lee, for the purpose of organizing the Virginia troops, which were being mustered into service at that place. On the morning of July 18th, my brigade was moved by order of General Beauregard to the left of Camp Walker on the railroad and remained there some time. And falling back, General Ewell, in pursuance of his instructions, had burned the bridges on the railroad over Pope's Run, from Fairfax Station to Union Mills, and while I was at Camp Walker, I saw the smoke ascending from the railroad bridge over Bull Run, which was burned that morning. The burning of this bridge had not been included in the previous instructions to Ewell, and I have always been at a loss to know why it was now fired.

That bridge certainly was not necessary to the enemy for crossing Bull Run, either with his troops or wagons, as that stream was easily fordable at numerous places, both above and below. The bridge was, moreover, susceptible of easy defense, as there were deep cuts leading to it on both sides. The only possible purpose to be subserved by the burning of that bridge would have been the prevention for a short time of the running of trains over it by the enemy in the event of our defeat. End quote. The attack made on the 18th is described as directed against our right center, and as having been met and repulsed in a manner quite creditable to our raw troops, of whom he writes, quote, Which consisted of a very few picks and spades, some rough bowie knives, and the bayonets of the muskets.

The position was a very weak one, as the banks on the opposite side of Boron overlooked and commanded those on the south side, which were but a few feet above the water's edge. And there was an open field in rear of the strip of woods on our side of the stream, for a considerable distance up and down it, which exposed all of our movements on that side to observation from the opposite one. As the strip of woods afforded but a thin veil which could be seen through. About dusk on the 19th, brigade commanders were summoned to a conference at Maclean's house by General Beauregard, and he then informed us of the fact that General Johnston had been ordered, at his instance, from the valley, and was marching to cooperate with us.

He stated that Johnston would march directly across the Blue Ridge toward the enemy's right flank, and would probably attack on that flank at dawn the next morning. Before he had finished his statement of the plans he proposed pursuing in the event of Johnston's attack on the enemy's right flank, a party of horsemen rode up in front of the house, and, dismounting, one of them walked in and reported himself as Brigadier General T.J. Jackson, who had arrived with the advanced brigade of Johnston's troops by the way of Manassas Gap Railroad, and he stated that his brigade was about 2,500 strong. This information took General Beauregard very much by surprise, and after ascertaining that General Jackson had taken the cars at Piedmont Station, General Beauregard asked him if General Johnston would not march the rest of his command on the direct road so as to get on the enemy's right flank.

General Jackson replied with some little hesitation, and, as I thought at the time, in rather a stolid manner, that he thought not. That he thought the purpose was to transport the whole force by railroad from Piedmont Station. This was the first time I ever saw General Jackson, and my first impressions of him were not very favorable from the manner in which he gave his information. I subsequently ascertained very well how it was that he seemed to know so little, in the presence of the strangers among whom he found himself, of General Johnston's intended movements. And I presume nothing but the fact of General Beauregard being his superior in rank, and his being ordered to report to him, could have elicited as much information from him, under the circumstances, as was obtained.

After General Jackson had given the information above stated, and received instructions where to put his brigade, he retired, and General Beauregard proceeded to develop fully his plans for the next day. The information received from General Jackson was wholly unexpected. But General Beauregard said he thought Jackson was not correctly informed and was mistaken, that he was satisfied General Johnston was marching with the rest of his troops and would attack the enemy's right flank early next day, as he had before stated. Upon this hypothesis, he directed that when General Johnston's attack began and he had become fully engaged, of which we were to judge from the character of the musketry fire, we should cross Bull Run from our several positions.

And move upon the enemy so as to attack him on his left flank and rear. He said that he had no doubt General Johnston's attack would be a complete surprise to the enemy. That the latter would not know what to think of it. That when he turned to meet that attack, and soon found himself assailed on the other side, he would be still more surprised, and would not know what to do. That the effect would become a complete rout. A perfect Waterloo. And that, when the enemy took to flight, we would pursue... Cross the Potomac and arouse Maryland. During the 20th, General Johnston arrived at Manassas Junction by the railroad, and that day we received the order from him assuming command of the combined armies of General Beauregard and himself.

Early on the morning of the 21st, Sunday, we heard the enemy's guns open from the heights north of Bull Run, from which they had opened on the 18th, and I soon received orders for the movement of my brigade. Upon arriving there, Maclean's Ford, I found General Jones had returned to the entrenchments with his brigade, and I was informed by him that General Beauregard had directed that I should join him, General Beauregard, with my brigade. He then asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard to go to him, and on my replying in the negative, he informed me that he had such an order for me in a note to him. He sent to one of his staff officers for the note, and showed it to me. The note was one directing him to fall back behind Bull Run, and was in pencil.

At the foot of it were these words, Send early to me. This was all the order that I received to move to the left, and it was shown to me a very little after twelve o'clock. Chisholm, who carried the note to Jones, in which was contained the order I received, passed me at McLean's Ford, going on to Jones about or a little after eleven o'clock. If I had not received the order until 2 p.m., it would have been impossible for me to get on the field at the time I reached it, about 3.30 p.m. Colonel Chisholm informed me that the order was for all the troops to fall back across Bull Run. I was met by Colonel John S. Preston, one of the General's aides, who informed me that General Beauregard had gone where the fighting was, but that General Johnston was just in front, and his directions were that we should proceed to the left.

Where there was a heavy fire of musketry. When we reached General Johnston, he expressed great gratification at our arrival, but it was very perceptible that his anticipations were not sanguine. He gave me special instructions as to my movements, directing me to clear our lines completely before going to the front. In some fields on the left of our line, we found Colonel Stewart with a body of cavalry and some pieces of artillery belonging, as I understood, To a battery commanded by Lieutenant Beckham, I found Stuart already in position beyond our extreme left, and, as I understood it, supporting and controlling Beckham's guns, which were firing on the enemy's extreme right flank, thus rendering very efficient service.

I feel well assured that Stuart had but two companies of cavalry with him, as these were all I saw when he afterward went in pursuit of the enemy. As I approached the left, A young man named Saunders came galloping to me from Stuart with the information that the enemy was about retreating, and a request to hurry on. This was the first word of encouragement we had received since we reached the vicinity of the battle. I told the messenger to inform Stuart that I was then moving as rapidly as my men could move, but he soon returned with another message informing me that the other was a mistake, that the enemy had merely retired behind the ridge in front to form a new flanking column. And cautioning me to be on my guard.

This last information proved to be correct. It was the last effort of the enemy to extend his right beyond our left, and was met by the formation of my regiments in his front. The hill on which the enemy's troops were was Chin's Hill, so often referred to in the accounts of this battle, and the one next year, on the same field. An officer came to me in a gallop, and entreated me not to fire on the troops in front. And I was so much impressed by his earnest manner and confident tone that I halted my brigade on the side of the hill and rode to the top of it when I discovered, about a hundred and fifty yards to my right, a regiment bearing a flag which was drooping around the staff in such a manner as not to be distinguishable from the Confederate flag of that day.

I thought that, if the one that had been in front of me was a Virginia regiment, this must also be a Confederate one. But one or two shots from Beckham's guns on the left caused the regiment to face about when its flag unfurled, and I discovered it to be the United States flag. I forthwith ordered my brigade forward, but it did not reach the top of the hill soon enough to do any damage to the retiring regiment, which retreated precipitately down the hill and across the Warrington Pike. At that time, there was very little distinction between the dress of some of the federal regiments and some of ours. As soon as the misrepresentation in regard to the character of the troops was corrected, my brigade advanced to the top of the hill that had been occupied by the enemy, and we ascertained that his troops had retired precipitately, and a large body of them was discovered in the fields in rear of Dogen's house and north of the turnpike.

Colonel Koch, with one of his regiments, now joined us, and our pieces of artillery were advanced and fired upon the enemy's columns with considerable effect, causing them to disperse. And we soon discovered that they were in full retreat. When my column was seen by General Beauregard, he at first thought it was a column of the enemy, having received erroneous information that such a column was on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The enemy took my troops, as they approached his right, for a large body of our troops from the valley. And as my men, moving by flank, were stretched out at considerable length, from weariness they were greatly overestimated. We scared the enemy worse than we hurt him. We saw the evidences of the flight all along our march, and unmistakable indications of the overwhelming character of the enemy's defeat in abandoned muskets and equipments.

It was impossible for me to pursue the enemy farther, as well because I was utterly unacquainted with the crossings of the run and the woods in front, as because most of the men belonging to my brigade had been marching the greater part of the day and were very much exhausted. But pursuit with infantry would have been unavailing, as the enemy's troops retreated with such rapidity that they could not have been overtaken by any other than mounted troops. On the next day, we found a great many articles that the routed troops had abandoned in their flight, showing that no expense or trouble had been spared by the enemy in equipping his army. In my movement after the retreat of the enemy commenced, I passed the Carter House and beyond our line of battle.

The enemy had by this time entirely disappeared, and, having no knowledge of the country whatever, being on the ground for the first time, besides not observing any movement of troops from our line, I halted with the expectation of receiving further orders. Observing some men near the Carter House, I rode to it, and found some five or six Federal soldiers who had collected some wounded there of both sides, and among them Colonel Gardner of the 8th Georgia Regiment. who was suffering from a very painful wound in the leg, which was fractured just above the ankle. Just after my return from the house where I saw Colonel Gardner, President Davis, in company with several gentlemen, rode to where my command was and addressed a few stirring remarks to my regiments, in succession, which received him with great enthusiasm.

I briefly informed Mr. Davis of the orders I had received and the movements of my brigade and asked him what I should do under the circumstances. He told me that I had better get my men into line and wait for further orders. I then requested him to inform Generals Johnston and Beauregard of my position and my desire to receive orders. I also informed him of the condition in which I had found Colonel Gardner, and also of Colonel Jones being in the neighborhood badly wounded, requesting him to have a surgeon sent to their relief, as all of mine were in the rear attending to the wounded of their regiments. While we were talking... We saw a body of troops moving on the opposite side of Bull Run, some distance below us.

Mr. Davis then left me, going to the house where Colonel Gardner was, and I moved my brigade some half a mile farther, and formed it in line across the peninsula formed by a very considerable bend in Bull Run above the stone bridge. I put out a line of pickets in front, and my brigade bevuacked in this position for the night. By the time all these dispositions were made, it was night. And I then rode back with Captain Gardner over the route I had moved on, as I knew no other, in order to find General Johnston or General Beauregard, so that I might receive orders, supposing that there would be a forward movement early in the morning. I first went to the Lewis House, which I found to be a hospital filled with wounded men, but was unable to get any information about either of the generals.

I then rode toward Manassas, and after going some distance in that direction, I met an officer who inquired for General Johnston, stating that he was on his staff. I informed him that I was looking for General Johnston also, as well as for General Beauregard, and supposed they were at Manassas. But he said that he was just from Manassas and neither of the generals was there. At about twelve o'clock at night, I lay down in the field, in rear of my command, on a couple of bundles of wheat in the straw. My men had no rations with them. I had picked up a haversack on the field which was filled with hard biscuits and had been dropped by some Yankee in his flight, and out of its contents I made my own suffer, distributing the rest among a number of officers who had nothing.

Very early next morning I sent Captain Gardner to look out for the generals and get orders for my command. He went to Manassas and found General Beauregard, who sent orders to me to remain where I was until further orders. And to send for the camp equipage, rations, etc., of my command. A number of the men spread over the country in the vicinity of the battlefield, and picked up a great many knapsacks, India rubber cloths, blankets, overcoats, etc., as well as a good deal of sugar, coffee, and other provisions that had been abandoned by the enemy. After I had received orders showing that there was no purpose to make a forward movement, I rode over a good deal of the field, north of the Warrington Pike.

And to some hospitals in the vicinity, in order to see what care was being taken of the wounded. I found a hospital on the Sudley Road, back of the field of battle, at which Colonel Jones of the 4th Alabama had been, which was in charge of a surge of the wounded. I directed a young surgeon of our cavalry. Who rode up at the time to furnish the morphine, which he did, from a pair of medical saddle pockets which he had. Dr. Harris told me that he knew that their troops had had a great deal of coffee and sugar mixed, ready for boiling, of which a good deal had been left at different points near the field, and asked if there would be any objection to his sending out and gathering some of it for the use of the wounded under his charge, as it would be of much service to them.

I gave him the permission to get not only that, But anything else that would tend to the comfort of his patients. There did not come within my observation any instance of harsh or unkind treatment of the enemies wounded, nor did I see any indication of a spirit to extend such treatment to them. The stories which were afterward told before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, appointed by the Federal Congress, in regard to rebel atrocities, were very grossly exaggerated, or manufactured from the whole cloth. On the night following the battle, when I was looking for Generals Beauregard and Johnston, in riding over and to the rear of the battlefield, I discovered that the greater part of the troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state of confusion.

I saw companies looking for their regiments, and squads looking for their companies, and they were scattered as far as I went toward Manassas. It was very apparent that no considerable body of those troops that had been engaged on the left Could have been brought into a condition next day for an advance toward Washington. The dispute as to who planned the battle or commanded on the field, General Johnston or General Beauregard, is a most unprofitable one. The battle which General Beauregard planned was never fought, because the enemy did not move as he expected him to move. The battle which was fought was planned by McDowell, at least so far as the ground on which it was fought was concerned.

He made a movement on our left which was wholly unexpected and unprovided for, and we were compelled to fight a defensive battle on that flank by bringing up reinforcements from other points as rapidly as possible. When Generals Johnston and Beauregard arrived on the field where the battle was actually fought, it had been progressing for some time, with the odds greatly against us. What was required then was to rally the troops already engaged, which had been considerably shattered. And hold the position to which they had been compelled to retire until reinforcements could be brought up. According to the statements of both generals, the command of the troops then on the field was given to General Beauregard, and he continued to exercise it until the close, but in subordination, of course, to General Johnston as commander-in-chief, while the movements of all the reinforcements as they arrived were unquestionably directed by the latter.

According to the statement of both, the movement of Alsey's brigade to the left averted a great danger, and both concur in attributing the turning of the tide of battle to the movement of my brigade against the enemy's extreme right flank, General Beauregard in a letter on the origin of the battle flag, and General Johnston in his narrative recently published. General Beauregard unquestionably performed the duty assigned him with great ability, and General Johnston gives him full credit therefor. Where, then, is there any room for a controversy in regard to the actual command, and what profit can there be in it? General Johnston assumes the responsibility for the failure to advance on Washington, and why, then, should an effort be made to shift it on anyone else?

He certainly was Commander-in-Chief and had the privilege of advancing if he thought proper. The attempt to show that the failure to advance was due to the want of transportation and rations for the army is idle. If the Bull Run Bridge had not been burned on the 18th, our supplies could have been run to Alexandria. If we could have advanced as easily as to Manassas, for the enemy had repaired the railroad to Fairfax Station as he moved up, and failed to destroy it when he went back. Moreover, we had abundant transportation at that time for all the purposes of an advance as far as Washington. In my brigade, the two Virginia regiments had about fourteen six-horse wagons each. And that would have furnished enough for the brigade, if the 7th Louisiana had none.

In 1862, we carried into Maryland only enough wagons to convey ammunition, medical supplies, and cooking utensils. And we started from the battlefield of Second Manassas with no rations on hand, being, before we crossed the Potomac, entirely dependent on the country, which, in July 1861, was teeming with supplies. But in August and September 1862, End quote. I will now make the promised extract from reminiscences of Colonel, then Captain Lay, which were sent to a friend and handed to me for my use. The paper bears date, February 13th, 1878. After some preliminary matter, and stating that his force consisted of three cavalry companies, the narrative proceeds. Quote, I was under orders to be in the saddle at 6.30 a.m., July 21st, 1861, and to report immediately to General Beauregard at his headquarters.

About 7.30 a.m., I accompanied him and General Johnston to a position near to Mitchell's Ford. Where, for some hours, we remained under an active fire of the long-range guns of the enemy upon the opposite hills. When the unexpected flank movement of the enemy was developed, with the generals named, we rode at rapid speed to the left, when General Beauregard immediately rode to the front, General Johnston taking position near and to the left of the Lewis House. About 3.15 p.m., Captain R. Lindsey Walker, with his battery, took position to the left and in front of the Lewis House, And commenced firing. I was near him when the shot from his battery was fired, and watched its effect as it swept through the columns of the enemy, producing perfect confusion and demoralization.

I rode to join my brother, Colonel Lay.

I started at once on a trot. I was passing General Johnston, who gave some orders. And I understood him to say, salute the President in passing. I saluted and passed on at a gallop. I halted at Bull Run to water my horses, then suffering, and to confer a moment or two with my gallant old commander, General Philip St. George Coke. I passed on, when to my astonishment I saw the President near me in the orchard. I immediately rode up to him and said that he was much farther forward than he should be, that the forces of the enemy were not entirely broken, And very few of our troops in front of the run, and advised him to retire. That I was then about to charge. We made the charge. A small body of the enemy broke before we reached them, and scattered, and the larger body of troops beyond proved to be of our own troops rapidly advancing upon our left.

After parting from the President, I pushed on to Sudley Church and far beyond. Sent my surgeon, Dr. Randolph Barksdale, I was going on until a superior force should stop me, but was recalled by an order and returned over the field to my quarters at Manassas a little before daylight. I and my little gallant squadron, having been actively in the saddle, I think, more than twenty hours. Signed, John F. Lay, late Colonel of Cavalry, C.S.A. N.B. It may be well to add that General R. Lindsey Walker, then Captain Walker of the Battery referred to, is now in my office and confirms my recollection. J. F. L., end quote. The Quartermaster General of General Beauregard's command, W. L. Cabell, states in a letter written at Dallas, Texas, on the 16th of August, 1880, in regard to the field transportation of General Beauregard's forces before the Battle of Manassas, that as nearly as he could remember, It was as follows.

This, one four-horse wagon to each company, one four-horse wagon for field and staff regimental, one four-horse wagon for ammunition, one four-horse wagon for hospital purposes, two four-horse wagons for each battery of artillery, twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes, one ambulance for each regiment. Transportation belonging to General Johnston's army did not arrive until the day or probably two days after the battle. If General Johnston, as stated, had 9,000 infantry, the field transportation reported above could surely have been distributed so as to supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Early states, the pretense, wholly untenable, that the advance in July 1861 was prevented by want of transportation.

The Deep Anxiety The peace of the Lord, which had existed and was justified by the circumstances, had corresponding gratification among all classes and in all sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress, then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the President from the field of Manassas, adopted resolutions expressive of their thanks to the Most High God, and inviting the people of the Confederate States to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mighty deliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which had caused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons, and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy, assuring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined the names of the gallant dead as the champions of free and constitutional liberty.

If universal gratulation at our success inspired an overweening confidence, it also begat increased desire to enter the military service. And, but for our want of arms and munitions, we could have enrolled an army little short of the number of able-bodied men in the Confederate States. I have given so much space to the Battle of Manassas because it was the first great action of the war, exciting intense feeling, and producing important moral results among the people of the Confederacy, and further because it was made the basis of misrepresentation and unjust reflection upon the chief executive, which certainly had no plausible pretext in the facts. And cannot be referred to a reasonable desire to promote the successful defense of our country.

Impressed with the conviction that time would naturally work to our disadvantage, as training was more necessary to make soldiers of the northern people than of our own. And further, because of their larger population, as well as their greater facility in obtaining recruits from foreign countries, the administration continued assiduously to exert every faculty to increase the efficiency of the army. By addition to its numbers, by improving its organization, and by supplying the needful munitions and equipments. Inactivity is the prolific source of evil to an army, especially if composed of new levies who, like ours, had hurried from their homes at their country's call. For these and other reasons more readily appreciated, it was thought desirable that all our available forces should be employed as actively as might be practicable.

On the 1st of August, 1861, I wrote to General J. E. Johnston at Manassas as follows, quote, We are anxiously looking for the official reports of the Battle of Manassas, and have present need to know what supplies and wagons were captured. I wish you would have prepared a statement of your wants in transportation and supplies of all kinds, to put your army on a proper footing for active operations. I am, as ever, your friend. Signed, Jefferson Davis, end quote.

21 21 - Part 4, Chapter 8a 27:58

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 8a. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99. Their influence on political affairs. Kentucky declares for neutrality. Correspondence of Governor McGoffin with the President of the United States and the President of the Confederate States. Occupation of Columbus, Kentucky by Major General Polk. His correspondence with the Kentucky Commissioners. Kentucky, the eldest daughter of Virginia, had moved contemporaneously with her mother In the assertion of the cardinal principles announced in the resolutions of 1798-99, she then, by the properly constituted authority, did, with due solemnity, declare that the government of the United States was a result of a compact between the states to which each acceded as a state, that it possessed only delegated powers, of which it was not the exclusive or final judge, and that, as in all cases of compact among parties having no common judge, Each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions, as of the mode and measure of redress.

Thus spoke Kentucky in the first years of her existence as a sovereign. The great truth announced in her series of resolutions was the sign under which the democracy conquered in 1800, and which constituted the cornerstone of the political edifice of which Jefferson was the architect, and which stood unshaken for sixty years from the time its foundation was laid. During this period, the growth, prosperity, and happiness of the country seemed unmistakably to confirm the wisdom of the voluntary union of free sovereign states under a written compact confining the action of the general government to the expressly enumerated powers which had been delegated therein. When infractions of the compact had been deliberately and persistently made, when the intent was clearly manifested to pervert the powers of the general government from the purposes for which they had been conferred, And to use them for the injury of a portion of the states, which were the integral parties to the Compact, some of them resolved to judge for themselves of the mode and measure of redress, and to exercise the right, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence to be the unalienable endowment of every people, to alter or abolish any form of government, and to institute a new one, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form.

As to them shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness. By no rational mode of construction in view of the history of the Declaration of Independence or of the resolutions of Kentucky can it be claimed that the word people had any other meaning than that of a distinct community, such as the people of each colony, who by their delegates in the Congress declared themselves to be henceforth a state, and that none other than the people of each state could Kentucky made no decision adverse to this right of a state, but she declared, in the impending conflict between the states seceding from and those adhering to the federal government, that she would hold the position of neutrality.

If the question was to be settled by a war of words, that was feasible, but... If the conflict was to be one of arms, it was utterly impracticable. To maintain neutrality under such circumstances would have required a power greater than that of both the contestants, or a moral influence commanding such respect for her wishes as could hardly have been anticipated from that party which had, in violation of right, inflicted the wrongs which produce a withdrawal of some of the states, and had uttered multiplied threats of coercion, If any state attempted to exercise the rights defined in the resolutions of 1798-99, if, however, any such hope may have been entertained, but few moons had filled and waned before the defiant occupation of her territory and the enrollment of her citizens as soldiers in the Army of Invasion must have dispelled the illusion.

The following correspondence took place in August between Governor McGoffin of Kentucky and President Lincoln, also between the Governor and myself. As President of the Confederate States, relative to the neutrality of the state. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department, Frankfurt, August 19, 1861. To His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States. Sir, from the commencement of the unhappy hostilities now pending in this country, the people of Kentucky have indicated an earnest desire and purpose as far as lay in their power. While maintaining their original political status, to do nothing by which to involve themselves in the war. Up to this time they have succeeded in securing to themselves and to the state peace and tranquility as the fruits of the policy they adopted.

My single object now is to promote the continuance of these blessings to this state. Until within a brief period, the people of Kentucky were quiet and tranquil, free from domestic strife, and undisturbed by internal commotion. They have resisted no law, rebelled against no authority, engaged in no revolution, but constantly proclaimed their firm determination to pursue their peaceful avocations, earnestly hoping that their own soil would be spared the presence of armed troops, and that the scene of conflict would be kept removed beyond the border of their state. By thus avoiding all occasions for the introduction of bodies of armed soldiers, and offering no provocation for the presence of military force, The people of Kentucky have sincerely striven to preserve in their state domestic peace and avert the calamities of sanguinary engagements.

Recently, a large body of soldiers have been enlisted in the United States Army and collected in military camps in the central portion of Kentucky. This movement was preceded by the active organization of companies, regiments, etc., consisting of men sworn into the United States service under officers holding commissions from yourself. Ordnance, arms, munitions, and supplies of war are being transported into the state and placed in large quantities in these camps. In a word, an army is now being organized and quartered within the state, supplied with all the appliances of war. Without the consent or advice of the authorities of the state, and without consultation with those most prominently known and recognized as loyal citizens.

This movement now imperils that peace and tranquility which, from the beginning of our pending difficulties, The people are quiet and tranquil, feeling no apprehension of any occasion arising to invoke protection from the Federal arm. They have asked that their territory be left free from military occupation, and the present tranquility of their communication left uninvaded by soldiers. They do not desire that Kentucky shall be required to supply the battlefield for the contending armies, or become the theater of the war. Now, therefore, as governor of the state of Kentucky, and in the name of the people I have the honor to represent, and with the single and earnest desire to avert from their peaceful homes the horrors of war, I urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within the state.

If such action as is here urged be promptly taken, I firmly believe the peace of the people of Kentucky will be preserved, and the horrors of a bloody war will be averted from a people now peaceful and tranquil. I am very respectfully your obedient servant, B. McGoffin."

Washington, August 24, 1861. To His Excellency B. McGoffin, Governor of the State of Kentucky, Sir, your letter of the nineteenth instant, in which you I urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within that state is received. I may not possess full and precisely accurate knowledge upon this subject, but I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large and is not now being augmented. I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky.

In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed and still believe to be the wish of a majority of all the union-loving people of Kentucky. While I have conversed on this subject with many of the eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them, or any other person except Your Excellency and the bearers of Your Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky, or to disband it. One very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time, taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment.

I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force shall be removed beyond her limits, and with this impression I must respectfully decline to so remove it. I most cordially sympathize with Your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native state, Kentucky. It is with regret I search for, and cannot find, in your not very short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union. Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln. Quote. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department, Frankfurt, August 24, 1861. Honorable Jefferson Davis, Richmond, Virginia. Sir, since the commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending in the country, the people of Kentucky have indicated a steadfast desire and purpose to maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent parties.

They have earnestly striven by their policy to avert from themselves the calamity of war and protect their own soil from the presence of contending armies. Up to this period, they have enjoyed comparative tranquility and entire domestic peace. Recently, a military force has been enlisted and quartered by the United States authorities within this state. I have on this day addressed a communication and dispatched commissioners to the President of the United States Urging the removal of these troops from the soil of Kentucky, and thus exerting myself to carry out the will of the people in the maintenance of a neutral position. The people of this state desire to be free from the presence of the soldiers of either belligerent, and to that end my efforts are now directed.

Although I have no reason to presume that the government of the Confederate States contemplate or have ever proposed any violation of the neutral attitude thus assumed by Kentucky. There seems to be some uneasiness felt among the people of some portion of the state, occasioned by the collection of bodies of troops along their southern frontier. In order to quiet this apprehension and to secure to the people their cherished object of peace, this communication is to present these facts and elicit an authoritative assurance that the government of the Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the position indicated as assumed by Kentucky. Very respectfully, your obedient servant End quote.

Quote, Richmond, August 28, 1861. To Honorable B. McGoffin, Governor of Kentucky, etc. Sir, I have received your letter informing me that, since the commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending in the country, the people of Kentucky have indicated a steadfast desire to maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent parties. In the same communication, you express your desire to elicit In reply to this request, I lose no time in assuring you that the government of the Confederate States neither desires nor intends to disturb the neutrality of Kentucky. The assemblage of troops in Tennessee, to which you refer, had no other object than to repel the lawless invasion of that state by the forces of the United States, should their government seek to approach it through Kentucky.

Without respect for its position of neutrality. That such apprehensions were not groundless as being proved by the course of that government in the states of Maryland and Missouri, and more recently in Kentucky itself, in which, as you inform me, a minute... The military force has been enlisted and quartered by the United States authorities. The government of the Confederate States has not only respected most scrupulously the neutrality of Kentucky, but has continued to maintain the friendly relations of trade and intercourse Which it has suspended with the United States generally. In view of the history of the past, it can scarcely be necessary to assure Your Excellency that the government of the Confederate States will continue to respect the neutrality of Kentucky so long as her people will maintain it themselves.

But neutrality, to be entitled to respect, must be strictly maintained between both parties, or if the door be opened on the one side for the aggressions of one of the belligerent parties upon the other. It ought not to be shut to the assailed when they seek to enter it for purposes of self-defense. I do not, however, for a moment believe that your gallant state will suffer its soil to be used for the purpose of giving an advantage to those who violate its neutrality and disregard its rights over others who respect both. In conclusion, I tender to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration and regard, and am, sir, very respectfully, yours, etc.

Movements by the Federal forces in southwestern Kentucky revealed such designs as made it absolutely necessary that General Polk, commanding the Confederate forces in that section, should immediately occupy the town of Columbus, Kentucky, a position of much strategic importance on the shore of the Mississippi River. That position was doubly important because it commanded the opposite shore in Missouri and was the gateway on the border of Tennessee. Two states of the Confederacy were therefore threatened by the anticipated movement of the enemy to get possession of Columbus. Major General Polk, therefore, crossed the state line, took possession of Hickman on September 3rd, and on the 4th secured Columbus.

General Grant, who took command at Cairo on September 2nd, being thus anticipated, seized Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee River and occupied it in force on the 5th and 6th. After the occupation, under date of September 4th, I received the following dispatch from Major General Polk. The enemy having descended the Mississippi River some three or four days since, and seated himself with cannon and entrenched lines opposite the town of Columbus, Kentucky, making such demonstrations as left no doubt upon the minds of any of their intention to seize and forcibly possess said town, I thought proper, under the plenary power delegated to me. To direct a sufficient portion of my command, both by the riverway and land, to concentrate at Columbus, as well to offer to its citizens that protection they unite to a man in accepting, as also to prevent, in time, the occupation by the enemy of a point so necessary to the security of western Tennessee.

The demonstration on my part has had the desired effect. The enemy has withdrawn his forces even before I had fortified my position. It is my intention to continue to occupy and hold this place. On the same day, I sent the following reply to Major General Polk. Your telegram received. The necessity must justify the action. The legislature of Kentucky passed resolutions and appointed a committee to inquire into the action of General Polk, from which the annexed correspondence resulted. Correspondence between Major General Polk and the authorities of Kentucky. Resolutions of the Kentucky Senate. Relative to the violation of the neutrality of Kentucky. Resolved by the Senate that the special committee of the Senate raise for the purpose of considering the reported occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by Confederate troops Take into consideration the occupation of Paducah and other places in Kentucky by the federal authorities, and report thereon when the true state of the case shall have been ascertained.

Let the Speaker appoint three members of the Senate to visit southern Kentucky. Who are directed to obtain all the facts they can in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by Confederate and Federal forces, and report in writing at as early a day as practicable. In Senate of Kentucky, Saturday, September 7th, A.D. 1861. Twice read and adopted, a test signed J.H. Johnson, S.S. In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the Speaker appointed as said committee, Messrs. John M. Johnson, William B. Reed and Thornton F. Marshall. A test signed J.H. Johnson, SS. Letter of Honorable J.M. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee of the Kentucky Senate to General Polk. Quote, Columbus, Kentucky, September 9th, 1861.

To Major General Polk, commanding forces, et cetera. Sir, I have the honor to enclose herewith a resolution of the Senate of Kentucky.

I need not say that the people of Kentucky are profoundly astonished that such an act should have been committed by the Confederates, and especially that they should have been the first to do so with an equipped and regularly organized army. The people of Kentucky, having with great unanimity determined upon a position of neutrality, In the unhappy war now being waged, and which they had tried in vain to prevent, had hoped that one place at least in this great nation might remain uninvaded by passion, and through whose good office something might be done to end the war, or at least In obedience to the thrice-repeated will of the people, as expressed at the polls and in their name. I ask you to withdraw your forces from the soil of Kentucky.

I will say in conclusion that all the people of the state await, in deep suspense, your action in the premises. I have the honor to be your obedient servant, et cetera, signed, John M. Johnson, Chairman of Committee." Letter from General Polk to the Kentucky Commissioners. Columbus, Kentucky, September 9, 1861. To J. M. Johnson, Chairman of Committee, Senate of Kentucky.

Directed to obtain all the facts they can in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and Federal Forces, and report in writing, at as early a day as practicable. From the terms of the resolution, it appears your office, as committee men, was restricted merely to collecting the facts in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and Federal Forces, and to report thereon in writing, at as early a day as possible. In answer to these resolutions, I have respectfully to say that, so far as the Confederate forces are concerned, the facts are plain, and shortly stated, the government which they represent, recognizing as a fundamental principle the right of sovereign states to take such a position as they choose in regard to their relations with other states, was compelled by that principle to concede to Kentucky the right to assume the position of neutrality, which she has chosen in the passing struggle.

This it has done on all occasions, and without an exception. The case is alluded to by His Excellency Governor McGoffin in his recent message as raids, I presume, are the cases of the steamers Cheney and Orr. The former was the unauthorized and unrecognized act of certain citizens of Alabama, and the latter the act of citizens of Tennessee and others, and was an act of reprisal. They cannot, therefore, be charged, in any sense, as acts of the Confederate government. The first and only instance in which the neutrality of Kentucky has been disregarded is that in which the troops under my command and by my direction took possession of the place I now hold, and so much of the I had no territory between it and the Tennessee line as was necessary for me to pass over in order to reach it.

This act finds abundant justification in the history of the concessions granted to the federal government by Kentucky ever since the war began. Notwithstanding the position of neutrality which she had assumed, and the firmness with which she proclaimed her intention to maintain it. That history shows the following, among other facts. In January, the House of Representatives of Kentucky passed anti-coercion resolutions, only four dissenting. The governor, in May, issued his neutrality proclamation. The address of the Union Central Committee, including Mr. James Speed, Mr. Prentiss, and other prominent Union men, In April, proclaimed neutrality as a policy of Kentucky and claimed that an attempt to coerce the South should induce Kentucky to make common cause with her and take part in the contest on her side, without counting the cost.

The union speakers and papers, with few exceptions, claimed, up to the last election, that the union vote was strict neutrality and peace. These facts and events gave assurance of the integrity of the avowed purpose of your state. And we were content with the position, she assumed. Since the election, however, she has allowed the seizure in her port, Paducah, of property of citizens of the Confederate States. She has, by her members in the Congress of the United States, voted supplies of men and money to carry on the war against the Confederate States. She has allowed the federal government to cut timber from her forests for the purpose of building armed boats for the invasion of the southern states.

She is permitting to be enlisted in her territory troops not only of her own citizens, but of the citizens of other states for the purpose of being armed and used in offensive warfare against the Confederate states. At Camp Robinson, in the county of Garrett, there are now 10,000 troops, if the newspapers can be relied upon, in which men from Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois are mustered with Kentuckians into the service of the United States. And armed by that government for the avowed purpose of giving aid to the disaffected in one of the Confederate States, and of carrying out the designs of that government for their subjugation. Notwithstanding all these and other acts of a similar character, the Confederate States have continued to respect the attitude which Kentucky had assumed as a neutral, and forborne from reprisals in the hope that Kentucky would yet enforce respect for her position on the part of the government of the United States.

Our patient expectation has been disappointed, and it was only when we perceived that this continued indifference to our rights and our safety was about to culminate in the seizure of an important part of her territory by the United States forces for offensive operations against the Confederate States that a regard for self-preservation demanded of us to seize it in advance. We are here, therefore, not by choice, but of necessity. And as I have had the honor to say, in a communication addressed to His Excellency, Governor McGoffin, a copy of which is herewith enclosed and submitted as a part of my reply. So I now repeat, in answer to your request, that I am prepared to agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided she will agree that the troops of the federal government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee, which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate government, that the federal troops shall not be allowed to enter nor occupy Any part of Kentucky for the future.

In view of the facts thus submitted, I cannot but think the world at large will find it difficult to appreciate the profound astonishment with which you say the people of Kentucky receive the intelligence of the End quote.

Letter from General Polk to Governor McGuffin, quote, Columbus, Kentucky, September 3, 1861. Governor McGovin, Frankfurt, Kentucky. I should have dispatched to you immediately, as the troops under my command took possession of this position, the very few words I addressed to the people here, but my duties since that time have so preoccupied me that I have but now the first leisure moment to communicate with you. It will be sufficient for me to inform you, as my short address herewith will do, that I had information. I need not describe to you the danger resulting to western Tennessee from such occupation. My responsibility could not permit me quietly to lose to the command entrusted to me so important a position.

In evidence of the accuracy of the information I possessed, I will state that, as the Confederate force approached this place, The Federal troops were found in formidable numbers in position upon the opposite bank, with their cannon turned upon Columbus. The citizens of the town had fled with terror, and not a word of assurance of safety or protection had been addressed to them. Since I have taken possession of this place, I have been informed by highly respected citizens of your state that certain representatives of the Federal Government are seeking to take advantage of its own wrong, are setting up complaints against my acts of occupation, And are making it a pretest for seizing other points.

Upon this proceeding, I have no comments to make, but I am prepared to say that I will agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided that she will agree that the troops of the federal government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate government that the federal troops shall not be allowed to enter or occupy any part of Kentucky in the future. I have the honor to be respectfully your obedient servant, signed Leonidas Polk, Major General Commanding.

22 22 - Part 4, Chapter 8b 30:38

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 8b. President Lincoln's View of Neutrality. Acts of the United States Government. Refugees. Their Motives of Expatriation. Address of Ex-Vice President Breckinridge to the people of the state. The occupation of Columbus secured. The purpose of the United States Government. Battle of Belmont. Albert Sidney Johnston commands the department. State of Affairs. Line of Defense. Efforts to obtain arms. Also troops. However willing the government of Kentucky might have been to accede to the proposition of General Polk, and which from his knowledge of the views of his own government he was fully justified in offering, the state of Kentucky had no power, moral or physical, to prevent the United States government from using her soil as best might suit its purposes in the war it was waging for the subjugation of the seceded states.

President Lincoln, in his message of the previous July, He had distinctly and reproachfully spoken of the idea of neutrality as existing in some of the border states. He said, quote, "...to prevent the Union forces passing one way or the disunion the other over their soil would be disunion completed. At a stroke, it would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade." End quote. The acts of the federal government corresponded with the views announced by its president. Briefly, but conclusively, General Polk showed in his answer that the United States government paid no respect to the neutral position which Kentucky wished to maintain, that it was armed, but not neutral, for the arms and the troops assembled on her soil were for the invasion of the South, and that he occupied Columbus to prevent the enemy from taking possession of it.

When our troops first entered Columbus, they found the inhabitants had been in alarm from demonstrations of the United States forces. But that they felt no dread of the Confederate troops. As far as the truth could be ascertained, a decided majority of the people of Kentucky, especially its southwestern portion, if left to a free choice, would have joined the Confederacy in preference to remaining in the Union. Could they have foreseen what in a short time was revealed, there can be little doubt that mule contracts and other forms of bribery would have proved unavailing. To make her the passive observer of usurpations destructive of the personal and political rights of which she had always been a most earnest advocate.

With the slow and sinuous approach of the serpent, the general government, little by little, gained power over Kentucky, and then, throwing off the mask, proceeded to outrage so regardless of law and the usages of English-speaking people as could not have been anticipated, and can only be remembered with shame. By those who honor the constitutional government created by the states. While artfully urging the maintenance of the Union as a duty of patriotism, the Constitution which gave the Union birth was trampled underfoot, and the excesses of the reign of terror which followed the French Revolution were reenacted in our land, once the vaunted home of law and liberty. Men who had been most honored by the state, and who had reflected back most honor upon it, were seized without warrant, condemned without trial, because they had exercised the privilege of free speech, and for adhering to the principles which were the bedrock on which our fathers builded our political temple.

Members of the legislature vacated their seats and left the state to avoid arrest, the penalty hanging over them for opinion's sake. The venerable Judge Monroe, who had presided over the United States District Court for more than a generation, Driven from the land of his birth, the state he had served so long and so well, with feeble step but upright conscience and indomitable will, sought a resting place among those who did not regard it a crime to adhere to the principles of 1776 and of 1787, and the declaratory affirmation of them in the resolutions of 1793-99. About the same time, others of great worth and distinction, impelled by the feeling that Where liberty is, there is my country. Left the land desecrated by despotic usurpation to join the Confederacy in its struggle to maintain the personal and political liberties which men of the Revolution had left as an inheritance to their posterity.

Space would not suffice for a complete list of the refugees who became conspicuous in the military events of the Confederacy. Let a few answer for the many. J.C. Breckinridge, the late Vice-President of the United States, and whose general and well-deserved popularity might have reasonably led him to expect in the Union the highest honors the states could bestow. William Preston, George W. Johnston, S.B. Buckner, John H. Morgan, and a host of others alike meritorious and alike gratefully remembered. When the passions of the hour shall have subsided. And the past shall be reviewed with discrimination and justice. The question must arise in every reflecting mind, why did such men as these expatriate themselves, and surrender all the advantages which they had won by a life of honorable effort in the land of their nativity?

To such inquiry, the answer must be, the usurpations of the general government foretold to them the wreck of constitutional liberty. The motives which govern them may best be learned. From the annexed extracts from the statement made in the address of Mr. Breckinridge to the people of Kentucky, whom he had represented in both houses of the United States Congress, with such distinguished ability and zeal for the general welfare as to place him in the front rank of the statesmen of his day.

And at the special session of Congress in July, spoke and voted against the whole war policy of the President and Congress, demanding, in addition, for Kentucky, the right to refuse, not men only, but money also, to the war, for I would have blushed to meet you with the confession that I had purchased for you exemption from the perils of the battlefield, and the shame of waging war against your Southern brethren, by hiring others to do the work you shrunk from performing. During that memorable session, a very small body of senators and representatives, even beneath the shadow of a military despotism, resisted the usurpations of the executive and with what degree of dignity and firmness they willingly submit to the judgment of the world.

Their efforts were unavailing, yet they may prove valuable hereafter as another added to former examples of many protest against the progress of tyranny. On my return to Kentucky, at the close of the late special session of Congress, it was my purpose immediately to resign the office of Senator. The verbal and written remonstrances of many friends in different parts of the state induced me to postpone the execution of my purpose, but the time has arrived to carry it into effect, and accordingly, I now hereby return the trust into your hands. In the House of Representatives, it was declared that the South should be reduced to abject submission. In the Senate, it was said that, if necessary, the South should be depopulated and repeopled from the North, and an eminent senator expressed a desire that the President should be made dictator.

This was superfluous, since they had already clothed him with dictatorial powers. In the midst of these proceedings, no plea for the Constitution is listened to in the North. Here and there a few heroic voices are feebly heard protesting against the progress of despotism. But, for the most part, beyond the military lines, mobs and anarchy rule the hour. The great mass of the northern people seem anxious to sunder every safeguard of freedom. They eagerly offer to the government what no European monarch would dare to demand. The president and his generals are unable to pick up the liberties of the people as rapidly as they are thrown at their feet. In every form by which you could give direct expression to your will, you declared for neutrality.

A large majority of the people at the May and August elections voted for the neutrality and peace of Kentucky. The press, the public speakers, the candidates, with exceptions in favor of the government at Washington, so rare as not to need mention, planted themselves on this position. You voted for it, and you meant it. You were promised it, and you expected it. Look now at the condition of Kentucky. And see how your expectations have been realized, how these promises have been redeemed. General Anderson, the military dictator of Kentucky, announces in one of his proclamations that he will arrest no one who does not act, write, or speak in opposition to Mr. Lincoln's government. It would have completed the idea if he had added, or think, in opposition to it.

Look at the condition of our state under the rule of our new protectors. They have suppressed the freedom of speech. And of the press. They seize people by military force upon mere suspicion and impose on them oaths unknown to the laws. Other citizens they imprison without warrant and carry them out of the state, so that the writ of habeas corpus cannot reach them. Every day foreign armed bands are making seizures among the people. Hundreds of citizens, old and young, venerable magistrates, whose lives have been distinguished by the love of the people, Have been compelled to fly from their homes and families to escape imprisonment and exile at the hands of Northern and German soldiers, under the orders of Mr.

Lincoln and his military subordinates. While yet holding an important political trust, confided by Kentucky, I was compelled to leave my home and family or suffer imprisonment and exile. If it is asked why I did not meet the arrest and seek a trial, my answer is that I would have welcomed an arrest to be followed by a judge and jury. But you well know that I could not have secured these constitutional rights. I would have been transported beyond the state to languish in some federal fortress during the pleasure of the oppressor. Witness the fate of Moorhead and his Kentucky associates in their distant and gloomy prison. The case of the gentleman just mentioned is an example of many others, and it meets every element in a definition of despotism.

If it should occur in England, it would be righted, or it would overturn the British Empire. He is a citizen and native of Kentucky. As a member of the legislature, Speaker of the House, Representative in Congress from the Ashland District, and Governor of the state, you have known, trusted, and honored him during a public service of a quarter of a century. He is eminent for his ability, his amiable character, and his blameless life. Yet this man without indictment, without warrant, without accusation, but by the order of President Lincoln, was seized at midnight in his own house. and in the midst of his own family, and led through the streets of Louisville, as I am informed, with his hands crossed and pinioned before him, was carried out of the state and district, and now lies a prisoner in a fortress in New York Harbor, a thousand miles away.

