menu_book Chapter 22

Section 22 of A History of the Papacy, Volume 1 by Mandel Creighton. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, read by Pamela Nagami. Book I, Chapter 5. Gregory XII. Benedict XIII. Negotiations between the rival popes, 1406-1409, Part 3. It would seem that the knowledge of the intentions of Ladislaus against Rome had stirred up the crafty mind of Benedict to a scheme on his own behalf. Benedict had always

had some adherents in Rome and is said to have spent large sums of money in raising up a party in his favor. He managed to gain the favor of Marshal Boussicot, the French governor of Genoa, who sent out eleven Genoese galleys to forestall Ladislaus and make a dash upon Rome in Benedict's behalf. The attempt, however, was too late, for the galleys only sailed from Genoa on April 25, 1408, the day on which Ladislaus entered Rome. The knowledge of this bold design gave Gregory XII

just grounds for distrusting his rival, and he could rejoice that Rome had fallen before Ladislaus rather than Benedict. He could now plead Benedict's perfidy and the momentous events which had happened in Rome as reasons why he could not at present proceed to a conference at Pisa. Political reasons had entirely overshadowed ecclesiastical obligations. His nephews had completely succeeded in dispelling from the old man's mind any further thoughts of his solemn oath to promote

the union of the Church by his abdication. When a preacher at Lucca urged upon Gregory in a discourse before the cardinals his duty to labor for the restoration of unity, the nephew, Paulo Correr, seized the indiscreet orator even in the Church, flung him into prison, and only released him on a promise never to preach again. The legate Stefanisci, who had fled from Rome, was received at Lucca without reproof. Everyone believed that Gregory had a secret understanding with Ladislaus,

and that all that had occurred in Rome had been done with his connivance as a means of averting any further talk of a conference. Ladislaus expressed his intention of being present to assert his rights at any conference that might be held. He urged on Gregory the further step of nominating new cardinals. Gregory XII again plucked up his courage and prepared to enter upon a new career. No longer as a commissioner for unity, but as a pope who was a political

necessity to resist the policy of France. He spoke of the proposal for his abdication as a damnable and diabolical suggestion. He wrote to his envoy in France to desist from further negotiations, and resolved to follow the advice of Ladislaus, and strengthen himself for his new position by the creation of a batch of cardinals on whose support he might rely. This raised the entire question whether Gregory XII was to be held bound by his oath made at election,

and the cardinals, who still held by their former policy, were strengthened by the advice of Florentine envoys in their determination to resist the pope. On May 4th, 1408, Gregory XII announced to the nine cardinals who were with him his intention of proceeding to a new creation. He declared that the events which had occurred gave him a just reason for supposing that the term mentioned in his oath at election had been reached. He ended by naming four cardinals,

two of them as nephews, one of whom, Gabriele Condulmer, afterwards became Pope Eugenius IV. Wishing to cut off from the cardinals all opportunity of protest, the pope ended by saying, I order you all to keep your seats. They gazed in speechless indignation on one another. What is the meaning of such an order? asked the cardinal of Tusculum. Since I cannot act rightly with you, replied the pope, I wish to provide for the church.

Rather you wish to destroy the church, was the retort. By this time others had recovered their courage. Let us die first, said the boldest of them, and rose to his feet to protest. There followed a scene of anger and expostulation which afforded Leonardo Bruni, who was present, an opportunity for a psychological study which the men of the early renaissance keenly enjoyed. Some grew pale, others turned red, some strove to bend the pope by entreaties,

others assailed him with their wrath. One fell at his feet and besought him to change his mind. Another assailed him with menaces. A third alternated between soothing his colleagues and supplicating the pope. All was of no avail. Whatever I do you oppose was the wail of the querulous old man. At last Gregory dismissed the cardinals with a prohibition to quit Lucca to meet together without his leave or to have any dealings with the ambassadors of Benedict XIII.