The Constitution of the United States, which these invaders unconstitutionally swear every citizen whom they unconstitutionally cease to support, has been wholly abolished. It is as much forgotten as if it lay away back in the twilight of history. The facts I have enumerated show that the very rights most carefully reserved by it to the states and to individuals have been most conspicuously violated. Your fellow citizen signed John C. Breckinridge. Such was the neutrality suffered by the Confederacy from governments both at home and abroad. The chivalric people of Kentucky showed their sympathy with the just cause of the people of the southern states, by leaving the home where they could not serve the cause of right against might, and nobly shared the fortunes of their southern brethren on many a blood-dyed field.

In like manner did the British people see with disapprobation their government, while proclaiming neutrality, make new rules and give new constructions to old ones, so as to favor our enemy and embarrass us. The Englishman's sense of fair play and the manly instinct which predisposes him to side with the weak gave us hosts of friends. But all their good intentions were paralyzed or foiled by their wily Minister for Foreign Affairs and his coadjutor on this side, the artful, unscrupulous United States Secretary of State. I have thus presented the case of Kentucky, not because it was the only state where false promises lawed the people into delusive security, Until, by gradual approaches, usurpation had bound them hand and foot, and where despotic power crushed all the muniments of civil liberty which the Union was formed to secure.

But because of the attempt, which has been noticed, to arraign the Confederacy for invasion of the state in disregard of her sovereignty, the occupation of Columbus by the Confederate forces was only just soon enough to anticipate the predetermined purpose of the federal government. All of which was plainly set forth in the letter of General Polk to the Governor of Kentucky, and his subsequent letter to the Kentucky Commissioners. Missouri, like Kentucky, had wished to preserve peaceful relations in the contest which it was foreseen would soon occur between the Northern and the Southern states. When the federal government denied to her the privilege of choosing her own position, which betokened no hostility to the general government, And she was driven to the necessity of deciding whether or not her citizens should be used for the subjugation of the southern states.

Her people and their representative, the state government, repelled the arbitrary assumption of authority by military force to control her government and her people. Among other acts of invasion, the federal troops had occupied Belmont, a village in Missouri opposite to Columbus, and with artillery threatened that town, inspiring terror in its peaceful inhabitants. After the occupation of Columbus, under these circumstances of full justification, a small Confederate force, Colonel Tappan's Arkansas Regiment and Belts Hoover's Battery, were thrown across the Mississippi to occupy and hold the village, in the state of Missouri, then an ally and soon to become a member of the Confederacy. On the 6th of November, General Grant left his headquarters at Cairo with a land and naval force, and encamped on the Kentucky shore.

This act and a demonstration made by detachments from his force at Paducah were probably intended to induce the belief that he contemplated an attack on Columbus, thus concealing his real purpose to surprise the small garrison at Belmont. General Polk, on the morning of the 7th, discovered the landing of the Federal forces on the Missouri shore, some seven miles above Columbus, and, divining the real purpose of the enemy, detached General Pillow with four regiments of his division, say 2,000 men. To reinforce the garrison at Belmont. Very soon after his arrival, the enemy commenced an assault which was sternly resisted, and with varying fortune, for several hours. The enemy's front so far exceeded the length of our line as to enable him to attack on both flanks, and our troops were finally driven back to the bank of the river with the loss of their battery, which had been gallantly and efficiently served until nearly all its horses had been killed and its ammunition had been expended.

The enemy advanced to the bank of the river below the point to which our men had retreated, and opened an artillery fire upon the town of Columbus, to which our guns from the commanding height responded with such effect as to drive him from the riverbank. In the meantime, General Polk had at intervals sent three regiments to reinforce General Pillow. Upon the arrival of the first of these, General Pillow led it to a favorable position, where it for some time steadily resisted and checked the advance of the enemy. General Pillow, with great energy and gallantry, rallied his repulsed troops and brought them again into action. General Polk now proceeded in person with two other regiments. Whether from this or some other cause, the enemy commenced a retreat.

General Pillow, whose activity and daring on the occasion were worthy of all praise, led the first and second detachments, by which he had been reinforced, to attack the enemy in the rear, and General Polk, landing further up the river, One would naturally suppose that the question about which there would be the greatest certainty would be the number of troops engaged in a battle. Yet there is nothing in regard to which we have such conflicting accounts. It is fairly concluded, from the concurrent reports, that the enemy attacked us on both flanks. And that in the beginning of the action we were outnumbered, but the obstinacy with which the conflict was maintained, and the successive advances and retreats which occurred in the action, indicate that the disparity could not have been very great, and therefore that, after the arrival of our reinforcements, our troops must have become numerically superior.

The dead and wounded left by the enemy upon the field, the arms, ammunition, and military stores abandoned in his flight, so incontestably prove his defeat. That his claim to have achieved victory is too preposterous for discussion. Though the forces engaged were comparatively small to those in subsequent battles of the war, six hours of incessant combat with repeated bayonet charges must be One of the results of the battle, which is at least significant, is the fact that General Grant Who had superciliously refused to recognize General Polk as one with whom he could exchange prisoners, did, after the battle, send a flag of truce to get such privileges as are recognized between armies acknowledging each other to be foemen worthy of General Polk reported as follows, quote, The number of prisoners taken by the enemy, as shown by their list furnished, was one hundred and six, all of whom have been returned by exchange.

After making a liberal allowance to the enemy, a hundred of their prisoners still remained in my hands, one stand of collars and a fraction over one thousand stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and other military stores. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 641. That of the enemy was probably not less than 1,200. Meanwhile, Albert Sidney Johnston, a soldier of great distinction in the United States Army, where he had attained the rank of Brigadier General by brevet and was in command of the Department of California, resigned his commission and came overland from San Francisco to Richmond to tender his services to the Confederate States. Though he had been bred a soldier and most of his life had been spent in the Army, He had not neglected such study of political affairs as properly belongs to the citizen of a republic, and appreciated the issue made between states claiming the right to resume the powers they had delegated to a general agent and the claims set up by that agent to coerce states, his creators, and for whom he held a trust.

He was a native of Kentucky, but his first military appointment was from Louisiana, and he was a volunteer in the war for independence by Texas. And for a time resided in that state. Much of his military service had been in the West, and he felt most identified with it. On the 10th of September 1861, he was assigned to command our Department of the West, which included the states of Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, the Indian Country, and the western part of Mississippi. General Johnston, on his arrival at Nashville, found that he lacked not only men, but the munitions of war and the means of obtaining them. Men were ready to be enlisted. But the arms and equipments had nearly all been required to fit out the first levies.

Immediately on his survey of the situation, he determined to occupy Bowling Green in Kentucky and ordered Brigadier General S.B. Buckner, with 5,000 men, to take possession of the position. This invasion of Kentucky was an act of self-defense, rendered necessary by the action of the government of Kentucky and by the evidences of intended movements of the forces of the United States. It was not possible to withdraw the troops from Columbus in the west, nor from Cumberland Ford in the east, to which General Felix K. Zollicoffer had advanced with 4,000 men. A compliance with the demands of Kentucky would have opened the frontiers of Tennessee and the Mississippi River to the enemy. Besides, it was essential to the defense of Tennessee.

East of Columbus, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Hopkinsville were garrisoned with small bodies of troops. And the territory between Columbus and Bowling Green was occupied by moving detachments, which caused the supposition that a large military force was present and contemplated an advance. A fortified camp was established at Cumberland Gap as the right of General Johnston's line, and an important point for the protection of East Tennessee against invasion. Thus, General Johnston located his line of defense from Columbus on the west to the Cumberland Mountains on the east, with his center at Bowling Green. It was a good base for military operations, was a proper depot for supplies, and, if fortified, could be held against largely superior numbers.

On October 28th, General Johnston took He states his force to have been 12,000 men, and that the enemy's force at that time was estimated to be double his own, or 24,000. He says, quote, So that by the last of November it numbered 50,000, and continued to increase until it ran up to between 75,000 and 100,000. My force was kept down by disease, so that it numbered about 22,000. The chief anxiety of the commander of the department was to procure arms and men. On the next day, after his arrival at Nashville, he wrote to the governor of Alabama, quote, I shall beg to rely on your excellency to furnish us as rapidly as possible. At this point, with every arm it may be in your power to provide. I mean small arms for infantry and cavalry."

The governor replied, "...it is out of the power of Alabama to afford you any assistance in the way of arms." The governor of Georgia replied to the same request on September 18th, "...it is utterly impossible for me to comply with your request." General Bragg, in command at Pensacola, writes in reply on September 27th. Quote, The mission of Colonel Buckner will not be successful, I fear, as our extreme southern country has been stripped of both arms and men. We started early in this matter and have well-nigh exhausted our resources. End quote. On September 19th, General Johnston telegraphed to me, quote, Thirty thousand stand of arms are a necessity to my command. I beg you to order them, or as many as can be got, to be instantly procured and sent with dispatch.

The Secretary of War replied, "...the whole number received by us by that steamer was 1,800, and we purchased of the owners 1,780, making it all 3,500 infield rifles, of which we have been compelled to allow the Governor of Georgia to have 1,000 forearming troops to repel an attack now hourly threatened at Brunswick. Of the remaining 2,500, I have ordered 1,000 sent to you." "'Leaving us but fifteen hundred for arming several regiments now encamped here, and who have been awaiting their arms for several months. We have not an engineer to send you. The whole engineer corps comprises only six captains."

End quote. These details are given to serve as an illustration of the deficiencies existing in every department of the military service in the first years of the war. In this respect, much relief came from the well-directed efforts of Governor Harris and the legislature of Tennessee. A cap factory, ordnance shops, and workshops were established. The powder mills at Nashville turned out about 400 pounds a day. Twelve or fourteen batteries were fitted out at Memphis. Laws were passed to impress and pay for the private arms scattered throughout the state, and the utmost efforts were made to collect and adapt them to military uses. The returns make it evident that, during most of the autumn of 1861, fully one-half of General Johnston's troops were imperfectly armed, and whole brigades remained without weapons for months.

No less energetic were the measures taken to concentrate and recruit his forces. General Hardy's command was moved from northeastern Arkansas and sent to Bowling Green, which added 4,000 men to the troops there. The regiment of Texan Rangers was brought from Louisiana and supplied with horses and sent to the front. 500 Kentuckians joined General Buckner on his advance, and five regiments were gradually formed and filled up. A cavalry company under John H. Morgan was also added. At this time, September 1861, General Johnston, under the authority granted to him by the government, made a requisition for 30,000 men from Tennessee, 10,000 from Mississippi, and 10,000 from Arkansas. The Arkansas troops were directed to be sent to General McCullough for the defense of their own frontier.

The governor of Mississippi sent four regiments when this source of supply was closed. Up to the middle of November, only three regiments were mustered in under this call from Tennessee, but by the close of December, The number of men who joined was from 12 to 15,000. Two regiments, 1,500 strong, had joined General Polk. In Arkansas, five companies and a battalion had been organized and were ready to join General McCullough. A speedy advance of the enemy was now indicated, and an increase of force was so necessary that further delay was impossible. General Johnston, therefore, determined upon a levy en masse in his department. He made a requisition on the governors of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi to call out every able-bodied member of the militia into whose hands arms could be placed, or to provide a volunteer force large enough to use all the arms that could be procured.

In his letters to these governors, he plainly presents his view of the posture of affairs on December 24th, points out impending dangers, and shows that, to his applications, the response had not been such as the emergency demanded. He says, Quote, It was apprehended by me that the enemy would attempt to assail the South, not only by boats and troops moving down the river to be assembled during the fall and winter, but by columns marching inland, threatening Tennessee, by endeavoring to turn the defenses of Columbus. Further observation confirms me in this opinion, but I think the means employed for the defense of the river will probably render it comparatively secure. The enemy will energetically push toward Nashville, The heavy masses of troops now assembled between Louisville and Bowling Green.

The general position of Bowling Green is good and commanding, but the peculiar topography of the place and the length of the line of the Barren River as a line of defense, though strong, require a large force to defend it. There is no position equally defensive as Bowling Green, nor line of defense as good as the Barren River, between the Barren and the Cumberland at Nashville. So that it cannot be abandoned without exposing Tennessee and giving vastly the vantage ground to the enemy. It is manifest that the Northern Generals appreciate this, and by withdrawing their forces from Western Virginia and East Kentucky, they have managed to add them to the new levies from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and to concentrate a force in front of me variously estimated at from 60 to 100,000 men, and which I believe will number 75,000.

To maintain my position, I have only about 17,000 men in this neighborhood. It is impossible for me to obtain additions to my strength from Columbus. The generals in command in that quarter considered that it would imperil that point to diminish their force and open Tennessee to the enemy. General Zollicoffer cannot join me as he guards the Cumberland and prevents the invasion and possible revolt of East Tennessee." On June 5th, General Johnston was reinforced. He also sent a messenger to Richmond to ask that a few regiments might be detached from the several armies in the field and sent to him to be replaced by new levies. He said, quote, I do not ask that my force shall be made equal to that of the enemy, but, if possible, it should be raised to fifty thousand men, end quote.

Meantime, such an appearance of menace had been maintained as led the enemy to believe that our force was large. And that he might be attacked at any time. Frequent and rapid expeditions through the sparsely settled country gave rise to rumors which kept alive this apprehension.

23 23 - Part 4, Chapter 9a 37:11

XXIII. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government.

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis.

B. Part IV. Chapter IX. A. The Coercion of Missouri. Answers of the Governors of States to President Lincoln's requisition for troops. Restoration of Forts Caswell and Johnson to the United States Government. Condition of Missouri similar to that of Kentucky. Hostilities. Howe initiated in Missouri. Agreement between Generals Price and Harney. Its favorable effects. General Harney relieved a command by the United States government because of his Pacific policy. Removal of public arms from Missouri. Searches for and seizure of arms.

Missouri on the side of peace. Address of General Price to the people. Proclamation of Governor Jackson.

To preserve the Union in the spirit and for the purposes for which it was established, an equilibrium between the states, as grouped in sections, was essential. When the territory of Missouri constitutionally applied for admission as a state into the Union, the struggle between the state rights and that sectional aggrandizement which was seeking to destroy the existing equilibrium gave rise to the contest which shook the Union to its foundation, and sowed the seeds of geographical divisions which have borne the most noxious weeds that have choked Our political vineyard. Again, in 1861, Missouri appealed to the Constitution for the vindication of her rights, and again did usurpation and the blind rage of a sectional party disregard the appeal and assume powers not only undelegated, but in direct violation of the fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which every federal officer had sworn to maintain, and which secured to every state a republican government and protection against invasion.

If it be contended that the invasion referred to must have been by other than the troops of the United States, and that their troops were therefore not prohibited from entering a state against its wishes, and for purposes hostile to its policy, The section of the Constitution referred to fortifies the fact, heretofore notice, of the refusal of the Convention, when forming the Constitution, to delegate to the Federal Government power to coerce a State. By its last clause, it was provided that not even to suppress domestic violence could the General Government, on its own motion, send troops of the United States into the territory of one of the states. That section reads thus, The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence.

Surely if federal troops could not be sent into a state without its application, even to protect it against domestic violence, still less could it be done to overrule the will of its people. That, instead of an obligation upon the citizens of other states to respond to a call by the president for troops to invade a particular state, It was in April 1861 deemed a high crime to so use them. References here made to the published answers of the governors of states, which had not seceded, to the requisition made upon them for troops to be employed against the states which had seceded. Governor Letcher of Virginia. Reply to the requisition of the United States Secretary of War, as follows, I am requested to detach from the militia of the State of Virginia, the quota designated in a table which you append, to serve as infantry or riflemen for the period of three months unless sooner discharged.

In reply to this communication, I have only to say that that the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the southern states, and a requisition made upon me for such an object. An object, in my judgment, Not within the purview of the Constitution or the Act of 1795. Will not be complied with.

Gov. McGuffin of Kentucky replied.

Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically. Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states.

Gov. Harris of Tennessee replied, Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but 50,000 if necessary for the defense of our rights or those of our Southern brothers.

Gov. Jackson of Missouri answered, Requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and cannot be complied with.

Gov. Rector of Arkansas replied, In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas to subjugate the southern states, I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury.

Gov. Ellis of North Carolina responded to the requisition for troops from that state as follows.

Your dispatch is received, and if genuine, which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt, I have to say in reply that... I regard the levy of troops made by the administration for the purpose of subjugating the states of the South, as in violation of the Constitution and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina.

Governor Ellis, who had lived long enough to leave behind him an enviable reputation, was a fair representative of the conservatism, gallantry, and tenacity in well-doing of the state over which he presided. He died too soon for his country's good, and the Confederacy seriously felt the loss of his valuable services. The prompt and spirited answer he gave to the call upon North Carolina to furnish troops for the subjugation of the southern states was the fitting complement of his earlier action in immediately restoring to the federal government Forts Johnson and Caswell, which had been seized without proper authority. In communicating his action to President Buchanan, he wrote, My information satisfies me that this popular outbreak was caused by a report very generally credited, but which, for the sake of humanity, I hope is not true.

That it was the purpose of the administration to coerce the southern states, and that troops were on their way to garrison the southern ports, and to begin the work of subjugation. Should I receive assurance that no troops will be sent to this state prior to the fourth of March next, then all will be peace and quiet here, and the property of the United States will be fully protected as heretofore. If, however, I am unable to get such assurances. I will not undertake to answer for the consequences. The forts in this state have long been unoccupied, and their being garrisoned at this time will unquestionably be looked upon as a hostile demonstration, and will, in my opinion, certainly be resisted."

The plea so constantly made by the succeeding administration, as an excuse for its warlike acts, that the duty to protect the public property required such action, is shown by this letter of Governor Ellis to have been a plea created by their usurpations, but for which there might have been peace, as well as safety to property, and what was of greater worth the lives, the liberties, and the republican institutions of the country.

There was great similarity in the condition of Missouri to that of Kentucky. They were both border states, and by their institutions and the origin of a large portion of their citizens were identified with the South. Both sought to occupy a neutral position in the impending war, and offer guarantees of peace and order throughout their territory if left free to control their own affairs. Both refused to furnish troops to the United States government for the unconstitutional purpose of coercing the southern states. Both, because of their stronger affinity to the South than to the North, were the objects of suspicion, and consequent military occupation by the troops of the United States government.

At the inception of this unwarrantable proceeding, an effort was made by the governor of Missouri to preserve the rights of the state without disturbing its relations to the United States government. If it had been the policy of the government to allow to Missouri the control of her domestic affairs, and an exemption from being a party to the violation of the Constitution in making war against certain of the states, the above-described effort of the governor might and probably would have been successful. The form and purpose of that effort appear in the compact entered into between Major General Price, commanding the militia, or Missouri State Guard, and General Harney, of the United States Army, commanding the Department of the West, a geographical division which included the State of Missouri.

During a temporary absence of General Harney, Captain Lyon, commanding United States Forces at St. Louis, initiated hostilities against the State of Missouri under the following circumstances. In obedience to the militia law of the State, An annual encampment was directed by the governor for instruction in tactics. Camp Jackson, near St. Louis, was designated for the encampment of the militia of the county in 1861. Here, for some days, companies of state militia, amounting to about 800 men, under command of Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, were being exercised, as is usual, upon such occasions. They presented no appearance of a hostile camp. There were no sentinels to guard against surprise. Visitors were freely admitted.

It was the picnic-ground for the ladies of the city, and everything wore the aspect of merry-making rather than that of grim-visaged war. Suddenly, Captain, Afterward, General Nathaniel Lyon appeared with an overwhelming force of Federal troops, surrounded this holiday encampment, and demanded an unconditional surrender. Resistance was impracticable, and none was attempted. The militia surrendered, and were confined as prisoners. But prisoners of what? There was no war. and no warrant for their arrest as offenders against the law. It is left for the usurpers to frame a vocabulary suited to their act. After the return of General Harney, Brigadier-General D. M. Frost of the Missouri Militia appealed to him from his prison, the St.

Louis Arsenal, on May 11th, 1861, representing that, In accordance with the laws of the State of Missouri, which have been existing for some years, and in obedience to the orders of the governor, on Monday last I entered into an encampment with the militia force of St. Louis County, for the purpose of instructing the same in accordance with the laws of the United States and of this State.

He further sets forth that every officer and soldier of his command had taken an oath to sustain the constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Missouri, and that while in the peaceable performance of their duties, the encampment was surrounded by the command of Captain N. Lyon, United States Army, and a surrender demanded, to which General Frost replied as follows, Camp Jackson. May 10, 1861. Sir, I, never for a moment having conceived the idea that so illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just received from you would be made by an officer of the United States Army, am wholly unprepared to defend my command from this unwarranted attack, and shall therefore be forced to comply with your demand.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant. D. Frost, Brig. Gen. C.M.M., M.M., Captain N. Lyon, Commanding United States Troops.

General Frost's letter to Gen. Harney continues, My command was, in accordance with the above, deprived of their arms, and surrendered into the hands of Captain Lyon. After which, while thus disarmed and surrounded, a fire was opened on a portion of it by his troops, and a number of my men put to death, together with several innocent lookers-on, men, women, and children.

On the occasion of the attack upon Cap Jackson, a large crowd of citizens, men, women, and children, were gathered around, gazing curiously at these strange proceedings, when a volley was fired into them, killing ten and wounding twenty non-combatants, mostly women and children. A reign of terror was at once established, and the most severe measures were adopted by the Federals to over-awe the excitement and the rage of the people.

The massacre at Camp Jackson produced intense excitement throughout the state. The legislature, upon receipt of the news, passed several bills for the enrollment and organization of the militia, and to confer special powers upon the governor of the state. By virtue of these, general officers were appointed, chief of whom was Sterling Price. Because of the atrocities at St. Louis, and the violent demonstrations consequent upon them, not only in St. Louis, but elsewhere in the state, General Price, well known to be what was termed a Union man, and not only by his commission as commander-in-chief of the militia of the state, but also, and even more, because of his influence among the people, was earnestly solicited by influential citizens of St.

Louis to unite with General Harney in a joint effort to restore order and preserve peace. With the sanction of Governor Jackson, he proceeded to St. Louis, the headquarters of the Department of the West, and after some preliminary conference, entered into the following agreement, which being promulgated to the people, was received with general satisfaction and for a time allayed excitement. The agreement was as follows, St. Louis, May 21st, 1861. The undersigned officers of the United States Government and of the Government of the State of Missouri, for the purpose of removing misapprehension and of allaying public excitement, Deem it proper to declare publicly that they have this day had a personal interview in this city, in which it has been mutually understood, without the semblance of dissent on either part, that each of them has no other than a common object equally interesting and important to every citizen of Missouri, that of restoring peace and good order to the people of the state, in subordination to the laws of the general and state governments.

It being thus understood, there seems no reason why every citizen should not confide in the proper officers of the general and state governments to restore quiet, and as among the best means of offering no counter-influences, we mutually commend to all persons to respect each other's rights throughout the state, Making no attempt to exercise unauthorized powers, as it is the determination of the proper authorities to suppress all unlawful proceedings which can only disturb the public peace. General Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of the state of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the governor of the state, already declared, to direct the whole power of the state officers to maintaining order within the state among the people thereof.

General Harney publicly declares that, this object being assured, he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements that might otherwise create excitement and jealousy, which he most earnestly desires to avoid. We, the undersigned, do therefore mutually enjoin upon the people of the state to attend to their civil business, of whatever sort it may be, and it is hoped that the unquiet elements which have threatened so seriously to disturb the public peace may soon subside and be remembered only to be deplored. W. S. Harney, Brig. Gen. C. Sterling Price, Major-General, Missouri State Guard.

The distinct position of General Harney that the military force of the United States should not be used in Missouri except in case of necessity, together with the emphatic declaration of General Price, that he had the power and would use it to preserve peace and order in Missouri, seemed to remove all danger of collision in that state between the federal and local forces. In conformity with this understanding, General Price returned to the capital of the state, and sent to their homes the militia who had been assembled there by the governor for the defense of the capital against an anticipated attack by the troops of the United States. Those who desired to preserve peace in Missouri had just cause to be gratified by the favorable prospect now presented.

Those who desired war had equal ground for dissatisfaction. A few days after the promulgation of the agreement between General Price and General Harney, the latter was removed from command, as many believed because of his successful efforts to allay excitement and avoid war. Rumors had been in circulation that the Missourians were driving the Union men from their homes, and many letters purporting to be written in different parts of the state represented the persecution of Union men. It was suspected that many of them were written in St. Louis, or inspired by the Cabal. An incident related in confirmation of the justice of this suspicion is, that General Harney received a letter from St. Joseph, stating that ex-governor Stewart and a number of the most respectable men in St.

Joseph had been driven from their homes, and that unless soldiers were soon sent, the Union men would all have to leave. He called upon the Hon. F. P. Blair, an influential citizen of St. Louis, and asked him if he knew the writer of the letter. The reply was, "'Oh, yes, he is perfectly reliable. You can believe anything he says.'" General Harney said he would write immediately to General Price. Dissatisfaction was then manifested at such delay, but two or three days later, a letter from ex-governor Stewart was published in the St. Joseph News. In which was a marked paragraph of the copy sent to General Harney, "'Neither I nor any other Union man has been driven out of St. Joe.'" An attempt has been made to evade the conclusion that General Harney was relieved of command because of his Pacific policy.

The argument is that the order was dated the 16th of May, and his agreement with General Price was on the 21st of the same month, an argument more specious than fair, as it appears from the letter of President Lincoln of May 18th, 1861, to Hon. F. P. Blair, that the order sent from the War Department to him was to be delivered or withheld at his discretion. and that it was not delivered until the thirtieth of the month, and until after General Harney had not only entered into his agreement with General Price, but had declined to act upon sensational stories of persecution, on which applications were made to send troops into the interior of Missouri.

During the days this order was held for his removal. With discretionary power to deliver or withhold it, the above recited events occurred, and they may fairly be considered as having decided the question of his removal from that command. The principal United States arsenal at the West was that near to St. Louis. To it had been transferred a large number of the altered muskets sent from Springfield, Massachusetts, so that in 1861 the arms in that arsenal were, perhaps, numerically second only to those at Springfield. These arms, by a conjunction of deceptive and bold measures, were removed from the arsenal in Missouri and transported to Illinois. To whom did those arms belong? Certainly to those whose money had made or purchased them.

That is, to the states in common, not to their agent the general government, or to a portion of the states which might be in a condition to appropriate them to their special use, and in disregard of the rights of their partners. Not satisfied with removing the public arms from the limits of Missouri, the next step was that, in total disrespect of the constitutional right of the citizens to bear arms for their own defense, and to be free from searches and seizures except by warrants duly issued, the officers of the general government proceeded to search the houses of citizens in St. Louis, and to seize arms wherever they were found. Missouri had refused to engage in war against her sister states of the South.

Therefore she was first to be disarmed, and then to be made the victim of an invasion characterized by such barbarous atrocities as shamed the civilization of the age. The wrongs she suffered, The brave efforts of her unarmed people to defend their hearthstones and their liberties against the desecration and destruction of both form a melancholy chapter in the history of the United States, which all who would cherish their fair fame must wish could be obliterated.

These acts of usurpation and outrage as well upon the political as personal rights of the people of Missouri aroused an intense feeling in that state. It will be remembered that Governor Jackson had responded to the call of Mr. Lincoln upon him for troops with the just indignation of one who understood the rights of the state and the limited powers of the general government. His stern refusal to become a party to the war upon the South made him the object of special persecution. By his side in this critical juncture stood the gallant veteran General Price. To the latter was confided the conduct of the military affairs of the state, and after exhausting every effort to maintain order by peaceful means, And seeing that the government would recognize no other method than that of force, he energetically applied himself to raise troops and procure arms so as to enable the state to meet force by force.

During this, and all the subsequent period, the governor and the general were ably seconded by the accomplished, gallant, and indefatigable Lieutenant Governor Reynolds. The position of Missouri in 1860 to 1861 was unquestionably that of opposition to the secession of the state. The people generously confided in the disposition of the general government to observe their rights and continued to hope for a peaceful settlement of the questions then agitating the country. This was evinced by the fact that not a single secessionist was elected to the State Convention, and that General Price, an avowed Union man, was chosen as President of the Convention. Hence the general satisfaction with the agreement made between Generals Harney and Price For the preservation of peace and non-intervention by the Army of the United States.

General Harney, the day before the order for his removal was communicated to him, wrote to the War Department, expressing his confidence in the preservation of peace in Missouri, and used this significant expression, interference by unauthorized parties as to the course I shall pursue. can alone prevent the realization of these hopes. The unauthorized parties here referred to could not have been the people or the government of Missouri. Others than they must have been the parties wishing to use force, provocative of hostilities. As has been heretofore stated, After his agreement with General Harney at St. Louis, General Price returned to the capital and dismissed to their homes the large body of militia that had been there assembled.

After the removal of General Harney, believed to be in consequence of his determination to avoid the use of military force against the people of Missouri, reports were rife of a purpose on the part of the administration at Washington to disarm the citizens of Missouri who did not sympathize with the views of the federal government, and to put arms into the hands of those who could be relied on to enforce them. On the fourth of June, General Price issued an address to the people of Missouri, and in reference to that report said, The purpose of such a movement Could not be misunderstood, and it would not only be a palpable violation of the agreement referred to, and an equally plain violation of our constitutional rights, but a gross indignity to the citizens of this state, which would be resisted to the last extremity."

The call of President Lincoln for seventy-five thousand volunteers removed any pre-existing doubt as to the intent to coerce the states which should claim to assert their right of sovereignty. Missouri, while avowing her purpose to adhere to the Union, had asserted her right to exercise supreme control over her domestic affairs, and this put her in the category of a state threatened by the proceedings of the United States government. To provide for such contingency as might be anticipated, Gov. Jackson, on the 13th of June, issued a call for 50,000 volunteers, and Major General Price took the field in command. In this proclamation, Gov. Jackson said, A series of unprovoked and unparalleled outrages has been inflicted on the peace and dignity of this commonwealth, and upon the rights and liberties of its people, by wicked and unprincipled men professing to act under the authority of the government of the United States.

In his endeavor to maintain the peace of the state, and to avert, if possible, from its borders a civil war. He caused the aforementioned agreement to be made with the commander of the northern forces in the state, by which its peace might be preserved. That officer was promptly removed by his government. The governor then, upon the increase of hostile actions, proposed at an interview with the new officer commanding the forces of the United States government, To disband the State Guard and break up its organization, to disarm all companies that had been armed by the states, to pledge himself not to organize the militia under the military bill, that no arms or munitions of war should be brought into the state, that he would protect the citizens equally in all their rights, regardless of their political opinions, That he would repress all insurrectionary movements within the states, would repel all attempts to invade it from whatever quarter, and by whosome ever made, and would maintain a strict neutrality and preserve the peace of the state.

And further, if necessary, he would invoke the assistance of the United States troops to carry out the pledges. The only conditions to this proposition made by the governor were that the United States government should undertake to disarm the home guard which it had illegally organized an arm throughout the state, and pledge itself not to occupy with its troops any localities in the state not occupied by them at that time.

24 24 - Part 4, Chapter 9b 27:38

XXIV. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. 9. B.

Humiliating concessions of the governor to the United States government for the sake of peace. Demands of the federal officers. Revolutionary principles attempted to be enforced by the United States government. The action at Boonville. The Patriot Army of Militia. Further rout of the enemy. Heroism and self-sacrifice of the people. Complaints and embarrassments. Zeal, its effects. Action of Congress. Battle of Springfield. General Price. Battle at Lexington. Bales of hemp. Other combats.

The words of a governor of a state who offered such truly generous terms deserve to be inserted.

Nothing but the most earnest desire to avert the horrors of civil war from our beloved state could have tempted me to propose these humiliating terms. They were rejected by the Federal officers.

These demanded not only the disorganization and disarming of the state militia, and the nullification of the military bill, but they refused to disarm their own Home Guard, and insisted that the government of the United States should enjoy an unrestricted right to move and station its troops throughout the state whenever and wherever it might, in the opinion of its officers, be necessary either for the protection of its loyal subjects or for the repelling of invasion, and they plainly announced that it was the intention of the administration To take military occupation of the whole state, and to reduce it, as avowed by General Lyon, to the exact condition of Maryland.

We have already stated that the revolutionary measures which the United States government had undertaken to enforce involve the subjection of every state, either by voluntary submission or subjugation. However much a state might desire peace and neutrality, its own will could not elect. The scheme demanded the absolute sovereignty of the government of the United States, or, in other words, the extinguishment of the independence and sovereignty of the state. Human actions are not only the fruit of the ruling motive, but they are also the evidence of the existence of that motive. Thus, when we see the governor of the state of Missouri offering such generous terms to the government of the United States in order to preserve peace and neutrality, and the latter rejecting them, avow its intention to do its will with the authorities, the property and the citizens of the state, and proceed with military force to do it, its actions are both the evidence and the fruit of its theory.

These measures were revolutionary in the extreme. They involved the entire subversion of those principles on which the American Union was founded, and of the compact or constitution of that Union.

The government of the United States, in the hands of those who wielded its authority, was made the bloody instrument to establish these usurpations on the ruins of the crushed hopes of mankind for permanent freedom under constitutional government. For the justness and truthfulness of these allegations, I appeal to the impartial and sober judgment of posterity.

The volunteers who were assembled under this proclamation of Governor Jackson of June Thirteenth had few arms, except their squirrel rifles and shotguns, and could scarcely be said to have any military equipments. The brigadier-generals who were appointed were assigned to geographical divisions, and with such men as they could collect, reported in obedience to their boarders at Booneville and Lexington. On the 20th of June, 1861, General Lyon and Colonel F. P. Blair, with an estimated force of 7,000 well-armed troops, having eight pieces of artillery, ascended the Missouri River and debarked about five miles below Boonville. To oppose them, the Missourians had there about eight hundred men, poorly armed, without a piece of artillery, and but little ammunition.

With courage which must be commended at the expense of their discretion, they resolved to engage the enemy, and after a combat of an hour and a half or more, Retired having inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, and suffering but little themselves. This first skirmish between the Federal troops and the Missouri militia inspired confidence in their fellow-citizens, and checked the contemptuous terms in which the militia had been spoken of by the enemy. Governor Jackson, with some two hundred and fifty to three hundred of the militia engaged in the action at Boonville, started toward the southwestern portion of the state. He marched in the direction of a place called Coal Camp, and when, within twelve or fifteen miles of it, learned that a force of seven hundred to one thousand of the enemy had been sent to that point by General Lyon and Colonel Blair, with the view of intercepting his retreat.

The design, however, was frustrated by an expedition consisting of about three hundred and fifty men, commanded by Colonel O'Kane, who had assembled them in a very few hours in the neighborhood south of the enemy's camp. There were no pickets out except in the neighborhood of Jackson's forces, and Colonel O'Kane surprised the enemy where they were asleep in two large barns. The attack was made at daybreak. The enemy routed after suffering the heavy loss of two hundred and six killed and more wounded, and more than a hundred prisoners. Three hundred and sixty-two muskets with bayonets were captured. The Missourians lost four killed and fifteen or twenty wounded.

General Price, with a view to draw his army from the base line of the enemy, the Missouri River, ordered his troops to the southwestern portion of the state. A column from Lexington marched without transportation, without tents or blankets, and relied for subsistence on the country through which it passed, being in the meantime closely pursued by the enemy. The movement was successfully made, and a junction effected in Cedar County with the forces present with Governor Jackson. The total, when assembled, was about thirty-six hundred men.

This, then, was the Patriot Army of Missouri. It was a heterogeneous mass, representing every condition of Western life. There were the old and young, the rich and poor, the grave and gray, the planter and laborer, the farmer and clerk, the hunter and boatman, the merchant and woodsman. At least five hundred of these men were entirely unarmed. Many had only the common rifle and shotgun. None were provided with cartridges or canteens. They had eight pieces of cannon, But no shells, and very few solid shot, or rounds of grape and canister. Rude and almost incredible devices were made to supply these wants. Trace-irons, iron rods, hard pebbles, and smooth stones were substituted for shot, and evidence of the effect of such rough missiles was to be given in the next encounter with the enemy.

Governor Jackson continued his march toward southwestern Missouri. He had received reliable intelligence that he was pursued by General Lyon from the northeast, and by Lane and Sturgis from the northwest, their supposed object being to form a junction in his rear, and he subsequently learned that a column numbering three thousand had been sent out from St. Louis to intercept his retreat, and had arrived at the town of Carthage, Immediately in his front. These undisciplined, poorly armed Missourians were, therefore, in a position which would have appalled less heroic men. A large, hostile force in their rear, and another nearly equal in numbers to their own disputing their passage in front. They, however, cheerfully moved forward, attacked the enemy in position, and after a severe engagement routed him, pursued him to a second position, From which he was again driven, falling back to Carthage, where he made his last stand, and upon being driven from which, as was subsequently ascertained, continued his retreat all night.

The killed and wounded of the enemy, left along the route of this retreat over a space of ten miles, were estimated at from one hundred and fifty to two hundred killed, and from three to four hundred wounded. Several hundred muskets were captured, and the Missourians were better prepared for future conflicts. Our loss was between forty and fifty killed, and from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty wounded.

If any shall ask why I have entered into such details of engagements where the forces were comparatively so small. And the results so little affected the final issue of the war. The reply is that such heroism and self-sacrifice as these undisciplined, partially armed, unequipped men, displayed against superior numbers, possessed of all the appliances of war, claim special notice as bearing evidence not only of the virtue of the men, but the sanctity of the cause which could so inspire them. Unsupported, saved by the consciousness of a just cause, without other sympathy than that which the Confederate states fully gave, despising the plea of helplessness, and defying the threats of a powerful government to crush her, Missouri, without arms or other military preparation, took up the gauntlet thrown at her feet, and dared to make war in defense of the laws and liberties of her people.

My motive for promptly removing the seat of government after authority was given by the Provisional Congress has been heretofore stated, but proximity to the main army of the enemy, and the flanking attacks by which the new capital was threatened, did not diminish the anxiety which had been felt before removal from Montgomery in regard to affairs in Missouri, the far west of the Confederacy.

The state, which forty years before had been admitted to the Union against sectional resistance to the right guaranteed by the Constitution, and specifically denominated in the Treaty for the Acquisition of Louisiana, now because her governor refused to furnish troops for the unconstitutional purpose of coercing states, became the subject of special hostility, and the object of extraordinary efforts for her Subjugation.

The little which it would have been possible for the Confederacy to do to promote our military efficiency was diminished by the anomalous condition in which the State troops remained until some time in the second year of the war. A strange misapprehension led to unreasonable complaints under the supposition that Missouri was generally neglected, and her favorite officer, General Price, was not accorded a commission corresponding to his merit and the wishes of the people. It is due to that gallant soldier and true patriot that it should here be stated that he was not a party to any such complaints, knew they were unfounded, and realized that his wishes for the defenses of Missouri were fully reciprocated by the executive of the Confederacy.

All of which was manifested in the correspondence between us before Missouri had tendered any troops to the Confederate States. It was his statement of the difficulties and embarrassments which surrounded him that caused me to write to the governor of Missouri on the 21st of December 1861, stating to him my anxiety to have the troops of Missouri tendered and organized into brigades and divisions so that they might be rendered more effective, and we be better able to provide for them by the appointment of general officers and otherwise. For a full understanding of the nature and degree of the complaints and embarrassments referred to, I here insert my reply to letters sent to me by the Hon. John B.

Clark, M.C., of Missouri.

Richmond, Virginia, January 8th, 1862 Hon.

John B. Clarke, Richmond, Virginia. Sir, I have received the two letters from Governor Jackson sent by you this day. The Governor speaks of delay by the authorities of Richmond and neglect of the interests of Missouri, and expresses the hope that he has said enough to be well understood by me. When I remembered that he wrote in reply to my call upon him to hasten the tender of Missouri troops, so that they should be put upon the footing of those of other states, and with a knowledge that as militia of the state I had no power to organize or appoint commanders for them, and that it was his duty to attend to their wants. But that I had sent an agent of the Confederate government as far as practicable, To furnish the necessary supplies to the militia of Missouri actually in service.

I can only say I hope he is not understood by me.

It is but a short time since, in a conversation of ours. I fully explain to you the ease so far as I am connected with it, and there is nothing for me to add to what you then seem to consider conclusive. Very respectfully yours, Jefferson Davis.

As is usually the case when citizens are called from their ordinary pursuits for the purposes of war, the people of Missouri did not then realize the value of preparation in camp, and were reluctant to enroll themselves for long periods. The state, even less than the Confederate government, could not supply them with the arms, munitions, and equipage necessary for campaigns and battles and sieges. Under all these disadvantages, it is a matter of well-grounded surprise that they were able to achieve so much. The Missourians who fought at Vicksburg, and who, after that long trying and disastrous siege, asked when in the camp of parole prisoners not if they could get a furlough, not if they might go home when released, But how soon they might hope to be exchanged and resume their places in the line of battle.

Show of what mettle the Missouri troops were made, and of what they were capable when tempered in the fiery furnace of war.

I can recall few scenes during the war which impressed me more deeply than the spirit of those worn prisoners waiting for the exchange that would again permit them to take the hazards of battle for the cause of their country.

This memory leads me to recur with regret to my inability, in the beginning of the war, to convince the governor of Missouri of the necessity for thorough organization, and the enrollment of men for long terms instead of loose combinations of militia for periods always short and sometimes uncertain. General Price possessed an extraordinary power to secure the personal attachment of his troops, and to inspire them with a confidence which served in no small degree as a substitute for more thorough training. His own enthusiasm and entire devotion to the cause he served were infused throughout his followers, and made them all their country's own. To Lord Wellington has been attributed the remark that He did not want zeal in a soldier, and to Napoleon the apothegm that Providence is on the side of the heavy battalions.

Zeal was oftentimes our main dependence, and on many a hard-fought field served to drive our small battalions like a wedge through the serried ranks of the enemy.

The Confederate states, yet in their infancy, and themselves engaged in an unequal struggle for existence, by act of their congress declared that, if Missouri was engaged in repelling a lawless invasion of her territory by armed forces, it was their right and duty to aid the people and government of said state in resisting such invasion, and in securing the means and the opportunity of expressing their will upon all questions Affecting their rights and liberties. With small means, compared to their wants, the Confederate Congress, on the sixth of August, appropriated one million dollars to aid the people of the state of Missouri in the effort to maintain within their own limits the constitutional liberty which it is the purpose of the Confederate states in the existing war to vindicate, etc., In the next battle after that of Carthage, which has been noticed, Missourians were no longer to be alone.

General McCullough, commanding a brigade of Confederate troops, marched from Arkansas to make a junction with General Price, then threatened with an attack by a large force of the enemy under General Lyon, which was concentrated near Springfield, Missouri. The battle was fiercely contested. But finally won by our troops. In this action, General Lyon was killed while gallantly endeavoring to rally his discomfited troops, and led them to the charge. While we cannot forget the cruel wrongs he had inflicted and sought still further to impose upon an unoffending people, we must accord to him the redeeming virtue of courage, and recognize his ability as a soldier. On this occasion, General Price exhibited in two instances the magnanimity, self-denial, and humanity which ever characterized him.

General McCullough claimed the right to command as an officer of the Confederate States Army. General Price, though he ranked him by a grade, replied that he was not fighting for distinction, but for the defense of the liberties of his countrymen, and that it mattered but little what position he occupied. He said he was ready to surrender not only the command, but his life as a sacrifice to the cause. He surrendered the command and took a subordinate position, though he felt assured of victory.

The second instance was an act of humanity to his bitterest enemy. General Lyons, surgeon, came in for his body under a flag of truce. After the close of the battle, and General Price sent it in his own wagon. But the enemy in his flight left the body unshrouded in Springfield. The next morning, August 11, Lieutenant Colonel Gustavus Elgin and Colonel R. H. Musser, two members of Brigadier General Clark's staff, caused the body to be properly prepared for burial.

After the Battle of Springfield, General McCullough returned with his brigade to his former position in Arkansas. John C. Fremont had been appointed a general and assigned to the command made vacant by the death of General Lyon. He signalized his entrance upon the duty by a proclamation confiscating the estates and slave property of rebels. On the 10th of September, when General Price was about to go into camp, He learned that a detachment of federal troops was marching from Lexington to Warrensburg to seize the funds of the bank in that place and to arrest and plunder the citizens of Johnson County, in accordance with General Fremont's proclamation and instructions.

General Price resumed his march, and pressing rapidly forward with his mounted men, arrived about daybreak at Warrensburg, where he learned that the enemy had hastily fled about midnight. He then decided to move with his whole force against Lexington. He found the enemy in strong intrenchments and well supplied with artillery.

The place was stubbornly defended. The siege proper commenced on the Eighteenth of September, 1861, and with varying fortunes. Fierce combats continued through that day and the next. On the morning of the twentieth, General Price ordered a number of bales of hemp to be transported to the point from which the advance of his troops had been repeatedly repulsed. They were arranged in a line for a breastwork, and, when rolled before the men as they advanced, formed a moving rampart which was proof against shot, and only to be overcome by a sortie in force, which the enemy did not dare to make. On came the hempen breastworks, While Price's artillery continued an effective fire. In the afternoon of the 20th, the enemy hung out a white flag, upon which General Price ordered a succession of firing, and sent to ascertain the object of the signal.

The Federal forces surrendered, as prisoners of war, to the number of thirty-five hundred. Also, seven pieces of artillery, over three thousand stands of muskets, a considerable number of sabres, A valuable supply of ammunition, a number of horses, a large amount of commissary stores, and other property. Here were also recovered the great seal of the state and the public records, and about nine hundred thousand dollars, of which the Bank of Lexington had been robbed. General Price caused the money to be at once returned to the bank.

After the first day of the siege of Lexington, General Price learned that Lane and Montgomery, from Kansas, with about four hundred men, and General Sturgis, with fifteen hundred cavalry, were on the north side of the Missouri River, advancing to reinforce the garrison at Lexington. At the same time, and from the same direction, Colonel Saunders, with about twenty-five hundred Missourians, was coming to the aid of General Price. General D. R. Acheson, who had long been a United States Senator from Missouri, and at the time of his resignation was President Pro Tem of the Senate. Was sent by General Price to meet the command of Colonel Saunders and hasten them forward. He joined them at the north bank of the river, and after all but about five hundred had been ferried over, General Acheson still remaining with these, they were unexpectedly attacked by the force from Kansas.

The ground was densely wooded, and partially covered with water. The Missourians, led and cheered by one they had so long and deservedly honored, met the assault with such determination, and fighting with the skill of woodsmen and hunters, that they put the enemy to rout, pursuing him for a distance of ten miles, and inflicting heavy loss upon him, while that of the Missourians was but five killed and twenty wounded.

The expedient of the bales of hemp was a brilliant conception. Not unlike that which made Tarek, the Saracen warrior, immortal, and gave his name to the northern pillar of Hercules. The victories in Missouri, which have been noticed, and which so far exceeded what might have been expected from the small forces by which they were achieved, had caused an augmentation of the enemy's troops to an estimated number of seventy thousand. Against these, the army of General Price, could not hope successfully to contend. He therefore retired toward the southwestern part of the state. The want of supplies and transportation compelled him to disband a portion of his troops. With the rest, he continued his retreat to Neosho.

By proclamation of Governor Jackson, the legislature had assembled at this place, and had passed the Ordinance of Secession. If other evidence were wanting, The fact that, without governmental aid, without a military chest, without munitions of war, the campaign which has been described had so far been carried on by the voluntary service of the citizens, and the freewill offerings of the people, must be conclusive that the ordinance of secession was the expression of the popular will of Missouri. The forces of Missouri again formed a junction with the Confederate troops under General McCullough, and together they moved to Pineville in MacDonald County.

25 25 - Part 4, Chapter 10 16:01

Vol. 1b. Part 4. Chapter 10. Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise takes command in Western Virginia. His movements. Advance of General John B. Floyd. Defeats the enemy. Attacked by Rosencrantz. Controversy between Wise and Floyd. General R. E. Lee takes the command in West Virginia. Movement on Cheat Mountain. Its failure. Further operations. Winter Quarters. Lee sent to South Carolina.

In June 1861, Brigadier General Henry A. Wise, who was well and favorably known to the people of the Kanawha Valley, in his enthusiasm for their defense and confidence in his ability to rally them, to resist the threatened invasion of that region, offered his services for that purpose. With a small command, which was to serve as a nucleus to the force he hoped to raise, he was sent thither. His success was as great as could have been reasonably expected, and after the small but brilliant affair at Skerry Creek, he prepared to give battle to the enemy, Then, advancing up the Kanawha Valley under General Cox. But the defeat of our forces at Laurel Hill, which has been already noticed, uncovered his right flank, and endangered his rear, which was open to approach by several roads.

He therefore fell back to Lewisburg. Brigadier-General John B. Floyd had in the meantime raised a brigade in southwestern Virginia and advanced to the support of General Wise. Unfortunately, there was a want of concert between these two officers, which prevented their entire cooperation. General Floyd engaged the enemy in several brilliant skirmishes. When he found that his right was threatened by a force which was approaching on that flank, with the apparent purpose of crossing the Gauley Valley at the Carnifex Ferry, so as to strike his line of communication with Lewisburg. He crossed the river with his brigade and a part of Wise's cavalry, leaving that general to check any advance which Cox might make.

General Floyd's movement was as successful as it was daring. He met the enemy's forces, defeated and dispersed them, but the want of cooperation between Generals Wise and Floyd prevented a movement against General Cox. Floyd intrenched himself on the Gauley in a position of great natural strength, but the small force under his command And the fact that he was separated from that of General Wise probably induced General Rosencrantz, commanding the enemy's forces in the Cheat Mountain, to advance and assail the position. Though his numbers were vastly superior, the attack was a failure. After a heavy loss on the part of the enemy, he fell back after nightfall. During the night, Floyd crossed the river and withdrew to the camp of General Wise to form a junction of the two forces, and together they fell back toward Sewell's Mountain.

The unfortunate controversy between these officers, which had prevented cooperation in the past, grew more bitter, and each complained of the other in terms that left little hope of future harmony. And this want of cooperation Led to confusion, and threatened further reverses.

General Loring had succeeded General Garnett, and was in command of the remnant of the force defeated at Laurel Hill. His headquarters were at Valley Mountain. General R. E. Lee, on duty at Richmond, aiding the President in the general direction of military affairs, was now ordered to proceed to Western Virginia. It was hoped that, by his military skill and deserved influence over men, he would be able to retrieve the disaster we had suffered at Laurel Hill, and, by combining all our forces in western Virginia on one plan of operations, give protection to that portion of our country. Such reinforcement as could be furnished had been sent to Valley Mountain, the headquarters of General Loring.

Thither General Lee promptly proceeded. The duty to which he was assigned was certainly not attractive by the glory to be gained, or the ease to be enjoyed, but Lee made no question as to personal preference, and, whatever were his wishes, they were subordinate to what was believed to be the public interest.

The season had been one of extraordinary rains, rendering the mountain roads ordinarily difficult, almost impassable.

With unfaltering purpose and energy, he crossed the Allegheny Mountains, and, learning that the main encampment of the enemy was in the valley of Tigard River and Elk Run, Randolph County, He directed his march toward that position. The troops under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. H. R. Jackson, together with those under Brig. Gen. Loring, were about thirty-five hundred men. The force of the enemy, as far as it could be ascertained, was very much greater. In the detached work at Cheat Mountain Pass, we learned by a provision return, Found upon the person of a captured staff-officer that there were three thousand men, being but a fraction less than our whole force. After a careful reconnaissance and a full conference with General Loring, Lee decided to attack the main encampment of the enemy by a movement of his troops converging upon the valley from three directions.

The colonel of one of his regiments, who had reconnoitred the position of the works at Cheat Mountain Pass reported that it was feasible to turn it and carry it by assault, and he was assigned to that duty. General Lee ordered other portions of his force to take position on the spurs overlooking the enemy's main encampment, while he led three regiments to the height below and nearest to the position of the enemy. The instructions were that the officers sent to turn the position at Cheat Mountain Pass should approach it at early dawn and immediately open fire, which was to be the signal for the concerted attack by the rest of the force. It rained heavily during the day, and after a toilsome night march, the force, led by General Lee, wet, weary, hungry, and cold, gained their position close to and overlooking the enemy's encampment.

In their march, they had surprised and captured the picket without a gun being fired, so that no notice had been given of their approach.

The officer who had been sent to attack the work at Cheat Mountain Pass found on closer examination that he had been mistaken as to the practicability of taking it by assault, and that the heavy abatis which covered it was advanced beyond the range of his rifles. Not having understood that his firing was to be the signal for the general attack, and should therefore be opened, whether it would be effective or not, he withdrew without firing a musket.

The height occupied by General Lee was shrouded in fog, and as morning had dawned without the expected signal, He concluded that some mishap had fallen the force which was to make it. By a tortuous path, he went down the side of the mountain low enough to have a distinct view of the camp. He saw the men, unconscious of the near presence of an enemy, engaged in cleaning their arms, cooking, and other morning occupations. Then, returning to his command, he explained to his senior officers what he had seen, and expressed his belief that Though the plan of attack had failed, the troops there with him could surprise and capture the camp. The officers withdrew, conferred with their men, and reported to the general that the troops were not in condition for the enterprise.

As the fog was then lifting, and they would soon be revealed to the enemy below, whose numbers were vastly superior to his own, he withdrew his command by the route they had come, and without observation, returned to his camp. Beyond some skirmishes with outposts and reconnoitering parties, our troops had not been engaged, and in these affairs our reported loss was comparatively small.

Colonel John A. Washington, aide-de-camp of General Lee, was killed while making a reconnaissance by a party in ambuscade. The loss of this valuable and accomplished officer was much regretted by his general and all others who knew him.

The report that Rosencrantz and Cox had united their commands and were advancing upon Wise and Floyd caused General Lee to move at once to their support. He found General Floyd at Meadow Bluff and General Wise at Sewell Mountain. The latter position being very favorable for defense, the troops were concentrated there to await the threatened attack by Rosencrantz, who advanced and took position in sight of General Lee's intrenched camp, and having remained there for more than a week, withdrew in the night without attempting the expected attack.

The weak condition of his artillery horses and the bad state of the roads Made worse by the retiring army, prevented General Lee from attempting to pursue, and the approach of Winter, always rigorous in that mountain region, closed the campaign with a small but brilliant action, in which General H. R. Jackson repelled an attack of a greatly superior force, inflicting severe loss on the assailants, and losing but six of his own command.

With the close of active operations, General Lee returned to Richmond, and, though subjected to depreciatory criticism by the carpet knights who make campaigns on assumed hypotheses, he, with characteristic self-abnegation, made no defense of himself, not even presenting an official report of his night march in the Cheat Mountain. But orally he stated to me the facts which have formed the basis of this sketch. My estimate of General Lee, my confidence in his ability, zeal and fidelity, rested on a foundation not to be shaken by such criticism as I have noticed. I had no more doubt then than after his fame had been securely established. that, whenever he had the opportunity to prove his worth, he would secure public appreciation.

Therefore, as affairs on the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia were in an unsatisfactory condition, he was directed to go there and take such measures for the defense, particularly of Savannah and Charleston, as he should find needful. Lest the newspaper attack should have created unjust and unfavorable impressions in regard to him, I thought it desirable to write to Governor Pickens and tell him what manner of man he was who had been sent to South Carolina.

After the withdrawal of the Confederate Army from Fairfax Court House, and the positions which had been occupied in front of that place, A movement was made by the enemy to cross the Potomac near Leesburg, where we had under the command of Brigadier-General N. S. Evans of South Carolina, four regiments of infantry, i.e., the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Mississippi, and the Eighth Virginia, commanded respectively by Col. Barksdale, Featherston, Burt, and Hunton. A small detachment of cavalry under Lt. Col. Jennifer and some pieces of artillery.

On the 21st of October, the enemy commenced crossing the river at Edwards Ferry. A brigade was thrown over and met by the Thirteenth Mississippi, which held them in check at the point of crossing. In the meantime, another brigade was thrown over at Balls Bluff. And as troops continued to cross at that point, where the Eighth Virginia had engaged them, General Evans ordered up the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Mississippi, and the three regiments made such an impetuous attack as to drive back the enemy to the bluff. And their leader, Colonel Baker, having fallen, a panic seemed to seize the command, so that they rushed headlong down the bluff and crowded into the flatboats, which were their means of transportation in such numbers that they were sunk, and many of the foe were drowned in their attempt to swim the river.

The loss of the enemy, prisoners included, exceeded the number of our troops in the action. The Confederate loss was reported to be thirty-six killed, one hundred and seventeen wounded, and two captured. Total, one hundred and fifty-five. Among the killed was the gallant Colonel Burt, a much-respected citizen of Mississippi, where he held high civil station, and where his death was long deplored.

26 26 - Part 4, Chapter 11a 46:17

XXVI. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government.

For more information, or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Chapter 11a. The issue. The American idea of government. Who was responsible for the war? Situation of Virginia. Concentration of the enemy against Richmond. Our difficulty. Unjust criticisms. The facts set forth. Organization of the army. Conference at Fairfax Courthouse. Inaction of the Army. It has been shown that the Southern States, by their representatives in the two Houses of Congress, consistently endeavored, even to the last day, when they were, by their constituents, permitted to remain in the halls of federal legislation, to maintain the Constitution, and preserve the Union. which the states had by their independent action ordained and established.

On the other hand, proof has been adduced to show that the northern states, by a majority of their representatives in the Congress, had persisted in agitation injurious to the welfare and tranquility of the southern states, and at the last moment had refused to make any concessions or to offer any guarantees to check the current The issue was then presented between submission to Empire The father of the north, or the severance of those tithes consecrated by many memories, and strengthened by those habits which render every people reluctant to sever long-existing associations. The authorities heretofore cited have, I must believe, conclusively shown that the question of changing their government was one that the states had the power to decide by virtue of the unalienable right announced in the Declaration of Independence, and which had been proudly denominated the American idea of government.

The hope and the wish of the people of the South were that the disagreeable necessity of separation would be peacefully met and be followed by such commercial regulations as would least disturb the prosperity and future intercourse of the separated states. Every step taken by the Confederate government was directed toward that end. The separation of the states having been decided on, it was sought to effect it in such a manner as would be just to the parties concerned. And preserve as far as possible, under separate governments, the fraternal and mutually beneficial relations which had existed between the States when united, and which it was the object of their compact of union to secure. To all the proofs heretofore offered, I confidently refer for the establishment of the fact that whatever of bloodshed, of devastation, or shock, The invasions of the Southern States, for purposes of coercion, were in violation of the written Constitution, and the attempt to subjugate sovereign States under the pretext of preserving the Union, was alike offensive to law, to good morals, and the proper use of language.

The Union was the voluntary junction of free and independent states. To subjugate any of them was to destroy constituent parts, and necessarily, therefore, must be the destruction of the Union itself. That the southern states were satisfied with a federal government, such as their fathers had formed. was shown by their adoption of a constitution so little differing from the instrument of 1787. It was against the violations of that instrument and usurptations offensive to their pride and injurious to their interests that they remonstrated, argued, and finally appealed to the inherent undelegated power of the states to judge of their wrongs and of the mode and measure of redress. After many years of fruitless effort to secure from their northern associates a faithful observance of the Compact of Union, after its conditions had been deliberately and persistently broken, and the signs of the times indicated further and more ruthless violations of their rights as equals in the Union.

The Southern states, preferring a peaceful separation to continuance in a hostile union, decided to exercise their sovereign right to withdraw from an association which had failed to answer the ends for which it was formed. It has been shown how they endeavored to effect the change with strict regard to the principles controlling a dissolution of partnership. And how earnestly they desired to remain in friendly relations to the northern states, and how all their overtures were rejected. When they pleaded for peace, the United States government deceptively delayed to answer while making ready To the calm judgment of mankind is submitted the question, who was responsible for the war between the states?

Virginia, whose history from the beginning of the Revolution of 1776 Had been a long course of sacrifices for the benefit of her sister states, and for the preservation of the Union she had mainly contributed to establish, clung to it with the devotion of a mother. It has been shown how her efforts to check the dissolution were persisted in when the aggrieved were hopeless and the aggressors reckless, and how her mediations were rejected in the Peace Congress. which on her motion had been assembled. Sorrowing over the failure of this, her blessed though unsuccessful attempt to preserve the Union of the Constitution, she was not permitted to mourn as a neutral, but was required by the United States government to choose between furnishing troops to subjugate her Southern sisters, or the reclamation of the grants she had made to the Federal Government when she became a member of the Union.

The first was a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. The second was a reserved right. The voice of Henry called to her from the ground. The spirits of Washington and Jefferson moved among her people. There was but one course consistent with her stainless reputation, and often declared tenets, as to the liberties of her people, which she could have adopted. As in 1776, reluctantly she bowed to the necessity of separation from the Crown, so in 1861 the Ordinance of Succession was adopted. Having exhausted all other means, she took the last resort, and, if for this she was selected as the first object of assault, methinks the punishment exceedeth the offense. The large resources and full preparation of the United States government enabled it to girt Virginia as with a wall of fire.

It has been shown that she was threatened from the East, from the North, and from the West. The capital of the State and of the Confederacy, Richmond, was the objective point, and on this the march of three columns concentrated. On the East, the advance of the enemy was on several occasions feasible, When we consider the number of his forces at and about Fortress Monroe, in comparison with the small means retained for the defense of the capital. On the north, the most formidable army of the enemy was assembled. To oppose it, we had the comparatively small army of the Potomac. This being regarded as the line on which the greatest danger was apprehended, our efforts were mostly directed toward giving it the requisite strength.

Troops as rapidly as they could be raised and armed were sent forward for that purpose. From the beginning to the close of the war, we mainly relied for the defense of the capital, on its aged citizens, boys too young for service, and the civil employees of the executive departments. On several occasions these were called out to resist an attack. They answered with alacrity, and always bore themselves gallantly, more than once repelling the enemy in the open field. Had it been practicable to do so, it surely would have been proper to keep a large force in reserve for the defense of the capital, so often and vaultingly proclaimed to be the object of the enemy's campaign. Perhaps the propriety of such a provision gave currency and credence to rumors that we had a large force at Richmond.

This even led to the application for detachment from it to reinforce our Army of the Potomac, which caused me to write to General J. E. Johnston at Manassas, Virginia, on September 5, 1861, as follows.

You have again been deceived as to the forces here. We never have had anything near to twenty thousand men, and have now but little over one-fourth of that number. Since the date of your glorious victory, the enemy have grown weaker in numbers, and far weaker in the character of their troops, so that I had felt it remained with us to decide whether another battle should Soon be fought or not. Your remark indicates a different opinion. I wish I could send additional force to occupy Loudoun, but my means are short of the wants of each division I am laboring to protect. One shipload of small arms would enable me to answer all demands, but vainly I have hoped and waited. Then, there, and everywhere, our difficulty was the want of arms and munitions of war.

Lamentable cries came to us from the West for the supplies which would enable patriotic citizens to defend their homes. The resource upon which the people had so confidently relied, the private arms in the hands of citizens, proved a sad delusion, and elsewhere it has been shown how deficient we were in ammunition or the means of providing it. The simple fact was the country had gone to war without counting the cost. Undue elation over our victory at Manassas was followed by dissatisfaction at what was termed the failure to reap the fruits of victory, and rumors for which there could be no better excuse than partisan zeal were circulated that the heroes of the hour were prevented from reaping the fruits of the victory.

by the interference of the President. Naturally, there followed another rumor that the inaction of the victorious army, to which reinforcements continued to be sent, was due to the policy of the President, and he also was held responsible, and with more apparent justice, for the failure to organize the troops of the several states, as the law contemplated, into brigades and divisions composed of the soldiers of each. Though these unjust criticisms weakened the power of the government to meet its present and provide for its future necessities, I bore them in silence, lest to vindicate myself should injure the public service by turning the public censure to the generals on whom the hopes of the country rested.

That motive no longer exists, and to justify the faith of those who, without a defense, continue to uphold my hands, I propose to set forth the facts by correspondence and otherwise. So far as in doing this blame shall be transferred from me to others, it will be the incident, not the design, as it would be most gratifying to me only to notice for praise each and all who wore the gray. The fiction of my having prevented the pursuit of the enemy after the victory of Manassas was exploded after it had acquired an authoritative and semi-official form in the manner and for the reasons heretofore set forth. It only remains, therefore, to notice the other points indicated above. First, the organization of the army.

Disease and discontent are known to be the attendants of armies lying unemployed in camps, especially, as in our case, when the troops were composed of citizens called from their homes under the idea of a pressing necessity and with the hope of soon returning to them. Our citizen-soldiers were a powerful political element. And their correspondence finding its way to the people, through the press, and to the halls of Congress, by direct communication with the members, was felt by its influence both upon public opinion and general legislation. Members of Congress, and notably the Vice President, contended that men should be allowed to go home and attend to their private affairs, while there were no active operations, and that there was no doubt But that they would return whenever there was to be a battle.

The experience of war soon taught our people the absurdity of such ideas, and before its close probably none would have outed them. There were very many men out of the army who were anxious to enter it, but for whom we had not arms. This gave rise to the remark more humorous than profound, that we stood around the camps with clubs to keep one set in and another set out. Had this been true, it was certainly justifiable to refuse to exchange a trained man for a recruit. All who have seen service know that one old soldier is, in campaign, equal to several who have everything of military life to learn. A marked characteristic of the Southern people was individuality, and time was needful to teach them.

That the terrible machine, a disciplined army, must be made of men who had surrendered their freedom of will. The most distinguished of our citizens were not the slowest to learn the lesson, and perhaps no army ever more thoroughly knew it than did that which Lee led into Pennsylvania, and none ever had a leader who in his own conduct better illustrated the lesson. Our largest army in 1861, was that of the Potomac. It had been formed by the junction of the forces under General J. E. Johnston with those under General P. G. T. Beauregard, with such additions as could be hurriedly sent forward to meet the enemy on the field at Manassas. They were combined into brigades and divisions as pressing exigencies required.

By the Act of February 28, 1861, The President was authorized to receive companies, battalions, and regiments to form a part of the Provisional Army of the Confederate States, and with the advice and consent of Congress, to appoint general officers for them, and by the act of March 6, the President was to apportion the staff and general officers among the respective states from which the volunteers were received. It will thus be seen that the states generously surrendered their right to preserve for those volunteers the character of state troops, and to appoint general officers, when furnishing a sufficient number of regiments, to require such grade for their command. But, in giving their volunteers to form the Provisional Army of the Confederacy, it was distinctly suggested that the general officers should be so appointed.

As to make a just apportionment among the states furnishing the troops. During the repose which followed the Battle of Manassas, it was deemed proper that the regiments of the different states should be assembled in brigades together, and, as far as consistent with the public service, that the spirit of the law should be complied with by the assignment of brigadier generals of the same state from which the troops were drawn. Instructions to that end were therefore given, and again and again repeated, but were for a long time only partially complied with, until the delay formed the basis of the argument that those who had by association become thoroughly acquainted would more advantageously be left united.

In the meantime, frequent complaints came to me from the army. of unjust discrimination, the law being executed in regard to the troops of some states, but not of others, and of serious discontent arising therefrom. The duty to obey the law was imperative, and neither the executive nor the officers of the army had any right to question its propriety. I, however, considered the policy of that law wise. I was not surprised when it was stated to me that the persistent obstruction to its execution was repressing the spirit to volunteer in places to which complaints of such supposed favoritism had been transmitted. About the first of October, at the request of General Johnston, I went to his headquarters at Fairfax Courthouse for the purpose of conference.

At the time of this visit to the Army, the attention of the general officers, who then met me in conference, was called to the obligation, created by law, to organize the troops, when the numbers tendered by any State permitted it, into brigades and divisions composed of regiments, battalions, or companies of such State, and to assign general and staff officers In the ratio of the troops thus received. After my return to the capital, the importance of the subject weighed so heavily upon me, as to lead to correspondence with the generals, which will be best understood by the following extracts from my letters to them, which are here appended. MAJOR GENERAL G. W. SMITH, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC How have you progressed in the solution of the problem I left, the organization of the troops with reference to the States and Term of Service?

If the volunteers continue their complaints that they are commanded by strangers and do not get justice, and that they are kept in camp to die when reported for hospital by the surgeon? We shall soon feel a reaction in the matter of volunteering. Already I have been much pressed on both subjects, and have answered by promising that the generals would give due attention and, I hoped, make satisfactory changes. The authority to organize regiments into brigades and the latter into divisions is, by law, conferred only on the President. And I must be able to assume responsibility of the action taken by whomsoever acts for me in that regard. By reference to the law, you will see that, in surrendering the sole power to appoint general officers, it was, nevertheless, designed, as far as should be, found consistent, to keep up the state relation of troops and generals.

Kentucky has a brigadier. But not a brigade. She has, however, a regiment. That regiment and brigadier might be associated together. Louisiana had regiments enough to form a brigade, but no brigadier in either corps. All of the regiments were sent to that corps commanded by a Louisiana general. Georgia has regiments now organized into two brigades. She has on duty with that army two brigadiers, But one of them serves with other troops.

Mississippi troops were scattered as if the state were unknown. Brigadier General Clark was sent to remove a growing dissatisfaction. But, though the state had nine regiments there, he was put in command of a post and depot of supplies. These nine regiments should form two brigades. Brigadier's Clark and, as a native of Mississippi, Whiting, should be placed in command of them, and the regiments for the war put in the Army Man's Brigade. Both brigades should be put in the division commanded by General Van Dorn of Mississippi. Thus would the spirit and intent of the law be complied with. Disagreeable complaint be spared me. and more of content be assured under the trials to which you look forward.

It is needless to specify further. I have been able in writing to you to speak freely, and you have no past associations to disturb the judgment to be passed upon the views presented. I have made, and am making, inquiries as to the practicability of getting a corps of negroes for laborers. to aid in the construction of an entrenched line in rear of your present position. Your remarks on the want of efficient staff officers are realized in all their force, and I hope among the elements which constitute a staff officer for volunteers, you have duly estimated the qualities of forbearance and urbanity. Many of the privates are men of high social position. of scholarship and fortune. Their pride furnishes the motive for good conduct, and, if wounded, is turned from an instrument of good to one of great power for evil.

Richmond, Virginia, October 16, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas, Virginia. I have thought often upon the questions of reorganization which were submitted to you. And it has seemed to me that, whether in view of disease or the disappointment and suffering of a winter cantonment on a line of defense or of a battle to be fought in and near your position, it was desirable to combine the troops by a new distribution with as little delay as practicable. They will be stimulated to extraordinary effort when so organized. in that the fame of their state will be in their keeping, and that each will feel that his immediate commander will desire to exalt rather than diminish his services. You pointed me to the fact that you had observed that rule in the case of the Louisiana and Carolina troops, and you will not fail to perceive that others find in the fact a reason for the like disposal of them.

In the hour of sickness, and the tedium of waiting for spring, men from the same region will best console and relieve each other. The maintenance of our cause rests on the sentiments of the people. Letters from the camp complaining of inequality and harshness in the treatment of the men have already dulled the enthusiasm which filled our ranks with men who, by birth, fortune, education, And social position were the equals of any officer in the land. The spirit of our military law is manifested in the fact that the state organization was limited to the regiment. The volunteers came in sufficient numbers to have brigadiers, but have only colonels. It was not then intended, is the necessary conclusion.

that those troops should be under the immediate command of officers above the grade of colonel. The spirit of the law, then, indicates that brigades should be larger than customary, the general being charged with the care, the direction, the preservation of the men rather than the internal police. Richmond, Virginia, October 20, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas, Virginia. My dear General, two rules have been applied in the projected reorganization of the Army of the Potomac. One, as far as practicable to keep regiments from the same State together. Two, to assign generals to command the troops of their own State. I have not overlooked the objections to each. But the advantages are believed to outweigh the disadvantages of that arrangement.

In distributing the regiments of the several states, it would, I think, be better to place the regiments for the war in the same brigade of the state, and assign to those brigades the brigadiers whose services could least easily be dispensed with. For this, among other reasons, I will mention but one. The commission of a brigadier expires upon the breaking up of his brigade. See the law for their appointment. Of course, I would not for slight cause change the relations of troops and commanders, especially when it has long been continued and endeared by the trials of battle. But it is to be noted that the regiment was fixed as the unit of organization, and made the connecting link Between the soldier and his home.

Above that, all was subject to the discretion of the Confederate authorities, save the pregnant intimation in relation to the distribution of generals among the several states. It was generous and confiding to surrender entirely to the Confederacy the appointment of generals, and it is the more incumbent on me to carry out, as well as may be. Richmond, May 10, 1862. General J. E. Johnston. Your attention has been heretofore called to the law in relation to the organization of brigades and divisions. Orders were long since given to bring the practice and the law into conformity. Recently, reports have been asked for from the commanders of separate armies as to the composition of their respective brigades and divisions.

I have been much harassed, and the public interest has certainly suffered, by the delay to place the regiments of some of the states in brigades together, it being deemed that unjust discrimination was made against them. And also by the popular error which has existed as to the number of brigadiers to which appointments could be specially urged on the grounds of residence. While some have expressed surprise at my patience when orders to you were not observed, I have at least hoped that you would recognize the desire to aid and sustain you, and that it would produce the corresponding action on your part. The reasons formerly offered have one after another disappeared, and I hope you will, as you can, proceed to organize your troops as heretofore instructed, and that the returns will relieve us of the uncertainty now felt as to the number and relations of the troops, and the commands of the officers having brigades and divisions.

I will not dwell on the lost opportunity afforded along the line of Northern Virginia, but must call your attention to the present condition of affairs and probable action of the enemy, if not driven from his purpose, to advance on the Fredericksburg route. Very truly yours, Jefferson Davis. On the 26th of May, General Johnston's attention was again called to the organization of the ten Mississippi regiments into two brigades, and was reminded that the proposition had been made to him in the previous autumn with an expression of my confidence that the regiments would be more effective in battle if thus associated. I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was responsible for inaction by the Army of the Potomac.

In the latter part of 1861, and in the early part of 1862, after the explosion of the fallacy that I had prevented the pursuit of the enemy from Manassas in July 1861, my assailants have sought to cover their exposure by a change of time and place locating their story at Fairfax Courthouse and dating it in the autumn of 1861. When, at that time and place, I met General Johnston for conference, he called in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith. The question for consideration was, what course should be adopted for the future action of the Army? And the preliminary inquiry by me was as to the number of the troops there assembled. To my surprise and disappointment, The effective strength was stated to be but little greater than when it fought the battle of the 21st of the preceding July.

The frequent reinforcements which had been sent to that army in no wise prepared me for such an announcement to my inquiry as to what force would be required for the contemplated advance into Maryland. The lowest estimate made by any of them was about twice the number there present for duty. How little I was prepared for such a condition of things will be realized from the fact that previous suggestions by the generals in regard to a purpose to advance into Maryland had induced me, when I went to that conference, to take with me some drawings made by the veteran soldier and engineer, Colonel Crozet, of the falls of the Potomac, to show the feasibility of crossing the river at that point. Very little knowledge of the condition and military resources of the country must have sufficed to show that I had no power to make such an addition to that army without a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions.

It only remained for me to answer that I had not power to furnish such a number of troops, and, unless the militia bearing their private arms should be relied on, We could not possibly fulfill such a requisition until after the receipt of the small arms which we had early and constantly striven to procure from abroad and had for some time expected. After I had written the foregoing and all the succeeding chapters on kindred subjects, a friend, in October 1880, furnished me with a copy of a paper relating to the conference at Fairfax Courthouse. which seems to require notice at my hands. Therefore, I break the chain of events to insert here some remarks in regard to it. The paper appears to have been written by General G.

W. Smith, and to have received the approval of Generals Beauregard and J. E. Johnston, and to bear date the 31st of January, 1862. It does not agree in some respects with my memory of what occurred, and is not consistent with itself. It was not necessary that I should learn in that interview the evil of inactivity. My correspondence of anterior date might have shown that I was fully aware of it, and my suggestions in the interview certainly did not look As if it was necessary to impress me with the advantage of action. In one part of the paper it is stated that the reinforcements asked for were to be seasoned soldiers, such as were there present, and who were said to be in the finest fighting condition.

This, if such a proposition had been made, would have exposed its absurdity as well as the loophole it offered for escape, by subsequently asserting that the troops furnished were not up to the proposed standard. In another part of the paper, it is stated that there were hope and expectation that, before the end of the winter, arms would be introduced into the country, and that then we could successfully invade that of the enemy. But this supply of arms, however abundant, could not furnish seasoned soldiers, and the two propositions are therefore inconsistent. In one place it is written that it was felt it might be better to run the risk of almost certain destruction fighting upon the other side of the Potomac, rather than see the gradual dying out and deterioration of this army during winter, etc.

But when it was proposed to cross into eastern Maryland, on a steamer in our possession, for a partial campaign, difficulties arose like the lion in the path of the sluggard, so that the proposition was postponed and never executed. In like manner, the other expedition in the Valley of Virginia was achieved by an officer not of this consul, General T. J. Jackson. In one place it is written that the President stated, at that time no reinforcements could be furnished to the army of the character asked for. In another place he is made to say he could not take any troops from the points named, and without arms from abroad could not reinforce that army. Here again, it is clear from the answer that the proposition had been for such reinforcement as additional arms would enable him to give.

Those arms he expected to receive, barring the dangers of the sea and of the enemy, which obstacles alone prevented the positive assurance that they would be received at all. It was, as stated, with deep regret And bitter disappointment that I found notwithstanding our diligent efforts to reinforce this army, before and after the Battle of Manassas, that its strength had but little increased, and that the arms of absentees and discharged men were represented by only twenty-five hundred on hand. I cannot suppose that General Johnston could have noticed the statement that his request for conference had set forth the object of it to be to discuss the question of reinforcement. He would have known that, in Richmond, where all the returns were to be found, any consideration of reinforcement by the withdrawal of troops from existing garrisons could best be decided.

Very little experience, or a fair amount of modesty, without any experience. Would serve to prevent one from announcing his conclusion that troops could be withdrawn from a place or places, without knowing how many were there and what was the necessity for their presence. I was at the conference by request. The confidence felt in those officers is shown by the fact that I met with them alone and did not require any minutes to be made of the meeting. About four months afterward, A paper was prepared to make a record of the conversation. The fact was concealed from me, whereas, both for accuracy and frankness, it should have been submitted to me, even if there had been nothing due to our official relations.

Twenty years after the event, I learned of this secret report by one party without notice, having been given to the other of a conversation said to have lasted two hours. I have noticed the improbabilities and inconsistencies of the paper, and, without remark, I submit to honorable men the concealment from me in which it was prepared, whereby they may judge of the chances for such co-intelligence as needs must exist between the executive and the commanders of armies to ensure attainable success. The position at Fairfax Courthouse Though it would answer very well as a point from which to advance, was quite unfavorable for defense, and when I so remarked, the opinion seemed to be that to which the generals had previously arrived.

It therefore only remained to consider what the change of position should be in the event of the enemy threatening soon to advance. But in the meantime, I hope that something could be done By detachments from the army, to effect objects less difficult than an advance against his main force, and particularly indicated the lower part of Maryland, where a small force was said to be ravaging the country and oppressing our friends. This, I thought, might be feasible by the establishment of a battery near Aquia Creek, where the channel of the Potomac was said to be so narrow That our guns could prevent the use of the river by the enemy's boats, and by employing a steamboat lying there, troops enough could be sent over some night to defeat that force and return, before any large body could be concentrated against them.

The effect of the battery and of the expedition, it was hoped, would be important in relieving our friends and securing recruits from those who wish to join us. Previously, General Johnston's attention had been called to possibilities in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and that these and other like things were not done was surely due to other causes than the policy of the administration, as will appear by the letters hereto and next. Richmond, Virginia, August 1, 1861. General J. E. Johnston. General Lee has gone to Western Virginia, and I hope may be able to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, or, failing in that, will be able to organize and post our troops so as to check the enemy, after which he will return to this place.

The movement of banks will require your attention. It may be a ruse, But if a real movement, when your army has the requisite strength and mobility, you will find an opportunity by a rapid movement through the passes to strike him in rear or flank, and thus add another to your many claims to your country's gratitude. We must be prompt to avail ourselves of the weaknesses resulting from the exchange of the new and less reliable forces of the enemy, For those heretofore in service, as well as of the moral effect produced by their late defeat. I am, as ever, your friend, Jefferson Davis. From the correspondence which occurred after the conference at Fairfax Courthouse, I select a reply made to General Smith, who had written to me in advocacy of the views he had then expressed about large reinforcements to the Army of the Potomac for an advance into Maryland.

Nothing is more common than that a general realizing the wants of the army with which he is serving, and the ends that might be achieved if those wants were supplied, should overlook the necessities of others, and accept rumors of large forces which do not exist. and assumed the absence of danger elsewhere than in his own front. Richmond, Virginia, October 10, 1861. Major General G. W. Smith, Army of the Potomac. Your remarks about the moral effect of repressing the hope of the volunteers for an advance are in accordance With the painful impression made on me when, in our Council, it was revealed to me that the Army of the Potomac had been reduced to about one-half the legalized strength, and that the arms to restore the numbers were not in depot.

As I there suggested, though, you may not be able to advance into Maryland and expel the enemy. It may be impossible to keep up the spirits of your troops by expeditions. Such as that particularly spoken of against Cyclists' brigade on the lower Potomac or Banks' above. By destroying the canal and making other rapid movements wherever opportunity presents to beat detachments or to destroy lines of communications. Very truly, your friend, Jefferson Davis. Richmond, Virginia, November 18, 1861. General J. E. Johnston, if a large force should be landed on the Potomac below General Holmes, with the view to turn or to attack him, the value of the position between Dumfries and Fredericksburg will be so great that I wish you to give to that line your personal inspection.

With a sufficient force, the enemy may be prevented from leaving his boats, should he be able to cross the river. To make our force available at either of the points which he may select, it will be necessary to improve the roads connecting the advance posts with the armies of the Potomac and of the Aquia, as well as with each other, and to have the requisite teams to move heavy guns with celerity. Very respectfully yours, Jefferson Davis.

27 27 - Part 4, Chapter 11b 39:07

Capture of Romney. Troops ordered to retire to the valley. Discipline. General Johnston regards his position as unsafe. The first policy. Retreat of General Johnston. The plans of the enemy. Our strength magnified by the enemy. Stores destroyed. The Trent Affair. In November 1861, reports became current that the enemy were concentrating troops west of the valley of the Shenandoah. With a view to a descent upon it. That vigilant, enterprising, and patriotic soldier, General T. J. Jackson, whose steadiness under fire at the first battle of Manassas had procured for him the sobriquet of Stonewall, was then on duty as district commander of the Shenandoah Valley. He was a West Virginian, and though he had not acquired the fame which subsequently shed such luster upon his name, He possessed a well-deserved confidence among the people of that region.

Ever watchful and daring in the discharge of any duty, he was intensely anxious to guard his beloved mountains of Virginia. This, stimulating his devotion to the general welfare of the Confederacy, induced him to desire to march against the enemy, who had captured Romney. On the 20th of November, 1861, He wrote to the War Department proposing an expedition to Romney in western Virginia. It was decided to adopt his proposition. Endorsed by the commander of the department, and further to ensure success, though not recommended in the endorsement, his old brigade, then in the Army of the Potomac, was selected as a part of the command with which he was to make the campaign. General Johnston remonstrated against this transfer, and the correspondences subjoined for a fuller understanding of the matter.

Headquarters, Valley District, November 20th, 1861 Honorable J.P. Benjamin, Secretary of War. Sir, I hope you will pardon me for requesting that, at once, all the troops under General Loring be ordered to this point. Deeply impressed with the importance of absolute secrecy respecting military operations, I have made it a point to say but little Respecting my proposed movements in the event of sufficient reinforcements arriving. But since conversing with Lieutenant Colonel J.L.T. Preston upon his return from General Loring, and ascertaining the disposition of the General's forces, I venture to respectfully urge that, after concentrating all his troops here, an attempt should be made to capture the Federal forces at Romney.

The attack on Romney would probably induce McClellan to believe that the Army of the Potomac had been so weakened as to justify him in making an advance on Centerville. But should this not induce him to advance, I do not believe anything will during the present winter. Should the Army of the Potomac be attacked, I would be at once prepared to reinforce it with my present volunteer force, increased by General Loring's. After repulsing the enemy at Manassas, Let the troops that marched on Romney return to the valley and move rapidly westward to the waters of the Monongahela and Little Kanawha. Should General Kelly be defeated, and especially should he be captured, I believe that by a judicious disposition of the militia, a few cavalry, and a small number of field pieces, no additional forces would be required for some time in this district.

I deem it of very great importance that northwestern Virginia be occupied by Confederate troops this winter. At present, it is to be presumed that the enemy are not expecting an attack there, and the resources of that region necessary for the subsistence of our troops are in greater abundance than in almost any other season of the year. Postpone the occupation of that section until spring, and we may expect to find the enemy prepared for us, and the resources to which I have referred I know that what I have proposed will be an arduous undertaking, and cannot be accomplished without the sacrifice of much personal comfort. But I feel that the troops will be prepared to make this sacrifice when animated by the prospects of important results to our cause and distinction to themselves.

It may be urged against this plan that the enemy will advance on Stanton or Huntersville. I am well satisfied that such a step would but make their destruction more certain. Again, it may be said that General Floyd will be cut off. To avoid this, if necessary, the general has only to fall back toward the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. When northwestern Virginia is occupied in force, the Kanawha Valley, unless it be the lower part of it, must be evacuated by the federal forces, or otherwise their safety will be endangered. By forcing a column across from the Little Kanawha between them and the Ohio River, admitting that the season is too far advanced, or that from other causes all cannot be accomplished that has been named, yet through the blessing of God, who has thus far so wonderfully prospered our cause.

Much more may be expected from General Loring's troops, according to this program, than can be expected from them where they are. If you decide to order them here, I trust that, for the purpose of saving time, all the infantry, cavalry, and artillery will be directed to move immediately upon the reception of the Order. The enemy, about 5,000 strong, have been for some time slightly fortifying at Romney, and have completed their telegraph from that place to Greenspring Depot. Their forces at and near Williamsport are estimated as high as 5,000, but as yet I have no reliable information of their strength beyond the Potomac. Your most obedient servant, T.J. Jackson, Major General, PACS.

Headquarters, Centerville, November 21st, 1861. Respectfully forwarded. I submit that the troops under General Loring might render valuable services by taking the field with General Jackson instead of going into winter quarters as now proposed. J.E. Johnston, General.

Headquarters, Centerville. November 22nd, 1861. General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. Sir, I have received Major General Jackson's plan of operations in his district, for which he asks for reinforcements. It seems to me that he proposes more than can well be accomplished in that high, mountainous country at this season. If the means of driving the enemy from Romney preventing the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and incursions by marauders into the counties of Jefferson, Berkeley, and Morgan, can be supplied to General Jackson, and with them those objects accomplished, we shall have reason to be satisfied, so far as the Valley District is concerned. The wants of other portions of the frontier, a quiet district, for instance, make it inexpedient, in my opinion, to transfer to the Valley District so large a force as had asked for by Major General Jackson.

It seems to me to be now of a special importance to strengthen Major General Holmes near Aquia Creek. The force there is very small compared with the importance of the position. Your obedient servant, J. E. Johnston, General. Endorsement, respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War, S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, November 25th, 1861." Richmond, Virginia. November 10th, 1861. General J. E. Johnston, Manassas, Virginia. Sir, the Secretary of War has this morning laid before me yours of the eighth instant. I fully sympathize with your anxiety for the Army of the Potomac. If indeed mine be less than yours, it can only be so because the South, the West, and the East, presenting like cause for solicitude, have in the same manner demanded my care.

Our correspondents must have assured you that I fully concur in your view of the necessity for unity in command, and I hope by a statement of the case to convince you that there has been no purpose to divide your authority by transferring the troops specified in Order No. 206 from the center to the left of your department. The active campaign in the Greenbrier region was considered as closed for the season. There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a portion of his forces from that mountain region toward the Valley of Virginia, and that he has sent troops and munitions from the east by the way of the Potomac Canal toward the same point. The failure to destroy his communications by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and by the Potomac Canal has left him in possession of great advantages for that operation.

General Jackson, for reasons known to you, was selected to command the division of the valley. But we had only the militia and one mounted regiment within the district assigned to him. The recent activity of the enemy, the capture of Romney, etc., required that he should have for prompt service a body of Confederate troops to cooperate with the militia of that district. You suggest that such force should be drawn from the army at the Greenbrier. This was originally considered, and abandoned Because they could not reach him in time to anticipate the enemy's concentration, and also because General Jackson was a stranger to them, and time was wanting for the growth of that confidence between the commander and his troops, the value of which need not be urged upon you.

We could have sent to him from this place an equal number of regiments, being about double the numerical strength of those specified in the order referred to, but they were parts of a brigade now in the Army of the Potomac. Or were Southern troops, and were ignorant of the country in which they were to serve, and all of them unknown to General Jackson. The troops sent were his old brigade, had served in the valley, and had acquired a reputation which would give confidence to the people of that region, upon whom the General had to rely for his future success. Though the troops sent to you are, as you say, raw, they have many able officers, and will, I doubt not, The greater numbers will, to you, I hope, more than compensate for the experience of those transferred, while in the valley, the latter, by the moral effect their presence will produce, will more than compensate for the inferiority of their numbers.