In vain the lord of Lucca with the chief citizens tried to make peace and the bishop of Lucca, who had been one of the newly nominated cardinals, was compelled to declare that under the existing circumstances he would never accept the office. Gregory XII persevered in his intention and summoned the cardinals to a consistory in which he was to publish his new creations. When they refused to come, he performed the ceremony in the presence of a few bishops and

officials. The old cardinals declared that they would never recognize these intruders. They determined to leave Lucca where they could not be sure of their personal safety. On May 11th the cardinal of Liège set the example of flight. Paulo Correr sent soldiers to pursue him while he himself turned his attention to the seizure of his goods. When his men returned without the fugitives, Paulo vented his anger on the cardinal's servants

till he was checked by the city magistrates through fear of the Florentines. Next day six more of the cardinals fled and all assembled at Pisa. Once they sent Gregory XII an appeal from himself to a general council and addressed an encyclical letter to all Christian princes declaring their zeal for the union of the church, the failure of Gregory to keep his promises and their hopes that all princes would aid them to establish the union which they desired.

Gregory XII replied by accusing them of sacrilegious intrigues against his person and constant hindrance to his endeavors after union. The breach was thenceforth irreparable and a war of pamphlets on both sides embittered the hostility. Benedict, meanwhile, was not in a position to enjoy a triumph over his rival. The assassination of the Duke of Orléans, November 23rd, 1407, deprived him of his chief supporter in France and the University of Paris lost no time

in urging the king to carry out the long-threatened withdrawal of obedience. The king wrote on January 12th, 1408, to Benedict saying that he was afraid the schism tended to grow worse instead of better and unless a union had been brought about before Ascension Day next, France would declare her new neutrality until one true and undoubted pope should be elected. Benedict had long foreseen this step and was prepared for it. He wrote the king that the threat of neutrality was equally opposed to

the king's honor and to the will of God. He could not pass it over in silence. Let the king revoke his decision or he would fall under the censures of a bull which had been prepared some time ago though not yet published and which he now enclosed. The bull was dated May 19th, 1407, from Marseilles and pronounced excommunication against all who should hinder the union of the church by measures against the pope and cardinals, by withdrawal of obedience, or appeal against the papal decisions.

The excommunication, if not heeded, was to be followed by an interdict. On May 14th, 1408, this bull was delivered to the king. It was Benedict's last move and Benedict had miscalculated its efficacy. He hoped no doubt that the feeble-minded king, who threw out all this matter, had merely been the mouthpiece of others, would shrink before the terrors of excommunication. He hoped that the disturbed state of the kingdom might make politicians pause before they added

to its other troubles a contest with the pope. But Benedict did not realize how the prevarications of the last few years had destroyed his moral hold upon men's minds, and he had not yet learned the strength of the University of Paris. The bull contained nothing contrary to custom or to canon law, and the politicians in the king's council doubted what to do. But the university had no hesitation. It boldly pronounced those who brought the bull to be guilty of high treason, and demanded

a public examination of its contents. This took place on May 21st, when a professor of theology, Jean Courtecuisse, impeached the bull as an attack upon the royal dignity and the national honor. Accused Benedict of promoting the schism, and declared him deserving of deposition. The university then presented their conclusions, which denounced Benedict as a schismatic and a heretic, to whom obedience was no longer due. His bull should be torn in pieces, and all who had

brought or suggested it should be punished. The royal secretary cut the bull in two, and handed it to the rector of the university, who tore it into shreds before the assembly. Some of Benedict's friends were imprisoned on the suspicion of being previously acquainted with the contents of the bull. Even Peter Dyee only escaped by prudently absenting himself from Paris. The university again behaved with the same violence as it had shown in 1398, and even treated with injustice

some of its most eminent sons. Nicolas de Clémence, as Benedict's secretary, was suspected of having written the bulls. And though he persistently denied it, he dared not enter France for some years, and when at length he returned, it was only to end his days in obscurity. Urged on by the university, the king proclaimed the neutrality of France, and wrote on May 22nd, to the cardinals of both parties, exhorting them to leave these popes, who had not been able to

find any place in the world suitable for the discharge of their solemn oaths, and for the relief of the afflicted church. Four of the cardinals of Benedict XIII were sent to Livorno to confer with four of Gregory XII's cardinals. The result of their joint deliberations was that it was best to summon a general council, before which both popes might resign. Benedict's cardinals affirmed that they were commissioned by their master to accept this course, but Benedict denied