I have labored to increase the army of the Potomac, and, so far from proposing a reduction of it, did not intend to rest content with an exchange of equivalence. In addition to the troops recently sent to you, I expected soon to send further reinforcements by withdrawing a part of the army from the Greenbrier Mountains. I have looked hopefully forward to the time when our army could assume the offensive and select the time and place where battles were to be fought, so that ours should be alternations of activity and repose. There's the heavy task of constant watching. When I last visited your headquarters, my surprise was expressed At the little increase of your effective force above that of the 21st of July last, notwithstanding the heavy reinforcements which, in the meantime, had been sent to you.

Since that visit, I have frequently heard of the improved health of the troops, of the return of many who had been absent sick, and some increase has been made by reinforcements. You can, then, imagine my disappointment at the information you give that, on the day before the date of your letter, The army at your position was yet no stronger than on the 21st of July. I can only repeat what has been said to you in our conference at Fairfax Courthouse that we are restricted in our capacity to reinforce by the want of arms. Troops to bear the few arms you have in store have been ordered forward. Your view of the magnitude of the calamity of defeat of the Army of the Potomac is entirely concurred in, and every advantage which is attainable "'should be seized to increase the power of your present force.

I will do what I can to augment its numbers, but you must remember that our wants greatly exceed our resources. Banks's brigade, we learn, has left the position occupied when I last saw you. Sickles is said to be yet in the lower Potomac, and when your means will enable you to reach him, I still hope he may be crushed.' I will show this reply to the Secretary of War. And hope there will be no misunderstanding between you in future. The success of the army requires harmonious cooperation. Very respectfully, etc., Jefferson Davis. End quote. After General Jackson commenced his march, the cold became unexpectedly severe, and as he ascended into the mountainous region, the slopes were covered with ice, which impeded his progress, the more because his horses were smooth-shod.

But his tenacity of purpose Fidelity and daring, too well known to need commendation, triumphed over every obstacle, and he attained his object, drove the enemy from Romney and its surroundings, took possession of the place, and prevented the threatened concentration. Having accomplished this purpose, and being assured that the enemy had abandoned that section of country, he returned with his old brigade to the valley of the Shenandoah, leaving the balance of his command at Romney. General Loring, the senior officer there present, and many others of the command so left, appealed to the War Department to be withdrawn. Their arguments were, as well as I remember, these. That the troops being from the south were unaccustomed to, and unprepared for, the rigors of a mountain winter.

That they were strangers to the people of that section. That the position had no military strength. And, at the approach of spring, After some preliminary action, an order was issued from the War Office directing the troops to retire to the valley. As that order has been the subject of no little complaint, both by civil and military functionaries, my letter to the General commanding the Department, in explanation of the act of the Secretary of War, is hereto annexed. 1862. General J. E. Johnston, Commanding, Department of Northern Virginia, Centerville, Virginia. General, I have received your letter of the fifth instant, while I admit the propriety in all cases of transmitting orders through you to those under your command.

It is not surprising that the Secretary of War should, in a case requiring prompt action, have departed from this. The usual method "'In view of the fact that he had failed more than once in having his instructions carried out when forwarded to you in the proper manner. You will remember that you were directed, on account of the painful reports received at the War Department, in relation to the command at Romney, to prepare to that place, and, after the needful examination, to give the orders proper in the case. You sent your adjutant, Inspector, General, and I am informed that he went no farther than Winchester.' To which point the commander of the expedition had withdrawn, leaving the troops, for whom anxiety had been excited, at Romney.

Had you given your personal attention to the case, you must be assured that the confidence reposed in you would have prevented the secretary from taking any action before your report had been received. In the absence of such security, he was further moved by what was deemed reliable information That large force of the enemy was concentrating to capture the troops at Romney, and by official report that place had no natural strength and little strategic importance. To ensure concertive action in the defense of our Potomac frontier, it was thought best to place all the forces for this object under one command. The reasons which originally induced the adding of the Valley District to your department exist in full force at present.

And I cannot, therefore, agree to its separation from your command. I will visit the Army of the Potomac as soon as other engagements will permit, although I cannot realize your complimentary assurance that great good to the Army will result from it, nor can I anticipate the precise time when it will be practicable to leave my duties here. Very respectfully and truly yours, Jefferson Davis." To complaints by General Johnston, That the discipline of his army was interfered with by irregular action of the Secretary of War, and its numerical strength diminished by furloughs granted directly by the War Department, I replied, after making inquiry at the War Office, by a letter, a copy of which is hereto annexed.

Richmond, Virginia, March 4, 1862. General J. E. Johnston, Centerville, Virginia. Dear Sir. "'Yours of the first instant received prompt attention, and I am led to the conclusion that some imposition has been practiced upon you. The Secretary of War informs me that he has not granted leaves of absence or furloughs to soldiers of your command for a month past, and then only to divert the current which threatened by legislation to destroy your army by a wholesale system of furloughs. Those which you inform me are daily received must be spurious." The authority to re-enlist and change from infantry to artillery, the secretary informs me, has been given but in four cases, three on the recommendation of General Beauregard, and specially explained to you some time since.

The remaining case was that of a company from Wheeling, which was regarded as an exceptional one. I wish, therefore, that you would send to the adjutant general the cases of recent date in which the discipline of your troops has been interfered with. The law in relation to reenlistment provides for reorganization, and was under the policy of electing the officers. The concession to Army opinions was limited to the promotion by seniority after the organization of the companies and regiments had been completed. The reorganization was not to occur before the expiration of the present term. A subsequent law provides for filling up the Twelve Months' companies by recruits for the war, but the organization ceases with the term of the Twelve Months' men.

Be assured of readiness to protect your proper authority, and I do but justice to the Secretary of War in saying that he cannot desire to interfere with the discipline and organization of your troops. He has complained that his orders are not executed, and I regret that he was able to present to me So many instances to justify that complaint, which were in no wise the invasion of your prerogative as a commander in the field. You can command my attention at all times to any matter connected with your duties, and I hope that full co-intelligence will secure full satisfaction. Very truly yours, Jefferson Davis." A fortnight after this letter, I received from General Johnston notice that his position was considered unsafe.

Many of his letters to me have been lost, and I have thus far not been able to find the one giving the notice referred to. But the reply which is annexed clearly indicates the substance of the letter which was answered. Richmond, Virginia, February 28th, 1862. General J. E. Johnston, Your opinion that your position may be turned whenever the enemy chooses to advance, and that he will be ready to take the field before yourself Clearly indicates prompt effort to disencumber yourself of everything which would interfere with your rapid movement when necessary, and such thorough examination of the country in your rear as would give you exact knowledge of its roads and general topography, and enable you to select a line of greater natural advantages than that now occupied by your forces.

The heavy guns at Manassas and Evansport need it elsewhere, and reported to be useless in their present position. Would necessarily be abandoned in any hasty retreat. I regret that you find it impossible to move them. The subsistence stores should, when removed, be placed in positions to answer your future wants. Those cannot be determined until you have furnished definite information as to your plans, especially the line to which you would remove in the contingency of retiring. The Commissary General had previously stopped further shipments to your army. and given satisfactory reasons for the establishment at thoroughfare. Footnote. Thoroughfare Gap was the point at which the Commissary General had placed a meatpacking establishment.

End footnote. I need not urge on your consideration the value to our country of arms and munitions of war. You know the difficulty with which we have obtained our small supply, that to furnish heavy artillery to the advanced posts, we have exhausted the supplies here I have only sought to present general purposes and views. I rely upon your special knowledge and high ability to effect whatever is practicable in this our hour of need. Recent disasters have depressed the weak and are depriving us of the aid of the wavering. Traitors show the tendencies heretofore concealed, and the selfish grow clamorous for local and personal interests. At such an hour, the wisdom of the trained and the steadiness of the brave possess a double value.

The military paradox that impossibilities must be rendered possible had never better occasion for its application. The engineers for whom you asked have been ordered to report to you, and further additions will be made to your list of brigadier generals. Let me hear from you often and fully. Very truly and respectfully yours, Jefferson Davis. Richmond, Virginia, March 6, 1862. General J. E. Johnston, Notwithstanding the threatening position of the enemy, I infer from your account of the roads and streams that his active operations must be for some time delayed, and thus I am permitted to hope That you will be able to mobilize your army by the removal of your heavy ordnance, and such stores as are not required for active operations, so that, whenever you are required to move, it may be without public loss and without impediment to celerity.

I was fully impressed with the difficulties which you presented when discussing the subject of a change of position. To preserve the efficiency of your army, you will, of course, avoid all needless exposure. And when your army has been relieved of all useless encumbrance, you can have no occasion to move it while the roads and the weather are such as would involve serious suffering, because the same reasons must restrain the operations of the enemy. Very respectfully yours, Jefferson Davis." At the conference at Fairfax Courthouse, heretofore referred to, I was sadly disappointed to find that the strength of that army had been little increased. Notwithstanding the reinforcements sent to it since the 21st of July, and that to make an advance the generals required an additional force, which it was utterly impracticable for me to supply.

Soon thereafter the army withdrew to Centreville, a better position for defence but not for attack, and thereby suggestive of the abandonment of an intention to advance. The subsequent correspondence with General Johnston during the winter expressed an expectation That the enemy would resume the offensive, and that the position then held was geographically unfavorable. There was a general apprehension at Richmond that the northern frontier of Virginia would be abandoned, and a corresponding earnestness was exhibited to raise the requisite force to enable our army to take the offensive. On the 10th of March, I telegraphed to General Johnston, quote, further assurance given to me this day that you shall be promptly and adequately reinforced.

End quote. The first policy was to carry the war beyond our own border. Five days thereafter, I received notice that our army was in retreat and replied as follows. Quote, Richmond, Virginia, March 15th, 1862. General J. E. Johnston, Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. General, I have received your letter of the 13th instant. "'Giving the first official account I have received of the retrograde movement of your army. Your letter would lead me to infer that others had been sent to apprise me of your plans and movements. If so, they have not reached me, and, before the receipt of yours of the thirteenth, I was as much in the dark as to your purposes, condition, and necessities as at the time of our conversation on the subject about a month since.'" It is true I have had many and alarming reports of great destruction of ammunition, camp equipage, and provisions, indicating precipitate retreat.

But having heard of no cause for such a sudden movement, I was at a loss to believe it. I have not the requisite topographical knowledge for the selection of your new position. I had intended that you should determine that question, and for this purpose a corps of engineers was furnished to make a careful examination of the country To aid you in your decision. The question of throwing troops into Richmond is contingent upon reverses in the west and southeast. The immediate necessity for such a movement is not anticipated. Very respectfully yours, Jefferson Davis." On the same day, I sent the following telegram. Your letter of the 13th received this day, being the first information of your retrograde movement.

I have no report of your reconnaissance, and can suggest nothing as to the position you should take, except it should be as far in advance as consistent with your safety. Jefferson Davis. To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where he should take position, I replied that I would go to his headquarters in the field, and found him on the south bank of the river. To which he had retired, in a position possessing great natural advantages. An elevated bank commanded the north side of the river, overlooking the bridge, and an open field beyond it, across which the enemy must pass to reach the bridge, which, if left standing, was an invitation to seek that crossing. Upon inquiring whether the south bank of the river continued to command the other side, down to Fredericksburg, General Johnston answered that he did not know.

That he had not been at Fredericksburg since he passed there in a stage on his way to West Point, when he was first appointed a cadet. I then proposed that we should go to Fredericksburg to inform ourselves upon that point. On arriving at Fredericksburg, a reconnaissance soon manifested that the hills on the opposite side commanded the town and adjacent riverbank, and therefore Fredericksburg could only be defended by an army occupying the opposite hills. For which our force was inadequate. In returning to the house of Mr. Barton, where I was a guest, I found a number of ladies had assembled there to welcome me, and who, with anxiety, inquired as to the result of our reconnaissance. Upon learning that the town was not considered defensible against an enemy occupying the heights on the other side, and that our force was not sufficient to hold those heights against such an attack as might be anticipated, the general answer was, With a self-sacrificing patriotism too much admired to be forgotten, quote, if the good of our cause requires the defense of the town to be abandoned, let it be done, end quote.

The purposes of the enemy were then unknown to us. If General Johnston's expectation of a hostile advance in great force should be realized, our course must depend partly upon receiving the reinforcement we had reason to expect from promises previously given and renewed. As was announced to General Johnston in my telegram of the 10th of March, 1862, in these words, quote, "...further assurance given to me this day that you shall be promptly and adequately reinforced, so as to enable you to maintain your position and resume first policy when the roads will permit," end quote. No immediate decision could therefore be made, and I return to Richmond to wait the further development of the enemy's plans.

The feeling heretofore noticed as arousing in Virginia a determination to resist the abandonment of her northern frontier, and which caused the assurance of reinforcements, bore fruit in the addition of about thirty thousand men by a draft made by the governor of the state. These, it is true, were not the disciplined, seasoned troops which were asked for by the generals in the conference at Fairfax Courthouse. But they were of such men as often during the war won battles for the Confederacy. The development of the enemy's plans, for which we had to wait, proved that, instead of advancing in force against our position at Centerville, he had, before the retreat of our army commenced, decided to move down the Potomac for a campaign against Richmond, from the peninsula as a base.

The conflagration at Centerville gave notice of its evacuation. And an advance was made as far as Manassas, but, as appears by General McClellan's report, with no more important design than to attack our rear guard, if it should be encountered. In the report on the conduct of the war by a committee of the United States Congress, evidence is found of much vacillation before the conclusion was finally reached of abandoning the idea of a direct advance upon Richmond for that of concentrating their army at the mouth of the Chesapeake. Whatever doubt or apprehension continued to exist about uncovering the city of Washington by removing their main army from before it was, of course, dispelled by the retreat of our army and the burning of bridges behind it.

In this last-mentioned fact, General McClellan says he found the strongest reason to believe that there was no immediate danger of our army returning. There was an apparent advantage to the enemy in the new base for his operations, Which was sufficiently illustrated by the events of the last year of the war. Had we possessed an army as large as the enemy supposed, it would have been possible for us at the same time to check his advance from the east, and to march against his capital, with fair prospect of capturing it, before the army he had sent against Yorktown could have been brought back for the defense of Washington. On this, as on other occasions, he greatly magnified the force we possessed, and on this, as on other occasions, It required the concentration of our troops successfully to resist a detachment of his.

Accepting as a necessity the withdrawal of the main portion of our army from northern Virginia to meet the invasion from the seaboard, it was regretted that earlier and more effective means were not employed for the mobilization of the army, a desirable measure in either contingency of advance or retreat, or at the least that the withdrawal was not so deliberate As to secure the removal of our ordnance, subsistence, and Quartermaster's stores, which had been collected on the line occupied in 1861 and the early part of 1862. A distinguished officer of our army, who has, since the war, made valuable contributions to the history of its operations, especially valuable as well for their accuracy as for their freedom from personal or partisan bias, writes thus of the retreat from Centerville.

A very large amount of stores and provisions had been abandoned for want of transportation, and among the stores was a very large quantity of clothing, blankets, etc., which had been provided by the states south of Virginia for their own troops. The pile of trunks along the railroad was appalling to behold. All these stores, clothing, trunks, etc., were consigned to the flames by a portion of our cavalry left to carry out the work of their destruction. The loss of stores at this point and at White Plains on the Manassas Gap Railroad, where a large amount of meat had been salted and stored, was a very serious one to us, and embarrassed us for the remainder of the war, as it put us at once on a running stock."

The same officer, and the value of his opinion will be recognized by all who know him, wherefore I give his name, General J. E. Early, in a communication subsequent to that from which I have just quoted, writes, In regard to the loss of supplies, quote, I believe that all might have been carried off from Manassas if the railroads had been energetically operated. The rolling stock of the Orange and Alexandria, Manassas Gap, and Virginia Central Railroads ought to have been sufficient for the purpose of removing everything in the two weeks allowed, if properly used, end quote. The enemy's plans, the development of which, as has been already stated, was necessary for the determination of our own movements.

were soon thereafter found to be the invasion of Virginia from the seaboard, and the principal portion of our army was consequently ordered to the peninsula, between the York River and the James. Thus the northern frontier of Virginia, which in the first year of the war had been the main field of skirmishes, combats, and battles, of advance and retreat, and the occupation and evacuation of fortified positions, ceased, for a time, to tremble beneath the tread of contending armies. To the foregoing narration of events immediately connected with the efforts of the Confederate government to maintain its existence at home, may here be properly added an incident bearing on its foreign relations in the first year of the war.

Our efforts for the recognition of the Confederate States by the European powers in 1861 served to make us better known abroad, to awaken a kindly feeling in our favor, and cause a respectful regard for the effort we were making to maintain the independence of the States Which Great Britain had recognized, and her people knew to be our birthright. On the 8th of November, 1861, an outrage was perpetrated by an armed vessel of the United States in the forcible detention on the high seas of a British mail steamer, making one of her regular trips from one British port to another, and the seizure on that unarmed vessel of our commissioners Mason and Slidell, who, with their secretaries, were bound for Europe on diplomatic service.

The seizure was made by an armed force against the protest of the captain of the vessel and of Commander Williams, R.N., the latter speaking as the representative of Her Majesty's government. The commissioners only yielded when force, which they could not resist, was used to remove them from the mail steamer and convey them to the United States vessel of war. This outrage was the more marked because the United States had been foremost in resisting the right of visit and search. And had made it the cause of the War of 1812 with Great Britain. When intelligence of the event was received in England, it excited the greatest indignation among the people, and Her Majesty's government, by naval and other preparations, unmistakably exhibited the purpose to redress the wrong.

The commissioners and their secretaries had been transported to the harbor of Boston and imprisoned in its main fortress. Diplomatic correspondence resulted from this event. The British government demanded the immediate and unconditional release of the commissioners, quote, in order that they may again be placed under British protection and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed, end quote. In the meantime, Captain Wilkes, commander of the vessel which had made the visit and search of the Trent, returned to the United States and was received with General Plaudet, both by the people and the government. The House of Representatives passed a vote of thanks. An honor not heretofore bestowed except for some deed deserving well of the country.

In the midst of all this exultation at the seizure of our commissioners on board of a British merchant ship came the indignant and stern demand for the restoration of those commissioners to the British protection from which they had been taken, and an apology for the aggression. It was little to be expected, after such explicit commendation of the Act, that the United States government would accede to the demand. And therefore the war and navy departments of the British government made active and extensive provision to enforce it. The haughty temper displayed toward four gentlemen arrested on an unarmed ship subsided in view of a demand to be enforced by the Army and Navy of Great Britain, and the United States Secretary of State, after a wordy and ingenious reply to the Minister of Great Britain at Washington City, wrote, quote, the four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren.

End quote. There was a time when the government and the people of the United States would not have sanctioned such aggression on the right of friendly ships, to pass unquestioned on the highway of nations, and the right of a neutral flag to protect everything, not contraband of war. But that was a time when arrogance and duplicity had not led them into false positions.

28 28 - Part 4, Chapter 12 36:57

XXVIII. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government.

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis.

Chapter Twelve. Supply of arms at the beginning of the war, of powder, of batteries, of other articles, contents of arsenals, other stores, mills, etc., first efforts to obtain powder, nitre, and sulfur, construction of mills commenced, efforts to supply arms, machinery, field artillery, ammunition, equipment. and Saltpeter. Results in 1862. Government powder mills, how organized? Success. Efforts to obtain lead. Smelting works. Troops, how armed? Winter of 1862. Supplies. NIDER and Mining Bureau. Equipment of First Armies. Receipts by Blockade Runners. Arsenal at Richmond. Armouries at Richmond and Fayetteville. A central laboratory built at Macon. Statement of General Gorgas. Northern Charge against General Floyd.

Answered. Charge of Slowness against the President. Answered. Quantities of arms purchased that could not be shipped in 1861. Letter of Mr. Hughes.

At the beginning of the war, the arms within the limits of the Confederacy were distributed as follows. At Richmond State About 4,000 rifles, no muskets. Fayetteville, N.C. About 2,000 rifles, 25,000 muskets. Charleston, S.C. About 2,000 rifles, 20,000 muskets. Augusta, GA. About 3,000 rifles, 28,000 muskets. Mount Vernon, Alabama. About 2,000 rifles, 20,000 muskets. Baton Rouge, Louisiana. About 2,000 rifles, 27,000 muskets. In total, 15,000 rifles, 120,000 muskets. There were at Richmond about 60,000 old flint muskets, and at Baton Rouge about 10,000 old Halls rifles and carbines. At Little Rock, Arkansas, there were a few thousand stands, and a few at the Texas Arsenal, increasing the aggregate of serviceable arms to about 143,000.

Add to these the arms owned by the several states, and by military organizations, and it would make a total of 150,000 for the use of the armies of the Confederacy. The rifles were of the caliber .54, known as Mississippi Rifles, except those at Richmond taken from Harper's Ferry, which were of the new model caliber .58. The muskets were the old flintlock caliber .69, altered to percussion. There were a few boxes of sabres at each arsenal, and some short artillery swords. A few hundred holster pistols were scattered about. There were no revolvers. There was, before the war, little powder or ammunition of any kind stored in the southern states, and this was a relic of the war with Mexico. It is doubtful if there were a million of rounds of small-arms cartridges.

The chief store of powder was that captured at Norfolk. There was, besides a small quantity at each of the southern arsenals, in all sixty thousand pounds, chiefly old cannon powder. The percussion caps did not exceed one quarter of a million, and there was no lead on hand. There were no batteries of serviceable field artillery at the arsenals, but a few old iron guns mounted on Gribbleville carriages Fabricated about 1812. The States and the volunteer companies did, however, possess some serviceable batteries, but there were neither harness, saddles, bridles, blankets, nor other artillery or cavalry equipments. To furnish 150,000 men on both sides of the Mississippi in May 1861, there were no infantry accoutrements.

No cavalry arms or equipments, no artillery, and above all, no ammunition. Nothing save arms, and these almost wholly the old pattern smoothbore muskets, altered to percussion from flintlocks. Within the limits of the Confederate States, the arsenals had been used only as depots, and no one of them, except that at Fayetteville, North Carolina, Had a single machine above the grade of a foot lab. Except at Harper's Ferry Armory, all the work of preparation of material had been carried on at the North. Not an arm, not a gun, not a gun carriage, and, except during the Mexican War, scarcely a round of ammunition, had for fifty years been prepared in the Confederate States. There were consequently no workmen.

Or, very few, skilled in these arts. Powder, save perhaps for blasting, had not been made at the South. No saltpetre was in store at any Southern port. It was stored wholly at the North. There were no worked mines of lead except in Virginia, and the situation of those made them a precarious dependence. The only cannon foundry existing was at Richmond. Copper. so necessary for field artillery and for percussion caps, was just being obtained in East Tennessee. There was no rolling mill for bar-iron south of Richmond, and but few blast furnaces, and these, with trifling exceptions, were in the border states of Virginia and Tennessee. The first efforts made to obtain powder were by orders sent to the North, which had been early done both by the Confederate government and by some of the states.

These were being rapidly filled when the attack was made on Fort Sumter. The shipments then ceased. Niter was contemporaneously sought for in North Alabama and Tennessee. Between four and five hundred tons of sulfur were obtained in New Orleans, at which place it had been imported for use in the manufacture of sugar. Preparations for the construction of a large powder mill were promptly commenced by the government, and two small private mills in East Tennessee were supervised and improved. On June 1, 1861, there was probably two hundred and fifty thousand pounds only, chiefly of cannon powder, and about as much nitre, which had been imported by Georgia, There were the two powder mills above mentioned, but we had no experience in making powder, or in extracting nitre from natural deposits, or in obtaining it by artificial beds.

For the supply of arms, an agent was sent to Europe, who made contracts to the extent of nearly half a million dollars. Some small arms had been obtained from the North, and also important machinery. The machinery at Harper's Ferry Armoury had been saved from the flames by the heroic conduct of the operatives headed by Mr. Armistead M. Ball, the master armourer. Of the machinery so saved, that for making rifle muskets was transported to Richmond, and that for rifles with sword bayonets to Fayetteville, North Carolina. In addition to the injuries suffered by the machinery, The lack of skilled workmen caused much embarrassment. In the meantime, the manufacture of small arms was undertaken at New Orleans and prosecuted with energy, though with limited success.

In field artillery, the manufacture was confined almost entirely to the Tredegar Works in Richmond. Some castings were made in New Orleans, and attention was turned to the manufacture of field and siege artillery at Nashville. A small foundry at Rome, Georgia, was induced to undertake the casting of the three-inch iron rifle. But the progress was very slow. The state of Virginia possessed a number of old four-pounder iron guns, which were reamed out to get a good bore, and rifled with three grooves after the manner of Parrot. The army at Harper's Ferry and that at Manassas were supplied with old batteries of six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers. A few parrot guns purchased by the state of Virginia were with General Magruder at Big Bethel.

For the ammunition and equipment required for the infantry and artillery, a good laboratory and workshop had been established at Richmond. The arsenals were making preparations for furnishing ammunition and knapsacks, but generally what little was done in this regard was for local purposes. Such was the general condition of ordnance and ordnance stores in May 1861. The progress of development, however, was steady. A refinery of saltpeter was established near Nashville during the summer. which received the nitre from its vicinity and from the caves in East and Middle Tennessee. Some inferior powder was made at two small mills in South Carolina. North Carolina established a mill near Raleigh, and a stamping mill was put up near New Orleans, and powder made there before the fall of the city.

Small quantities were also received through the blockade. It was estimated that on January 1, 1862, there were 1,500 Seacoast guns of various caliber in position from Evansport on the Potomac to Fort Brown on the Rio Grande. If their caliber was averaged at 32-pounder, and the charge at 5 pounds, it would, at 40 rounds per gun, require 600,000 pounds of powder for them. The field artillery, say three hundred guns, with two hundred rounds to the piece, would require one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds, and the small-arm cartridges, say ten million, would consume one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds more, making in all eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds. Deducting two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, supposed to be on hand in various shapes, and the increment is six hundred thousand pounds for the year 1861.

Of this, perhaps two hundred thousand pounds had been made at the Tennessee and other mills, leaving four hundred thousand pounds to be supplied through the blockade or before the beginning of hostilities.

The liability of powder to deteriorate in damp atmospheres Results from the impurity of the nitre used in its manufacture, and this it is not possible to detect by any of the usual tests. Security, therefore, in the purchase depends on the reliability of the maker. To us, who had to rely on foreign products and the open market, this was equivalent to no security at all. It was, therefore, as well for this reason as because of the precariousness of thus obtaining the requisite supply, necessary that we should establish a government powder mill. It was our good fortune to have a valuable man whose military education and scientific knowledge had been supplemented by practical experience in a large manufactory of machinery.

He, General G. W. Rains, was at the time resident in the state of New York, but when his native state, North Carolina, seceded from the Union and joined the Confederacy, true to the highest instincts of patriotism, he returned to the land of his birth and only asked where he could be most useful. The expectations, which his reputation justified, caused him to be assigned to the task of making a great powder mill. which should alike furnish an adequate supply, and give assurance of its possessing all the requisite qualities. This problem, which under the existing circumstances seemed barely possible, was fully solved. Not only was powder made of every variety of grain and exact uniformity in each, But the nitre was so absolutely purified that there was no danger of its deterioration in service.

Had Admiral Semes been supplied with such powder, it is demonstrated by the facts which have since been established that the engagement between the Alabama and the Kearsage would have resulted in a victory for the former.

These government powder mills were located at Augusta, GA, and satisfactory progress was made in the construction during the year. All the machinery, including the very heavy rollers, was made in the Confederate States. Contracts were made abroad for the delivery of niter through the blockade, and for obtaining it immediately, we resorted to caves, tobacco houses, cellars, etc. The amount delivered from Tennessee was the largest item in the year's supply. But the whole was quite inadequate to existing and prospective needs.

The consumption of lead was mainly met by the Virginia lead mines at Wytheville, the yield from which was from 60,000 to 80,000 pounds per month. Lead was also collected by agents in considerable quantities throughout the country, and the battlefield of Manassas was closely gleaned, from which much lead was collected. A laboratory for the smelting of other ores was constructed at Petersburg, Virginia, and was in operation before midsummer of 1862. By the close of 1861, eight arsenals and four depots had been supplied with materials and machinery, so as to be efficient in producing the various munitions and equipments, the want of which had caused early embarrassment. Thus, a good deal had been done to produce the needed material of war, and to refute the croakers who found in our poverty application for the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit.

The troops were, however, still very poorly armed and equipped. The old smoothbore musket was the principal weapon of the infantry. The artillery had mostly the six-pounder gun, and the twelve-pounder howitzer, and the cavalry were armed with such various weapons as they could get—sabers, horse-pistols, revolvers, sharps' carbines, musketoons, short-enfield rifles, holts' carbines, muskets cut off, etc.

Equipments were, in many cases, made of stout cotton domestic, stitched in triple folds and covered with paint or rubber varnish. But, poor as were the arms, enough of them, such as they were, It could not be obtained to arm the troops pressing forward to defend their homes and their political rights.

In December 1861, arms purchased abroad began to come in, and a good many infield rifles were in the hands of the troops at the Battle of Shiloh. The winter of 1862 was the period when our ordnance deficiencies were most keenly felt. Powder was called for on every hand, And the equipments most needed were those we were at least able to supply. The abandonment of the line of the Potomac and the Upper Mississippi from Columbus to Memphis did somewhat. However, the pressure for heavy artillery, and after the fall of 1862, when the powder mills at Augusta had got into full production, there was no further inability to meet all requisitions for ammunition. To provide the iron needed for cannon and projectiles, it had been necessary to stimulate by contracts the mining and smelting of its ores.

But it was obviously beyond the power of even the great administrative capacity of the Chief of Ordnance, General J. Gorgas, to whose monograph I am indebted for these details, to add to his already burdensome labors. The numerous and increasing cares of obtaining the material from which ammunition, arms, and equipments were to be manufactured. On his recommendation, a niter and mining bureau was organized, and Colonel St. John, who had been hitherto assigned to duty in connection with procuring supplies of niter and iron, was appointed to be chief of this bureau. A large, difficult, and most important field of operation was thus assigned to him. And well did he fulfill its requirements. To his recent experience was added scientific knowledge, and to both, untiring systematic industry and his heart's thorough devotion to the cause he served.

The tree is known by its fruit, and he may confidently point to results as the evidence on which he is willing to stand for judgment. Briefly, they will be noticed. Niter was to be obtained from caves and other like sources, and by the formation of niter beds, some of which had previously been begun at Richmond, these beds were located at Columbia, South Carolina, Charleston, Savannah, Augusta, Mobile, Selma, and various other points. At the close of 1864, there were 2,800,000 feet of earth collected. and in various stages of nitrification, of which a large proportion was assumed to yield one and a half pound of nitre per foot of earth. The whole country was laid off into districts, each of which was under the charge of an officer who obtained details of workmen from the army and made his monthly reports.

Thus the nitre production, in the course of a year, was brought up to something like half of the total consumption. The district from which the most constant yield could be relied on had its chief source at Greensboro, North Carolina, a region which had no nitre caves in it. The nitre was obtained from lixiviation of nitrous earth found under old houses, barns, etc. The supervision of the production of iron, lead, copper, and all the minerals which needed development, as well as the manufacture of sulfuric and nitric acids, The latter required for the supply of the fulminator of mercury for percussion caps, without which the firearms of our day would have been useless, was added to the Niter Bureau.

Such was the progress that, in a short time, the Bureau was aiding or managing some twenty-to-thirty furnaces with an annual yield of fifty thousand tons or more of pig-iron.

The lead and copper smelting works erected were sufficient for all wants, and the smelting of zinc of good quality had been achieved. The chemical works were placed at Charlotte, North Carolina, to serve as a reserve when the supply from abroad might be cut off.

In equipping the armies first sent into the field, the supply of accessories was embarrassingly scant. There were arms, such as there were, for over one hundred thousand men, But no accoutrements nor equipments, and a meager supply of ammunition. In time the knapsacks were supplanted by haversacks, which the women could make. But soldiers' shoes and cartridge-boxes must be had. Leather was also needed for artillery harness and for cavalry saddles, and as the amount of leather which the country could furnish was quite insufficient for all these purposes, It was perforce apportioned among them. Soldiers' shoes were the prime necessity. Therefore a scale was established by which first shoes and then cartridge-boxes had the preference, after these artillery harness and then saddles and bridles.

To economize leather, the waist and cartridge-box belts were made of prepared cotton cloths stitched in three or four thicknesses. Bridal reins were likewise so made, and then cartridge boxes were thus covered except the flap. Saddle skirts, too, were made of heavy cotton cloth strongly stitched. To get leather, each department procured its quota of hides, made contracts with the tanners, obtained hands for them by exemptions from the army, got transportation over the railroads for the hides and for supplies. To the varied functions of this bureau was finally added that of assisting the tanners to procure the necessary supplies for the tanneries. A fishery, even, was established on Cape Fear River to get oil for mechanical purposes, and at the same time food for the workmen.

In cavalry equipments the main thing was to get a good saddle, which would not hurt the back of the horse. For this purpose, various patterns were tried, and reasonable success was obtained. One of the most difficult wants to supply in this branch of the service was the horseshoe for cavalry and artillery. The want of iron and of skilled labor was strongly felt. Every wayside blacksmith's shop accessible, especially those in and near the theater of operations, was employed. These, again, had to be supplied with material. and the employees exempted from service.

It early became manifest that great reliance must be placed on the introduction of articles of prime necessity through the blockaded ports. A vessel capable of stowing 650 bales of cotton was purchased by the agent in England and kept running between Bermuda and Wilmington. Some fifteen to eighteen successive trips were made before she was captured. Another was added, which was equally successful. These vessels were long, low, rather narrow, and built for speed. They were mostly of pale sky color, and with their lights out and with fuel that made little smoke, they ran to and from Wilmington with considerable regularity. Several others were added, and devoted to bringing in ordnance, and, finally, general supplies.

Depots of stores were likewise made at Nassau and Havana. Another organization was also necessary that the vessels coming in through the blockade might have their return cargoes promptly on their arrival. These resources were also supplemented by contracts for supplies brought through Texas from Mexico.

The arsenal in Richmond soon grew into very large dimensions. and produced all the ordnance stores that the army required, except cannon and small arms, in quantity sufficient to supply the forces in the field. The arsenal at Augusta was very serviceable to the armies serving in the south and west, and turned out a good deal of field artillery complete. The government powder mills were entirely successful. The arsenal and workshops at Charleston were enlarged, Steam introduced, and good work done in various departments. The arsenal at Mount Vernon, Alabama, was moved to Selma in that state, where it grew into a large and well-ordered establishment of the first class. Mount Vernon Arsenal was dismantled, and served to furnish lumber and timber for use elsewhere.

At Montgomery, shops were kept up for the repair of small arms, and the manufacture of articles of leather. There were many other small establishments and depots. The chief armories were at Richmond and Fayetteville, North Carolina. The former turned out about fifteen hundred stands per month, and the latter only four hundred per month, for wad of operatives. To meet the wad of cavalry arms, a contract was made for the construction in Richmond of a factory for Sharpe's Carbines. This being built, It was then converted into a manufactory of rifle carbines, caliber fifty-eight. Smaller establishments grew up at Asheville, North Carolina, and at Tallahassee, Alabama. A great part of the work of the armories consisted in the repair of arms.

In this manner the gleanings of the battlefields were utilized. Nearly ten thousand stands were saved from the field of Manassas, and from those about Richmond in 1862, About twenty-five thousand excellent arms. All the stock of inferior arms disappeared from the armories during the first two years of the war, and were replaced by a better class of arms, rifled and percussioned. Placing the good arms lost previous to July 1863 at one hundred thousand, there must have been received from various sources four hundred thousand stands of infantry arms, in the first two years of the war. Among the obvious requirements of a well-regulated service was one central laboratory of sufficient capacity to prepare all ammunition, and thus to secure the vital advantage of absolute uniformity.

Authority was therefore granted to concentrate this species of work at Macon, Georgia. Plans of the buildings and of the machinery required were submitted and approved, and the work was begun with energy. The pile of buildings, at a façade of six hundred feet, was designed with taste and comprehended every possible appliance for good and well-organized work.

The buildings were nearly ready for occupation at the close of the war, and some of the machinery had arrived at Bermuda. This project preceded that of a general armory for the Confederacy, and was much nearer completion. These, with the admirable powder mills at Augusta, would have been completed, and with them the government would have been in a condition to supply arms and ammunition to 300,000 men. To these would have been added a foundry for heavy guns at Selma or Briarfield, Alabama, where the strongest cast iron in the country had been made.

Thus has been briefly sketched the development of the resources from which our large armies were supplied with arms and ammunition, while our country was invaded on land and water by armies much larger than our own. It will be seen under what disadvantages our people successfully prosecuted the, to them, new pursuits of mining and manufacturing. The chief of ordnance was General J. Gorgas, a man remarkable for his scientific attainment. for the highest administrative capacity and moral purity, all crowned by zeal and fidelity to his trust, in which he achieved results greatly disproportionate to the means at his command. He closes his excellent monograph in the following words.

We began in April 1861 without an arsenal, laboratory, or powder mill of any capacity. and with no foundry or rolling mill, except in Richmond, and before the close of 1863, or within a little over two years, we supplied them. During the harassment of war, while holding our own in the field, defiantly and successfully against a powerful enemy, crippled by a depreciated currency, throttled with a blockade that deprived us of nearly all the means of getting material or workmen, Obliged to send almost every able-bodied man to the field, unable to use the slave labor with which we were abundantly supplied, except in the most unskilled departments of production, hampered by want of transportation even of the commonest supplies of food, with no stock on hand even of articles such as steel, copper, leather, iron, which we must have to build up our establishments.

Against all these obstacles, In spite of all these deficiencies, we persevered at home as determinedly as did our troops in the field against a more tangible opposition, and in that short period created almost literally out of the ground foundries and rolling mills at Selma, Richmond, Atlanta, and Macon, smelting works at Petersburg, chemical works at Charlotte, North Carolina, a powder mill far superior to any in the United States, and unsurpassed by any across the ocean, and a chain of arsenals, armories, and laboratories equal in their capacity and their improved appointments to the best of those in the United States, stretching link by link from Virginia to Alabama.

The same officer writes, It was a charge often repeated at the North against General Floyd. that, as Secretary of War, he had, with traitorous intent, abused his office by sending arms to the South just before the secession of the States. The transactions which gave rise to this accusation were in the ordinary course of an economical administration of the War Department. After it had been determined to change the old flintlock muskets which the United States possessed to percussion, It was deemed cheaper to bring all the flintlock arms in store at southern arsenals to the northern arsenals and armories for alteration, rather than to send the necessary machinery and workmen to the south. Consequently, the southern arsenals were stripped of their deposits, which were sent to Springfield, Waterville, Pittsburgh, St.

Louis, and other points. After the conversion had been effected, The denuded southern arsenals were again supplied with about the same number, perhaps slightly augmented, that had formerly been stored there. A quota deposited at the Charleston Arsenal, where I was stationed in 1860, arrived there full a year before the opening of the war.

The charge was made early in the war that I was slow in procuring arms and munitions of war from Europe. We were not only in advance of the government of the United States and the markets of Europe, but the facts presented in the following extracts from the letter of our agent, Caleb Hughes, dated December 30, 1861, and addressed to Major C.C. Anderson, will serve to place the matter in its proper light.

London, December 30, 1861. Dear Major, we are all waiting with almost breathless anxiety for the arrival of the answer from the United States to the unqualified demand of England for the captured commissioners. Will Mr. Lincoln disregard the international writ of habeas corpus served by Great Britain? We shall soon know. If the prisoners are given up, the affair will result in great inconvenience to us in the way of shipping goods. I have now more than enough to load three Bermudas, and cannot ship a package, though I have a steamer off the wharf, all ready to receive her cargo. We are literally fighting two governments here. Government watchmen guard the wharf, where our goods are stowed, and others in the neighborhood night and day And the Warfinger has orders not to ship or deliver, by land or water, any goods marked W.D., without first acquainting the Honorable Board of Customs.

I have applied myself to ship to Bermuda, offering to give bonds to double the amount of value of the goods that they should be held in Bermuda, subject to the direction of Her Majesty's Representative in Bermuda. I have applied for permission to ship to Cardenas, agreeing to hold the goods subject to the order of the Spanish authorities. But all without avail, and our army must suffer for the want of blankets, overcoats, shoes, socks, field forges, arms, and ammunition, which have been collected to an amount more than double that I have yet received. It is miserable to have to look at the immense pile of packages in the warehouse at St. Andrew's Wharf and not be able to send anything. Only read the following.

Twenty-five thousand rifles, two thousand barrels of powder, five hundred thousand caps, ten thousand friction tubes, five hundred thousand cartridges, thirteen thousand accoutrements, thirteen thousand knapsacks, 13,000 gunslings, 44,338 pairs of socks, 16,484 blankets, 226 saddles, Sadler's tools, artillery harness, leather, etc. Very truly yours, Caleb Hughes.

29 29 - Part 4, Chapter 13a 38:09

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 13a.

Chapter 13. Extracts from my inaugural, our financial system, receipts and expenditures of the first year, resources, loans, and taxes, loans authorized, notes and bonds, funding notes, treasury notes guaranteed by the states, measure to reduce the currency, operation of the general system, Currency fundable. Taxation. Popular aversion. Compulsory reduction of the currency. Tax law. Successful result. Financial condition of the government at its close. Sources whence revenue was derived. Total public debt. System of direct taxes and revenue. The tariff. War tax of fifty cents on a hundred dollars. Property subject to it. Every resource of the country to be reached. Tax paid by the states mostly.

Obstacle to the taking of the census. The foreign debt. Terms of the contract. Premium. False charge against me of repudiation. Facts Stated.

In my inaugural address in 1862, I said, quote, The first year of our history has been the most eventful in the annals of this continent. A new government has been established, and its machinery put in operation over an area exceeding 700,000 square miles. The great principles upon which we have been willing to hazard everything that is dear to man have made conquest for us which could never have been achieved by the sword. Our confederacy has grown from six to thirteen states, and Maryland, already united to us by hallowed memories and material interests, will, I believe, when enabled to speak with unstifled voice, Connect her destiny with the South.

Our people have rallied with unexampled unanimity to the support of the great principles of constitutional government, with firm resolve to perpetuate by arms the rights which they could not peacefully secure. A million of men, it is estimated, are now standing in hostile array and waging war along a frontier of thousands of miles. Battles have been fought, sieges have been conducted, and although the contest is not ended and the tide for the moment is against us, the final result in our favor is not doubtful. Fellow citizens, after the struggles of ages had consecrated the right of the Englishman to constitutional representative government, Our colonial ancestors were forced to vindicate that birthright by an appeal to arms.

Success crowned their efforts, and they provided for their posterity a peaceful remedy against future aggression.

The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most odious and the least responsible form of despotism, has denied us both the right and the remedy. Therefore, We are in arms to renew such sacrifices as our forefathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty."

The financial system which had been adopted from necessity proved adequate at this early period to supply all the wants of the government and of the people. An unexpected and very large increase of expenditures It resulted from the great enlargement of the necessary means of defense. Yet the government entered on its second year without a floating debt and with its credit unimpaired. The total expenditures of the first year, ending February 1, 1862, amounted to $170 million. A statement of the Secretary of the Treasury Comprising the period from the organization of the government to August 1, 1862 presents the following results.

Expenditures for the War Department. $298,376,549.41 Expenditures for the Navy Department. $14,605,777.86. Expenditures for civil and miscellaneous $15,766,503.43. Total $328,748,830.70. Outstanding Requisitions, $18,524,128.15. Total Expenditures, $347,272,958.85. Total Receipts, $302,482,096.60.

Deficient Treasury Notes Authorized $16,755,165. Deficient Treasury Notes to be provided $28,035,697.25 Total $44,790,862.25 The receipts were derived as follows. Customs $1,437,399.96 War Tax $10,539,910.70 Miscellaneous $1,000,000 $974,769.33. Subtotal, $13,952,079.99. Loans, bonds, February 1861, $15 million. Bonds, August 1861, $22,613,346.61 Call Certificates April 1861 $37,515,200 Treasury Notes April 1861 $22,799,900 Demand Notes August 1861, $187,130,670. One and two dollar notes, $846,900. Due banks, $2,645,000. Subtotal, $288,000,000. $5,051,016.61. Total Receipts. $302,503,096.60. Such was the result presented by the Treasury of a government that had been in existence only 18 months.

It commenced that existence without a Treasury. and, without the sinews and the munitions of war, was in less than two months invaded on every side by an implacable foe. Its ways and means consisted in loans and taxes, and to these it resorted. On February 28th, I was authorized by Congress to borrow, at any time within twelve months, $15 million or less, as might be needed. It was to be applied to the payment of appropriations for the support of the government and for the public defense. Certificates of stocks or bonds, payable in 10 years at 8% interest, were issued. For the payment of the interest and principal of this loan, a tax or duty of 1% per pound was laid on all cotton exported. On March 9th, an issue of $1 million in Treasury Notes of $50 and upward was authorized, payable in one year from date at 3.65% interest, and receivable for all public debts except the export duty on cotton.

A reissue was authorized for a year. On May 16th, a loan of $50 million in bonds, Payable after 20 years at 8% interest was authorized. The bonds were, quote, to be sold for specie, military stores, or for the proceeds of sales of raw produce or manufactured articles, to be paid in the form of specie or with foreign bills of exchange, unquote.

The bonds could not be issued in fractional parts of a hundred dollars, or be exchanged for Treasury notes, or the notes of any bank, corporation, or individual. In lieu of any amount of these bonds, not exceeding $20,000, an equal amount of Treasury notes, without interest, in denominations of $5 and upward, was authorized to be issued. These notes were payable in two years in specie, and were receivable for all debts or taxes except the export duty on cotton. They were also convertible into bonds payable in 10 years at 8% interest.

On August 19th, another issue of Treasury Notes, amounting with those then issued to $100,000,000, was authorized. They were of the denominations of $5 and upward. They were receivable for the war tax and all other public dues except the export duty on cotton. These notes were convertible into 20-year bonds, bearing 8% interest, of which the issue was limited to $100 million. $30 million were to be a substitute for the same amount authorized by the Act of May 16, 1861. These bonds could be exchanged for specie, military, and naval stores, or for the proceeds of raw produce and manufactured articles.

On December 19, $10 million in Treasury notes were issued to pay the advance of the banks. On December 24, an additional issue of $50 million of Treasury notes, like those of the Act of August 19, was authorized. An additional issue of 30 millions of bonds was also authorized. On April 12, 1862, an issue of Treasury Notes, certificates of stocks and bonds, as the public necessities might require, to the amount of 200 and 15 millions was authorized. Of these, 50 millions in Treasury Notes were issued without reserve, 10 millions in Treasury Notes retained, as a reserve fund to pay any sudden or unexpected call for deposits, and 165 million certificates of stocks or bonds. Bonds to the amount of $50 million, payable in 10 years at 6% interest, were authorized and made exchangeable for any of the above Treasury notes.

All these notes and bonds were subject to the same conditions as those of the Acts of August 19 and December 24, 1861. On April 17, five millions of Treasury Notes were authorized to be issued in denominations of one and two dollars, which were receivable for all public dues except the Cotton duty.

An amount of Treasury Notes bearing interest at two cents per day on each hundred dollars As a substitute for as much of the 165 millions of bonds authorized, was also authorized to be issued. On September 19, 1862, $3,500,000 in bonds was authorized to be issued to meet a contract for six ironclad vessels of war. On September 23, 1862, the amount of Treasury notes under the denomination of $5 was increased from $5 million to $10 million, and a further issue of bonds or certificates of stock to the amount of $50 million was authorized.

On March 23, 1863, an effort was made to remove from circulation some of the issues of Treasury notes by funding them. For this purpose, it was provided that all Treasury notes, Not bearing interest, issued prior to December 1862, should be fundable in 8% bonds or stock during the ensuing 30 days and during the succeeding three months in 7% bonds or stock after which they ceased to be fundable. All Treasury notes not bearing interest and issued after December 1, 1862, until ten days after the passage of the Act. Call certificates were made fundable in 7% bonds, or stock during the ensuing four months, and afterward only in 4% 30-year bonds. Call certificates were made fundable in 30-year bonds at 8%, and all outstanding on the ensuing July 1st were deemed bonds at 6% payable in 30 years.

A monthly issue of Treasury notes without interest to the amount of $50 million was also authorized. These were made fundable during the first year of their issue in 6% 30-year bonds, and after the expiration of the year in 4% 30-year bonds. The further issue of call certificates was suspended, but Treasury notes fundable in the 6% bonds might be converted at the pleasure of the holder into such certificates at 5% interest, which were reconvertible, into like notes within six months, or afterward exchanged for 30-year 6% bonds. Treasury notes fundable in 4% bonds were convertible in like manner at 4%. All disposable means in the Treasury were to be applied to the purchase of Treasury notes, bearing no interest, Until the amount in circulation did not exceed $175 million.

The issue of $5 million in notes of $2, $1.50 was also authorized. It was further provided in this act that 6% bonds, as mentioned above, might be sold to any of the states for Treasury notes, and, being guaranteed by any of the states, they might be used to purchase Treasury notes.

A whole amount of such bonds could not exceed $200 million. Treasury notes so purchased were not to be reissued. The issue of 6% coupon bonds to the amount of $100 million, which were to be applied only to the absorption of Treasury notes, was also authorized. The coupons were payable either in the currency in which interest on other bonds was paid, or in cotton certificates pledging the government to pay the same in cotton of New Orleans middling quality, delivered at the rate of eight pence sterling per pound. An important measure was adopted on February 17th, 1864, the object of which was to reduce the currency and to authorize a new issue of notes and bonds. All Treasury notes above the denomination of $5 and not bearing interest were, if offered within a short period, made fundable in registered 20-year bonds at 4%.

At the same time, a new issue of Treasury notes was authorized and made receivable for all public dues, except custom duties, at the rate of $2 for three of the old. The issue of other Treasury notes After the first of the ensuing April was prohibited. To pay the expenses of the government, an issue of $500 million in 6% bonds was authorized. For the payment of interest, the receipts of the export and import duties, payable in specie, were pledged. A review of this statement of the legislation of Congress will clearly present the financial system of the government. The first action of the Provisional Congress was confined to the adoption of a tariff law and an act for a loan of $15 million, with a pledge of a small export duty on cotton to provide for the redemption of the debt.

At the next session after the commencement of the war, provision was made for the issue of $20 million in Treasury notes and for borrowing $30 million in bonds. At the same time, the tariff was revised, and preparatory measures taken for the levy of internal taxes. After the purpose of subjugation became manifest by the action of the Congress of the United States, early in July 1861, and the certainty of a long war was demonstrated, there arose the necessity that a financial system should be devised on a basis sufficiently large for the vast proportions of the approaching contest. The plan then adopted was founded on the theory of issuing Treasury notes, convertible at the pleasure of the holder into eight per cent bonds, with the interest payable in coin.

It was assumed that any tendency to depreciation, which might arise from the overissue of the currency, Would be checked by the constant exercise of the holder's right to fund the notes at a liberal interest payable in specie. The success of this system depended on the ability of the government constantly to pay the interest in specie. The measures, therefore, adopted to secure that payment consisted in the levy of an internal tax, termed a war tax, and the appropriation of the revenue from imports. The first operation of this plan was quite successful. The interest was paid from the reserve of coin existing in the country, and experience sustained the expectation of those who devised the system.

Wheat, in the beginning of the year 1862, was selling at $1.30 per bushel, thus but little exceeding its average price in time of peace. The other agricultural products of the country were at similarly moderate rates, thus indicating that there was no excess of circulation. At the same time, the premium-owned coin had reached about 20 percent. But it had become apparent that the commerce of our country was threatened with permanent suspension by reason of the conduct of neutral nations, who virtually gave aid to the United States government by sanctioning its declaration of a blockade. These neutral nations treated our invasion by our former limited and special agent as though it were the attempt of a sovereign to suppress a rebellion against lawful authority.

This exceptional cause heightened the premium on specie, because it indicated the exhaustion of our reserve without the possibility of renewing the supply. At the inauguration of the Permanent Government in February 1862, A popular aversion to internal taxation had been so strongly manifested as to indicate its partial failure. This will be further explained presently in our statement of the system of taxation. Under all these circumstances, the effort was made to avoid the increase in the volume of notes in circulation by offering inducements to voluntary funding. The measures adopted for that purpose were but partially successful. Meanwhile, the intervening exigencies from the fortunes of war permitted no delay.

The issues of Treasury notes were increased until, in December 1863, the currency in circulation amounted to more than $600 million, or more than threefold the amount required by the business of the country. The evil effects of this financial condition were but too apparent. In addition to the difficulty presented to the necessary operations of the government and the efficient conduct of the war, the most deplorable of all its results was, undoubtedly, its corrupting influence on the morals of the people. The possession of large amounts of treasury notes led to a desire for investment. And, with a constantly increasing volume of currency, there was an equally constant increase of price in all objects of investment.

This effect stimulated purchase by the apparent certainty of profit, and a spirit of speculation was thus fostered, which had so debasing an influence and such ruinous consequences that it became our highest duty to remove the cause by prompt and stringent measures. I therefore recommended to Congress, in December 1863, the compulsory reduction of the currency to the amount required by the business of the country, accompanied by a pledge that, under no stress of circumstances, would the amount be increased. I stated that, if the currency was not greatly and promptly reduced, the existing scale of inflated prices would not only continue, but, By the very fact of the large amounts thus made requisite in the conduct of the war, these prices would reach rates still more extravagant, and the whole system would fall under its own weight, rendering the redemption of the debt impossible, and destroying its value in the hands of the holder.

If, on the contrary, a funded debt, with interest secured by adequate taxation, could be substituted for the outstanding currency, Its entire amount would be made available to the holder, and the government would be in a condition beyond the reach of any probable contingency to prosecute the war to a successful issue. This recommendation was followed by the passage of the Act of February 17th, 1864, above mentioned. One of its features is the tax levied on the circulation. Regarding the government when contracting a debt as the agent of the people, its debt is their debt. As the currency was held exclusively by ourselves, it was obvious that if each person held treasury notes in exact proportion to the valuation of his whole estate, each would, in fact, owe himself the amount of the notes held by him.

Were it possible to distribute the currency among the people in this exact proportion, a tax levied on the currency alone, to an amount sufficient to reduce it to its proper limits, would afford the best of all remedies. Under such circumstances, the notes remaining in the hands of each holder after the payment of his tax would be worth quite as much as the whole sum previously held. for it would have an equal purchasing capacity. After this law had been in operation for one year, it was manifest that it had the desired effect of withdrawing from circulation the large excess of Treasury notes which had been issued. On July 1, 1864, the outstanding amount was estimated at $230,000. The estimate of the amount funded under this Act, about this time, was $300 million, while new notes were authorized to be issued to the extent of two-thirds of the sum received under his provisions.

The cheap difficulty apprehended in connection with our finances, up to the close of the war, resulted from the depreciation of our Treasury notes, which was to be attributed to the increasing redundancy in amount and the diminishing confidence in their ultimate redemption.

The financial condition of the government near its close is very correctly represented in the report of the Treasury Department. The total receipts of the Treasury for the two quarters ending on September 30, 1864, amounted to $415,191,550, which some added to the balance Three hundred and eight million, two hundred and eighty-two thousand, seven hundred and twenty-two dollars, that remained in the Treasury on April 1st, 1864, formed a total of seven hundred and twenty-three million, four hundred and seventy-four thousand, and two hundred and seventy-two dollars. Of this total, not far from half, that is to say, three hundred and forty-two million, five hundred and sixty-two thousand, $327,00 were applied to the extinction of the public debt, while the total expenditures were $272,378,505, leaving a balance in the Treasury on October 1, 1864 of $108,434,440.

The sources from which this revenue was derived were as follows. Four Percent Registered Bonds, Act of February 17, 1864, $13,363,500. 6% bonds, $500 million loan, Act of February 17, 1864, $14,481,050. Four percent call certificates, Act of February 17, 1864, $20,978,100. Tax on old issue of certificates redeemed, $14,440,566. Repayments by dispersing officers, $20,115,830. Treasury Notes Act of February 17, 1864 $277,576,950 War Tax $42,294,314 Sequestrations $1,338,732 Customs $50,004. Export duty. $4,320. Coin seized by the Secretary of War. $1,653,200. Premium on loans. $4,822,249. Soldiers tax. $908,622. The total amount of the public debt on October 1, 1864, on the books of the Register of the Treasury was $1,147,007,208, of which $5,30,003,004,090 were funded debt bearing interest, and $283,008,000 and $150 were Treasury notes of the new issue, and the remainder consisted of the former issue of Treasury notes, which were converted into other forms of debt, and ceased to exist on December 31.

In consequence, however, of the absence of certain returns from distant officers, the true amount of the debt was less by $21,500,000 than appeared On the books of the register, so that the total public debt on October 1st might have been fairly considered to have been $1,126,381,095. Of this amount, $541,340,090 consisted of funded debt, and the balance unfunded debt are Treasury notes. The foreign debt is omitted in these statements. It amounted to £2,200,000 and was provided for by about 250,000 bales of cotton collected by the government.

These bales were the security for the foreign cotton bonds and were seized by the United States government. Was it not liable to the bondholders?

The aggregate appropriations called for by the different departments of the government for the six months ending on June 30, 1865, amounted to $438,416,504. It was estimated that the remains of former appropriations would, on January 1, 1865, amount to a balance of $467,000, Four hundred and sixteen thousand and five hundred and four dollars. No additional appropriations were therefore required for the ensuing six months. A system of measures by which to obtain a revenue from direct taxes and duties was commenced at the first session of Congress under the Provisional Government. The officers who, at the time of the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, held any office connected with the collection of the customs, duties, and imposts in the several states of the Confederacy, or as assistant treasurers, instructed with the keeping of moneys arising therefrom, were continued in office with the same powers and subject to the same duties.

The tariff laws of the United States were continued in force until they might be altered. The free list was enlarged so as to embrace many articles of necessity. Additional ports and places of entry were established. Restrictive laws were repealed, and foreign vessels were admitted to the coasting trade. A lighthouse bureau was organized. A lower rate of duties was imposed on a number of enumerated articles, and an export duty of one-eighth of one per cent per pound was imposed on all cotton exported in the raw state. At the second session in May, a complete tariff law was enacted, with a lower scale of duties than had previously existed. On August 19th, 1861, a war tax of 50 cents on each hundred dollars of certain classes of property was levied for the special purpose of paying the principal and interest of the public debt, and of supporting the government.

The different classes of property on which the tax was levied were as follows. Real estate of all kinds, slaves, merchandise, bank stocks, railroad and other corporation stocks, money and interest or invested by individuals in the purchase of bills, notes, and other securities for money, except the bonds of the Confederate States, in cash on hand or on deposit. Cattle, Horses and mules, gold watches, gold and silver plate, pianos, and pleasure carriages. There were some exceptions, such as the property of educational, charitable, and religious institutions, and of a head of a family having property worth less than $500. An act was passed for the sequestration of the property of alien enemies as a retaliatory measure to offset the Confiscation Act.

of the United States. On April 24th, 1863, a new act was passed relative to internal or direct taxes. It was designed to reach, as far as practicable, every resource of the country except the capital invested in real estate and slaves, and, by means of an income tax, and a tax in kind on the produce of the soil, as well as by licenses on business occupations and professions, to command resources sufficient for the wants of the country. On February 17, 1864, an amendment to this last-mentioned act was passed. It levied additional taxes on all business of individuals, of copartnerships and corporations, also on trades, sales, liquor dealers, hotel-keepers, On June 10, 1864, an act was passed which levied a tax equal to one-fifth of the amount of the existing tax upon all subjects of taxation for the year.

Within six months after the passage of the war tax, on August 19, 1861, the popular aversion to internal taxation by the general government It had so influenced the legislation of the several states that only in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas were the taxes actually collected from the people. The quotas of the remaining states had been raised by the issue of bonds and state treasury notes. The public debt of the country was thus actually increased instead of being diminished by the taxation imposed by Congress.

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 13b. Tax Law. Successful Result. Financial condition of the government at its close. Sources whence revenue was derived. Total public debt. System of direct taxes and revenue. The tariff. War tax of 50 cents on $100. Property subject to it. Every resource of the country to be reached. Tax paid by the states mostly. Obstacle to the taking of the census. The foreign debt. Terms of the contract. Premium. False charge against me of repudiation. Facts stated. At the first and second sessions of Congress in 1862, no means were provided by taxation for maintaining the government. The legislation was confined to authorizing further sales of bonds and issues of treasury notes.

An obstacle had arisen against successful taxation. About two-thirds of the entire taxable property of the Confederate States consisted in land and slaves. Under the Provisional Constitution, which ceased to be in force on February 22nd, 1862, the power of Congress to levy taxes was not restricted by any other condition than that, quote, "...all duties, imposts, and excises should be uniform throughout the states of the Confederacy," end quote. But in the Permanent Constitution, which took effect on the same day, February 22nd, it was specially provided that, quote, Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all slaves.

According to the received construction of the Constitution of the United States, which had been acquiesced in for sixty years, taxes on lands and slaves were direct taxes. In repeating, without modification, in our Constitution, this language of the United States Constitution, our Convention necessarily seems to have intended to attach to it the meaning which had been sanctioned by long and uninterrupted acquiescence, thus deciding that taxes on lands and slaves were direct taxes. Our Constitution further ordered that a census should be made within three years after the first meeting of Congress, and that, No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

So long as there seemed to be a probability of being able to carry out these provisions of the Constitution fully, and in conformity with the intentions of its authors, there was an obvious difficulty in framing any system of taxation. A law which should exempt from the burden two-thirds of the property of the country The urgency of the need, however, was such that, after great embarrassment, the law of April 24, 1863, above mentioned, was framed. Still, a very large proportion of these resources was unavailable for some time, and the intervening exigencies permitting of no delay, a resort to further issues of Treasury notes, The foreign debt of the Confederate States at the close of the war was £2,200,000.

The earliest proposals on which this debt was contracted were issued in London and Paris in March 1863. The bonds bore interest at 7% per annum in sterling, payable half-yearly. They were exchangeable for cotton on application at the option of the holder or redeemable at par in sterling in 20 years. By half-yearly drawings, commencing March 1, 1864. The special security of these bonds was the engagement of the government to deliver cotton to the holders. Each bond at the option of the holder was convertible at its nominal amount into cotton at the rate of sixpence sterling for each pound of cotton, say, four thousand pounds of cotton for each bond of a hundred pounds, or twenty-five hundred francs.

And this could be done at any time not later than six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the belligerents. Sixty days after the notice, the cotton was to be delivered, if, in a state of peace, at the ports of Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, or New Orleans. If at war, at points in the interior of the country, within ten miles of a railroad or a stream navigable to the ocean. The delivery was to be made free of all charges, except the export duty of one-eighth of one cent per pound. The quality of the cotton was to be the standard of New Orleans middling. An annual sinking fund of 5% was provided for, whereby 2.5% of the bonds unredeemed by cotton should be drawn by lot half-yearly, so as finally to extinguish the loan in 20 years from the first drawing.

The bonds were issued at 90%, payable in installments. The loan soon stood in the London market at 5% premium. The amount asked for was three million pounds. The amount of applications in London and Paris exceeded 15 million pounds. Great efforts had previously been made by agents of the United States government to reflect upon the credit of the Confederate States by resuscitating an almost forgotten accusation of repudiation against the state of Mississippi, and especially by an emissary sent to Great Britain. Than whom no one knew better how false were the attempts to implicate my name in that charge. The slanderous tongues of Northern hatred even went so far as to style me the father of repudiation.

How unjust all such assertions were will be manifest by a simple statement of the case.

The facts with regard to the Mississippi Union Bank bonds may be briefly stated as follows. The Constitution of Mississippi required that no law should ever be passed, quote, to raise a loan of money on the credit of the state or to pledge the faith of the state for the payment or redemption of any loan or debt, end quote, unless such law should be proposed and adopted by the legislature, then published for three months previous to the next regular election, and finally reenacted by the succeeding legislature. The object was to enable the people of the state to consider the question intelligently. and to indicate and exercise their will upon it by the election of representatives to the ensuing legislature, whose views upon the subject would be known, and with such instructions express or implied as they might think proper to give.

In 1837, a law was passed by the legislature for incorporating the Union Bank of Mississippi with a capital of $15,500,000, quote, to be raised by means of a loan to be obtained by the directors of the institution. End quote. In order to secure this loan, the stockholders were required to give mortgages on productive and unencumbered property, to be in all cases of value greater by a fixed ratio than the amount of their stock. When the stock had been thus secured, as a further guarantee for the redemption of the loan, the governor was directed to issue bonds in the name and behalf of the state equal in amount to the stock secured by mortgage on private property. No bonds, as thus directed, were ever issued.

This Act was duly promulgated to the people and duly reenacted by the succeeding Legislature on the 5th of February, 1838, in strict accordance with the Constitution. Ten days afterward, however, viz. on the 15th of February, the Legislature passed an Act supplemental to the Act chartering the Union Bank, which materially changed or abolished the essential conditions for the Pledge of the Credit of the State. By this supplemental act, the Governor was instructed, as soon as the books of subscription should be opened, to, quote, "...subscribe for, in behalf of the State, 50,000 shares of the stock of the original capital of said bank, to be paid for out of the proceeds of the State bonds, to be executed to the said bank, as already provided for in the said Charter."

End quote. This Act was passed in the ordinary mode of legislation, and was not referred, published, nor reenacted As soon as the directory was organized and the books of subscription were opened, and before the mortgages required by the charter were executed, the governor, in behalf of the state, subscribed for 50,000 shares of the stock and issued the bonds of the state for $5 million payable to the order of the bank. These bonds were sold to Nicholas Biddle, president of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania. And by him sent to Great Britain as collateral security for a loan previously made. None of the money received for them went into the treasury of the state of Mississippi. Nor was any of it used for a public improvement.

All the consideration ever received by the state was its stock in the Union Bank. The bank soon failed, and the stock became utterly worthless. Before the bonds became due, the governor of the state had declared them to be null and void, among other causes. In consequence of the failure to sell them at par, as required by the Supplemental Act under which they were issued. It is not necessary here to discuss the question of the validity or nodity of the bonds. The object is merely to state the principal facts. While these events were occurring, and until a period several years subsequent to their consummation, I, who had just resigned my commission in the army, was a private citizen, had never held any civil office, and took no part in political affairs.

Indeed, I have never at any time before, during, or since those events held any civil office under the state government, and neither had nor could have had any part in shaping the policy of the state. When brought out as a candidate for office, my nomination was opposed by that section of my party which advocated repudiation on account of my opinions in favor of the payment of the bonds. As a private citizen, it may be stated that I held that the question of the validity of the bonds The Constitution of Mississippi authorized suit to be brought against the state in such cases in her own courts, and this I regarded as the proper course to be pursued by the bondholders, holding that the state would be bound by the judicial decision if it should sustain the validity of the claim.

This course, however, was not adopted until long afterward, when the question had become complicated with political issues. Which rendered the effort to obtain a settlement entirely nugatory. When I was a member of the Senate of the United States, my official influence was exerted to promote the objects of a citizen of Mississippi, who, with quasi-credentials from the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, went to London to propose to the bondholders an arrangement by which the claim, or the greater portion of it, might be paid by private subscription, on consideration of the cancellation of the bonds. This effort failed from a mistaken estimate on the part of some of the principal bondholders to whom the proposition was made of the extent to which state pride would induce our citizens to contribute and to the belief in a power to coerce payment.

The gentleman who bore the proposal, indignant at the offensive manner of its rejection, unconscious of the disinterestedness of his motives, abandoned the negotiation in disgust, and the opportunity was lost. End footnote. We should not omit to refer once more to the most prolific source of sectional strife and alienation, which is believed to have been the question of the tariff or duties upon imports. Its influence extended to and affected subjects with which it was not visibly connected, and finally assumed a form surely not contemplated in the original formation of the Union. In the Articles of Confederation, the first Constitution of the United States The theory was that of direct taxation, and the manner was to impose upon the states an amount which each was to furnish to the common treasury, to defray expenses for the common defense and general welfare.

During the period of our colonial existence, the policy of the British government had been to suppress the growth of manufacturing industry. It was forcibly expressed by Lord North in the declaration that, quote, not a hobnail should be made in the American colonies, end quote. The consequence was that in the War of the Revolution, our armies and people suffered so much from the want of the most necessary supplies that General Washington, after we had achieved our independence, expressed the opinion that the government should, by bounties, encourage the manufacture of such materials as were necessary in time of war. In the convention which framed the Constitution for a more perfect union, one of the greatest difficulties in agreeing upon its terms was found in the different interests of the states.

But among the compromises which were made, there prominently appears the purpose of a strict equality in the burdens to be borne, as well as the blessings to be enjoyed by the people of the several states. For a long time after the formation of the more perfect union, but little capital was invested in manufacturing establishments. And though in the early part of the present century the amount had considerably increased, The products were yet quite insufficient for the necessary supplies of our armies in the War of 1812. Government contracts, high prices, and to some extent no doubt patriotic impulses led to the investment of capital in the articles required for the prosecution of the war. With the restoration of peace and the renewal of commerce, prices naturally declined.

And it was represented that the investments made in manufacturing establishments were so unprofitable The Congress of the United States in 1816, from motives at least to be commended for their generosity, enacted a law to protect from the threatened ruin those of their countrymen who had employed their capital for purposes demanded by the general welfare and common defense. These good intentions, if it be conceded that the danger was real, which it was designed to avert, were most unfortunate, as the beginning of a policy The end of which was fraught with the greatest evils that have ever befallen the Union. By the Constitution of 1789, power was conferred upon Congress, quote, "...to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," end quote.

In the exercise of this delegated trust, Tariff laws were enacted, and had been in operation to the satisfaction of all parts of the Union, from the organization of the government down to 1816. But throughout that period all of those laws were based upon the principle of duties for revenue. It was true, and of course it was known, that such duties would give incidental protection to any industry producing an article on which the duty was levied. But while the money was collected for the purposes enumerated, and the rate kept down to the lowest revenue standard, The consumer had no cause to complain of the indirect benefit received by the manufacturer, and the history of the time shows that it produced no discontent.

Not so with the tariff law of 1816. Though sustained by men from all sections of the Union, and notably by so strict a constructionist as Mr. Calhoun, they were not wanting those who saw in it a departure from the limitation of the Constitution. And sternly opposed it as the usurpation of a power to legislate for the benefit of a class. The law derived much of its support from the assurance that it was only a temporary measure, and intended to shield those whose patriotism had exposed them to danger, thus presenting the not uncommon occurrence of a good case making a bad precedent. For the first time, a tariff law had protection for its object, and for the first time it produced discontent. In the law, there was nothing which necessarily gave to it, or in its terms, violated the obligation that duties should be uniform throughout the United States.

The fact that it affected the sections differently was due to physical causes, that is, geographical differences. The streams of the southern Atlantic states ran over wide plains into the sea. Their last falls were remote from ocean navigation, and their people, almost exclusively agricultural, resided principally on this plain. And as near to the seaboard as circumstances would permit. In the northern Atlantic states, the highlands approached more nearly to the sea, and the rivers made their last leap near to harbors of commerce. Water power being relied on before the steam engine had been made, and ships the medium of commerce before railroads and locomotives were introduced, it followed that the staples of the southern plains were economically sent to the water power of the north to be manufactured.

This remark, of course, applies to such articles as were not exported to foreign countries, and is intended to explain how the North became the seat of manufacturers, and the South remained agricultural. From this it followed that legislation for the benefit of manufacturers became a Northern policy. It was not, as has been erroneously stated, because of the agricultural character of the Southern people, that they were opposed to the policy inaugurated by the Tariff Act of 1816. This is shown by the fact that, anterior to that time, they had been the friends of manufacturing industry, without reference to its location. As long as duties were imposed for revenue, so that the object was to supply the common treasury, it had been cheerfully borne, and the agriculture of one section and the manufacturing of another were properly regarded as handmaids, and not unfrequently referred to as the means of strengthening and perpetuating the bonds by which the states were united.

When duties were imposed, not for revenue, but as a bounty to a particular industry, it was regarded both as unjust and without warrant expressed or implied in the Constitution. Then arose a controversy, quadrennially renewed and with increasing provocation, in 1820, in 1824, and in 1828, each stage intensifying the discontent, arising more from the injustice than the weight of the burden borne. It was not the twenty shillings ship money tax, but the violation of the Magna Carta, which Hampton and his associates resisted. It was not the stamp duty nor the tea tax, but the principle involved in taxation without representation, against which our colonial fathers took up arms. So the Tariff Act in 1828, known at the time as the Bill of Abominations, was resisted by Southern representatives.

Because it was the invasion of private rights in violation of the compact by which the states were united. In the last stage of the proceeding, after the friends of the bill had advocated it as a measure for protecting capital invested in manufacturers, Mr. Drayton, of South Carolina, moved to amend the title so that it should read, quote, "...an act to increase the duties upon certain imports for the purpose of increasing the profits of certain manufacturers," end quote. and stated his purpose for desiring to amend the title to be that, upon some case which would arise under the execution of the law, an appeal might be made to the Supreme Court of the United States to test its constitutionality.

Those who had passed the bill refused to allow the opportunity to test the validity of a tax imposed for the protection of a particular industry. Though the debates showed clearly enough the purpose to be to impose duties for protection, The phraseology of the law presented it as an act to raise revenue, and therefore the victims of the discrimination were deprived of an appeal to the tribunal instituted to hear and decide on the constitutionality of a law. South Carolina, oppressed by onerous duties and stung by the injustice of a refusal to allow her the ordinary remedy against unconstitutional legislation, asserted the right, as a sovereign state, to nullify the law. This conflict between the authority of the United States and one of the states threatened for a time such disastrous consequences as to excite intense feeling in all who loved the Union as the fraternal federation of equal states.

Before an actual collision of arms occurred, Congress wisely adopted the Compromise Act of 1833. By that, the fact of protection remained, but the principle of duties for revenue was recognized by a sliding scale of reduction. And it was hoped the question had been placed upon a basis that promised a permanent peace. The party of protective duties, however, came into power about the close of the period when the compromise measure had reached the result it proposed, and the contest was renewed with little faith on the part of the then-dominant party, and with more than all of its former bitterness. The cause of the departure from a sound principle of a tariff for revenue, which had prevailed during the first quarter of a century, And the adoption in 1816 of the rule imposing duties for protection was stated by Mr.

McDuffie to be that politicians and capitalists had seized upon the subject and used it for their own purposes, the former for political advancement, the latter for their own pecuniary profit, and that the question had become one of partisan politics and sectional enrichment. Contemporaneously with this theory of protective duties, Arose a policy of making appropriations from the common treasury for local improvements. As the Southern representatives were mainly those who denied the constitutional power to make such expenditures, it naturally resulted that the mass of those appropriations were made for Northern works. Now that direct taxes had in practice been so wholly abandoned as to be almost an obsolete idea, and now that the treasury was supplied by the collection of duties upon imports, Two golden streams flowed steadily to enrich the northern and manufacturing region by the impoverishment of the southern and agricultural section.

In the train of wealth and demand for labor followed immigration and the more rapid increase of population in the northern than in the southern states. I do not deny the existence of other causes, such as the fertile region of the northwest, the better harbors, the greater amount of shipping of the northeastern states. And the prejudice of Europeans against contact with the Negro race, but the causes I have first stated were, I think, the chief and those only which are referable to the action of the general government. It was not found that the possession of power mitigated the injustice of its use by the North, and discontent therefore was steadily accumulating, and, as stated in the beginning of this chapter, I think was due to class legislation in the form of protective duties and its consequences.

More than to any or all other causes combined. Turning from the consideration of this question in its sectional aspect, I now invite attention to its general effect upon the character of our institutions. If the common treasury of the states had, as under the Confederation, been supplied by direct taxation, who can doubt that a rigid economy would have been the rule of the government? That representatives would have returned to their taxpaying constituents to justify appropriations? When the money was obtained by indirect taxation, so that but few could see the source from which it was derived, it readily followed that a constituency would ask not why the representative had voted for the expenditure of money, but how much he had got for his own district, and perhaps he might have to explain why he did not get more.

Is it doubtful that this would lead to extravagance, if not to corruption? Nothing could be more fatal to the independence of the people and the liberties of the states than dependence for support upon the public treasury, whether it be in the form of subsidies, of bounties, or restrictions on trade for the benefit of special interests. In the decline of the Roman Empire, the epoch in which the hopelessness of renovation was made manifest was that in which the people accepted corn from the public granaries. It preceded but a little the time when the post of emperor became a matter of purchase. How far would it differ from this if constituencies should choose their representatives not for their integrity, not for their capacity, not for their past services, but because of their ability to get money from the public treasury for the benefit of their local interests?

And how far would it differ from a purchase of the office If a president were chosen because of the favor he would show to certain moneyed interests. Now that fanaticism can no longer inflame the prejudices of the uninformed, it may be hoped that our statesmen will review the past and give to our country a future

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The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 4, Chapter 14. Military Laws and Measures Agricultural Products Diminished Manufacturers flourishing. The call for volunteers. The term of three years. Improved discipline. The law assailed. Important constitutional question raised. Its discussion at length. Power of the government over its own armies and the militia. Object of confederations. The war power is granted. Two modes of raising armies in the Confederate States. Is the law necessary and proper? Congress is the judge under the grant of specific power. What is meant by militia? Whole military strength divided into two classes. Powers of Congress. Objections answered.

Good effects of the law. The limitations enlarged. Results of the operations of these laws. Act for the employment of slaves. Message to Congress. Died of a theory. Act to use slaves as soldiers past. Not time to put it in operation. The agricultural products were diminished every year during the war. Its demands diminished the number of cultivators, and their labors were more extensively devoted to grain crops. The amount of the cotton crop was greatly reduced, and numbers of bales were destroyed when in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy. The manufacturing industry became more extensive than ever before, and in many branches more highly developed. The results in the Ordinance Department of the Government, stated elsewhere in these pages, serve as an illustration of the achievements in many branches of industry.

During the first year of the war, the authority granted to the President to call for volunteers in the Army for a short period was sufficient to secure all the military force which we could fit out and use advantageously. As it became evident that the contest would be long and severe, better measures of preparation were enacted. I was authorized to call out and place in the military service for three years, unless the war should sooner end, all white men residents of the Confederate States between the ages of 18 and 35 years, and to continue those already in the field until three years from the date of their enlistment. But those under 18 years and over 35 were required to remain 90 days. The existing organization of companies, regiments, etc.

was preserved. But the former were filled up to the number of 125 men. This was the first step toward placing the army in a permanent and efficient condition. The term of service being lengthened, the changes by discharges and by receiving recruits were diminished, so that, while additions were made to the forces already in the field, the discipline was greatly improved. At the same time, on March 13, 1862, General Robert E. Lee was, Charged with the conduct of the military operations of the armies of the Confederacy, under my direction. Nevertheless, the law upon which our success so greatly depended was assailed with unexpected criticism in various quarters. A constitutional question of high importance was raised, which tended to involve the harmony of cooperation so essential in this crisis between the general and the state governments.

It was advanced principally by the governor of Georgia Honorable Joseph E. Brown, and the following extracts are taken from my reply to him, dated, Executive Department, Richmond, May 29, 1862. I propose from my high respect for yourself and for other eminent citizens who entertain opinions similar to yours to set forth somewhat at length my own views on the power of the Confederate government over its own armies and the militia. and will endeavor not to leave without answer any of the positions maintained in your letters. The main, if not the only purpose for which independent states form unions or confederations is to combine the power of the several members in such manner as to form one united force in all relations with foreign powers, whether in peace or in war.

Each state, amply competent to administer and control its own domestic government, yet too feeble successfully to resist powerful nations, Thank you. Now, the powers delegated by the several states to the Confederate government, which is their common agent, are enumerated in the eighth section of the Constitution, each power being distinct. The only exception is the eighteenth paragraph, which by its own terms is made dependent on those previously enumerated, as follows. Eighteen. To make all Now, the war powers granted to the Congress are conferred in the following paragraphs. Gives authority to raise revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the government, etc.

Number eleven. To declare war, grant letters of mark and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. Number twelve. To raise and support armies, but no appropriations of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. Number thirteen. To provide and maintain a navy. Number fourteen, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. It is impossible to imagine a more broad, ample, and unqualified delegation of the whole war power of each state than is here contained, with the solitary limitation of the appropriations to two years. The states not only gave power to raise money for the common defense, to declare war, to raise and support armies, in the plural, to provide and maintain a navy, to govern and regulate both land and naval forces, but they went further, and covenanted, by the third paragraph of the tenth section, not to engage in war unless actually invaded, or in I know of but two modes of raising armies within the Confederate States, viz., voluntary enlistment and draft or conscription.

I perceive in the delegation of power to raise armies no restriction as to the mode of procuring troops. I see nothing which confines Congress to one class of men, nor any greater power to receive volunteers and conscripts into its service. I see no limitation by which enlistments are to be received of individuals only, but not of companies, or battalions, or squadrons, or regiments. I find no limitation of time of service, but only of duration of appropriation. I discovered nothing to confine Congress to waging war within the limits of the Confederacy, nor to prohibit offensive war. In a word, when Congress desires to raise an army, and passes a law for that purpose, the solitary question is under the 18th paragraph, viz.

Is the law one that is necessary and proper to execute the power to raise armies? On this point, you say, but did the necessity exist in this case? The Conscription Act cannot aid the government in increasing its supply of arms or provisions, but can only enable it to call a larger number of men into the field. The difficulty has never been to get men. The states have already furnished the government more than it can arm, etc. I would have very little difficulty in establishing to your entire satisfaction that the passage of the law was not only necessary, but that it was absolutely indispensable. That numerous regiments of twelve months' men were on the eve of being disbanded, whose places could not be supplied by raw levies in the face of superior numbers of the foe, without entailing the most disastrous results.

That the position of our armies was so critical as to fill the bosom of every patriot with the liveliest apprehension, and that the provisions of this law were effective in warding off a pressing danger. But I prefer to answer your objection on other and broader grounds. I hold that when a specific power is granted by the Constitution, like that now in question, to raise armies, Congress is the judge whether the law passed for the purpose of executing that power is necessary and proper. It is not enough to say that armies might be raised in other ways, and that, therefore, this particular way is not necessary. The same argument might be used against every mode of raising armies. To each successive mode suggested, The objection would be that other modes were practicable and that, therefore, the particular mode used was not necessary.

The true and only test is to inquire whether the law is intended and calculated to carry out the object, whether it devises and creates an instrumentality for executing the specific power granted, and, if the answer be in the affirmative, the law is constitutional. None can doubt that the conscription law is calculated and intended to raise armies. It is, therefore, necessary and proper for the execution of that power, and is constitutional, unless it comes in conflict with some other provision of our Confederate Compact. You express the opinion that this conflict exists and support your argument by the citation of those clauses which refer to the militia. There are certain provisions not cited by you.

The Civil War. Several states agree not to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace. They further stipulate that a well-regulated militia being necessary for the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, What, then, are militia? They can only be created by law. The arms-bearing inhabitants of a state are liable to become its militia, if the law so order. But in the absence of a law to that effect, the men of a state capable of bearing arms are no more militia than they are seamen. The Constitution also tells us that militia are not troops, nor are they any part of the land or naval forces. For militia exist in time of peace, and the Constitution forbids the states to keep troops in time of peace.

And they are expressly distinguished and placed in a separate category from land or naval forces in the 16th paragraph above quoted. And the words land and naval forces are shown by paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 to mean the army and navy of the Confederate States. Now, if militia are not the citizens taken singly, but a body created by law, if they are not troops, if they are no part of the army and navy of the Confederacy, We are led directly to the definition, quoted by the Attorney General, that militia are a body of soldiers in a state enrolled for discipline. In other words, the term militia is a collective term meaning a body of men organized and cannot be applied to the separate individuals who compose the organization.

The Constitution divides the whole military strength of the states into only two classes of organized bodies. One, the armies of the Confederacy, the other The Militia of the States. In the delegation of power to the Confederacy, after exhausting the subject of declaring war, raising and supporting armies, and providing a navy, in relation to all which the grant of authority to Congress is exclusive, the Constitution proceeds to deal with the other organized body, the militia, and instead of delegating power to Congress alone or reserving it to the States alone, the power is divided as follows. Viz. Congress is to have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Confederate States, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederate States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Congress, then, has the power to provide for organizing the arms-bearing people of the state into militia. Each state has the power to officer and train them when organized. Congress may call forth the militia to execute Confederate laws. The state has not surrendered the power to call them forth to execute state laws. Congress may call them forth to repel invasion. So may the state, for the power is impliedly reserved of governing all the militia. I confess myself at a loss to perceive in what manner these careful and well-defined provisions of the Constitution, regulating the organization and government of the militia, can be understood as applying in the remotest degree to the armies of the Confederacy.

Nor can I conceive how the grant of exclusive power to declare and carry on war by armies raised and supported by the Confederacy is to be restricted or diminished by the clauses which grant a divided power over the militia. On the contrary, the delegation of authority over the militia, so far as granted, appears to me to be plainly an additional enumerated power.

You state, after quoting the 12th, 15th, and 16th grants of power to Congress, that These grants of power all relate to the same subject matter, and are all contained in the same section of the Constitution, and by a well-known rule of construction must be taken as a whole and construed together. This argument appears to me unsound. All the powers of Congress are enumerated in one section, and the three paragraphs quoted can no more control each other by reason of their location in the same section than they can control any of the other paragraphs preceding So far as the subject matter is concerned, I have already endeavored to show that the armies mentioned in the twelfth paragraph are a subject matter as distinct from the militia mentioned in the fifteenth and sixteenth as they are from the Nothing can so mislead as to construe together and as a whole the carefully separated clauses which define the different powers to be exercised over distinct subjects by the Congress.

But you add that, by the grant of power to Congress to raise and support armies without qualification, the framers of the Constitution intended the regular armies of a Confederacy, and not armies composed of the whole militia of all the states. I must confess myself somewhat at a loss to understand this position. If I am right that the militia is a body of enrolled state soldiers, it is not possible in the nature of things that armies raised by the Confederacy can The militia may be called forth in whole or in part into the Confederate service, but do not thereby become part of the armies raised by Congress. They remain militia, and go home when the emergency which provoked their call has ceased.

Armies raised by Congress are of course raised out of the same population as the militia organized by the states, and to deny to Congress the power to draft a citizen into the army or to receive his voluntary offer of services, because he is a member of the state militia, is to deny the power to raise an army at all. For, practically, all men fit for service in the army may be embraced in the militia organization. You seem, however, to suggest, rather than directly to assert, that the conscript law may be unconstitutional because it comprehends all arms-bearing men between eighteen and thirty-five years. At least this is an inference which I draw from your expression, armies composed of the whole militia of all the states.

But it is obvious that if Congress have power to draft into the armies raised by it any citizens at all, without regard to the fact whether they are or not members of militia organizations, the power must be coextensive with the exigencies of the occasion, or it becomes illusory. And the extent of the exigency Must be determined by Congress. For the Constitution has left the power without any other check or restriction than the executive veto. Under ordinary circumstances, the power thus delegated to Congress is scarcely felt by the states. At the present moment, when our very existence is threatened by armies vastly superior in numbers to ours, the necessity for defense has induced to call not for the whole militia of all the states, not for any militia, Surely there is no mystery in this subject.

During our whole past history, as well as during our recent one year's experience as a new Confederacy, the militia have been called forth to repel invasion in numerous instances, and they never came otherwise than as bodies organized by the states with their company, field, and general officers. And when the emergency had passed, they went home again. I cannot perceive how anyone can interpret the conscription law as taking away from the states the power to appoint officers to their militia. You observe on this point in your letter that, unless your construction is adopted, the very object of the states in reserving the power of appointing the officers is defeated, and that portion of the Constitution is not only a nullity, but the whole military power of the states, and the entire control of the militia, with the appointment of the officers, is vested in the Confederate government, whenever it chooses to call its own action raising an army, and not calling forth the militia.

I can only say in reply to this that the power of Congress depends on the real nature of the act it proposes to perform, not on the name given to it, and I have endeavored to show that its action is really that of raising an army, and bears no semblance to calling forth the militia. I think I may safely venture the assertion, That there is not one man out of a thousand of those who will do service under the Conscription Act that will describe himself while in the Confederate service as being a militiaman. And, if I am right in this assumption, the popular understanding concurs entirely with my own deductions from the Constitution as to the meaning of the word militia. My answer has grown to such a length that I must confine myself to one more quotation from your letter.

You proceed. Congress shall have power to raise armies. How shall it be done? The answer is clear. In conformity to the provisions of the Constitution, which expressly provides that, when the militia of the states are called forth to repel invasion, and employed in the service of the Confederate states, which is now the case, the state shall appoint the officers. I beg you to observe that the answer which you say is clear is not an answer to the question put. The question is... How are armies to be raised? The answer given is that when militia are called upon to repel invasion, the state shall appoint the officers. There seems to me to be a conclusive test on this whole subject. By our Constitution, Congress may declare war offensive as well as defensive.

It may acquire territory. Now suppose that, for good cause and to right unprovoked injuries, Congress should declare war against Mexico. And invade Sonora. The militia could not be called forth in such a case, the right to call it being limited to repel invasions. Is it not plain that the law now under discussion, if passed under such circumstances, could by no possibility be aught else than a law to raise an army? Can one and the same law be construed into a calling forth the militia if the war be defensive, and a raising of armies if the war be offensive? At some future day, after our independence shall have been established, it is no improbable supposition that our present enemy may be tempted to abuse his naval power by depredations on our commerce, and that we may be compelled to assert our rights by offensive war.