that he had given them any such power. He felt, however, that he was not safe from personal danger in any land where French influence prevailed. He knew that Boussicot was again commissioned to seize him, and on June 15th he sailed away from Porto Venere, accompanied by four cardinals, and took refuge in his own land at Perpignan, in the county of Roussillon. Still he retained his dignity and his resolute will. Before his flight he wrote in a tone of lofty remonstrance

to Gregory, and as the cry of Christendom was now for a council, he issued a summons to a general council to be held at Perpignan on November 1st. Gregory XII could do nothing but follow this example. He proclaimed a council to be held at Witsentide, 1409, in the province of Aquileia, or the ex-arcade of Ravenna. He could not be more precise, for he was uncertain where he could find shelter. On July 12th he issued an appeal to his rebellious cardinals,

offering them forgiveness if they appeared and asked for pardon within the month of July. He did not, however, think it worthwhile to stay at Lucca and await them. On July 14th he quitted the city, and two of the cardinals who were still with him took advantage of the opportunity to join their colleagues at Pisa. Gregory went forth on his journey with a scanty band of followers, only one of his old cardinals still remained with him. He did not know where it was safe for him to

go, as disquieting rumors reached him that the cardinal Baldassare Cossa, legate in Bologna, had publicly burned his bulls and was raising troops against him. Finally he took refuge in Siena, which was in close alliance with Lattislaus. From Siena, September 17th, he issued a bull revoking the legate in powers of Cardinal Cossa. It was a useless measure, as Cossa had already sent in his adhesion to the cardinals at Pisa. In September Gregory created ten new cardinals,

and early in November left Siena for Rimini, where he put himself under the protection of the powerful Carlo Malatesta. Meanwhile, the cardinals at Livorno were agreed in maintaining their policy and on June 29th they entered into a solemn agreement to establish the unity of the Church by a general council after the abdication, death, or deposition of the two popes. On July 1st, Gregory's cardinals issued a letter to his entire obedience, calling upon all to

withdraw from him and pay him no more of the dues of the Church, so that his obstinacy might be conquered. When Gregory issued his summons to a council, they declared that under existing circumstances he had no right to do so, as the unity of the Church could not be established by means of a council held by either pope. Benedict's cardinals rode in a similar strain. And finally on July 14th, the united cardinals issued to all bishops an invitation to a council

to be held at Pisa on May 29th, 1409, and sent to all courts a request that they would take part in it. The Venetians, Florentines, and Sienese sent ambassadors to attempt a reconciliation between Gregory and his cardinals. Gregory asserted that he alone had the right to summon a council. The cardinals replied that he could in any case only summon a council of his own obedience and not of the universal Church. Yet to show their desire for peace, they would receive him with all

honor. On October 11th, they issued an address to all prelates who still adhere to the pope, calling on them to leave him and share in their pious undertaking. Benedict's cardinals wrote on September 24th and besought him to join with them in summoning the council at Pisa and to recall his summons for a council at Perpigno. Benedict's reply was characteristic of his legal mind. He wondered at the steps they had taken without him. If they could show that their proceedings

were in accordance with the canons, he would through love of peace agree with their wishes. Meanwhile, he could not revoke his council, as already many prelates were assembled. But with the help of God and his synod, he would soon frame a decree for ending the schism. Benedict's council met at Perpigno on November 1st, 1408 and was attended by about 120 prelates. The opening ceremonies went smoothly enough. All listened with sympathy to Benedict's

justification of himself and account of all his labors to bring about the unity which he so much desired. A commission of 60, which afterwards was reduced to 30 and again to 10, was appointed to discuss this question. The council dwindled away before the commission had reported in favor of the abdication of Benedict and the sending of envoys to lay this proposal before the council of Pisa. Benedict received this report on February 12th, 1409 and agreed to act on it. Envoys were

nominated accordingly, but through the misjudging zeal of the French, they were imprisoned at Nîmes and were deprived of their instructions. Benedict's conciliatory temper passed away and on March 5th, he answered the cardinal's summons to the council of Pisa by a solemn excommunication of them and their adherents. The course, however, of the two rival popes was run. They had wearied out the patience of Christendom with illusory promises and endless delays till men had ceased to pay much heed