How is it to be carried on? Of what is the army to be composed? If this government cannot call on its arms-bearing population otherwise sent as militia... And if the militia can only be called forth to repel invasion, we should be utterly helpless to vindicate our honor or protect our rights. War has been well styled, the terrible litigation of nations. Have we so formed our government that in this litigation we must never be plaintiffs? Surely this cannot have been the intention of the framers of our compact. In no respect in which I can view this law can I find just reason to distrust the propriety of my action in approving and signing it. And the question presented involves consequences both immediate and remote, too momentous, to permit me to leave your objections unanswered.

Jefferson Davis. End quote. The operation of this law was suspended in the states of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland because of their occupation by the armies of the federal government. The opposition to it, where its execution was continued, soon became limited, and before June 1st its good effects were seen in the increased strength and efficiency of our armies. At the same time, I was authorized to commission officers to form bands of partisan rangers, either of infantry or cavalry, which were subsequently confined to cavalry alone, on September 27th, 1862. All white men between the ages of 35 and 45 were placed in the military service for three years. All persons subject to enrollment might be enrolled wherever found and were made subject to the provisions of the law.

Authority was also given for the reception of volunteers from the states in which the law was suspended. On February 11, 1864, it was enacted by Congress that all white men between the ages of 17 and 50 should be in the military service for the war. Also, that all then in the service between the ages of eighteen and forty-five should be retained during the war. An enrollment was also ordered of all persons between the ages of seventeen and eighteen and between forty-five and fifty years, who should constitute a reserve for state defense and detail duty. On February 17th, all male free Negroes between the ages of eighteen and fifty years were made liable to perform duties with the Army. Or in connection with the military defenses of the country in the way of work upon the fortifications.

Or in government works for the production or preparation of materials of war. Or in military hospitals. The Secretary of War was also authorized to employ for the same duties any number of Negro slaves, not exceeding 20,000. In the operation of the military laws, we found the exemption from military duty accorded by the law to all persons engaged in certain specified pursuits or professions to be unwise. Indeed, it seems to be indefensible in theory. The defense of home, family, and country is universally recognized as the paramount political duty of every member of society. And in a form of government where each citizen enjoys an equality of rights and privileges, Nothing can be more invidious than an unequal distribution of duties or obligations.

No pursuit nor position should relieve anyone who is able to do active duty from enrollment in the army, unless his functions or services are more useful to the defense of his country in another sphere. But the exemption from service of entire classes should be wholly abandoned. The Act of February 17, 1864, above mentioned, which authorized the employment of slaves, It, however, brought forward the question of the employment of the Negroes as soldiers in the army, which was warmly advocated by some and is ardently opposed by others. My own views upon it were expressed freely and frequently in intercourse with members of Congress, and emphatically in my message of November 7, 1864, when, urging upon Congress the consideration of the propriety of a radical modification of the theory of the law, I said, quote, viewed merely as property and therefore as the subject of impressment, the service or labor of the slave has been frequently claimed for short periods in the construction of defensive works.

The slave, however, bears another relation to the state, that of a person. The law of last February contemplates only the relation of the slave to the master and limits the impressment to a certain term of service. But for the purposes enumerated in the act, Instruction in the manner of camping, marching, and packing trains is needful, so that even in this limited employment, length of service adds greatly to the value of the Negro's labor. Hazard is also encountered in all the positions to which Negroes can be assigned for service with the army, and the duties required of them demand loyalty and zeal. In this aspect, The relation of person predominates so far as to render it doubtful whether the private right of property can consistently and beneficially be continued, and it would seem proper to acquire for the public service the entire property in the labor of the slave, and to pay, therefore, due compensation, rather than to impress his labor for short terms.

And this the more especially, as the effect of the present law would vest this entire property In all cases where the slave might be recaptured after compensation for his loss had been paid to the private owner. Whenever the entire property in the service of a slave is thus acquired by the government, the question is presented by what tenure he should be held. Should he be retained in servitude, or should his emancipation be held out to him as a reward for faithful service? Or should it be granted at once on the promise of such service? And if emancipated, What action should be taken to secure for the freedman the permission of the state from which he was drawn to reside within its limits after the close of his public service?

The permission would doubtless be more readily accorded as a reward for past faithful service, and a double motive for zealous discharge of duty would thus be offered to those employed by the government. Their freedom and the gratification of the local attachment which is so marked a characteristic of the Negro The policy of engaging to liberate the Negro on his discharge after service faithfully rendered seems to me preferable to that of granting immediate manumission or that of retaining him in servitude. If this policy should commend itself to the judgment of Congress, it is suggested that in addition to the duties heretofore performed by the slave, he might be advantageously employed as a pioneer and engineer laborer.

And in that event, that the number should be augmented to 40,000. Beyond this limit and these employments, it does not seem to me desirable, under existing circumstances, to go. A broad moral distinction exists between the use of slaves as soldiers in defense of their homes and the incitement of the same persons to insurrection against their masters. The one is justifiable, if necessary. The other is iniquitous and unworthy of civilized people. And such is the judgment of all writers on public law, as well as that expressed and insisted on by our enemies in all wars prior to that now waged against us. By none have the practices of which they are now guilty been denounced with greater severity than by themselves in the two wars with Great Britain, in the last and in the present century, and in the Declaration of Independence in 1776, when an enumeration was made of the wrongs which justified the revolt.

From Great Britain. The climax of atrocity was deemed to be reached only when the English monarch was denounced as having excited domestic insurrection among us. The subject is to be viewed by us, therefore, solely in the light of policy and our social economy. When so regarded, I must dissent from those who advise a general levy and arming of the slaves for the duty of soldiers. Until our white population shall prove insufficient for the armies we require and can afford to keep in the field, to employ as a soldier the Negro, who has merely been trained to labor, and as a laborer, the white man accustomed from his youth to the use of arms would scarcely be deemed wise or advantageous by any. And this is the question now before us.

But should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation, or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, There seems no reason to doubt what should then be our decision. Whether our view embraces what would, in so extreme a case, be the sum of misery entailed by the dominion of the enemy, or be restricted solely to the effect upon the welfare and happiness of the Negro population themselves, the result would be the same. The appalling demoralization, suffering, disease, and death, which have been caused by partially substituting the invaders' system of police, For the kind relation previously subsisting between the master and slave have been a sufficient demonstration that external interference with our institution of domestic slavery is productive of evil only.

If the subject involved no other consideration than the mere right of property, the sacrifices heretofore made by our people have been such as to permit no doubt of their readiness to surrender every possession in order to secure independence. But the social and political question The world, which is exclusively under the control of the several states, has a far wider and more enduring importance than that of pecuniary interest. In its manifold phases, it embraces the stability of our republican institutions, resting on the actual political equality of all its citizens, and includes the fulfillment of the task which has been so happily begun, that of Christianizing and improving the condition of the Africans who have, by the will of Providence, been placed in our charge.

Comparing the results of our own experience with those of the experiments of others who have borne similar relations to the African race, the people of the several states of the Confederacy have abundant reason to be satisfied with the past, and to use the greatest circumspection in determining their course. These considerations, however, are rather applicable to the improbable contingency of our need of resorting to this element of assistance than to our present condition. If the recommendations above made for the training of 40,000 Negroes for the service indicated shall meet your approval, it is certain that even this limited number, by their preparatory training in intermediate duties, would form a more valuable End quote.

Subsequent events advanced my views from a perspective to a present need for the enrollment of Negroes to take their place in the ranks. Strenuously, I argued the question with members of Congress who called to confer with me. To a member of the Senate, the House in which we most needed to vote, I stated, as I had done to many others, the fact of having led Negroes against a lawless body of armed white men And the assurance which the experiment gave me that they might, under proper conditions, be relied on in battle, and finally used to him the expression which I believe I can repeat exactly, quote, if the Confederacy falls, this should be written on its tombstone, died of a theory, end quote.

General Lee was brought before a committee to state his opinion as to the probable efficiency of Negroes as soldiers, and disappointed the probable expectation By his unqualified advocacy of the proposed measure. After much discussion in Congress, a bill authorizing the president to ask for and accept from their owners such a number of able-bodied Negro men, as he might deem expedient, subsequently passed the House, but was lost in the Senate by one vote. The senators of Virginia opposed the measure so strongly that only legislative instruction could secure their support of it. Their legislature did so instruct them, And they voted for it. Finally, the bill passed, with an amendment providing that not more than 25% of the male slaves between the ages of 18 and 45 should be called out.

But the passage of the Act had been so long delayed that the opportunity was lost. There did not remain time enough to obtain any result from its provisions.

32 32 - Appendix G 35:45

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Appendix G. Correspondence between the Commissioners of South Carolina And the President of the United States, Mr. Buchanan, relative to the forts in the harbor of Charleston. Letter of the Commissioners to the President. Washington, December 28, 1860. Sir, we have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina, under which we are, quote, authorized and empowered to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, Lighthouses and other real estate with their appurtenances within the limits of South Carolina, and also for an appointment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held by the government of the United States as agent of the Confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member, and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties.

End quote. She has made an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to the government of the United States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence. It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage, and a future of goodwill and harmony beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here, an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, Not only without but against your orders has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we came. Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangements by which our mutual interests might be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, We would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shows, threaten speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment. We have the honor, sir, to be very respectfully your obedient servants, R. W. Barnwell, J. H. Adams, James L. Orr, Commissioners. To the President of the United States. Reply of the President to the Commissioners. Washington City, December 30th, 1860. Gentlemen, I have the honor to receive your communication of 28th Inst, together with a copy of your, quote, Full Powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina, end quote, authorizing you to treat with the Government of the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned.

And also a copy of the ordinance bearing date of the 20th inst, declaring that, quote, the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states under the name of the United States of America is hereby dissolved, end quote. In answer to this communication, I have to say that my position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress of the third instant. In that, I stated that, quote, apart from the execution of the laws, So far as this may be practicable, the executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the federal government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that state.

This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the Confederacy among our 33 sovereign states. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question in all its bearings." Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest character. And was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possessed the power as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston.

And I therefore deeply regret that, in your opinion, The events of the last 24 hours render this impossible. In conclusion, you urge upon me, quote, the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston, end quote, stating that, quote, under present circumstances they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible and, as our present experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment, end quote. The reason for this change in your position is that, since your arrival in Washington, an officer of the United States, acting as we, you, are assured, not only without your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we, you, came.

You also allege that you came here, The representatives of an authority which could at any time, within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we, you, cannot doubt, determine to trust to your, my, honor rather than to its own power." This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message of the 3rd of December last, I stated, In regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it, quote, "...has been purchased for a fair equivalent by the consent of the legislature of the state for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, etc.

And over these the authority to exercise exclusive legislation has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force, but..." If in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the Fords has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants." This being the condition of the parties, on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these Fords.

And the best means of preventing a collision between the parties for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy. Quote, To His Excellency James Buchanan, President of the United States, in compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities nor any body of the people of the state of South Carolina will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston, previously to the action of the convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made through an accredited representative John McQueen.

William Porche Miles, M. L. Bonham, W. W. Boyce, Lawrence M. Keat, Washington, December 9, 1860. And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that... At the time the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word, provided, as it might be construed into an agreement on my part which I never would make. They said that nothing was further from their intention. They did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, And the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed.

The event has proved that they have faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them or from any member of the Convention on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked. Or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might still be preserved, and that time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge. But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my part, From the nature of my official duties, impossible.

The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts in Charleston Harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made, quote, in their relative military status, end quote. Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War on the 11th instant, to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st instant. It is as follows, quote, Memorandum of Verbal Instructions to Major Anderson, 1st Artillery Commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina. You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this state shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision.

He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point. Or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or to interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give you such instructions. You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression, and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude.

But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three-fourths, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of either of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act. D. P. Butler, Assistant Adjutant General, Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, December 11, 1860. This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell, John B.

Floyd, Secretary of War." These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in regard to a particular which does not, in any degree, affect the present question. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless indeed he had, quote, tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, end quote, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still, he is a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing. Be this as it may. When I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, and there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions.

This could only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But before any steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on the 28th instant, that, The Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night, the 27th, to Fort Moultrie. Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted, not only without, but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized by a military force, Two of the three Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag instead of that of the United States.

At this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day, the 27th instant, at possession of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over the Federal Custom House and Post Office in Charleston. And on the same day, every officer of the customs, collector, Naval officers, surveyor, and appraisers resigned their offices. And this, although it was well known, from the language of my message, that as an executive officer I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the Federal flag floated only four days ago.

But now, over two of them, this flag has been supplanted. And the Palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these circumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that, without this, negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in command of all the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another.

I cannot admit the justice of any such inference. At this point of writing, I have received information by telegram from Captain Humphreys, in command of the arsenal at Charleston, that, quote, it has today Sunday the 30th, been taken by force of arms. It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to the United States in this arsenal are worth half a million dollars. Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add that while it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter as a portion of the public property of the United States against hostile attacks from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may possess for this purpose I do not perceive how such a defense can be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston.

With great personal regard, I remain yours very respectfully, James Buchanan. To Honorable Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, James L. Orr. Reply of the Commissioners to the President, Washington, D.C., January 1st, 1861. Sir, we have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December. In reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th of the same month, as commissioners from South Carolina, in reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that, quote, your position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress of the third instant, end quote, that you possess, quote, no power to change the relations heretofore existing between South Carolina and the United States, much less to acknowledge the independence of that state, end quote, And that, consequently, you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say that, the state of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government, which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude As to the character in which you might recognize us.

Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content, with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress Which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which we represent, and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.

You say, quote, It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston. And I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible." We expressed no such opinion, and the language which you quote as ours is altered, in its sense, End quote.

Again, professing to quote our language, you say, We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained here and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration, a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument. Some weeks ago, the state of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a convention of her people to put her declaration in force.

The convention met and passed the ordinance of secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your annual message, you declared that you had no right and would not attempt to coerce a seceding state, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina, if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not reinforce the garrisons in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition.

You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your cabinet, rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter to return immediately to the arsenal forty muskets, which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed, not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whose testimony will be placed upon the record whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if commissioners should be sent to the government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress.

You received and acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, That no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the memory of the End quote. And although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper, although you, quote, considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen, end quote, as an obligation on one side without corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered, if we are rightly informed, that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it, before you executed your resolution.

"'You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding. Besides all this, you had received formal and official notice, from the Governor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed commissioners and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came. Our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday at three o'clock." And you appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day, Thursday, the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until half past two o'clock on Friday, in order that you might consult your cabinet.

On Friday, we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it, with the facts we have stated. And in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the government, and that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed he was dishonored, denial was impossible. You did not deny it. You do not deny it now. Would you seek to escape from its obligations on two grounds? One. That we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston.

And two. That the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both. In the first place, we deny positively that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession. It will stand by this on the record. In it, we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to assure you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed.

And then... Having made this request for explanation, we added, quote, "...and in conclusion we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible," end quote, etc. Quote, "...under present circumstances," end quote. What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson. In the face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal, and there is nothing in the letter which would or could have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire.

It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we demanded nothing. But such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say, quote, This I cannot do, this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it. End quote. And in support of this impression, we would add that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation and the most unsullied integrity, men whose name and fame Secured by long service and patriotic achievement, place their testimony beyond cavil that such suggestions had been made to and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you.

It was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it its own wisdom and the weight of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, And giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe, first, that, even if this were so, it does not avail you for defense, for the opportunity for decision was a force of the United States. I recorded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday. The news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday and was immediately communicated to you. All that day, men of the highest consideration...

Men who had striven successfully to lift you to your great office, who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration, sought you and entreated you to act, to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so, if the commander had acted without and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges, you would restore the status you had pledged. Your honor to maintain. You refused to decide. Your Secretary of War, your immediate and proper advisor in this whole matter, waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at any moment of that time would have avoided the subsequent complications.

But if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days you have had in Charleston Harbor not force enough to hold the forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty, one of those two the most important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to know, better than any man, that it would have been taken But for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their commissioners to negotiate with you.

They meant you no harm. Wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had their commissioners left than Major Anderson waged war. No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another. It was a hostile act in the highest sense. One only justified in the presence of a superior enemy. And in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war. No man could have believed, without your assurance, that any officer could have taken such a step, quote, not only without orders, but against orders, end quote.

What the state did... The war was in simple self-defense, for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley. And, war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay. And, even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that, when the first gun shall be fired... There will have been, on your part, one continuous consistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular reinforcement, and terminating in defeat or victory, and all this without the slightest provocation.

For, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you cannot say. You have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this, quote, "...tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act on the part of the authorities of South Carolina," end quote, which is the only justification of Major Anderson, you are forced to admit, quote, "...has not yet been alleged," end quote. But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, Have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your executive authority.

Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith. By your course, you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and relying upon him who is the God of justice as well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly. Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our arrival, And intimating, as we think, your determination to reinforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we propose returning to Charleston on tomorrow afternoon.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectful. The last communication is endorsed as follows. Executive Mansion, 3 1⁄2 o'clock, Wednesday. This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it. End of Appendix G.

33 33 - Appendix H, Part 1 38:47

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Appendix H, Part 1. Speech on the State of the Country by Mr. Davis of Mississippi. In the Senate of the United States, January 10th, 1861. A motion to print the special message of the President of the United States of January 9th being under consideration. Mr. Davis. Mr. President, when I took the floor yesterday, I intended to engage somewhat in the argument which has heretofore prevailed in the Senate upon the great questions of constitutional right which have divided the country from the beginning of the government. I intended to adduce some evidences which I thought were conclusive, in favor of the opinions which I entertain.

But events, with the current hurrying on as it progresses, have borne me past the point where it would be useful for me to argue, by the citing of authorities, the question of rights. Today, therefore, it is my purpose to deal with events. Abstract argument has become among the things that are past. We have to deal now with facts. And in order that we may meet those facts and apply them to our present condition, It is well to inquire what is the state of the country. The Constitution provides that the President shall, from time to time, communicate information on the State of the Union. The message, which is now under consideration, gives us very little, indeed, beyond that which the world, less indeed than reading men generally, knew before it was communicated.

What, Senators, today is the condition of the country? From every corner of it comes the wailing cry of patriotism, pleading for the preservation of the great inheritance we derived from our fathers. Is there a senator who does not daily receive letters appealing to him to use even the small power which one man here possesses to save the rich inheritance our fathers gave us? Tears are trickling down the stern faces of men who have bled for the flag of their country, and are willing now to die for it. But patriotism stands powerless before the plea that the party about to come into power laid down a platform, and that come what will, though ruin stare us in the face, consistency must be adhered to, even though the government be lost.

In this state of the case, then, we turn and ask, what is the character of the administration? What is the executive department doing? What assurance have we there for the safety of the country? But we come back from that inquiry with a mournful conviction that feeble hands now hold the reins of state, that drivelers are taken in as counselors, not provided by the Constitution, that vacillation is the law, and the policy of this great government is changed with every changing rumor of the day. Nay, more, it is changing with every new phase of causeless fear. In this state of the case, after complications have been introduced into the question, After we were brought to the verge of war, after we were hourly expecting by telegraph to learn that the conflict had commenced, after nothing had been done to ensure the peace of the land, we are told in this last hour that the question is thrown at the door of Congress, and here rests the responsibility.

Had the garrison at Charleston, representing the claim of the government to hold the property in a fort there, been called away thirty days, nay, ten days ago, Peace would have spread its pinions over this land, and calm negotiation would have been the order of the day. Why was it not recalled? No reason yet has been offered save that the government is bound to preserve its property, and yet look from north to south, from east to west, wherever we have constructed forts to defend states against a foreign foe, and everywhere you find them without a garrison, except at a few points where troops are kept for special purposes. Not to coerce or to threaten a state, but stationed in seacoast fortifications, there merely for the purposes of discipline and instruction as artillerists.

You find all the other forts in the hands of fortkeepers and ordnance sergeants, and before a moral and patriotic people, standing safely there as the property of the country. I asked in this Senate weeks ago, what causes the peril that is now imminent at Fort Moultrie? Is it the weakness of the garrison? And then I answered, no, it is its presence, not its weakness. Had an ordnance sergeant there represented the federal government, had there been no troops, no physical power to protect it, I would have pledged my life upon the issue that no question ever would have been made as to its seizure. Now, not only there but elsewhere, we find movements of troops further to complicate this question, and probably to precipitate us upon the issue of civil war.

And, worse than all, this government reposing on the consent of the governed. This government, strong in the affections of the people, this government, I describe it as our fathers made it, is now furtively sending troops to occupy positions lest the mob should seize them. When before in the history of our land was it that a mob could resist the sound public opinion of the country? When before was it that An unarmed magistrate had not the power, by crying, I command the peace, to quell a mob in any portion of the land. Yet now we find, under cover of night, troops detach from one position to occupy another. Fort Washington, standing in its lonely grandeur and overlooking the home of the father of his country, nearby the place where the ashes of Washington repose, Built there to prevent a foreign foe from coming up the Potomac with armed ships to take the capital, Fort Washington is garrisoned by Marines, sent secretly away from the Navy Yard at Washington.

And Fort McHenry, memorable in our history as a place where, under bombardment, the Star-Spangled Banner floated through the darkness of night, the point which was consecrated by our national song, Fort McHenry, too, has been garrisoned by a detachment of Marines. Senators, the responsibility is thrown at the door of Congress. Let us take it. It is our duty in this last hour to seize the pillars of our government and uphold them, though we be crushed in the fall. Then what is our policy? Are we to drift into war? Are we to stand idly by and allow war to be precipitated upon the country? Allow an officer of the army to make war. Allow an unconfirmed head of a department to make war. Allow a general of the army to make war.

Allow a president to make war. No, sir. Our fathers gave to Congress the power to declare war, and even to Congress they gave no power to make war upon a state of the Union. It could not have been given, except as a power to dissolve the Union. When, then, we see, as is evident to the whole country, that we are drifting into a war between the United States and an individual state, does it become the Senate to sit listlessly by and discuss abstract questions and read patchwork from the opinions of men now mingled with the dust? Are we not bound to meet events as they come before us, manfully and patriotically to struggle with the difficulties which now oppress the country? In the message yesterday, We were even told that the District of Columbia was in danger.

In danger of what? From whom comes the danger? Is there a man here who dreads that the deliberations of this body are to be interrupted by an armed force? Is there one who would not prefer to fall with dignity at his station, the representative of a great and peaceful government, rather than to be protected by armed bands? And yet, the rumor is, and rumors seem now to be so authentic, That we credit them rather than other means of information. That companies of artillery are to be quartered in the city to preserve peace, where the laws have heretofore been supreme, and that this district is to become a camp by calling out every able-bodied man within its limits to bear arms under the militia law.

Are we invaded? Is there an insurrection? Are there two senators here who would not be willing to go forth as a file? And put down any resistance which showed itself in this district against the government of the United States. Is the reproach meant against these, my friends from the South, who advocate Southern rights and state rights? If so, it is a base slander. We claim our rights under the Constitution, we claim our rights reserved to the states, and we seek, by no brute force, to gain any advantage which the law and the Constitution do not give us. We have never appealed to mobs. We have never asked for the Army and the Navy to protect us. On the soil of Mississippi, not the foot of a Federal soldier has been impressed since 1819, when, flying from the yellow fever, they sought refuge within the limits of our State.

And on the soil of Mississippi there breathes not a man who asks for any other protection than that which our Constitution gives us, that which our strong arms afford. And the brave hearts of our people will ensure in every contingency. Senators, we are rapidly drifting into a position in which this is to become a government of the Army and Navy, in which the authority of the United States is to be maintained, not by law, not by constitutional agreement between the states, but by physical force. And will you stand still and see this policy consummated? Will you fold your arms? The degenerate descendants of those men who proclaimed the eternal principle that government rests on the consent of the governed, and that every people have a right to change, modify, or abolish a government when it ceases to answer the ends for which it was established, and permit this government imperceptibly to slide from the moorings where it was originally anchored, and become a military despotism.

It was well said by the Senator from New York, Mr. Seward. Whom I do not now see in his seat, well said in a speech wherein I found but little to commend, that this union could not be maintained by force, and that a union of force was a despotism. It was a great truth, come from what quarter it may. That was not the government instituted by our fathers, and against it, so long as I live, with heart and hand, I will rebel. This brings me to a passage in the message which says, quote, I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any state, and I am perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely withheld that power even from Congress, end quote. Very good. Quote, but the right and the duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the federal officers in the exercise of their legal functions and against those who assail the power of the federal government.

Are clear and undeniable." Is it so? Where does he get it? Our fathers were so jealous of a standing army that they scarcely would permit the organization and maintenance of any army. Where does he get the clear and undeniable power to use the force of the United States in the manner he there proposes? To execute a process, troops may be summoned in a posse comitatus, and here, in the history of our government, It is not to be forgotten that in the earlier, and, as it is frequently said, the better days of the Republic, and painfully we feel that they were better indeed, a President of the United States did not recur to the Army. He went to the people of the United States. Vaguely and confusedly, indeed, did the Senator from Tennessee, Mr.

Johnson, bring forward the case of the great man Washington, as one in which he had used a means which, he argued, was equivalent to the coercion of a state. For he said that Washington used the military power against a portion of a people of the state. And why might he not as well have used it against the whole state? Let me tell that Senator that the case of General Washington has no such application as he supposes. It was a case of insurrection in the state of Pennsylvania, and the very message from which he read communicated the fact that Governor Mifflin thought it was necessary to call the militia President Washington cooperated with Governor Mifflin. He called the militia of adjoining states to cooperate with those of Pennsylvania.

He used the militia not as a standing army. It was by the consent of the governor. It was by his advice. It was not the invasion of the state. It was not the coercion of the state, but it was aiding the state to put down insurrection. And in the very manner provided for in the Constitution itself. But, I ask again, what power has a President to use the Army and Navy except to execute process? Are we to have drumhead courts substituted for those which the Constitution and laws provide? Are we to have sergeants sent over the land, instead of civil magistrates? Not so, thought the Elder Adams, and here, in passing, I will pay him a tribute he deserves. As the one to whom, more than any other man among the early founders of this government, credit is due for the military principles which prevail in its organization.

Associated with Mr. Jefferson originally, in preparing the rules and articles of war, Mr. Adams reverted through the long pages of history back to the Empire of Rome, and drew from that foundation the very rules and articles of war which govern in our country today, and drew them, thence, Because he said they had brought two nations to the pinnacle of glory, referring to the Romans and the Britons, whose military law was borrowed from them. Mr. Adams, however, when an insurrection occurred in the same state of Pennsylvania, not only relied upon the militia, but his orders through Secretary McHenry required that the militia of the Vicinage should be employed, and though he did order troops from Philadelphia, He required the militia of the northern counties to be employed as long as they were able to execute the laws.

And the orders given to Colonel McPherson and in New Jersey were that federal troops should not go across the Jersey Line except in the last resort. I say then, when we trace our history to its early foundation, under the first two presidents of the United States, we find that this idea of using the Army and the Navy to execute the laws at the discretion of the president Was one not even entertained, still less acted upon in any case. Then, Senators, we are brought to consider passing events. A little garrison in the harbour of Charleston now occupies a post which, I am sorry to say, it gained by the perfidious breach of an understanding between the parties concerned. And here, that I may do justice to one who had not the power, on this floor at least, to right himself, who has no friend here to represent him, Let me say that remark does not apply to Major Anderson, for I hold that, though his orders were not so designed, as I am assured, they did empower him to go from one post to another, and to take his choice of the posts in the harbor of Charleston.

But, in so doing, he committed an act of hostility. When he dismantled Fort Moultrie, when he burned the carriages and spiked the guns bearing upon Fort Sumter, He put Carolina in the attitude of an enemy of the United States, and yet he has not shown that there was any just cause for apprehension. Vague rumors had reached him, and causeless fear seems now to be the impelling motive of every public act. Vague rumors of an intention to take Fort Moultrie. But, sir, a soldier should be confronted by an overpowering force before he spikes his guns and burns his carriages. A soldier should be confronted by a public enemy before he destroys the property of the United States, lest it should fall into the hands of such an enemy.

Was that fort built to make war upon Carolina? Was an armament put into it for such a purpose? Or was it built for the protection of Charleston Harbor? And was it armed to make that protection effective? If so, what right had any soldier to destroy that armament, lest it should fall into the hands of Carolina? Sometime since, I presented to the Senate resolutions which embodied my views upon this subject, drawing from the Constitution itself the data on which I based those resolutions. I then invoked the attention of the Senate in that form to the question as to whether garrisons should be kept within a state against the consent of that state. Clear was I then, as I am now, in my conclusion. No garrison should be kept within a state during a time of peace.

If the state believes the presence of that garrison to be either offensive or dangerous. Our army is maintained for common defense. Our forts are built out of the common treasury, to which every state contributes. And they are perverted from the purpose for which they were erected whenever they are garrisoned with a view to threaten, to intimidate, or to control a state in any respect. Yet we are told this is no purpose to coerce a state. We are told that the power does not exist to coerce a state. But the senator from Tennessee, Mr. Johnson, says it is only a power to coerce individuals. And the senator from Ohio, Mr. Wade, seems to look upon this latter power as a very harmless power in the hands of the president, though the results of such coercion might be to destroy the state.

What is a state? Is it land and houses? Is it taxable property? Is it the organization of the local government? Or is it all these, combined with the people who possess them? Destroy the people, and yet not make war upon the state. To state the proposition is to answer it, by reason of its very absurdity. It is like making desolation and calling it peace. There being, as it is admitted on every hand, no power to coerce a state. I ask, what is the use of a garrison within a state? Where it needs no defense. The answer from every candid mind must be, there is none. The answer from every patriotic breast must be, peace requires under all such circumstances that the garrison should be withdrawn. Let the Senate today, as the responsibility is thrown at our door, pass those resolutions, or others which better express the idea contained in them.

And you have taken one long step toward peace, one long stride. The President's message of December, however, has all the characteristics of a diplomatic paper, for diplomacy is said to abhor certainty as nature abhors a vacuum, and it was not within the power of man to reach any fixed conclusion from that message. When the country was agitated, when opinions were being formed, when we were drifting beyond the power ever to return, this was not what we had a right to expect. From the chief magistrate. One policy, or the other, he ought to have taken. If believing this to be a government of force, if believing it to be a consolidated mass and not a confederation of states, he should have said, quote, no state has a right to secede.

Every state is subordinate to the federal government, and the federal government must empower me with physical means to reduce to subjugation the state asserting such a right, end quote. If not... If a state rights man and a Democrat, as for many years it has been my pride to acknowledge your venerable chief magistrate to be, then another line of policy should have been taken. The Constitution gave no power to the federal government to coerce a state. The Constitution gave an army for the purposes of common defense and to preserve domestic tranquility. But the Constitution never contemplated using that army against a state. A state exercising the sovereign function of secession is beyond the reach of the federal government, unless we woo her with the voice of fraternity and bring her back to the enticements of affection.

One policy or the other should have been taken, and it is not for me to say which, though my opinion is well known. But one policy or the other should have been pursued. He should have brought his opinion to one conclusion or another. And today our country would have been safer than it is. What is the message before us? Does it benefit the case? Is there a solution offered here? We are informed in it of propositions made by commissioners from South Carolina. We are not informed even as to how they terminate it. No countervailing proposition is presented. No suggestion is made. We are left drifting loosely without chart or compass. There is in our recent history, however, an event which might have suggested a policy to be pursued.

When foreigners having no citizenship within the United States declared war against it and made war upon it, when the inhabitants of a territory, disgraced by institutions offensive to the laws of every state of the Union, held this attitude of rebellion, when the executive there had power to use troops, he first sent commissioners of peace to win them back to their duty. When South Carolina, a sovereign state, resumes the grants she had delegated. When South Carolina stands in an attitude which threatens within a short period to involve the country in a civil war unless the policy of the government be changed. No suggestion is made to us that this government might send commissioners to her. No suggestion is made to us that better information should be sought.

There is no policy of peace. But we are told the Army and Navy are in the hands of the President of the United States, to be used against those who assail the power of the Federal Government. Then, my friends, are we to allow events to drift onward to this fatal consummation? Are we to do nothing to restore peace? Shall we not, in addition to the proposition I have already made to withdraw the force which complicates the question, send commissioners there in order that we may learn what this community desire? What this community will do, and put the two governments upon friendly relations. I will not weary the Senate by going over the argument of coercion. My friend from Ohio, Mr. Pugh, I may say, has exhausted the subject.

I thank him because it came appropriately from one not identified by his position with South Carolina. It came more effectively from him than it would have done from me, had I, as I have not... A power to present it as forcibly as he has done. Sirs, let me say, among the painful reflections which have crowded upon me by day and by night, none have weighed more heavily upon my heart than the reflection that our separation severs the ties which have so long bound us to our northern friends, of whom we are glad to recognize the Senator as a type. Now let us return a moment to consider what would have been the state of the case if the garrison at Charleston had been withdrawn. The fort would have stood there, not dismantled, but unoccupied.

It would have stood there in the hands of an ordinance sergeant. Commissioners would have come to treat of all questions, with the federal government, of these forts as well as others. They would have remained there to answer the ends for which they were constructed, the ends of defense. If South Carolina was an independent state, then she might hold to us such a relation as Rhode Island held after the dissolution of the Confederation and before the formation of the Union, when Rhode Island appealed to the sympathies existing between the states connected in the struggles of the Revolution, and asked that a commercial war should not be waged upon her. These forts would have stood there, then, to cover the harbor of a friendly state.

And if the feeling which once existed among the people of the states had subsisted still, and that fort had been attacked, brave men from every section would have rushed to the rescue, and there imperiled their lives in the defense of a state identified with their early history, and still associated in their breasts with affectionate memories. The first act of this kind would have been one appealing to every generous motive of those people, again to reconsider the question of how we could live together. And through that bloody ordeal to have brought us into the position in which our fathers left us. There need have been no collision, as there could have been no question of property which that state was not ready to meet.

If it was a question of dollars and cents, they came here to adjust it. If it was a question of covering an interior state, their interests were identical. In whatever way the question could have been presented, the consequence would have been to relieve the government Thus we see that no evil could have resulted. We have yet to learn what evil the opposite policy may bring. Telegraphic intelligence by the man who occupied the seat on the right of me in the old chamber was never relied on. He was the wisest statesman I ever knew, a man whose prophetic vision foretold all the trials through which we are now passing. Whose clear intellect, elaborating everything, borrowing nothing from anybody, seemed to dive into the future and to unveil those things which are hidden to other eyes.

Need I say, I mean Calhoun. No other man than he would have answered this description. I say, then, not relying upon telegraphic dispatches, we still have information enough to notify us that we are on the verge of civil war. That civil war is in the hands of men irresponsible, as it seems to us, their acts unknown to us, their discretion not covered by any existing law or usage, and we now have the responsibility thrown upon us which justifies us in demanding information to meet an emergency in which the country is involved. Is there any point of pride which prevents us from withdrawing that garrison? I have heard it said by a gallant gentleman, To whom I make no special reference, that the great objection was an unwillingness to lower the flag.

To lower the flags! Under what circumstances? Does any man's courage impale him to stand boldly forth to take the life of his brethren? Does any man insist upon going upon the open field with deadly weapons to fight his brother on a question of courage? There is no point of pride. These are your brethren, and they have shed as much glory upon that flag As any equal number of men in the Union. They are the men, and that is the locality, where the first Union flag was unfurled, and where was fought a gallant battle before our independence was declared. Not the flag with thirteen stripes and thirty-three stars, but a flag with the cross of St. George, and the long stripes running through it. When the gallant Moultrie took the British Fort Johnson and carried it, for the first time, I believe, did the Union flag fly in the air.

And that was in October, 1775, when he took the position and threw up a temporary battery with palmetto logs and sand. Upon the site called Fort Moultrie, that fort was assailed by the British fleet, and bombarded until the old logs, clinging with stern tenacity, were filled with balls. But the flag still floated there, and, though many bled, the garrison conquered. Those old logs are gone. The eroding current is even taking away the site where Fort Moultrie stood. The gallant men who held it now mingle with the earth, for their memories live in the hearts of a brave people, and their sons yet live, and they, like their fathers, are ready to bleed and to die for the cause in which their fathers triumphed.

Glorious are the memories clinging around that old fort, which now, for the first time, has been abandoned. Abandoned not even in the presence of a foe. But under the imaginings that a foe might come, and guns spiked and carriages burned, where the band of moultrie bled, and, with an insufficient armament, repelled the common foe of all the colonies. Her ancient history compares proudly with the present. Can there, then, be a point of pride upon so sacred a soil as this, where the blood of the fathers cries to heaven against civil war? Can there be a point of pride against laying upon that sacred soil today the flag for which our fathers died? My pride, senators, is different. My pride is that the flag shall not set between contending brothers, and that, when it shall no longer be the common flag of the country, it shall be folded up and laid away, like a vesture no longer used, that it shall be kept as a sacred memento of the past.

To which each of us can make a pilgrimage and remember the glorious days in which we were born. In the answer of the commissioners which I caused to be read yesterday, I observed that they referred to Fort Sumter as remaining a memento of Carolina faith. It is an instance of the accuracy of the opinion which I have expressed. It stood without a garrison. It commanded the harbor, and the fort was known to have the armament in it capable of defense. Did the Carolinians attack it? Did they propose to seize it? It stood there safe as public property, and there it might have stood to the end of the negotiations without a question, if a garrison had not been sent into it. It was the faith on which they relied that the federal government would take no position of hostility to them, that constituted its safety, and by which they lost the advantage they would have had in seizing it when unoccupied.

I think that something is due to faith as well as fraternity. And I think one of the increasing and accumulative obligations upon us to withdraw the garrison from that fort is from the manner in which it was taken. Taken, as we heard by the reading of the paper yesterday, while Carolina remained under the assurance that the status would not be violated. While I was under that assurance, and half a dozen other senators now within the sound of my voice... The government felt secure under the same pledge, that nothing would be done until negotiations had terminated, unless it was to withdraw the garrison. Then we, the federal government, broke the faith. We committed the first act of hostility, and from this first act of hostility arose all those acts to which reference is made in the message as unprovoked aggressions, the seizing of forts elsewhere.

Why were they seized? Self-preservation is the first law of nature. And when they no longer had confidence that this federal government would not seize the forts constructed for their defense and use them for their destruction, they only obeyed the dictates of self-preservation when they seized the forts to prevent the enemy from taking possession of them as a means of coercion, for they then were compelled to believe this federal government had become an enemy. Now, what is the remedy? To assure them that you do not intend to use physical force against them is your first remedy. To assure them that you intend to consider calmly all the propositions which they make, and to recognize the rights which the Union was established to secure, that you intend to settle with them upon a basis in accordance with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.

When you do that, peace will prevail over the land. And force become a thing that no man will consider necessary. I am here confronted with a question which I will not argue. The position which I have taken necessarily brings me to its consideration. Without arguing it, I will merely state it. Is it the right of a state to withdraw from the Union? The President says it is not a constitutional right. The Senator from Ohio, Mr. Wade, and his ally, the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Johnson argued it as no right at all. Well, let us see. What is meant by a constitutional right? Is it meant to be a right derived from the Constitution? A grant made in the Constitution? If that is what is meant, of course we all see at once that we do not derive it in that way.

Is it intended that it is not a constitutional right because it is not granted in the Constitution? That shows, indeed, But a poor appreciation of the nature of our government. All that is not granted in the Constitution belongs to the states, and nothing but what is granted in the Constitution belongs to the federal government. And, keeping this distinction in view, it requires but little argument to see the conclusion at which we necessarily arrive. Did the states surrender their sovereignty to the federal government? Did the states agree that they never could withdraw from the federal union? I know it has been argued here that the Confederation said the Articles of Confederation were to be a perpetual bond of union, and that the Constitution was made to form a more perfect union, that is to say, a government beyond perpetuity, or one day, or two or three days after doomsday.

But that has no foundation in the Constitution itself. It has no basis in the nature of our government. The Constitution was a compact between independent states. It was not a national government, and hence Mr. Madison answered with such effectiveness to Patrick Henry in the Convention of Virginia, which ratified the Constitution, denying his proposition that it was to form a nation, and stating to him the conclusive fact that, quote, we sit here as a convention of the state to ratify or reject that Constitution, and how, then, can you say that it forms a nation and is adopted by the mass of the people, end quote. It was not adopted by the mass of the people, as we all know historically. It was adopted by each state.

Each state, voluntarily ratifying it, entered the Union, and that Union was formed whenever nine states should enter it. And in abundance of caution, it was stated in the resolutions of ratification of three of the states that they still possessed the power to withdraw the grants which they had delegated. Whenever they should be used to their injury or oppression. I know it is said that this meant the people of all the states, but that is such an absurdity that I suppose it hardly necessary to answer it. For to speak of an elective government rendering itself injurious and oppressive to the whole body of the people by whom it is elected is such an absurdity that no man can believe it. And to suppose that a state convention, speaking for a state and having no authority to speak for anybody else, would say that it was declaring what the people of the other states would do would be an assumption altogether derogatory to the sound sense and well-known sentiments of the men who formed the Constitution and ratified it.

But, in abundance of caution, not only was this done, but the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution declared that all which had not been delegated was reserved to the States or to the people. Now, I ask, Where among the delegated grants to the federal government do you find any power to coerce a state? Where, among the provisions of the Constitution, do you find any prohibition on the part of a state to withdraw? And if you find neither one nor the other, must not this power be in that great depository, the reserved rights of the states? How was it ever taken out of that source of all power to be given to the federal government? It was not delegated to the federal government. It was not prohibited to the states.

It necessarily remains, then, among the reserved powers of the states. This question has been so forcibly argued by the Senator from Louisiana, Mr. Benjamin, that I think it unnecessary to pursue it. Three times a proposition was made to give power to coerce the states, in the Convention, and as often refused. Opposed as a proposition to make war on a state, and refused on the ground that the federal government Could not make war upon a state. The Constitution was to form a government for such states as should unite. It had no application beyond those who should voluntarily adopt it. Among the delegated powers, there is none which interferes with the exercise of the right of secession by a state.

As a right of sovereignty, it remained to the states under the Confederation, and, if it did not, you arraigned the faith of the men who framed the Constitution to which you appeal. For they provided that nine states should secede from thirteen. Eleven did secede from the thirteen, and put themselves in the very position which, by a great abuse of language, is today called treason, against the two states of North Carolina and Rhode Island, they still claiming to adhere to the perpetual Articles of Confederation, these eleven states absolving themselves from the obligations which arose under them. End of Appendix H, Part One.

34 34 - Appendix H, Part 2 39:27

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume 1b by Jefferson Davis, Chapter 34. Appendix H, Part Two. The senator from Tennessee, to whom I must refer again, and I do so because he is a Southern senator, taking the most hostile ground against us, refers to the state of Tennessee, and points to the time when that state may do those things which he has declared it an absurdity for any state to perform. I will read a single paragraph from his speech, showing what his language is, in order that I may not, by any possibility, produce an impression upon others which his language does not justify. Here are the expressions to which I refer. I call the Senator's attention to them.

If there are grievances, why cannot we all go together and write them down and point them out to our northern friends after we have agreed what those grievances were and say, yeah, is what we demand. Yeah, our wrongs are enumerated. Upon these terms, we have agreed. And now, after we have given you a reasonable time to consider these additional guarantees in order to protect ourselves against these wrongs, if you refuse them, then, having made an honourable effort, having exhausted all other means, we may declare the association to be broken up, and we may go into an act of revolution. We can then say to them, You have refused to give us guarantees that we think are needed for the protection of our institutions and for the protection of our other interests.

When they do this, I will go as far as he who goes the furthest.

Now it does appear that he will go that far, and he goes a little further than anybody, I believe, who has spoken in vindication of the right, for he says, We do not intend that you shall drive us out of this house that was reared by the hands of our fathers. It is our house. It is the constitutional house. We have a right here, and because you come forward and violate the ordinances of this house, I do not intend to go out. And if you persist in the violation of the ordinances of the house, We intend to eject you from the building and retain the possession ourselves.

I wonder if this is what has caused the artillery companies to be ordered here, and the militia of the city to be organized. I think it was a mere figure of speech. I do not believe the Senator of Tennessee intended to kick you out of the house. And if he did, let me say to you in all sincerity, We who claim the constitutional right of a state to withdraw from the Union do not intend to help him. He says, however, and this softens it a little. We do not think, though, that we have just cause for going out of the Union now. We have just cause of complaint, but we are for remaining in the Union and fighting the battle like men. What does he mean? In the name of common sense, I ask, how are we to fight in the Union?

We take an oath of office to maintain the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution of the United States was formed for domestic tranquility. And how, then, are we to fight in the Union? I have heard the proposition from others, but I have not understood it. I understand how men fight when they assume attitudes of hostility. But I do not understand how men, remaining connected together in a bond as brethren, sworn to a mutual aid and protection, still propose to fight each other. I do not understand what the Senator means. If he chooses to answer my question, I am willing to hear him, for I do not understand how we ought to fight in the Union.

Mr. Johnson of Tennessee. When my speech is taken altogether, I think my meaning can be very easily understood. What I mean by fighting the battle in the Union is, I think, very distinctly and clearly set forth in my speech, and, if the Senator will take it from the beginning to end, I apprehend that he will have no difficulty in ascertaining what I mean. But, for his gratification upon this particular point, I will repeat in substance. What I then said as to fighting the battle in the Union, I meant that we should remain here under the Constitution of the United States and contend for all its guarantees, and by preserving the Constitution and all its guarantees, we would preserve the Union. Our true place to maintain these guarantees and to preserve the Constitution is in the Union, there to fight our battle.

How? By argument, by appeals to patronism, to the good sense, and to the judgment of the whole country, by showing the people that the Constitution had been violated, that all its guarantees were not complied with, and I have entertained the hope that When they were possessed of that fact, there would be found patronism and honesty enough in the great mass of people, North and South, to come forward and do what was just and right between the contending sections of the country. I meant... That the true way to fight the battle was for us to remain here and occupy the places assigned to us by the Constitution of the country. Why did I make that statement? It was because on the fourth day of March, next, we shall have six majority in this body.

And if, as some apprehend, the incoming administration shall show any disposition to make encroachments upon the institution of slavery, encroachments upon the rights of the states, and any other violation of the Constitution, we, by remaining in the Union and standing at our places, will have the power to resist all these encroachments. How? We have the power even to reject the appointment of a Cabinet Office of the incoming President. Then, should we not be fighting the battles in the Union? By resisting even the organization of the administration in a constitutional mode, and thus, at the very start, disable an administration which was likely to encroach on our rights and to violate the Constitution of the country.

So far as appointing even a minister abroad is concerned, the incoming administration will have no power without our consent. If we remain here, it comes into office handcuffed, powerless to do harm. We're standing here. Hold the balance of power in our hands. We can resist it at the very threshold effectually, and do it inside of the union and In our house, the incoming administration has not even the power to appoint a postmaster whose salary exceeds $1,000 a year without consultation with and the aggressions of the Senate of the United States. The president has not even the power to draw his salary, his $25,000 I contend, then, that the true place to fight the battle is in the Union, and within the provisions of the Constitution.

The Army and Navy cannot be sustained without appropriations by Congress, and if we were apprehensive that encroachments would be made on the southern states, And on their institutions, in violation of the Constitution, we could prevent him from having a dollar even to feed his army or his navy.

Mr. Davis, I received the answer from the Senator, and I think I comprehend now that he is not going to use any force, but it is a sort of fighting that is to be done by votes and words, and I think... Therefore, the President need not bring artillery and order out the militia to suppress them. I think altogether that we are not in danger of much bloodshed in the mode proposed by the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. Johnson, I had not quite done, but if the Senator is satisfied. Mr. Davies. Quite satisfied. I am entirely satisfied that the answer of the Senator shows me he did not intend to fight at all, that it was a mere figure of speech, and does not justify converting the Federal Capital into a military camp. But it is a sort of revolution which he proposes. It is a revolution under the forms of the government. Now I have to say, once and for all, that, as long as I am a Senator here, I will not use the powers I possess to destroy the very government to which I am accredited. I will not attempt, in the language of the Senator, to handcuff the President. I will not attempt to destroy the administration by refusing any officers to administer its functions.

I should vote, as I have done in administrations to which I stood in nearest relation, against the bad nomination, but I... Never would agree under the forms of the Constitution and with the powers I bear as a Senator of the United States to turn those powers to the destruction of government I was sent to support. I leave that to gentlemen who take their oath with a mental reservation. It is not my policy. If I must have revolution, I say, let it be a revolution such as our fathers made when they were denied their natural rights. So much for that. It has quieted apprehension, and I hope that the artillery will not be brought here, that the militia will not be called out, and that the female schools will continue their sessions as year to four.

The authority of Mr. Maidson, however, was relied upon by the Senator from Tennessee, and he read fairly an extract from Mr. Maidson's letter to Mr. Webster. And I gave him credit for reading what, it seems to me, destroys his whole argument. It is this clause. The powers of the government being exercised, as in other elective and responsible governments, under the control of its constituents, the people, and the legislature of the states, and subject to the revolutionary rights of the people in extreme cases. Now, sir, we are confusing language very much. Men speak of revolution, and when they say revolution, they mean blood. Our fathers meant nothing of the sort. When they spoke of revolution, they meant an unalignable right.

When they declared as an unalignable right, the power of the people to abrogate and modify They did not mean that they were to sustain that by brute force. They meant that it was a right, and force could only be invoked when that right was wrongfully denied. Red Britain denied the right in the case of the colonies, and Therefore, our revolution for independence was bloody. If Great Britain had admitted the great American doctrine, there would have been no bloodshed. And does it become the descendants of those who proclaim this as the great principle on which they took their place among the nations of the earth, now to proclaim? If that is a right, it is one which you can only get. As the subjects of the Emperor of Austria may get their rights by force overcoming force.

Are we, in this age of civilization and political progress, when political philosophy had advanced to the point which seemed to render it possible that the millennium should now be seen to prophetic eyes? Are we now to roll back the whole current of human thought, and again to return to the mere brute force which prevails between beasts of prey, as the only method of settling questions between men? If the Declaration of Independence be true, and who here again says it? Every community may dissolve its connection with any other community previously made, and have no other obligation than that which results from the breach of the alliance between states. Is it to be supposed, could any man reasoning a priory, come to the conclusion that the men who fought the battles of the revolution for community independence, that the men who struggled against the then greatest military power, on the face of the globe in order that they might possess those unalignable rights which they had declared, terminate their great efforts by transmitting posterity to a condition in which they could only gain those rights by force.

If so, the blood of the revolution was shed in vain. No great principles were established. For force was the law of nature before the battles of the revolutions were fought. I see, then, if gentlemen insist on using the word revolution in the sense of a resort to force, a very great difference between their opinion and that of Mr. Madison. Mr. Madison put the rights of the people over and above everything else, and he said this was the government du jour. And de facto, call it by what name you will, he understood ours to be a government of the people. The people never have separated themselves from those rights which our fathers had declared to be unalignable. They did not delegate to the federal government.

The powers which the British Crown exercised over the colonies. They did not achieve their independence for any purpose so low as that. They left us to the inheritance of free men, living in independent communities. The states united for the purpose which they thought would bless posterity. It is in the exercise of this reserved right As defined by Mr. Madison as one to which all the powers of government are subject, that the people of a state in convention have claimed to resume the functions which in like manner they had made to the federal government. The question which now presents itself to the country is, what shall we do with events as they stand? Shall we allow the separation to be total?

Shall we render it peaceful with a view to the chance that, when hunger shall brighten the intellects of men, and the teachings of hard expedience shall have tamed them? They may come back, in the spirit of our fathers, to the task of reconstruction. Or will they have that separation partial? Will they give each state all its military power? Will they give to each state its revenue power? Will they still preserve the common agent? And will they thus carry on a government different from that which now exists? Yet, no separating the states so entirely as to make the work of reconstruction equal to a new creation. Not separating them, so as to render it utterly impossible to administer any functions of the government in security and peace.

I waive the question of duality. Considering that a dual executive would be the institution of a king log, I considered a dual legislative. Departments would be to bring into antagonism the representatives of two different countries. To war perpetually, and thus to continue, not union, but the irreplaceable conflict. There is no duality possible unless there be two confederacies, which seems to me consistent with the interest of either or of both. It may be that two confederacies could be so organized as to answer jointly many of the ends of our present union. It may be that states Agreeing with each other in their internal policy, having a similarity of interest and an identity of purpose might associate together, and that these two confederacies might have relations to each other so close as to give them a united power in time of war against a foreign nation.

These things are possibilities. These things it becomes us to contemplate. These things it... Devolves on the majority section to consider now, for with every motion of the clock is passing away your opportunity. It was greater when we met on our first Monday in December than it is now. It is greater now than it will be on the first day of next week. We have waited long. We have come to the conclusion that you mean to do nothing. In the Committee of Thirteen, where the resolutions of the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. Crittenden, were considered, various attempts were made, but no prospect of any agreement on which it was possible for us to stand in security of the future could be matured. I offered a proposition which was but a declaration of that which the Constitution announces.

But that which the Supreme Court had, from time to time and from an early period asserted, but that which was necessary for equality in the Union. Not one single vote of the Republican portion of that committee was given for the proposition. Looking then upon the separation is inevitable. Not knowing how that separation is to occur, Or at least, what states is it to embrace? There remains to us, I believe, as the consideration which is most useful. The inquiry. How can the separation be effected so as to leave to us the power, whenever we shall have the will, to reconstruct? It can only be done by adopting a policy of peace. It can only be done by denying to the federal government all power to coerce.

It can only be done by returning to the point from which we started and saying, this is a government of fraternity, a government of consent, and it shall not be administered in a departure from those principles.

I do not regard the failure of our Constitutional Union, as very many do, to be the failure of self-government. To be conclusive in all future time of the unfitness of man to govern himself. Our state governments have charged of nearly all the relations of persons and property. This federal government was instituted mainly as a common agent for foreign purposes, for free trade among the states, and for common defense. Representative, liberty will remain in the states after they are separated. Liberty was not crushed by the separation of the colonies from the mother country, then the most constitutional monarchy and the freest government known. Still less will be liberty be destroyed by the separation of the states, to prevent the destruction of the spirit of the Constitution by the maladministration of it.

There will be injury, injury to all, differing in degree, differing in manner. The injury to the manufacturing and navigating states will be to their internal prosperity. The injury to the southern states will be mainly to their foreign commerce. All will feel the deprivation of that high pride and power which belonged to the flag now representing the greatest republic, if not the greatest government upon the face of the globe. I would that it still remain to consider what we might calmly have considered on the first Monday in December, how this could be avoided, but events have ruled past that point. You would not make propositions when they would have been effective. I presume you will not make them now, and I know not what effect they would have had if you did.

Your propositions would have been most welcome if they have been made before. Any question of coercion and before any vain boasting of power, for pride and passion do not often take counsel of pecuniary interest, at least among those whom I present, but you have chosen to take the policy of clinging to words, the Chicago platform, in disregard of passing events and have hastened them onward. It is true, as shown by history of all revolutions, that they are most precipitated and intensified by obstinacy and vacillation. The want of a policy, the obstinate adherence to unimportant things, have brought us to this condition, where I close my eyes because I cannot see anything that encourages me to hope.

In the long period which elapsed after the downfall of the great republics of the East, When despotism seemed to brood over the civilized world, and only here and there constitutional monarchy even was able to rear its head. When all the great principles of Republican and representative government had sunk deep, fathomless into the sea of human events, it was then that the storm of our revolution moved the waters. The earth, the air, and the sea became brilliant. And, from the foam of ages, rose the constellation which was set in the political firmament as a sign of unity and confederation and community independence coexisting with Confederate strength. That constellation has served to bless our people, nay more.

Its light has been thrown on foreign lands. And its regenerative power will outlive, perhaps, the government, as a sign for which it was set. It may be pardoned to me, sir, who, in my boyhood, was given the military service, and who have followed, under tropical suns and over northern snows, the flag of the Union. If I yet express the deep sorrow which always overwhelms me when I think of taking the last leave, I was a proud man, feeling that henceforth it is not to be the banner which by day and by night I was ready to follow, to hail with a rising and blessed with a setting sun. But God, who knows the hearts of men, will judge between you and us, at whose door lies responsibility. Men will see the efforts made, here and elsewhere.

That we have been silent when words would not avail, and have curbed an impatient temper, and hoped that conciliary counsels might do that which could not be affected by harsh means. And yet, the only response which has come from the other side has been a stolid indifference, as though it mattered not. Let the temple fall. We do not care. Sirs, remember that such conduct is offensive, and that men may become indifferent even to objects of their early attachments.

If our government should fail, it will not be from the defect of the system, though each planet was set to revolve in an orbit of its own, each moving by its own impulse. Yet, being all attracted by the affections and interests which counterveiled each other, there was no inherent tendency to disruption. It has been the perversion of the Constitution. It has been the substitution of theories of morals for the principles of government. It has been forcing crude opinions upon the domestic institutions of others, which has disturbed these planets in their orbit. It is this which threatens to destroy the constellation which, in its power and its glory, had been gathering stars one after another until, from thirteen, it had risen to thirty-three.

If we accept the argument of today in favor of coercion as the theory of our government, its only effect will be to precipitate men who have pride and self-reliance into the assertion of the freedom and independence to which they were born. Our fathers would never have entered into a Confederate government which had within itself power of coercion. They would not agree to remain one day in such a government after I had the power to get out of it. To argue that the man who follows the mandate of his state, resuming her sovereign jurisdiction and power, is disloyal to his allegiance to the United States? Which allegiance he only owed through his state? Is such a confusion of ideas, as does not belong.

to an ordinary comprehension of our government. It is treason to the principle of community independence. It is to recur to the doctrine of passive obedience, which in England cost one monarch his head and drove another to exile, a doctrine which, since the revolution of 1688, has obtained nowhere where men speak the English tongue. Yet all this It is needful to admit, before we accept this doctrine of coercion, which is to send an army and a navy to do that which there are no courts to perform, to execute a law without a judicial decision and without an officer to serve process. This, I say, would degrade us to the basest despotism under which man could live. The despotism of many-headed monster.

Without the sensibility or regardful consideration which might belong to an hereditary king. There is a strange similarity in the position of affairs at the present day to that which the colonies occupied. Lord North asserted the right to collect the revenue, and insisted on collecting it by force. He sent the troops to Boston Harbor and to Charlestown. and he courted troops in those towns. The result was collision, and out of that collision came the separation of the colonies from the mother country. The same thing is being attempted today. Not the law, not the civil magistrate, but the troops are relied upon now to execute the laws. To gather taxes in the southern ports, the army and navy must be sent to perform the functions of magistrates.

It is the old case over again. Senators of the North, you are re-enacting the blunders which statesmen in Great Britain committed. But among you there are some who, like Chatham and Burke, though not of our section, yet are vindicating our rights. I have heard, with some surprise, for it seemed to me idle, the repetition of the assertion year to four made, that the cause of the separation was the election of Mr. Lincoln. It may be a source of gratification to some gentlemen that their friend is elected. But no individual had the power to produce the existing state of things. It was the purpose, the end, it was the declaration by himself and his friends, which constitute the necessity of providing new safeguards for ourselves.

The man was nothing, save as he was the representative of opinions, of a policy, of purposes, of power to inflict upon us those wrong to which free men never tamely submit. Senators, I have spoken longer than I desire. I had supposed it was possible avoiding argument and not citing authority to have made to you a brief address. It was thought useless to argue a question which now belongs to the past. The time is near at hand when the places which have known us as colleagues, labouring together, can know us in that relation no more forever. I have striven to avert the catastrophe which now impends over the country, unsuccessfully, and I regret it. For the few days which I may remain, I am willing to labor in order that that catastrophe shall be as little as possible destructive to public peace and prosperity.

If you desire at this last moment to avert civil war, so be it. It is better so. If you will but allow us to separate from you peacefully, since we cannot live peacefully together, to leave with the rights we had before we were united, since we cannot enjoy them in the union, then there are many relations which may still subsist between us, drawn from the associations of our struggles from the revolutionary era to the present day. which may be beneficial to you as well as us.

If you will not have it thus, if in the pride of power, if in contempt of reason and reliance upon force, you say we shall not go, but shall remain as subjects to you, then, gentlemen of the North, a war is to be inaugurated the like of which men have not seen. Sufficiently numerous on both sides, in close contact with only imaginary lines of division, and with many means of approach, each sustained by productive sections, the people of which will give freely both of money and of store. The conflict must be multiplied indefinitely, and the masses of men sacrificed to the demon of civil war will furnish Hector tombs, such as the recent campaign in Italy did not offer. At the end of all of this, what will you have affected?

Destruction upon both sides? Subjugation upon either? A treaty of peace leaving both torn and bleeding? The wail of the widow and the cry of the orphan substituted for those peaceful notes of domestic happiness that now prevail throughout the land? And then you will agree that each is to pursue his separate course as best he may. This is to be the end of war. Through the long series of years, you may waste your strength, distress your people, and yet at last must come to the position which you might have had at first. Had justice and reason instead of selfishness and passion, folly and crime, dictated your course.

Is there wisdom? Is there patronism in the land? If so, easy must be the solution of this question. If not, then Mississippi's gallant sons will stand like a wall of fire around their state, and I go hence, not in hostility to you, but in love and allegiance to her, to take my place among her sons, be it for good or for evil. I shall probably never again attempt to utter here the language either of warning or of argument. I leave the case in your hands. If you solve it, not before I go, you will still have to decide it, toward you individually as well as toward those whom you represent. I would that I had the power now to say there shall be peace between us forever. I would. That I had the power now to say, the intercourse and the commence between the states, if they cannot live in one union, shall be uninterrupted.

That all the social relations shall remain undisturbed. And that the son in Mississippi shall visit freely his father in Maine. And the reverse, and that each shall be welcomed when he goes to the other. Not By himself alone, but also by his neighbors, and that all the kindly intercourse which has subsisted between the different sections of the Union shall continue to exist. This is not only for the interest of all, but it is my profoundest wish, my sincerest desire, that such a remnant of that which is passing away may grace the memory of a glorious foe. To brief existence. Day by day you have become more and more exasperated. False reports have led you to suppose there was in our section hostility to you with manifestations which did not exist.

In one case, I well remember when the Senator from Vermont, Mr. Colomar, was serving with me on a special committee. It was reported that a gentleman who had gone From a commercial house in New York had been inhumanely treated at Vicksburg, and this embarrassed a question which we then had pending. I wrote to Vicksburg for information, and my friends could not learn that such a man had ever been there, but if he had been there, no violence certainly had been offered to him. Falsehood and suspicion thus led you step by step. in the career of crimination, and perhaps has induced to some part of your aggression. Some evil effects we have, year to four suffered, and consequences now have their fatal culmination.

On the verge of war, distrust and passion increased danger. Today it is in the power of two bad men, at opposite ends of the telegraphic line between Washington and Charleston. To precipitate the state of South Carolina and the United States into a conflict of arms without other cause to have produced it. And still, will you hesitate? Still will you do nothing? Will you sit with sublime indifference and allow events to shape themselves? No longer can you say the responsibility is upon the executive. He has thrown it open to you. He has notified you that he can do nothing, and you, therefore, know he will do nothing. He has told you the responsibility. Now rest with Congress. And I close, as I began, by invoking you to meet that responsibility, bravely to act the Patriots part.

If you will, the angel of peace may spread her wings, though it be over divided states. And the sons of their sires of the revolution may still go on in friendly intercourse with each other, ever renewing memories of a common origin. The sections by the diversity of their products and habits acting and reacting beneficially. The commerce of each may swell the prosperity of both, and the happiness of all be still interwoven together, thus it may be, and thus It is in your power to make it.

End of section 34. This is a reading by Rolder. London, 2601, 2014.

35 35 - Appendix I 53:10

35. Appendix I. Correspondence and Extracts from Correspondence Relative to Fort Sumter. From the Affair of the Star of the West, January 9, 1861, to the withdrawal of the Envoy of South Carolina from Washington, February 8, 1861. Major Anderson to the Governor of South Carolina. To His Excellency, the Governor of South Carolina. Sir, Two of your batteries fired this morning upon an unarmed vessel bearing the flag of my government. As I have not been notified that war has been declared by South Carolina against the government of the United States, I cannot but think that this hostile act was committed without your sanction or authority. Under that hope, and that alone, did I refrain from opening fire upon your batteries.

I have the honor, therefore, respectfully to ask whether the above-mentioned Act, one I believe without a parallel in the history of our country or of any other civilized government, was committed in obedience to your instructions and to notify you, if it be not disclaimed, that I must regard it as an act of war. And that I shall not, after a reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit any vessels to pass within a range of the guns of my fort, in order to save, as far as in my power, the shedding of blood. I beg that you will have due notification of this, my decision given to all concerned. Hoping, however, that your answer may be such as will justify a further continuance of forebordance on my part, I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

Robert Anderson.

Major 1st Artillery, USA Commanding, Fort Sumter, Carolina, January 9, 1861. Extracts from the reply of the Governor to Major Anderson. State of Carolina, Executive Office, Headquarters, Charleston, January 9, 1861. Sir, your letter has been received. In it you make certain statements, which very plainly show that you have not been fully informed by your government of the precise relations which now exist between it. And, the State of South Carolina. Official information has been communicated to the government of the United States that the political connection, year to four existing between the state of Carolina and the states, which were known as the United States, had ceased, and that the state of South Carolina had resumed All the power it had delegated to the United States under the compact known as the Constitution of the United States, the right which the State of South Carolina possessed to change the political relations it held with other states under the Constitution of the United States, has been solemnly asserted by the people of the state in convention and now does not admit of discussion.

The attempt to reinforce the troops now at Fort Sumter, or to retake and resume possession of the forts within the waters of the States, which you have abandoned, after spiking the guns placed there, and doing otherwise much damage, cannot be regarded by the authorities of the State as indicative of any other purpose than the coercion of the State by the armed force of the government. To repel such an attempt is to plainly its duty to allow it to be discussed. But while defending its waters, the authorities of the State have been careful so to conduct the affairs of the State that no act, however necessary for its defence, should lead to a useless waste of life. Special agents, therefore, have been off the bar to warn all approaching vessels.

If armed or unarmed, and having troops to reinforce the forts on board, not to enter the harbour of Charleston. And special orders have been given to the commanders of all the forts and the batteries not to fire at such vessels, until a shot is fired across their bows, would warn them of the prohibition of the states. Under these circumstances, the Star of the West, it is understood. This morning attempted to enter this harbour with troops on board, and, having been notified that she could not enter, was fired into. The act is perfectly justified by me. In regard to your threat in relation to vessels in the harbour, it is only necessary to say that you must judge of your responsibilities. Your position in this harbour has been tolerated by the authorities of the state, and while the act The state of which you complain is in a perfect consistency with the rights and duties of the state.

It is not perceived how far the conduct which you propose to adopt can find a parallel in the history of any country, or be reconciled with, any other purpose of your government than that of imposing upon this state the condition of a conquered province.

F.W. Pinkens. To Major Robert Anderson, commanding Fort Sumter. Major Anderson to the government. Headquarters, Fort Sumter, South Carolina, January 9, 1861. To His Excellency, F. W. Pinkins, Governor of the State of Carolina. Sir. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of today, and to say that, under the circumstances, I have deemed it proper to refer the whole matter to my government, and that I intend deferring the course indicated in my note of this morning until the arrival from Washington of the instructions I may receive. I have the honor also to express a hope that no obstructions will be placed in the way of And that you will do me the favor to afford every facility to the departure and return of the bearer, Lieutenant T.

Talbot, U.S. Army, who has been directed to make the journey. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Robert Anderson, Major U.S. Army Commanding.

The Governor to the President of the United States, State of Carolina, Executive Office, Headquarters, Charleston, January 11, 1861. Sir, at the time of the separation of the State of South Carolina from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and still is, in the possession of the troops of the United States, under the command of Major Anderson. I regard that possession as not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina, and I have this day addressed to the Major Anderson a communication to obtain from him the possession of that fault, by the authority of the State. The reply of Major Anderson informs me that he has no authority to do what I require. But he desires a reference of the demand to the President of the United States.

Under the circumstances now existing, and which needs no comment by me, I have determined to send to you the Honorable I. W. Hine, the Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed him to demand the delivery of Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston to the constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and which I now make of you, is suggested because of my earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in your attempt to retain the possession of that fort will cause, and which will be unavailing to secure you that possession, but induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored. If the consequences so unhappy shall ensue, I will secure for this state In the demand which I now make the satisfaction of having exhausted every attempt to avoid it.

In relation to the public property of the United States within the Ford Sumter, the Honorable I. W. Hayne, who will hand you this communication, is authorized to give you the pledge of the State that the valuation of such property will be accounted for by the State upon the adjustment of its relations with the United States. F. W.

Pinkins to the President of the United States.

Extracts from instructions of the State Department of South Carolina to the Honorable I. W. Hain. State of South Carolina Executive Office. State Department, Charleston, January 12, 1861. Sir, the Government has considered it proper in view of the grave question which now affect the state of South Carolina and the United States to make a demand upon the President of the United States for the delivery to the state of South Carolina of Fort Sumter, now within the territorial limits of the state and occupied by the troops of the United States. You are now instructed to proceed to Washington, and there, in the name of the government of the State of South Carolina, inquire of the President of the United States whether it was by his order that troops of the United States were sent into the harbor of Charleston to reinforce Fort Sumter.

If he avows that order, you will then inquire whether he asserts a right to introduce troops of the United States within the limits of the state to occupy Fort Sumter, and you will, in case of his avowal, inform him that neither will be permitted and either will be regarded as his declaration of war against the state of South Carolina. The governor to save life. And determined to admit no course of proceeding usual among civilized nations. Previous to that condition of the general hostilities which belongs to war, and not knowing under what order or by what authority Fort Sumter is now held, demanded from Major Robert Anderson, now in command of that fort, its delivery to the State. That officer, in his reply, has referred to the Governor, that the Government of the United States at Washington.

You will therefore demand from the President of the United States the withdrawal of the troops of the United States from the fort and its delivery to the State of South Carolina. You're instructed not to allow any question of property claimed by the United States to embarrass the assertion of the political right of the state of South Carolina to the possession of Fort Sumner. The possession of that fort by the state is alone consistent with the dignity and safety of the state of South Carolina. By such possession is not inconsistent with the right to compensate in money in another government. if it has against the state of South Carolina any just claim connected with that fort. But the possession of the fort cannot, in regard to the state of South Carolina, be compensated by any consideration of any kind from the government of the United States, when the possession of it by the government is invasive of the dignity and affects the safety of the state.

That possession cannot become now a matter of discussion or negotiation. You will therefore require from the President of the United States a positive and distinct answer to your demand for the delivery of the fort, and you are further authorized to give the pledge of the State to adjust all matters which may be, and are in their nature, Susceptible of valuation in money, in the manner most usual, and upon the principles of equity and just, always, recognized by independent nations, for the ascertainment of their relative rights and obligations in such matters. Respectfully, your obedient servant, A. G. McGrath. To Honorable W. Hain, Special Envoy from the State of South Carolina, to the President of the United States.

Letter of Senators of Seceding States to Honorable I. W. Hain, Washington City, January 15, 1861. Honorable Isaac W. Hain, Sir, we are apprised that you visit Washington as an envoy from the State of South Carolina, bearing a communication from the Governor of your State to the President of the United States. In relation to Fort Sumter, without knowing its contents, we venture to request you to defer its delivery to the President for a few days, or until you and he have considered the suggestions which we beg leave to submit. We know that the possession of Fort Sumter by troops of the United States, coupled with the circumstances under which it was taken, is the Chief, If not only source of difficulty between the government of South Carolina and that of the United States, we would add that we, too, think it is a just cause of irritation and of apprehension on the part of your state.

But we have also assurances, notwithstanding the circumstances under which Major Anderson left Fort Moultrie and entered Fort Sumter, with the forces under his command. That it was not taken and is not held with any hostile or unfriendly purpose towards your State, but merely as a property of the United States, which the President deems it his duty to protect and preserve. We will not discuss the question of right or duty on the part of either government touching the property, or the late acts of either in relation thereto. But we think that, without any compromise of right or breach of duty on either side, an amical adjustment of the matter of differences may and should be adopted. We desire to see such an adjustment and to prevent war or the shedding of blood.

We represent states which have already seceded from the United States or will have done so before the 1st of February next. And which will meet your state in convention on or before the 15th of that month. Our people feel that they have a common destiny with your people, and accept to form with them. In that convention, a new confederation or provisional government. We must and will share your fortunes, suffering with you the evils of war if it cannot be avoided. And enjoying with you the blessings of peace, if it can be preserved. We therefore think it is specially due from South Carolina to our states to say nothing of other slave-holding states that she should, as far as she can, consistently with her honor, avoiding initiating hostilities between her and the United States or any other power.

We have the public declaration of the President that he has not the constitutional power or the will to make war on South Carolina, and that the public peace shall not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards your State. We therefore see no reason why there may not be a settlement of existing difficulties. If time be given for calm and deliberate counsel with those States which are equally involved with South Carolina, We, therefore, trust that an arrangement will be agreed on between you and the President, at least till the 15th of February next, by which time your and our states may, in convention, devise a wise, just, and peaceable solution of existing difficulties. In the meantime... We think your state should suffer, Major Anderson, to obtain necessary supplies of food, fuel, or water, and enjoy free communication by post or special messenger with the President, upon the understanding that the President will not send him reinforcements during the same period.

We propose to submit this proposition and your answer to the President. If not clothed with the power to make such arrangement, then we trust that you will submit our suggestions to the Governor of your State for his instructions. Until you have received and communicated his response to the President, of course your State will not attack Fort Sumter, and the President will not offer to reinforce it. We most respectfully submit these propositions in the earnest hope that you, or the proper authority of your state, may accede to them. We have the honor to be, with profound esteem, your obedient servants. Lewis T. Wigfall, John Hemphill, D.L. Uli, S.R. Mallory, Jefferson Davis, C.C. Clay, Jr., Benjamin Fitzpatrick, A.

Iverson, John Slidell, J.P. Benjamin. Letter of Honourable I.W. Hain in reply to the Senators from seceding States. Washington, January 1861. Gentlemen, I have just received your communication dated the 15th instant. You represent, you say, States which have already seceded from the United States, or will have, done so before the 1st of February next, And which will meet South Carolina in convention on or before the 15th of that month. That your people feel they have a common destiny with our people and expect to form with them in that convention a new Confederacy and provisional government. That you must And will share our fortunes, suffering with us the evils of war if it cannot be avoided, and enjoying with us the blessings of peace if it can be preserved.

I feel, gentlemen, the force of this appeal, and, so far as my authority extends, most cheerfully comply with your request. I am not clothed with the power to make the arrangements you suggest, but provided you can get assurances with which you are entirely satisfied that no reinforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that public peace shall not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina. I will refer your communication to the authorities of South Carolina and Withholding their communication, with which I am at present charge, will wait for their instructions. Major Anderson and his command, let me assure you, do now obtain all necessary supplies of food, including fresh meat and vegetables, and I believe fuel and water, and do now enjoy free communication by post and special messengers with the President.

And will continue to do so, certainly until the door of negotiation shall be closed. If your proposition is acceded to, you may assure the President that no attack will be made on Fort Sumter until a response from the Governor of South Carolina has been received by me and communicated to him, with great consideration and profound esteem, your obedient servant, Isaac W. Hain. Envoy from the Governor and Council of South Carolina. Letter of Senators of Seceding States to the President. Senate Chamber, January 19, 1861. Sir, we have been requested to present you copies of the correspondence between certain Senators of the United States and Colonel Isaac W. Hayne, now in the city, on behalf of the Government of South Carolina.

And to ask that you will take into consideration the subject of said correspondence, very respectfully, your obedient servants, Benjamin Fitzpatrick, S. O. Mallory, John Seidel, to his excellent James Buchanan, President of the United States. To the letter above, an evasive reply was returned on the 22nd by the Honorable Joseph Holt, Secretary of War. Add interim on behalf of the President, the material points of which are contained in the following paragraph. In regard to the proposition by Colonel Hayne that no reinforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the public peace will not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina, it is impossible for me to give you any such assurances.

The President has no authority to enter into such an agreement or understanding. As an executive officer, he is simply bound to protect The public property, so far as it may be practicable, and it would be a manifest violation of his duty to place himself under engagements that he would not perform this duty either for an indefinite or limited period. At the present moment, it is not deemed necessary to reinforce Major Anderson, because he makes no such request and feels quite secure in his position. Should his safety, however, require reinforcements, every effort will be made to supply them. Mr. Holt concludes his letter by saying, Major Anderson is not menacing Charleston, and I am convinced that the happiest result which can be attained is that both he and the authorities of South Carolina shall remain on their present amicable footing, neither party being bound by any obligations whatever except the high Christian and moral duty to keep the peace and to avoid all causes of mutual irritation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. Holt, Secretary of War ad interim.

Letter of Senators of Seceding States to Honorable I. W. Hayne. Honorable Isaac W. Hayne, Washington, January 23rd, 1861. Sir, in answer to your letter of the 17th instant, we have now to inform you That after communicating with the President, we have received a letter signed by the Secretary of War, an address to Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mallory and Sliddle on the subject of your proposition. Which letter we now enclose to you? Although its terms are not as satisfactory as we could have desired in relation to the ulterior purpose of the Executive, We have no hesitation in expressing our entire confidence that no reinforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter, nor will the public peace be disturbed within the period requested for full communication between yourself and your government.

And we trust, therefore, that you will feel justified in applying for further instructions before delivering to the President any message with which you may have been charged. We take this occasion to renew the expression of an earnest hope that South Carolina will not deem it incompatible with her safety, dignity, or honor to refrain from initiating any hostilities against any power whatsoever, or from taking any steps tending to produce collision, until our states, which are to share her fortunes, shall have an opportunity of joining their council with hers. We are, with great respect, your obedient servants.

P.S. Some of the signatures to the former letter addressed to you are not affixed to the foregoing communication. In consequence of the departure of several Senators, now on their way to their respective states. Letter of Honourable I. W. Hayne to Senators of Seceding States. To the Honourable Louis T. Wigfall, D. L. Uley, J. P. Benjamin, A. Iverson, John Hemphill, John Siddell, and C. C. Clay, Jr. Gentlemen, I have received your letter of the 23rd instance. In closing, a communication dated on the 22nd instant addressed to Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mallory and Sleddell from the Secretary of War, ad interim. This communication from the Secretary is far from being satisfactory to me, but inasmuch as you state that we You have no hesitation in expressing an entire confidence that no reinforcement will be sent to Fort Sumter, nor will the public peace be disturbed within the period requested for full communication between yourself, myself, and your, my government, in compliance with your previous understanding.

I withhold the communication with which I am at present charged and refer The whole matter to the authorities of South Carolina, and will await their reply. Mr. Gowden of South Carolina, now in the city, will leave here by the evening train, and will lay before the Governor of South Carolina and his council the whole correspondence between yourselves, And myself, and between you and the Government of the United States, with a communication from me asking for further instructions. I cannot, in closing, but express my deep regret that the President should deem it necessary to keep a garrison of troops at Fort Sumter. For the protection of the property of the United States, South Carolina scorns the idea of appropriating herself the property of another.

Whether of a government or an individual, without accounting to the last dollar, for everything which, for the protection of her citizens, and in vindication of her own honour and dignity, she may deem it necessary to take into her own possession. As property, Fort Sumter is in far greater jeopardy occupied by a garrison of the United States troops than it would be if delivered over to the State authorities, with the pledge that, in regard to that and all other property claimed by the United States within the jurisdiction of South Carolina, they would fully account upon a fair adjustment. Upon the other point of the preservation of peace and the avoidance of bloodshed, Is it supposed that the occupation of the fort in the midst of a harbor with guns bearing upon every position of it by a government no longer acknowledged can be other than the occasion of constant irritation, excitement, and indignation?

It creates a condition of things which I fear is but little calculated to advance the observation of the high Christian and moral duty to keep the peace. To avoid all causes of mutual irritation recommended by the Secretary of War in his communication. In my judgment, to continue to hold Fort Samsa by United States troops is the worst possible means of protecting it as property, and the worst possible means of effecting a peaceful solution of the present difficulties. I beg leave, in conclusion, to say that it is in defense to the unanimous opinion expressed by the Senators present in Washington representing states which have already seceded from the United States, or will have done so before the 1st of February next, that I comply with your suggestions, and I feel assured That suggestions from such a quarter will be considered with profound respect by the authorities of South Carolina, and will have great weight in determining their action.

With high consideration, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Isaac W. Hain, envoy from the Governor and Council of South Carolina.

Mr. Hain to the President of the United States, Washington. January 31st, 1861. To His Excellency James Buchanan, President. Sir. I had the honor to hold a short interview with you on the 14th instant, informal and unofficial. Having previously been informed that you desire that whatever was official should be on both sides conducted by written communication, I did not at the time present my credentials, but verbally inform you that I bore a letter from the Governor of South Carolina in regard to the occupation of Fort Sumter. which I would deliver the next day under cover of a written communication from myself. The next day, before such communication could be made, I was waited upon by a senator from Alabama, who stated that he came on the part of all the senators, then in Washington, from the states which had already seceded from the United States, or would certainly have done so before the first day of February next.

The senator from Alabama urged that he and they were interested in the subject of my mission, and in most an equal degree with the authorities of South Carolina. He said that hostilities commenced between South Carolina and your government would necessarily involve the states represented by themselves in civil strife and Fearing that the action of South Carolina might complicate the relations of your government to the seceded states and seceding states, and thereby interfere with a peaceful solution of existing difficulties, these Senators requested that I would withhold my message to yourself until consultation among themselves could be had. To this I agreed, and the result of the consultation was the letter of these Senators addressed to me.

dated 15th January, a copy of which is in your possession. To this letter, I replied on the 17th, and a copy of that reply is likewise in your possession. This correspondence, as I am informed, was made the subject of a communication from Senators Fitzpatrick, Melanie, and Slidell, addressed to you, and your attention called to the contents. These gentlemen received on the twenty-second day of January a reply to their application, conveyed in a letter addressed to them, dated twenty-second, signed by the Hon. John Holt, Secretary of War, Ad Interim. Of this letter you, of course, have a copy. This letter from Mr. Holt was communicated to me under the cover of a letter from all the Senators of the seceded and seceding states, who still remain in Washington, and of this letter, too, I am informed you have been furnished with a copy.

This reply of yours through the Secretary of War, ad interim, to the application made by the Senators was entirely unsatisfactory to me. It appeared to me to be not only a rejection in advance of the main proposition made by the Senators, to wait. That an arrangement should be agreed on between the authorities of South Carolina and your government, at least until the 15th of February next, by which time South Carolina and the states represented by Senators might, in the Convention, devise a wise, just, and peaceable solution of the existing difficulties. In the meantime, they say, we think, that is, these Senators, That your state, South Carolina, should suffer Major Anderson to obtain necessary supplies of food, fuel, or water, and enjoy free communication by post or special messenger.

with the President, upon the understanding that the President will not send him reinforcements during that same period. But besides this rejection of the main proposition, there was in Mr. Holt's letter a distinct refusal to make any stipulation on the subject of reinforcement, even for the short time that might be required to communicate with my government. This reply to the Senator was, as I have stated, altogether unsatisfactory to me, and I felt sure that it would be so to the authorities whom I represent. It was not, however, addressed to me or the authorities of South Carolina, and, as South Carolina had addressed nothing to your government and had asked nothing at your hands, I look not I had consented to withhold my message at their insistence, provided that they could get assurances satisfactory to them that no reinforcements would be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the peace should not be disturbed by an act of hostility.

The senators expressed in their note to me on the 23rd instant their entire confidence, but no reinforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter, nor will the public peace be disturbed within the period requested for full communication between you, myself, and your, my government. And renewed the request that I would withhold the communication with which I stood charge and await further instructions. This I have done. The further instructions arrived on the 30th instant and bare date the 26th. I now have the honor to make to you my first communication as Special Envoy from the Government of South Carolina. You will finally close the original communication to the President of the United States. I am now instructed by the Governor of South Carolina to say that his opinion as to the propriety of the demand which is contained in this letter has not only been confirmed by the circumstances which your My mission has developed, but is now increased to the conviction of its necessity.

The safety of the state requires that the position of the president should be distinctly understood. The safety of all seceding states requires it as much as the safety of South Carolina. If it be so that Fort Sumter is held as property, then as property the rights, whatever they may be, of the United States can be ascertained, and for the satisfaction of these rights, the Pledge of the States of South Carolina, you are I am authorized to give. If Fort Sumter is not held as property, it is held, say, by instruction, as a military post, and such a post within the limits of South Carolina cannot be tolerated. You will perceive that it is upon the presumption that it is solely as property that you continue to hold Fort Sumter, that I have been selected For the performance of the duty upon which I have entered, I do not come as a military man to demand the surrender of the fortress, but as a legal officer of the State, its Attorney General, to claim for the State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent domain, and to pledge the State to make good all injury to the rights of property which may arise from the exercise of the claim.

South Carolina, as a separate, independent sovereignty, assumes the right to take into her possession everything within her limits essential to maintain her honor or her safety, irrespective of the question of property, subject only to the moral duty requiring that compensation should be made to the owner. This right she cannot permit to be drawn into discussion. As to the compensation for any property, whether of an individual or a government, which she may deem it necessary for her honour or safety to take into her possession, her past history gives ample guarantee that it would be made upon fair accounting to the last dollar. The proposition is now that her law officer should, under authority of the Governor, And his council distinctly pledged the faith of South Carolina to make such compensation in regard to Fort Sumter and its appurtenances and contents to the full extent of the money, value of the property of the United States delivered over to the authorities of South Carolina by your command.

I will not suppose that a pledge like this can be considered insufficient security. It is not the money value of the property of the United States in this fort, situated where it cannot be made available to the United States for any one purpose for which it was originally constructed, worth more to the United States and the property itself, when then, as property, insist on holding it by an armed garrison. Yet, such has been the ground upon which you have invariably placed your occupancy of this fort by troops, beginning Prospectively with your annual message of the 4th December, again in your special message of the 9th, 8th January, and still more empathetically in your message of the 28th January.

The same position is set forth in your reply to the Senators through the Secretary of War ad interim. It is there virtually conceded that Fort Sumter is held merely as a property of the United States, which you deem it your duty to protect and preserve. Again, it is submitted that the continuance of an armed possession actually jeopardizes the property you desire to protect. It is impossible that such a possession, if continued long enough, must lead to collision. No people, not completely abject and, palsy and animus, could submit indefinitely to the armed occupation of a fortress in the midst of the harbour of its principal city, and commanding the ingress and egress of every ship that enters the port.

The daily ferryboats that ply upon the waters moving but at the sufferance of aliens. An attack upon this fort would scarcely improve it as property, whatever the result, and if captured, it would no longer be the subject of account. To protect Fort Sumter merely as a property, it is submitted. That an armed occupancy is not only unnecessary, but that it is manifestly the worst possible means which can be resorted to for such an object. Your reply to the Senators, through Mr. Holt, declares it to be your sole object to act strictly on the defensive, and to authorize no movement against South Carolina unless justified by a hostile movement on their part. Yet, In reply to the proposition of the Senators that no reinforcements should be sent to Fort Sumter, provided South Carolina agrees that during the same period no attack should be made, you say.

It is impossible for me, your Secretary, to give you, the Senators, any such assurance that it would be a manifest violation of his, your, duty to place himself, yourself, under engagements that he You would not perform the duty either for an indefinite or limited period. In your passage of the 28th instant, in expressing yourself in regard to similar proposition, you say, however strong may be my desire to enter into such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not possess the power. Congress and Congress alone, under the war-making power, can exercise the discretion of agreeing to sustain from any and all its acts calculated to produce a collision of arms between this and other governments. It would, therefore, be an uncipation for the executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an agreement in regard to matters over which he has no constitutional control.

If he were thus to act, they might pass laws which he should be bound to obey, though in conflict with his agreement. The proposition, it is suggested, was addressed to you under the laws as they now are, and was not intended to refer to a new condition of things arising under new legislations. It was addressed to the executive discretion, acting under existing laws. If Congress should, under the war-making power, or in any other way legislate in a manner to effect the peace of South Carolina, her interests or her rights, it would not be accomplished in secret. South Carolina would have timely notice, or she would, I trust, endeavor to meet the emergency. It is added in the letter of Mr. Holt that, at the present moment, it is not deemed necessary to reinforce Major Anderson.

Because he makes no such request, and feels quite secure in his position. But should his safety be required, every effort will be made to supply reinforcements. This would seem to ignore the other branch of the proposition made by the Senators. Viz that no attack was to be made on Fort Sumter during the period suggested, and that the Major Anderson should enjoy the facilities of communications. I advert to this point, however, for the purpose of saying that to send reinforcements to Fort Sumter could not serve as a means of protecting and preserving property, for, as must be known to your government, it would inevitably lead to an immediate hostilities, in which property, on all sides, would necessarily suffer.

South Carolina has every disposition to preserve the public peace and feels, I am sure, in full force those high Christian and moral duties referred to by your secretary, and it is submitted that on her part there is scarcely any consideration of mere property, apart from harbor and safety. She rests her position on something higher than mere property. It is a consideration of her own dignity as a sovereign, and the safety of her people, which prompts her to demand that this property should no longer be used as a military post. By a government she no longer acknowledges. She feels this to be an imperative duty. It has, in fact, become an absolute necessity of her condition. Repudiating, as you do, the idea of coercion, avowing peaceful intentions, and expressing a patriot's horror for civil war and bloody strife among those who were once your brethren.