to them and their obedience had dwindled away to the few who had a direct interest in maintaining their power. It is impossible not to feel sympathy for them both as victims of circumstances which they had no part in creating. They lamented the schism, as did others, and would gladly have seen it end. But they were bound to consider the dignity and rights of the office which they claimed to hold. It was easy for those who framed crude plans for the solution of the difficulty to lay all the

blame of failure on the obstinacy of the pope. Gregory XII had been elected pope on the ground of his integrity of character and the senile weakness which was rapidly growing upon him. The cardinals sought to protect their own interests by the choice of a pope who would retain office only long enough to enable them to make a good bargain for themselves. They forgot that the weakness which rendered their creature amenable to themselves made him equally subject to the

influence of others who had more exclusive interests at stake. Gregory XII soon fell into the hands of his nephews who adroitly managed to identify his cause with that of opposition to the influence of France. For a time, Gregory XII had a position in the affairs of Europe. But when once the plan of a congress at Savona had been defeated and the cardinals in despair undertook a revolutionary scheme to restore unity to the church, Gregory's cause was abandoned and his position was gone.

In public matters, Gregory XII was merely a puppet in the hands of others, his cardinals, his nephews, the king of Naples in turn. And his actions were merely a series of subterfuges and pretenses. Yet he himself retained his simplicity and uprightness of character so that many who disapproved of his conduct still reverenced the man. I followed the pope from Lucca, says Leonardo Bruni, rather through affection than because I approved his course. Yet Gregory had great integrity

of life and character. Moreover, he was learned it in the scriptures and had subtle and true power of investigation. In short, he satisfied me in all things save in the matter of the union of the church. We feel pity rather than contempt for one of simple character who was set in a position beset with difficulties and temptations, which he had neither skill to grapple with nor strength to resist. Far different was the character of Benedict XIII. A man of trained and vigorous intellect,

strong character and indomitable resoluteness. He failed through intellectual rather than moral faults. His mind was too abstract and his point of view too technical. He dealt in a dry legal spirit with a problem which concerned the very life of Christendom. He felt from the beginning that as a foreigner he had scant justice dealt him in France. He knew that he had no strong power to back him, no nation deeply interested in maintaining him. He was keenly alive to the personal element

in all the proceedings of the university and court of France and he resented the thought that the dignity of the papal office should be impaired while in his hands. His position was legally as rightful as had been that of Clement VII. Why should language be used towards himself that had never been addressed to his predecessor? Why should he be treated as a criminal and be subjected to threats and persecutions? With dignity and astuteness he carried on an unequal struggle.

He was always ready with an answer and it was impossible to take him at a disadvantage in argument. Wise and moderate men like Dailly and Clémence were on his side so long as it was possible and regretted the violence of the university which gave Benedict no loophole whence to escape with dignity. Moreover, Benedict himself never showed obstinacy till the last when his cause was hopeless. While a prisoner at Avignon, he issued no excommunications against his foes

but bided his time patiently. He bore no ill will or rancor and his equanimity never gave way under the strain of the conflict. He was kindly to those around him and inspired strong personal attachment. He was a genuine student, a lover of books and of learned men, and was scrupulous in the discharge of his ecclesiastical duties. His many good qualities are worthy of admiration and he had all the elements of a great ecclesiastical statesman. Unfortunately, the problem with which he

had to deal was one which statesmanship alone could not solve. Europe was weary of the schism and France had no interest in maintaining a Spanish pope. Benedict XIII contented himself with upholding the technical legality of his position against what he rightly thought an ill-considered attempt on the part of the University of Paris to solve a difficult problem by recourse to violent measures. The fault of Benedict XIII was that he had no plan of his own for meeting the growing desire

for a union of the Church. It is his merit that he made a dignified resistance. He maintained an unequal struggle which prevented the settlement of the affairs of the Church from falling into the hands of the unstable government of France. A revolution headed by the Cardinals was preferable to the political intervention of the French Court. End of Section 22.