It is hoped that on further consideration you will not. on a mere question of property, refused the reasonable demand of South Carolina, which honor and necessity alike compel her to vindicate. Should you disappoint this hope, the responsibility for the result surely does not rest with her. If the evils of war are to be encountered, especially the calamities of civil war, an elevated statesmanship would seem to require that it should be accepted as the unavoidable alternative of something still more disastrous, such as national dishonor or measures materially affecting the safety or permanent interest of a people, that it should be a choice deliberately made and entered upon as war. And of set purpose.

But that a war should be the incident or accident. Attendant on a policy professedly peaceful, and not required to affect the object which is avowed as the only end intended, can only be excused when there has been no warning given as to the consequences. I am further instructed to say, South Carolina cannot, by her silence, appear to acquiesce in the imputation that she was guilty of an act of unprovoked aggression in firing on the Star of the West. Though an unarmed vessel, she was filled with armed men entering her territory against her will, with the purpose of reinforcing a garrison held within her limits against her protest. She forbears to recriminate by discussing the question of the property of attempting such a reinforcement at all, as well as of the disguised and secret manner in which it was intended to be effected, and on this occasion she will say nothing as to the manner in which Fort Sumter was taken into possession of its present occupants.

The interposition of the Senators who have addressed you was a circumstance unexpected by my Government, and unsolicited, certainly by me. The Governor, while he appreciates the high and generous motives by which they were prompted, and while he fully approves the delay which, in deference to them, has taken place in the presentation of this demand, feels that it can no longer be withheld. I conclude with an extract from the instructions just received by me from the Government of South Carolina. The letter of the President through Mr. Holt may be received as a reply to the question you were instructed to ask as to his assertion of his right to send reinforcements to Fort Sumter. You were instructed to say to him, if he asserted that right, that the State of South Carolina regarded such a right when asserted, Or with an attempt at its exercise as a declaration of war.

If the President intends, it shall not be so understood. It is proper to avoid any misconception hereafter. That he should be informed of the manner in which the Governor will feel bound to regard it. If the President, when you have stated the reason which prompted the Governor in making the demand for the delivery of Fort Sumter, If the President shall not be prepared to give you an immediate answer, you will communicate to him that his answer may be transmitted within a reasonable time to the Governor, at this place, Charleston, South Carolina. The Governor does not consider it necessary that you I should remain longer in Washington than is necessary to execute this. The closing duty of your, my mission, in the manner now indicated to you, me, as soon as the Governor shall receive from you information that you have closed your mission, and the reply, whatever it may be, of the President, he will consider the conduct which may be necessary on his part.

Allow me to request That you would, as soon as possible, inform me whether, under these instructions, I need wait your answer in Washington, and if not, I would be pleased to convey from you to my government information as to the time when an answer may be expected in Charleston. With high consideration, I am, very respectfully, Isaac W. Hain, Special Envoy. Some further correspondence ensued, but without the presentation of any new feature necessary to a full understanding of the case, the result was to leave it as much unsettled in the end as it had been in the beginning, and the efforts at negotiation were terminated by the retirement from Washington of Colonel Hayne on the 8th of February, 1861.

36 36 - Appendix K, Part 1 27:20

The Constitutions. The Provisional Constitution of the Confederate States, adopted on the 8th of February, 1861, is here presented, followed by the Constitution of the United States with all its amendments to the period of the secession of the Southern States and the Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States, adopted on the 11th of March, 1861, in parallel columns. The variations from the Constitution of the United States in the Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States are indicated by italics, the parts omitted by periods. Constitution for the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America. We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent states of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, invoking the favor of Almighty God, do hereby, in behalf of these states, ordain and establish this Constitution for the provisional government of the same.

To continue one year from the inauguration of the President, or until a permanent constitution or confederation between the said States shall be put in operation, whichsoever shall first occur. Article I. Section I. All legislative powers herein delegated shall be vested in this Congress now assembled until otherwise ordained. Section II. When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the same shall be filled in such manner as the proper authorities of the State shall direct. Section 3. 1. The Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members. Any number of deputies from a majority of the States being present shall constitute a quorum to do business.

But a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members. Upon all questions before the Congress, each State shall be entitled to one vote, and shall be represented by any one or more of its deputies who may be present. The Congress may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with a concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. Three. The Congress shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy. And the yeas and nays of the members on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, or at the insistence of any one State, be entered on the journal.

Section IV. The members of Congress shall receive a compensation for their services to be ascertained by law and paid out of the Treasury of the Confederacy. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, and for any speech or debate they shall not be questioned in any other place. Section 5. 1. Every bill which shall have passed the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the Confederacy. If he approve, he shall sign it. But if not, he shall return it with his objections to the Congress, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it.

If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the Congress shall agree to pass the bill, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their adjournment, Prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. The President may veto any appropriation or appropriations, and approve any other appropriation or appropriations in the same bill. 2.

Any order, resolution, or vote intended to have the force and effect of a law shall be presented to the President, and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Congress, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. 3. Until the inauguration of the President, all bills, orders, resolutions, and votes adopted by the Congress shall be of full force without approval by him. Section 6. 1. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for the revenue necessary to pay the debts and carry on the government of the Confederacy. And all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the states of the Confederacy.

Two. To borrow money on the credit of the Confederacy. Three. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. Four. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the Confederacy. Five. To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures. Six. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the Confederacy. Seven. To establish post offices and post roads. Eight. To promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.

Nine. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. Ten. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations. Eleven. To declare war, grant letters of mark and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water. Twelve. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. Thirteen. To provide and maintain a navy. Fourteen. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Fifteen. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Confederacy, suppress insurrections, and repel invasion. 16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederacy, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

17. To make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers expressly delegated by this Constitution to this provisional government. 18. The Congress shall have power to admit other States. 19. This Congress shall also exercise executive powers until the President is inaugurated. Section 7. One. The importation of African Negroes from any foreign country, other than the slaveholding states of the United States, is hereby forbidden, and Congress are required to pass such laws as shall effectively prevent the same. Two. The Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of this Confederacy.

Three. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. Four. No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. Five. No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another, nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. 6. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law. And a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. 7. Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury unless it be asked and estimated for by the President or some one of the heads of departments, except for the purpose of paying its own expenses and contingencies.

8. No title of nobility shall be granted by the Confederacy. And no person holding any office of profit or trust under it shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign state. 9. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, Or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of such grievances as the delegated powers of this government may warrant it to consider and redress. 10. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

11. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law. Twelve. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. And no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentiment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. 14. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been committed, which District shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

To be confronted with the witness against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 15. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. And no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the Confederacy than according to the rules of the common law. 16. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. 17. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 18. The powers not delegated to the Confederacy by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.

19. The judicial power of the Confederacy shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the States of the Confederacy, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State. Section 8. One. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of mark and reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. Two. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.

And the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the Confederacy, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Article II. Section I. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Confederate States of America. He, together with the Vice-President, shall hold his office for one year, or until this provisional government shall be superseded by a permanent government, whichsoever shall first occur.

Two. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by ballot by the states represented in this Congress, each state casting one vote, and a majority of the whole being requisite to elect. 3. No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of one of the States of this Confederacy at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President. Neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident of one of the States of this Confederacy. 4. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, which inability shall be determined by a vote of two-thirds of the Congress, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President.

And the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected. 5. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services during the period of the Provisional Government a compensation at the rate of twenty-five thousand dollars per annum, and he shall not receive during that period any other emolument from this Confederacy or any of the States thereof. 6. Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation. I do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the Confederate States of America, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution thereof.

Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the Confederacy, and of the Militia of the Several States, when called into the actual service of the Confederacy. He may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon subjects relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the Confederacy, except in cases of impeachment. Two. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Congress, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Congress concur. And he shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Congress, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the courts, and all other officers of the Confederacy, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law.

But the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 3. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Congress, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. Section 3. 1. He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the State of the Confederacy, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. He may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the Congress at such times as he shall think proper. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers.

He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the Confederacy. 2. The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the Confederacy shall be removed from office on conviction by the Congress of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. A vote of two-thirds shall be necessary for such conviction. Article III. Section I. I. The judicial power of the Confederacy shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as are herein directed, or as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Two. Each State shall constitute a district in which there shall be a court called a District Court, which, until otherwise provided by the Congress, shall have the jurisdiction vested by the laws of the United States, as far as applicable, in both the District and Circuit Courts of the United States for that State.

The Judge whereof shall be appointed by the President By and with the advice and consent of the Congress, and shall, until otherwise provided by the Congress, exercise the power and authority vested by the laws of the United States in the judges of the district and circuit courts of the United States for that State, and shall appoint the times and places at which the courts shall be held. Appeals may be taken directly from the District Courts to the Supreme Court under similar regulations to those which are provided in cases of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, or under such regulations as may be provided by the Congress. The commissions of all the judges shall expire with this provisional government.

The Supreme Court shall be constituted of all the district judges, a majority of whom shall be a quorum, and shall sit at such times and places as the Congress shall appoint. 4. The Congress shall have power to make laws for the transfer of any causes which were pending in the courts of the United States to the courts of the Confederacy, and for the execution of the orders, decrees, and judgments heretofore rendered by the said courts of the United States. And also all laws which may be requisite to protect the parties to all such suits, orders, judgments, or decrees, their heirs, personal representatives, or assignees. Section Two. One. The judicial power shall extend to all cases of law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States and of this Confederacy, and treaties made, or which shall be made under its authority.

To all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the Confederacy shall be a party, controversies between two or more states, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states. Two. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed. But, when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such a place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. Section 3.1. Treason against this Confederacy shall consist only in levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. Two. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason. But no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

Article IV. Section I. I. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect of such prove. Section 2. 1. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. Two. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.

3. A slave in one State escaping to another shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom said slave may belong, by the executive authority of the State in which such slave shall be found, and, in case of any abduction or forcible rescue, full compensation, including the value of the slave and all costs and expenses, shall be made to the party by the State in which such abduction or rescue shall take place. Section 3. 1. The Confederacy shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence.

Article 5. 1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds, may at any time alter or amend this Constitution. Article VI. This Constitution, and the laws of the Confederacy, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the Confederacy, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. The government hereby instituted shall take immediate steps for the settlement of all matters between the states forming it and their other late Confederates of the United States, in relation to the public property and public debt at the time of their withdrawal from them.

These states hereby declaring it to be their wish and earnest desire to adjust everything pertaining to the common property, common liability, and common obligations of that union upon the principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith. Three, until otherwise provided by the Congress, the city of Montgomery in the state of Alabama shall be the seat of government. Four, The members of the Congress and all executive and judicial officers of the Confederacy shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution, but no religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under this Confederacy.

37 37 - Appendix K, Part 2 40:30

Transcriber's Note. Following are the constitutions of the United States of America and of the Confederate States of America, listed essentially sentence by sentence and with the corresponding sentences from each constitution. This is the listing in parallel columns described earlier. Each sentence is prefixed with either USA or CSA to indicate the source. End note. USA. Constitution of the United States of America. C. S. A. Constitution of the Confederate States of America. U. S. A. We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

C. S. A. We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent Federal Government, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America. USA and CSA, Article I. USA. Section One. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. C.S.A. Section One. All legislative powers herein delegated shall be vested in a Congress of the Confederate States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

USA. Section Two. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. C.S.A. Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall be citizens of the Confederate states and have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. But no person of foreign birth, not a citizen of the Confederate states, shall be allowed to vote for any officer, civil or political, state or federal.

No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen. C. S. A. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained the age of twenty-five years, and be a citizen of the Confederate States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. U.S.A. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.

Other persons refers to slaves. See Amendments, Article 14, Sections 1 and 2. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative. And until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

C.S.A. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Confederacy, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all slaves. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the Confederate States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall be by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every fifty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative, and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of South Carolina shall be entitled to choose six, the state of Georgia ten, the state of Alabama nine, the state of Florida two, the state of Mississippi seven, the state of Louisiana six, and the state of Texas six.

USA. When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. C.S.A. When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. U.S.A. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers The principal of these are the clerk, sergeant-at-arms, doorkeeper, and postmaster, and shall have the sole power of impeachment. C. S. A. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment, except that any judicial or other Federal Officer, resident and acting solely within the limits of any State, may be impeached by a vote of two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature thereof.

U. S. A. Section 3. The Senate and the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years, and each senator shall have one vote. C.S.A. Section III. The Senate of the Confederate States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen for six years by the legislature thereof, at the regular session next immediately preceding the commencement of the term of service, and each senator shall have one vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be chosen every second year, and if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise during the recess of the legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature which shall then fill such vacancies. C.S.A. Immediately after they shall be assembled, in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes.

The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be chosen every second year. And if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies. U.S.A. No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen.

C.S.A. No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the age of thirty years and be a citizen of the Confederate States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State for which he shall be chosen. U.S.A. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided. C.S.A. The Vice President of the Confederate States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided. U.S.A. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of the President of the United States.

C.S.A. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the absence of the vice-president, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the Confederate States. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. C.S.A. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Confederate States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

U.S.A., Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. C.S.A. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Confederate States, but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. U.S.A. Section 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators.

C.S.A., Section 4. The times, place, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, subject to the provisions of this Constitution. But the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the times and places of choosing Senators. USA The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and each meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. C.S.A. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. U.S.A. Section 5.

Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business. But a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each house may provide. C.S.A. Section 5. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.

U.S.A. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with a concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.

Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with a concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number, expel a member.

Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. C.S.A. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members of either house, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. U.S.A. Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

C.S.A. Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. U.S.A. Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services to be ascertained by law and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same. And for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. C.S.A. Section 6.

The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services to be ascertained by law and paid out of the Treasury of the Confederate States, They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. U.S.A. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time, and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.

C.S.A. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the Confederate States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time, and no person holding any office under the Confederate States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office. But Congress may, by law, grant to the principal officer in each of the executive departments a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to his department.

All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. C.S.A. Section 7. All bills for raising the revenue shall generate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. U.S.A. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States. If he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it.

If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days, Sundays accepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

C.S.A. Every bill which shall have passed both houses shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the Confederate States. If he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and, if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively.

If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. The President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In such case, he shall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations disapproved, and shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objections, to the house in which the bill shall have originated, and the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of other bills disapproved by the President.

U.S.A. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary, except on a question of adjournment, shall be presented to the President of the United States. And before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. C. S. A. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on a question of adjournment, shall be presented to the President of the Confederate States, and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved, shall be repassed by two-thirds of both houses, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in case of a bill.

USA and CSA Section 8. The Congress shall have power. USA. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. But all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. C. S. A. to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the government of the Confederate States. But no bounties shall be granted from the Treasury, nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry, and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the Confederate States.

To borrow money on the credit of the United States. USA. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes. C.S.A. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes, but neither this nor any other clause contained in the Constitution shall ever be construed to delegate the power to Congress to appropriate money for any internal improvement intended to facilitate commerce, except for the purpose of furnishing lights, beacons, and buoys, and other aid to navigation upon the coasts, and the improvement of harbors and the removing of obscenity. The law must be a good man.

thereof. U.S.A. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. C.S.A. To establish uniform laws of naturalization and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the Confederate States, but no law of Congress shall discharge any debt contracted before the passage of the same. U.S.A. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures. C.S.A. To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures. USA. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States.

CSA. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the Confederate States. USA. To establish post offices and post roads. CSA. To establish post offices and post routes, but the expenses of the post office department after the first day of March in the year of our Lord 1863 shall be paid out of its own revenue.

To promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. C.S.A. To promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. U.S.A. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. C.S.A. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. U.S.A. C.S.A. and offenses against the law of nations.

To declare war, grant letters of mark and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. To declare war, grant letters of mark and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. To provide and maintain a navy. C.S.A. to provide and maintain a navy. U.S.A. to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. C.S.A. to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. U.S.A. to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

C.S.A. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Confederate States, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. C. S. A. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederate States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

U. S. A. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever under such district not exceeding 10 miles square, As may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, and C.S.A. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may, by cession of one or more States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the Confederate States, and to the exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other places and other needful buildings, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

C.S.A. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the Confederate States, or in any department or officer thereof. U.S.A. Section 9. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, and not exceeding ten dollars for each person. C.S.A. Section 9. The importation of Negroes of the African race from any foreign country other than the slave-holding states or territories of the United States of America is hereby forbidden, and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectively prevent the same.

C.S.A. Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of, or territory not belonging to, this Confederacy. USA. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. CSA. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. USA. No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. C.S.A. No bill of attainder ex post facto law or law denying or impairing the right of property in Negro slaves shall be passed. U.S.A. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

C. S. A. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. U. S. A. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. C. S. A. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State, except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses. USA. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another, nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. CSA. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another. USA. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law, and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.

C.S.A. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law, and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. C.S.A. Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury except by a vote of two-thirds of both houses taken by yeas and nays, unless it be asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of departments and submitted to Congress by the President. Or for the purpose of paying its own expenses and contingencies, or for the payment of claims against the Confederate States, the justice of which shall have been judicially declared by a tribunal for the investigation of claims against the government, which it is hereby made the duty of Congress to establish.

All bills appropriating money shall specify, in Federal currency, the exact amount of each appropriation, and the purposes for which it is made. And Congress shall grant no extra compensation to any public contractor, officer, agent, or servant, after such contract shall have been made, or such service rendered. U.S.A. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state. C. S. A. No title of nobility shall be granted by the Confederate States, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

C. S. A. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for a redress of grievances. C.S.A. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. C. S. A. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. C. S. A. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.

And no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, in particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. C. S. A. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger. Nor shall any person be subject, for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be C.

S.

A. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been committed, which District shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. C.S.A. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact so tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the Confederacy than according to the rules of the common law.

C.S.A. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. C. S. Every law or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. U.S.A. Section 10. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of mark and reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. C.S.A. Section 10. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of mark and reprisal, coin money, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.

USA. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. C.S.A. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. And the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the Treasury of the Confederate States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress.

U.S.A. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. C.S.A. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, except on sea-going vessels, for the improvement of its rivers and harbors navigated by the said vessels. But such duties shall not conflict with any treaties of the Confederate States with foreign nations. And any surplus revenue thus derived shall, after making such improvement, be paid into the common treasury.

Nor shall any State keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement of compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. But when any river divides or flows through two or more States, they may enter into compacts with each other to improve the navigation thereof.

38 38 - Appendix K, Part 3 38:29

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Appendix K, Part 3. U.S.A. Article 2, Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President chosen for the same term, be elected as follows. CSA, Article II, Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Confederate States of America. He and the Vice President shall hold their offices for the term of six years, but the President shall not be re-eligible. The President and the Vice President shall be elected as follows. USA. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.

But no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. C.S.A. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress, but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the Confederate States shall be appointed an elector. U.S.A.

The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves, And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed.

And if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President. And if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be Vice-President.

But if there should remain two or more have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice-President. C.S.A. The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. They shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President. And they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the Confederate States, directed to the President of the Senate.

The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed. And if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice.

And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. C. S. A. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice-President. A quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

C.S.A. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the Confederate States. U.S.A. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors and the day on which they shall give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the United States. C.S.A. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the Confederate States. U.S.A. No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President. Neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.

C. S. A. No person except a natural-born citizen of the Confederate States, or a citizen thereof at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, or a citizen thereof born in the United States prior to the 20th of December, 1860, shall be eligible to the office of President. Neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the limits of the Confederate States, as they exist at the time of his election. U.S.A. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and the Vice-President, declaring what officers shall then act as President, and such officers shall act accordingly, until the disability C.

S.

A. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may, by law, provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President. And such officers shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed or a president shall be elected.

The president shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased or diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

C.S.A. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the Confederate States or any of them.

U.S.A. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation. C.S.A. Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation. U.S.A. I do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I shall faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. C.S.A. I do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the Confederate States of America, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution thereof. U.S.A. Section 2. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.

He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. C.S.A. Section 2. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the Confederate States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the Confederate States. He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the Confederacy, except in cases of impeachment.

U.S.A. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur. And he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law, But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. C.S.A. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.

And he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the Confederate States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law, But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. C.S.A. The principal officer in each of the executive departments, and all persons connected with the diplomatic service, may be removed from office at the pleasure of the President. All other civil officers of the Executive Department may be removed at any time by the President or other appointing power when their services are unnecessary or for dishonesty, incapacity, inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty, and, when so removed, the removal shall be reported to the Senate, together with the reasons therefor.

U.S.A. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. C.S.A. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. But no person rejected by the Senate shall be reappointed to the same office during their ensuing recess. U.S.A. Section III. He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. He may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such a time as he shall think proper.

He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.

C.S.A. The President shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the State of the Confederacy, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. He may on extraordinary occasions convene both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such a time as he shall think proper. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the Confederate States. U.S.A. Section 4. The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

C. S. A. Section 4. The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the Confederate States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. U. S. A. and C. S. A. Article III. U. S. A. Section 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. C.S.A. Section 1. The judicial power of the Confederate States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, The laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority, to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state. Between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states citizens or subjects. C.S.A. Section Two. The judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under this Constitution, the laws of the Confederate States and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority, to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the Confederate States shall be a party, to controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another.

State, where the State is plaintiff, between citizens claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof, USA.

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. C. S. A. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

U. S. A. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed. But when not committed with any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. C. S. A. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed, but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. U. S. A. Section 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.

No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. C.S.A. Section 3. Treason against the Confederate States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

Article Four. U.S.A. Section One. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. C.S.A. Section One. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. U.S.A. Section Two. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

C.S.A. Section Two. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, and shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any state of this Confederacy, with their slaves and their property, and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired. U.S.A. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. C. S. A. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime against the laws of such state, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.

U.S.A. No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered upon claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be done. C. S. A. No slave or other person held to service or labor in any state or territory of the Confederate States, under the laws thereof, escaping or lawfully carried into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such slave belongs, or to whom such service or labor may be due. U.S.A. section 3.

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union, but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. C.S.A. Section 3. Other States may be admitted into this Confederacy by a vote of two-thirds of the whole House of Representatives and two-thirds of the Senate, the Senate voting by States. But no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

U.S.A. The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular State. C. S. A. The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning the property of the Confederate States, including the lands thereof. C.S.A. The Confederate States may acquire new territory, and Congress shall have power to legislate and provide governments for the inhabitants of all territory belonging to the Confederate States, lying without the limits of the several states, and may permit them, at such times and in such manner as it may by law provide, to form states to be admitted into the Confederacy.

In all such territory, the institution of Negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by the territorial government, and the inhabitants of the several Confederate States and territories shall have the right to take to such territory any slaves lawfully held by them in any of the States or territories of the Confederate States. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence. C. S. A. The Confederate States shall guarantee to every State that now is, or hereafter may become, a member of this Confederacy, a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the executive when the legislature is not in session, against domestic violence.

U. S. A. and C. S. A. Article V. U. S. A. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths. thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress, provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the C.

S. A.

Upon the demand of any three states, legally assembled in their several conventions, the Congress shall summon a convention of all the states to take into consideration such amendments to the Constitution as the said states shall concur in suggesting at the time when the said demand is made. And should any of the proposed amendments to the Constitution be agreed on by the said Convention, voting by States, and the same be ratified by the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, or by Conventions in two-thirds thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the General Convention, they shall thenceforward form a part of this Constitution. But no State shall, without its consent, be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate.

USA and CSA, Article VI. USA. All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation. CSA. The government established by this Constitution is the successor of the provisional government of the Confederate States of America, and all the laws passed by the latter shall continue in force until the same shall be repealed or modified, and all the officers appointed by the same shall remain in office until their successors are appointed and qualified, or the offices abolished. C.S.A. All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the Confederate States under this Constitution as under the provisional government.

U.S.A. This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. And the judges in every state shall be bound thereby any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. C. S. This Constitution, and the laws of the Confederate States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the Confederate States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

U.S.A. The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution, but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. C. S. A. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the Confederate States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution, but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the Confederate States.

C. S. A. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people of the several States. C.S.A. The powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people thereof.

U.S.A. C.S.A. Article 7. U.S.A. The ratification of the conventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the states so ratifying the same. C.S.A. When five States shall have ratified this Constitution, in the manner before specified, the Congress under the Provisional Constitution shall prescribe the time for holding the election of President and Vice-President, and for the meeting of the Electoral College, and for counting the votes and inaugurating the President. They shall also prescribe the time for holding the first election of members of Congress under this Constitution, and the time for assembling the same. Until the assembling of such Congress, the Congress under the Provisional Constitution shall continue to exercise the legislative powers granted them, not extending beyond the time limited by the Constitution of the Provisional Government.

Articles in addition to, and amendment of, the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress and ratified by the legislatures of the several states, pursuant to the fifth article of the original Constitution. Article I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Article II. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Article III. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Article 4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Article V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. Nor shall any person be subject to the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb.

Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. Article VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been committed, which District shall have been previously He was fully ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel.

Article 7. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be Article 8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. This article is substituted for Clause 3, Section 1, Article 2, and annuls it. It was declared adopted in 1804. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. They shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each.

The President of the Senate shall, in presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed. And if no person has such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice.

And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice-President. A quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.

39 39 - Appendix L 27:27

The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1b, Part 39, Appendix L. Correspondence between the Confederate Commissioners, Mr. Secretary Seward and Judge Campbell. The Commissioners to Mr. Seward, Washington City, March 12, 1861. Honorable William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States. Sir, the undersigned have been duly accredited by the Government of the Confederate States of America as Commissioners to the Government of the United States, and, in pursuance of their instructions, Have now the honor to acquaint you with that fact, and to make known, through you to the President of the United States, the objects of their presence in this capital. Seven states of the late Federal Union, having in the exercise of the inherent right of every free people to change or reform their political institutions, and through conventions of their people, withdrawn from the United States and re-assumed the attributes of sovereign power delegated to it, have formed a government of their own.

The Confederate states constitute an independent nation, de facto and de jure, and possess a government perfect in all its parts, and endowed with all the means of self-support. With a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of this political separation, upon such terms of amity and goodwill as the respective interests, geographical contiguity, and future welfare of the two nations may render necessary. The undersigned are instructed to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the government of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions, that it is neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in strictest justice, nor do any act to injure their late Confederates.

The undersigned have now the honor, in obedience to the instructions of their government, to request you to appoint as early a day as possible, in order that they may present to the President of the United States the credentials which they bear and the objects of the mission with which they are charged. We are, very respectfully, your obedient servants. John Forsythe. Martin J. Crawford. Memorandum. Department of State, Washington, March 15, 1861. Mr. John Forsythe of the State of Alabama and Mr. Martin J. Crawford of the State of Georgia on the 11th instant, through the kind offices of a distinguished senator, submitted to the Secretary of State their desire for an unofficial interview. This request was, on the 12th instant, upon exclusively public considerations, respectfully declined.

On the 13th instant, while the Secretary was preoccupied, Mr. A. D. Banks of Virginia called at this department and was received by the Assistant Secretary, to whom he delivered a sealed communication, which he had been charged by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to present to the Secretary in person. In that communication, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford informed the Secretary of State that they have been duly accredited by the Government of the Confederate States of America as commissioners to the Government of the United States, and they set forth the objects of their attendance at Washington. They observed that seven states of the American Union, in the exercise of a right inherent in every free people, have withdrawn, through conventions of their people, from the United States, reassumed the attributes of sovereign power, and formed a government of their own, and that those Confederate states now constitute an independent nation, de facto and de jure, and possess a government perfect in all its parts, and fully endowed with all the means of self-support.

Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, in their aforesaid communication, thereupon proceeded to inform the secretary that, with a view to a speedy adjustment of all Christians growing out of the political separation thus assumed upon such terms of amity and good-will as the respective interests, geographical contiguity, and the future welfare of the supposed two nations might render necessary. They are instructed to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring this government that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions, and that it is neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in the strictest justice, nor do any act to injure their late Confederates.

After making these statements, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford closed their communication, as they say, in obedience to the instructions of their government, by requesting the Secretary of State to appoint as early a day as possible, in order that they may present to the President of the United States the credentials which they bear, and the objects of the mission with which they are charged. The Secretary of State frankly confesses that he understands the events which have recently occurred, and the condition of political affairs which actually exists in the part of the Union to which his attention has thus been directed, very differently from the aspect in which they are presented by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford.

He sees in them not a rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation with an established government, but rather a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to the inconsiderate purposes of an unjustifiable and unconstitutional aggression upon the right and the authority vested in the federal government, and hitherto benignly exercised, as from their very nature they always must be so exercised, for the maintenance of the Union, the preservation of liberty, and the security, peace, welfare, happiness, and aggrandizement of the American people. The Secretary of State, therefore, avows to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford that he looks patiently, but confidently, for the cure of evils which have resulted from proceedings so unnecessary, so unwise, so unusual, and so unnatural, not to irregular negotiations, having in view new and untried relations with Agencies unknown to and acting in derogation of the Constitution and laws, but to regular and considerate action of the people of those States, in cooperation with their brethren in other States, through the Congress of the United States, and such ordinary conventions, if there shall be need thereof, as the Federal Constitution contemplates and authorizes to be assembled.

It is, however, the purpose of the Secretary of State on this occasion not to invite or engage in any discussion of these subjects, but simply to set forth his reasons for declining to comply with the request of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. On the 4th of March instant, the then newly elected President of the United States, in view of all the facts bearing on the present question, assumed the executive administration of the government, first delivering in accordance with an early honored custom an inaugural address to the people of the United States. The Secretary of State respectfully submits a copy of this address to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. A simple reference to it will be sufficient to satisfy these gentlemen that the Secretary of State, guided by the principles therein announced, is prevented altogether from admitting or assuming that the states referred to by them have, in law or in fact, withdrawn from the Federal Union, or that they could do so in the manner described by Messrs.

Forsyth and Crawford, or in any other manner than with the consent and concert of the people of the United States to be given through a national convention to be assembled in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Of course, the Secretary of State cannot act upon the assumption, or in any way admit that the so-called Confederate States constitute a foreign power with whom diplomatic relations ought to be established. Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State, whose official duties are confined, subject to the direction of the President, to the conducting of the foreign relations of the country, and do not at all embrace domestic questions or questions arising between several states and the federal government, and is unable to comply with the request of Messrs.

Forsyth and Crawford to appoint a day on which they may present the evidences of their authority and the objects of their visit to the President of the United States. On the contrary, he is obliged to state to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford that he has no authority, nor is he at liberty to recognize them as diplomatic agents or hold correspondence or other communication with them. Finally, the Secretary of State would observe that, although he has supposed that he might safely and with propriety have adopted these conclusions, without making any reference of the subject to the executive, yet so strong has been his desire to practice entire directness, and to act in a spirit of perfect respect and candor towards Messrs.

Forsyth and Crawford, and that portion of the people of the Union, in whose name they present themselves before him, that he has cheerfully submitted this paper to the President, who coincides generally in the views it expresses and sanctions the secretary's decision declining official intercourse with Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. April 8, 1861. The foregoing memorandum was filed in this department on the 15th of March last. A delivery of the same to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford was delayed, as was understood with their consent. They have now, through their secretary, communicated their desire for a definite disposition of the subject. The Secretary of State therefore directs that a duly verified copy of the paper now be delivered.

The Commissioners in Reply to Mr. Seward, Washington, April 9, 1861. Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State for the United States, Washington. The Memorandum, dated Department of State, Washington, March 15, 1861, with postscript under date of eighth instant, has been received through the hands of Mr. J. T. Pickett, secretary of this commission, who by the instructions of the undersigned called for it on yesterday at the department. In that memorandum, you curriculily state the purport of the official note addressed to you by the undersigned on the 12th ultimo. Without repeating the contents of that note in full, it is enough to say here that its object was to invite the government of the United States to a friendly consideration of the relations between the United States and the seven states, lately the Federal Union, but now separated from it by the sovereign will of their people, growing out of the pregnant and undeniable fact that those people have rejected the authority of the United States and established a government of their own.

Those relations had to be friendly or hostile. The people of the old and new governments, occupying contiguous territories, had to stand to each other in the relation of good neighbors, each seeking their happiness and pursuing their national destinies in their own way, without interference with the other. Or they had to be rival and hostile nations. The government of the Confederate states had no hesitation in electing its choice in this alternative. Frankly and unreservedly, seeking the good of the people who had entrusted them with power, in the spirit of humanity, of the Christian civilization of the age, And of that Americanism which regards the true welfare and happiness of the people, the government of the Confederate States, among its first acts, commissioned the undersigned to approach the government of the United States with the olive branch of peace, and to offer to adjust the great questions pending between them in the only way to be justified by the consciences and common sense of good men who had nothing but the welfare of the people of the two Confederacies at heart.

Your government has not chosen to meet the undersigned in the conciliatory and peaceful spirit in which they are commissioned, persistently wedded to those fatal theories of construction of the Federal Constitution always rejected by the statesmen of the South, and adhered to by those of the administration's school, until they have produced their natural and often-predicted result of destruction of the Union, under which we might have continued to live happily and gloriously together, had the spirit of the ancestry who framed the common Constitution animated the hearts of all their sons, You now, with a persistence untaught and uncured by the ruin which has been wrought, refuse to recognize the great fact presented to you of a completed and successful revolution.

You close your eyes to the existence of the government founded upon it, and ignore the high duties of moderation in humanity which attach to you in dealing with this great fact. Had you met these issues with the frankness and manliness with which the undersigned were instructed to present them to you and treat them? The undersigned had not now the melancholy duty to return home and tell their government and their countrymen that their earnest and ceaseless efforts in behalf of peace had been futile, and that the government of the United States meant to subjugate them by force of arms. Whatever may be the result, impartial history will record the innocence of the government of the Confederate States, and place the responsibility of the blood and mourning that may ensue upon those who have denied the great fundamental doctrine of American liberty.

that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and who have set naval and land armaments in motion to subject the people of one portion of this land to the will of another portion. That can never be done while a free man survives in the Confederate States to wield a weapon, the undersigned appeal to pass history to prove. These military demonstrations against the people of the seceded States are certainly far from being in keeping in consistency with the theory of the Secretary of State maintained in his memorandum that these states are still component parts of the late American Union, as the undersigned are not aware of any constitutional power in the President of the United States to levy war without the consent of Congress upon a foreign people, much less upon any portion of the people of the United States.

The undersigned, like the Secretary of State, have no purpose to invite or engage in discussion of the subject on which their two governments are so irreconcilably at variance. It is this variance that has broken up the old Union, the disintegration of which has only begun. It is proper, however, to advise you that it were well to dismiss the hopes you seem to entertain that, by any of the modes indicated, the people of the Confederate States will ever be brought to submit to the authority of the government of the United States. You are dealing with delusions, too, when you seek to separate our people from our government, and to characterize the deliberate sovereign act of that people as a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement.

If you cherish these dreams, you will be awakened from them and find them as unreal and unsubstantial as others in which you have recently indulged. The undersigned would omit the performance of an obvious duty were they to fail to make known to the government of the United States that the people of the Confederate States have declared their independence with a full knowledge of all the responsibilities of that act, and with as firm a determination to maintain it by all the means with which nature has endowed them as that which sustained their fathers when they threw off the authority of the British crown. The undersigned clearly understand that you have declined to appoint a day to enable them to lay the objects of the mission with which they are charged before the President of the United States, because to do so would be to recognize the independence and separate nationality of the Confederate States.

This is the vein of thought that pervades the memorandum before us. The truth of history requires that it should distinctly appear upon the record that the undersigned did not ask the government of the United States to recognize the independence of the Confederate States. They only asked audience to adjust in the spirit of amity and peace the new relations springing from a manifest and accomplished revolution of the government of the late Federal Union. Your refusal to entertain these overtures for a peaceful solution The active naval and military preparations of this government, and a formal notice to the commanding general of the Confederate forces in the harbor of Charleston that the president intends to provision Fort Sumter by forcible means if necessary, are viewed by the undersigned and can only be received by the world as a declaration of war against the Confederate States.

For the President of the United States knows that Fort Sumter cannot be provisioned without the effusion of blood. The undersigned, in behalf of their government and people, accept the gauge of battle thus thrown down to them, and appealing to God and the judgment of mankind for the righteousness of their cause, the people of the Confederate States will defend their liberties to the last against this flagrant and open attempt at their subjugation to sectional power. This communication cannot be properly closed without averting to the date of your memorandum. The official note of the undersigned of the 12th of March was delivered to the Assistant Secretary of State on the 13th of that month. The gentleman who delivered it informed him that the secretary of this commission would call at twelve o'clock noon on the next day for an answer.

At the appointed hour, Mr. Pickett did call, and was informed by the Assistant Secretary of State that the engagements of the Secretary of State had prevented him from giving the note his attention. The Assistant Secretary of State then asked for the address of Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth, the member of the commission then present in this city, took note of the address on a card, and engaged to send whatever reply might be made to their lodgings. Why this was not done, it is proper should be here explained. The memorandum is dated March 15th, and was not delivered until April 8th. Why was it withheld during the intervening 23 days? In the postscript to your memorandum, you say it was delayed, as was understood, with their, Messrs.

Forsyth and Crawford's consent. This is true, but it is also true that, on the fifteenth of March, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford were assured by a person occupying a high official position in the government, and who, as they believed, was speaking by authority, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated in a very few days, and that no measure changing the existing status prejudicially to the Confederate States, as respects Fort Pickens, was then contemplated And these assurances were subsequently repeated, with the addition that any contemplated change as respects Pickens would be notified to us. On the first of April, we were again informed that there might be an attempt to supply Fort Sumter with provisions, but that Governor Pickens should have previous notice of this attempt.

There was no suggestion of any reinforcement. The undersigned did not hesitate to believe that these assurances expressed the intentions of the administration at the time, or at all the events of the prominent members of that administration. This delay was assented to for the express purpose of attaining to the great end of the mission of the undersigned to wit, a pacific solution of existing complications. The inference, deductible from the date of your memorandum, that the undersigned had, of their own volition and without cause, consented to this long hiatus in the grave duties with which they were charged, is therefore not consistent with a just exposition of the facts of the case. The intervening twenty-three days were employed in active, unofficial efforts, the object of which was to smooth the path to a Pacific solution.

The distinguished personage alluded to cooperating with the undersigned, and every step of that effort is recorded in writing and now in the possession of the undersigned and of their government. It was only when all those anxious efforts for peace had been exhausted, and it became clear that Mr. Lincoln had determined to appeal to the sword to reduce the people of the Confederate States, to the will of the section or party whose president he is that the undersigned resumed the official negotiation temporarily suspended and sent their secretary for a reply to their official note of March 12. It is proper to add that, during these twenty-three days, two gentlemen of official distinction as high as that of the personage hitherto alluded to aided the undersigned as intermediaries in these unofficial negotiations for peace.

The undersigned commissioners of the Confederate States of America, having thus made answer to all they deem material in the memorandum filed in the department on the 15th of March last, have the honor to be John Forsyth, Martin J. Crawford, A.B. Roman. Mr. Stewart, in reply to the commissioners. Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1861. Messrs. Forsyth, Crawford, and Roman, having been apprised by a memorandum which has been delivered to them, That the Secretary of State is not at liberty to hold official intercourse with them will, it is presumed, expect no notice from him of the new communication which they have addressed to him under the date of the ninth instant, beyond the simple acknowledgment of the receipt thereof, which he hereby very cheerfully gives.

Judge Campbell, to Mr. Seward, Washington City, Saturday, April Eighteenth, 1861. Sir. On the Fifteenth of March Ultimo, I left with Judge Crawford, one of the commissioners of the Confederate States, a note in writing, to the effect following, I feel entire confidence that Fort Sumter will be evacuated in the next ten days, and this measure is felt as imposing great responsibility on the administration. I feel entire confidence that no measure changing the existing status prejudicially to the southern Confederate states is at present contemplated. I feel entire confidence that an immediate demand for an answer to the communication of the commissioners will be productive of evil and not of good.

I do not believe that it ought at this time to be pressed. The substance of this statement I communicated to you the same evening by letter. Five days elapsed, and I called with a telegram from General Beauregard to the effect that Sumter was not evacuated, but that Major Anderson was at work making repairs. The next day, after conversing with you, I communicated to Judge Crawford in writing that the failure to evacuate Sumter was not the result of bad faith, but was attributable to the causes consistent with the intention to fulfill the engagement, and that, as regarded Pickens, I should have notice of any design to alter the existing status there. Mr. Justice Nelson was present at these conversations, three in number, and I submitted to him each of my written communications to Judge Crawford, and informed Judge Crawford that they had his, Judge Nelson's, sanction.

I gave you, on the 22nd of March, a substantial copy of the statement I had made on the 15th. The 30th of March arrived, and at that time a telegram came from Governor Pickens, inquiring concerning Colonel Layman, whose visit to Charleston he supposed had a connection with the proposed evacuation of Fort Sumter. I left that with you, and was to have an answer the following Monday, 1st of April. On the 1st of April, I received from you the statement in writing, I am satisfied the government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor P. The words, I am satisfied, were for me to use as expressive of confidence in the remainder of the declaration. The proposition, as originally prepared, was, the President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so, etc., And your verbal explanation was that you did not believe any such attempt would be made, and that there was no design to reinforce Sumter.

There was a departure here from the pledges of the previous month, but with the verbal explanation I did not consider a matter then to complain of. I simply stated to you that I had that assurance previously. On the seventh of April I addressed you a letter on the subject of the alarm that the preparations by the government had created, and asked you if the assurances I had given were well or ill-founded. In respect to Sumter, your reply was, Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see. In the morning's paper I read, an authorized messenger from President Lincoln informed Governor Pickens and General Beauregard that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably, or otherwise by force. This was the eighth of April at Charleston, the day following your last assurance, and is the last evidence of the full faith I was invited to wait for and see.

In the same paper, I read that intercepted dispatches disclosed the fact that Mr. Fox, who had been allowed to visit Major Anderson on the pledge that his purpose was Pacific, employed his opportunity to devise a plan for supplying the fort by force, and that this plan had been adopted by the Washington government and was in the process of execution. My recollection of the date of Mr. Fox's visit carries it to a day in March. I learn he is a near connection of a member of the cabinet. My connection with the commissioners and yourself was superinduced by a conversation with Justice Nelson. He informed me of your strong disposition in favor of peace, and that you were oppressed with a demand of the commissioners of the Confederate States for a reply to their first letter, and that you desired to avoid it, if possible, at that time.

I told him I might perhaps be of some service in arranging the difficulty. I came to your office entirely at his request, and without the knowledge of either of the commissioners. Your depression was obvious to both Judge Nelson and myself. I was gratified at the character of the counsels you were desirous of pursuing, and much impressed with your observation that a civil war might be prevented by the success of my mediation. You read a letter of Mr. Weed to show how irksome and responsible the withdrawal of troops from Sumter was. A portion of my communication to Judge Crawford on the 16th of March was founded upon these remarks, and the pledge to evacuate Sumter is less forcible than the words you employed.

These words were, Before this letter reaches you, a proposed letter by me to President Davis. Sumter will have been evacuated. The commissioners who received those communications conclude they have been abused and overreached. The Montgomery government hold the same opinion. The commissioners have supposed that my communications were with you, and upon the, that, hypothesis, were prepared to arraign you before the country in connection with the President. I placed a peremptory prohibition on this as being contrary to the terms of my communications with them. I pledged myself to them to communicate information upon what I considered as the best authority, and they were to confide in the inability of myself, aided by Judge Nelson, to determine upon the credibility of my informant.

I think no candid man who will read over what I have written and considers for a moment what is going on at Sumter but will agree that the equivocating conduct of the administration, as measured and interpreted in connection with these promises, is the proximate cause of the great calamity. I have a profound conviction that the telegrams of the 8th of April of General Beauregard and of the 10th of April of General Walker, the Secretary of War, can be referred to nothing else than their belief that there has been systematic duplicity practiced on them through me. It is under an impressive sense of the weight of this responsibility that I submit to you these things for your explanation. Very respectfully, signed John A.

Campbell, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, United States. Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State. Judge Campbell to Mr. Secretary Seward. Washington, April 20, 1861. Sir, I enclose you a letter corresponding very nearly with when I addressed to you one week ago, April 13th. To which I have not had any reply. The letter is simply one of inquiry in reference to facts concerning which, I think, I am entitled to an explanation. I have not adopted any opinion in reference to them which may not be modified by explanation, nor have I affirmed in that letter, nor do I in this, any conclusion of my own unfavorable to your integrity in the whole transaction. All that I have said and mean to say is that an explanation is due from you to myself.

I will not say what I shall do in case this request is not complied with, but I am justified in saying that I shall feel at liberty to place these letters before any person who is entitled to ask an explanation of myself. Very respectfully, John A. Campbell, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, United States. Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State. No reply has been made to this letter. End of Appendix L. End of the Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. Volume 1B. By Jefferson Davis.

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